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
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
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BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.



NEW YORK SERIES.

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# BROWNSON'S QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JANUARY, 1857.

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ART. I.—*Brownson on the Church and the Republic.* Universalist Quarterly and General Review. Boston: Tompkins. October, 1856.

It is not often that the secular or the Protestant periodicals of the country make any formal attempts to refute our arguments or to show the inconclusiveness of our reasoning in behalf of the Church; and when they do make some such attempt, they ordinarily do it with so much levity, violence, or ignorance of the subject, that we cannot, without derogating from the dignity of our position, offer them any reply. The *Universalist Quarterly Review*, a respectable Protestant periodical published in Boston, and conducted with a fair share of learning and ability, offers, in its issue for last October, an exception to the general rule, and presents, upon the whole, an able and interesting criticism on the article, entitled *The Church and the Republic*, in this Review for July, 1856. We know not the author, but, though not perfectly master of his subject, he writes with a certain degree of courtesy and candor, and apparently with an earnest love of truth and justice. He opens his essay with some remarks on the influence of our writings, which cannot fail to be gratifying to our friends, and which will prove to them that, notwithstanding many discouragements and unfavorable appearances, our Review is silently doing its work, and making its mark even on the mind of non-Catholic Americans. Our readers will pardon us for reproducing them.

"Few American readers need to be told who or what is O. A. Brownson. Perhaps no man in this country has, by the simple effort  
NEW YORK SERIES.—VOL. II. NO. I. 1

fort of the pen, made himself more conspicuous, or has more distinctly impressed the peculiarities of his mind. Other writers may have a larger number of readers, but no one has readers of such various character. He has the attention of intelligent men of all sects and parties—men who read him without particular regard to the themes on which he spends his energies, or the sectarian or partisan position of which he may avow himself the champion. The extraordinary ingenuity of his logic, the vigor of his thought, and the clearness and directness of his style, will attract attention, regardless of the particular opinions which prove the occasion of bringing out these fascinating qualities.”—p. 400.

This is generous ; but the writer thinks there is, however, a grave defect in our mind.

“ Mr. Brownson, however, is wanting in the highest characteristic of eloquence—he does not *convince*. He may puzzle and perplex those whose convictions differ from his own, but he will make few converts. His Protestant readers find in his productions a sort of intellectual gymnasium, for whatever may be the intrinsic merit of his argumentation, it will not be denied that it stimulates thought ; but, of the many whom we know to be among his constant readers, we cannot name one who has been forced thereby into a change of conviction.”—pp. 400, 401.

The author probably means that we fail to persuade. To convince is the province of logic, in which few even of our enemies regard us as deficient ; to persuade is the province of eloquence, and to eloquence we lay no claim. A man may be persuaded by the eloquence of the writer or speaker without being logically convinced, and he may be convinced by reasoning without being persuaded. His understanding may be convinced, and yet his prejudices, mental habits, interests, feelings, passions, or affections may prevent him from following his convictions. His intellect is mastered, but his feelings and will are not persuaded. We may not have had great success in making converts, for converts are not made by human efforts alone ; but there is a respectable number of persons, whose lives adorn their Catholic profession, who have assured us that they owe their conversion, under God, to our writings and lectures. The writer himself seems also to concede that we have not been wholly unsuccessful.

“ The secret of his apparent success in maintaining the claims of the Catholic Church will, if we mistake not, be found in the un-

warrantable readiness with which Protestant readers accede to the premises of his argumentation. Protestantism does not claim infallibility; and certainly, in the form in which it has thus far been most popular, most egregious error has gone under its name. Those who have been reared under its Calvinistic phase, are little aware of the mongrel character of their beliefs—the arbitrary mingling of truth and error, which to them has the force of pure doctrine. And even those who have reached what we must deem a higher form of faith, still retain the impressions of early education, and unconsciously accede to notions wholly incompatible with the convictions which they formally avow. From the mass of men, thus unconsciously under the influence of principles which their awakened judgment would repudiate, an ingenious disputant can easily elicit premises of argument, the logical sequence of which is revolting to their sensibilities.

“We have long been convinced that Protestants are to blame for whatever is perplexing in the argument by which it is attempted to maintain the dogmas of Catholicism. Indeed, if we must admit the principles of which the Calvinistic interpretation of Protestantism is predicated, we see no way by which to resist the inference which the Catholic logician finds it easy to educe. Not one Protestant in ten will hesitate to admit the proposition, that *God has revealed to mankind a perfect and complete system of religious truth*; and the further proposition, *that men are morally obligated to receive, and practically act up to, this revelation of truth, will find an equally prompt admission*. Yet, out of these propositions, Mr. Brownson will construct an argument for the ‘infallible interpreter,’ which no skill of controversy can possibly resist. For, it will be asked, is it not preposterous to claim, that the just God has obligated his rational creatures to receive and practise a truth, without providing them with a sure means of ascertaining what that truth is? Would it not be to tantalize his children, to require their belief in the truth, and at the same time to leave them, even after their most conscientious efforts to find it, in a state of uncertainty as to whether they had attained it? If God has made it the duty of man to believe the truth, and nothing but the truth, he must, if justice is one of its attributes, have furnished them an ‘infallible interpreter,’ whereby they may know for a certainty what the truth is, and when they have received it! We must add, that the existence of an infallible interpreter admitted, the presumption that the Catholic Church is that interpreter, though not logical, is, nevertheless, unquestionable. It is certain, that the Church or institution on which this marvellous gift has been bestowed will be aware of the fact that it possesses it, and will claim to exercise it; and as the Catholic Church is the only institution which professes to have such knowledge, and presumes to exercise such prerogative, it alone *can* be the infallible interpreter! And such essentially, in various forms of

statement and application, is the reasoning with which Mr. Brownson opposes Catholicism to Protestantism,—a method of argument which Calvinistic theologians find it no easy matter to confront.”—pp. 401–403.

We commend this explanation of our apparent success to the attention of our readers, which, as indicating the state of mind of a large class of our countrymen, is not without significance. It justifies the hopes for them we have so often expressed. Even the writer himself can hardly be prepared to maintain that Almighty God has *not* “revealed to mankind a perfect and complete system of truth,” and that men are *not* “morally obligated to receive and practically act up to this revelation of truth.” If God has made us a revelation at all, he must have revealed perfect and complete truth, and all the truth on the points intended to be covered by the revelation ; and if he has revealed this truth, he must require us to receive and practically conform to it, since he must reveal it for a purpose, and there is no other purpose conceivable for which he could have revealed it. If he requires it, we are morally obliged to obey, for certainly we are morally bound to comply with all the requirements of God. To deny either of these propositions is tantamount to the denial that God has made us a revelation at all ; and hence we have always maintained that no man who admits revelation can stop short of the Catholic Church, save at the expense of his logic. We wish, however, to remind our author, in passing, that to be an infallible interpreter of the revelation is not the only office of the Church, nor the only thing for which her existence is held by Catholics to be necessary in the order of salvation.

Our readers are aware that in our article on *The Church and the Republic* we were not offering an argument for the Church herself, or assigning a reason why men should become Catholics. We have never fallen into the absurdity of urging men to become Catholics for a temporal motive, or of urging that the Church must be the Church of God, because she is what is needed to sustain our Republic. We have never identified her with any particular political theory, form of government, order of society, or earthly cause whatever. All we have aimed at has been to remove the prejudices of our non-Catholic

countrymen, and to answer the objections of those who allege that she is incompatible with republicanism in the State. From the fact that abroad we see Catholicity, for the most part, apparently associated with monarchical forms of government, and from the further fact that eminent Catholic writers have opposed all movements in favor of republicanism, and defended monarchy on principle, there is in many minds, both out of the Church and within her pale, an impression that she is unfavorable to popular governments. This impression is an obstacle to the spread of Catholicity among the middle and lower classes of the American people, who are all staunch republicans; and we have, therefore, deemed it not improper or useless to attempt to remove it, and to do it, not by showing that the Church is compatible with republicanism, or adapted to a republican state of society, but by showing that republican institutions, maintaining at once the just rights of society and the imprescriptible freedom of the individual, are impracticable without her. We do not conform our religion to our politics; we aim to conform our politics to our religion; that is, we do not set up any political theory or form of government as a test of religion; but we hold that any political theory of liberty or despotism repugnant to religion is for that reason false, and not to be maintained. Yet knowing that the Church is not incompatible with republicanism, and that the republican, as every other form of legal government, has need of her to secure the common good of society, we have believed that it would be doing a service to religion as well as to politics, to make it evident.

The argument in our article, not for the Church, but to prove the necessity of the Church as an element in the social system, is what our Boston friend criticizes and undertakes to prove incomplete. The proposition we defended is, Catholicity is essential to the maintenance of the republic according to the thought of its founders, by mediating between the authority of society and the freedom of the individual, and restraining each from encroaching on the just rights of the other; that is, the Church is necessary to restrain authority from becoming social despotism, and individual freedom from becoming anarchy. In supporting this thesis, we maintained that it is only re-

ligion that can mediate between the two elements, and religion only as a power resting on its own basis, independent of both, higher than either, and strong enough to restrain. Up to this point the critic goes with us. "To all this," he says, p. 407, "we readily accede, and we may add," he says, "that we have never met with a man stupid enough to aver the contrary."

But having proved this, we conclude that the religion which will answer our purpose must be the Christian Church, or religion as an organization, that is, as we explained ourselves, religion organized, or as an organism. Here the Reviewer refuses to go with us. He concedes, however, and our readers will bear the concession in mind, that if religion as an organization is necessary, Protestantism cannot, and Catholicity can answer our purpose. We let him speak for himself.

"Those who have been constant readers of Mr. Brownson's effusions in support of his present faith, must have noticed the circumstance, that he usually passes hastily over the vital point of his argument. That part of his argument which is obvious, and really needs little more than a distinct statement, he amplifies and fortifies with the greatest patience and caution. The feature about which doubts will arise, if any where, and which demands the most labored treatment, he glides over or perhaps assumes, as if the point he would urge were too evident to justify proof! This eccentricity (to call it by no severer term) is singularly glaring in the article we have now under consideration. The points of his argument which we have already presented, and which, as we have seen, will be readily admitted as soon as distinctly stated, he labors, and amplifies, and illustrates through several solid pages of his periodical. We come, however, to the vital point—the point where the Protestant reader finds, for the first time, in the article, a necessity for great proof and ample illustration—the point where it is to be shown, that religion, the authoritative element in society, conceded by most every reader not to depend on the individual or the State, is dependent on the Catholic Church, and we find the whole matter disposed of in the following summary style:

"This you will willingly concede me. Then you must concede that religion, to answer our purpose, must be the Christian Church, or religion organized. Religion without the Church, without an organization, is not a power, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a Church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and adds to the individual nothing beyond the strength of his conviction. If it be a Church, an organism, and yet dependent on the individual for its organization, the individual can make or

unmake it at his will, and though he may exercise power over it, it can exercise none over him. If it be a Church, and dependent on the State, and under its control, as is the Russian Church, the Prussian Church, and the English Church, it is simply a function of the State itself. It must be what the civil power chooses to make it; and its ministers, instead of being independent in face of the State, and free before the magistrate, will be simply a part of the constabulary. Religion must then be religion organized, and as religion organized, or as the Church, it must be independent alike of the State and the individual, or it will not answer the purpose.—p. 287.

“And this is all the proof we are furnished with in support of the only questionable point in the proposition which Mr. Brownson purposes to maintain! Following the paragraph which we have just quoted, we have a succession of pages to prove what no one disputes, that Protestantism does not comply with the conditions put forth in the paragraph—to prove what to many minds will be considered evident at a glance, that such conditions being assumed, Catholicism, and not Protestantism, is the authoritative medium in adjusting the rival claims of the state and the individual. Mr. Brownson gives us twenty solid pages to prove that the Catholic Church is necessary to the republic, in that it has the prerogative of restraining the element of individualism from rushing into anarchy, and the element of the state from becoming despotic—that it has this prerogative, in that it is independent of both the individual and the state, and is the infallible interpreter of their respective duties and rights. Fourteen of these pages are employed in setting forth the several elements of a well-regulated society, and in explaining their several relations; and in these fourteen pages we find nothing to which we can materially object—what he states is obvious, and needs statement rather than proof. Five of these pages are also given to demonstrate, what *nobody will dispute, that Protestantism does not, and that Catholicism does, comply with certain conditions, and is in conformity with certain principles. The only question in the mind of a Protestant relates to the justness of those conditions and the soundness of those principles.* Here, and only here, we need to be convinced; here, and only here, we need argument, illustration, amplification. And here we have the paragraph last quoted, and this is all that we have! He gives page on page to convince us of that which we are prepared to believe without proof; he gives little over half a page on the point where alone proof is indispensable. Re-reading the article, we cannot restrain a smile as we pause over the paragraph alluded to. It is amusing to see our intellectual giant putting forth his herculean efforts where they are not needed; it is provoking to see with what complacency he disposes of the only particular where his exertions can be of some service to us. We must, however, presume that he has done the best he could do—we may add, the best that any one can do, in support of such a position; for, surely, the impression is not to be tolerated, that though argument exists, Mr. Brownson is not competent to find



it. What we have to say, therefore, in confronting his reasoning is necessarily confined to the extract last made from his article.

"We have complained that Mr. Brownson's labors on indisputable points are out of all proportion to what he expends on the vital point in his argument—that he gives pages where a simple statement would be sufficient—that he gives a brief paragraph where the bulk of his efforts should be directed. We feel justified in another complaint—that what little he does give us on the essential point is not argument but assumption. He burdens us with proof where we really need no proof; where proof is needed, he gives naked assertion. Possibly, it is susceptible of proof, that religion, to be of any use, must be organized, and that, without organization, that is, without a visible Church, it is nothing but individualism, and therefore powerless; but, what proof does our author give us? Here it is in his own words: 'You *must* concede' it! He does not even pretend to argue it. He does not put forth even a form of proof. He makes no show of trying to convince us. Nothing of the kind—we '*must concede*' it. We come to the point where alone the whole controversy between Catholicism and Protestantism is virtually to be decided—the point, above all others, where we are curious to see what argument can be introduced, and we are complaisantly assured, that we '*must concede*' the point! True, the words 'you must concede,' are grammatically related to the statement, that religion, to be of any use, must be organized—must have a visible Church; but the remainder of the paragraph is merely an explanation of what is meant by this, and it gives nothing in the form of argument in support of what we must concede."—pp. 407–410.

The fault found with us is that we prove at great length what nobody doubts, and adroitly slip over the turning-point of the question, the only point in the controversy which Protestants want proved, without proving it, nay, without even offering so much as a show of proving it. This charge, if founded, would prove us no better than a logical trickster. We are glad, however, to learn that the point we are said to have so adroitly hustled in without even a show of proof, is all in the whole controversy that Protestants want proved. It narrows the controversy down within manageable limits, and presents a single issue not difficult to dispose of. We hope the author is right.

With the author's leave we must tell him that he is mistaken in saying that we leave this point without proof, or without offering any reason why it must be conceded. The point is given as a logical conclusion from

what we had previously established, and which the author of the criticism himself concedes. It is proved in proving the premises, and the author should object, if he objects at all, not that it is a naked assertion left without a show of proof, but that it does not necessarily follow from these premises. In what immediately precedes, as he himself cites us, we say, "It—religion—must rest on a basis independent of both—the state and the individual,—and higher than that of either, and be a *power* which neither the national authority nor the individual authority can control, but strong enough to restrain them both. This you will willingly concede me. [The author does concede it.] Then you must concede that religion to answer our purpose must be the Christian Church, or religion as an organization." Why so? Because, "religion without the Church, without an organization, is not a *power*, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. Unorganized, existing not as a Church, or as an organism, with no organs through which it can speak, it is nothing but the private conviction of the individual, and can add to the individual nothing but the strength of his conviction." Surely this is not adroitly to slip over the point, and to leave it without even a show of proof. This is not simple naked assertion, as alleged, but argument, at least an attempt at argument, whether successful or unsuccessful.

If religion, in order to meet the wants of society, must be a *power* resting on a basis independent of the nation and the individual, and a power strong enough, as occasion demands, to restrain either from encroaching on the rights of the other, it must be the Christian Church, religion organized, or religion as an organism, because religion without the Church, religion unorganized, or which is not an organism, is only an idea, and therefore not a *power*. Here is in substance our argument, and it is a conclusive, an unanswerable argument, if, as we allege, it be true, that religion unorganized, religion without the Church, is only an idea, and religion as an idea is not a power. That religion without the Church, religion unorganized, is only an idea, our Universalist friend does not deny, nay concedes, as he must, if he speaks not merely of natural religion, or the law of nature, for it is impos-

sible to conceive it to be any thing else. We do not say or imply that religion with non-Catholics or with non-Churchmen is only an idea, for we hold that the Church exists, that there is an organized religion actually existing in the world, from which even those who are not within her communion, and who even deny her to be the Church of God, derive many truths and religious convictions to which they would be absolute strangers were it not for her presence and influence. There is in fact an objective religion actually existing in the world ; and hence the actual notions or convictions of all men who live and are brought up in Christendom, are not purely subjective, are not pure ideas, or merely private convictions, for they have their source, and their objective basis in the actually existing Church. What we say is, that religion, on the supposition that there were no Church, no religious organism in existence, is only an idea, and this cannot be successfully denied.

Nobody denies that religious convictions derived indirectly from the Church have a certain influence on the conduct even of non-Catholics ; but experience proves them to be insufficient, because they are more or less subject to individual or popular passion and caprice, and are never strong enough to resist the despotism of either. We of course do not look upon Protestants, or reason with them, as we should, if there were no Church in the world. The Church is a city set upon a hill, that cannot be hid, and her light sends out its rays far and wide beyond her walls. The nations that reject her never do, and while she exists never can, sink so low as did ancient Pagan nations, or find themselves enveloped in a moral darkness so thick as was theirs. We concede that the presence of the Church in our country keeps alive the sense of religion in multitudes who are not within her pale, and exerts a conservative influence even on many who deny her claims, or war against her. But this proves nothing in favor of the efficiency of religion as a pure idea, or in favor of the position that religion unorganized, uninstituted, will serve the purpose of harmonizing authority and liberty ; because religion even with these is not a pure idea, as it would be if there were no such thing as an actually existing Church. It is this fact

that deceives so many non-Catholics, and induces them to suppose that what of religion they have does not derive its efficacy, so far as efficacy it has, from the Church or an actually existing religious organism, but that it is efficacious simply as an idea.

Religion to answer our purpose, it is conceded, must be a power, capable on the one hand of restraining or resisting authority when it tends to become despotic, and on the other of restraining or resisting individualism when it tends to anarchy. Then it must be a power distinct from both, and capable of a distinct and separate action of its own, now with, now against, one or the other, as the occasion demands. When the state would encroach on personal freedom, it throws itself on the side of the individual against the state; when individualism would encroach on the just prerogatives of authority and introduce anarchy, it throws itself on the side of authority, and upholds or defends it against individualism, or personal freedom pushed to license. It must, then, be a power resting on a basis independent of both the other social elements, and able to act not only without them, but even against them, and so act as to control them, and compel each to return to its own province, and keep within it. But religion as idea, opinion, or private conviction, cannot be such a power, for it is included in the individual taken in the concrete, and has no separate or distinct activity. When you deny religion all organic existence of its own, when you deny it to be a Church or organism, you deny it all substantive existence, and make it a predicate either of the state or of the individual,—not a subject, but the attribute of a subject, subsisting only in the subject of which it is the attribute. If you predicate it of authority, the subject, agent, or power that acts is society, and you have nothing to interpose between society and the individual; if you predicate it of the individual, the subject, agent, or power that acts is the individual, and you have no third element or power to interpose between the individual and the government. In either case you have only the two social elements, the state and the individual, while you concede that a third is essential. The religion you assert is not a third element, for it resolves itself into an attribute or function either of the state or of the individual, and as such answers not the

purpose conceded. To be a power, distinct from the other two elements, and capable of mediating between them, religion must, in the necessity of the case, be a substantive existence, be an agent with a will and activity of its own, which can act irrespective of the activity of either of the others, as much so as one man can act irrespective of another man. It must act from its own centre, its own inherent life and energy, which it cannot do, if it is only an attribute or function of the individual or of the state,—if it is not an organic existence, as much so as the state or the individual,—if it is not an organism, that is to say the Church, as we alleged in the article to which our Universalist friend takes exception.

The author seems not to have felt the force of the reason we assigned why religion, to answer the purpose assumed, must be the Christian Church, or religion as an organism. That reason is, that religion without the Church is only an idea, and, therefore, not a power. If he had remarked the sense in which we habitually use the word *idea*, or had consulted his philosophy, we think he could hardly have failed to perceive that what we really alleged was that religion, which is not an organism or Church, which is only an idea, cannot answer our purpose, because such religion is not an actual, but only a possible religion. Ideas are not substantive existences, as Plato according to Aristotle taught, and can exist only in some intelligence, without which they are absolute nullities. They must be regarded as existing either in the Divine mind, or as existing in the human mind. In the Divine mind, ideas are the eternal types or possibilities of things, not things actually existing, but which God may create or cause to exist, if he chooses; in the human mind, ideas are the apprehension of actual or possible existences. In neither case are they the existence or the thing itself. Religion as a simple idea in the Divine mind is merely possible religion, or the possibility of religion; in the human mind it is the intuition or apprehension of that possibility, or the power of God to give us a religion, if he chooses. In neither case is it actual religion, or the intuition or apprehension of an actual religion. Nothing is apprehended or asserted, but the possibility of religion, or a possible religion, and we need not undertake to prove that what is merely

possible is not a power. The possible is something which may but does not actually exist, and what does not actually exist is incapable of acting, or of producing any effect whatever. Had our Boston friend considered this, or allowed himself to reflect for a moment on the point, for he unquestionably knows all this well enough, we cannot doubt that he would have seen that the reason we assigned why religion to be a power must be the Church or an organism was a solid reason, and very much to the purpose. He could not have failed to perceive that religion must be an organism, or the Church, for if not, it is no actual religion at all, no actual existence, as we had explained in our article on *The Constitution of the Church*, in this Review for January, 1856, and which the author might have had under his eye, but which he appears not to have remarked.

Although the Reviewer cannot be unacquainted with the teachings of philosophy with regard to ideas, he seems not to have grasped the Catholic conception of the Church, and his own views of religion appear to have prevented him from clearly apprehending the reason why Catholics maintain that Christianity to be efficacious, must be the Christian Church. We must let him speak once more for himself.

“ We have said that the whole controversy between Protestantism and Catholicism finds its turning-point in the position so unceremoniously assumed by Mr. Brownson, that religion, to be of any use in adjusting the conflicting tendencies of the individual and the State, must be the Christian Church, or religion organized. Unless it has a visible organization, it is nothing but individualism, and so subject to the caprice of the individual, altered at his will, and instead of ruling him, ruled by him. Now, as it seems to us, the first mistake—and we will show it to be an egregious one—in his argument, is in this unsupported assumption. Does religion get its efficacy from organization? The assertion is most preposterous, for the truth is precisely the contrary. Organization gets its efficiency from religion; religion by no means gets its efficiency from organization. We do indeed believe in organization. Truth, as it operates on the minds of men, brings them together; and systematic action is found to be natural and convenient. But the fountain of force is in the truth itself. In fact, organization is powerless except as held together by the adhesive force of the idea which calls it into being. That religion can do its work better through organiza-

tion—that it finds in this an instrumentality, a convenience, will be conceded by most Protestants; but the notion, that the efficiency of religion is in the instrumentality—that it is powerless and useless except as it has this, is philosophically absurd.

“ We take the ground, that a religious organization has power, and that it gets this power from religion itself. This we are safe in terming a Protestant position. But how does religion communicate its power to the organization? We are prepared to answer: through the individual. In a visible Church there is just as much of power as the several members thereof bring into it. Religion manifests itself through the individual conscience and heart. It exerts its power as it enlightens the mind, warms the affections, and stimulates the sense of rectitude. All the religion there is or ever was in the world reached the world in this way. Mr. Brownson objects to this, and calls it individualism. We shall not quarrel with him about terms. We admit that, so far as regards the *method* whereby religion becomes a power among men, the Protestant view may be called individualism. But why object to individualism in this qualified application of the term? Mr. Brownson’s objection involves the essential fallacy in his argument to prove that the Catholic Church is necessary to the republic.”—pp. 412, 413.

This, unquestionably, would be very conclusive against us, if we held or were obliged to hold the view our learned friend supposes. He very quietly assumes that we do and must make Christianity depend for its efficacy on the Church, or the organization; but in doing so he ascribes to us his views instead of taking ours. We derive neither the efficacy of Christianity from organization, nor the efficacy of the organization from Christianity, simply because we do not distinguish between them, and hold that Christianity and the Church are identically one and the same thing. Christianity is efficacious as the Church, because it is only as the Church that it exists, or that there is any Christianity. This is the point in our argument which our learned author has been prevented by his own no-Church views from distinctly apprehending, perhaps, even from suspecting, and by his supposing that we speak only of the outward or visible organization, when by the Church we mean always the entire organism, external and internal, visible and invisible, which are no more separable than body and soul without death.

The able and philosophical writer supposes, what we deny, that there is an actual, living, efficacious Christianity



prior to and independent of the Church. He makes the Church a secondary affair, and regards her as a simple voluntary or instinctive association of individuals, who are brought together by common sympathies, convictions, and purposes. She is not only a simple, but a very small matter, hardly worth troubling one's head about. She has no more mystery in her than a debating club, a literary or scientific institute, or a temperance society. He recognizes in her no mystic union of the members with Christ the head, and through him, with one another. If this were really the fact, it were indeed absurd to contend that Christianity is a power only as organized. The Church, as the author maintains, would and could have only "so much of power as the several members thereof bring into it." But though this is all he sees in the Church, is it safe to conclude, therefore, that it is all that there is to be seen? Has he the right to infer, because he understands no more, that there is nothing more to be understood? When sober-minded men in all nations and ages, men before whose genius, ability, and knowledge of the subject, even he may bow with reverence, tell him that his view falls short of the reality, that they see in the Church something far deeper, higher, and more significant than he recognizes, something which tasks their minds, moves their will, and fills their hearts, why can it not occur to him that there really is something more in the Church than he perceives or even dreams of, and that a refutation of the Catholic so easy as the one he offers, only betrays its author's want of depth or penetration? Can he, after all, really suppose that matters lying so plain and obvious on the very surface of things as those he alleges, escaped even our observation, especially since we were bred in his school and knew his doctrine as well as he can be presumed to know it, perhaps even before he was born? He alleges nothing against us of which we were ignorant, or which we had not ourselves alleged years and years ago. He must permit us to tell him that if he wishes to offer any thing to the purpose against even our reasoning, he must dive deeper, and rise higher. What we assert is not that Christianity depends on organization for its efficacy, but that unorganized, it is not actual religion, is no actual existence. God gave us Christianity as a living

organism, and abstracted from the Church, like all abstractions, it is a nullity. He gave us Christianity not as an ideal entity, as a mere possibility, but as an actual living religion, therefore as an organism, as is and must be every living creature, whether of the natural or of the supernatural order.

This organism is the Christian Church, and the Church is identically Christianity itself. There is no Christianity outside of the Church, before it, after it, above it, or below it. Christianity has not formed or organized the Church, as the author supposes; it does not use the Church as its organ or instrument, as he pretends; it is the Church, —indissolubly and indistinguishably the Church herself. Popes, Cardinals, Bishops, Priests, do not, as he imagines, make or constitute the Church; any more than the molecules of matter assimilated from the blood and converted into flesh make or constitute the human body, and which may be totally changed several times over without changing the body or in the least affecting its identity. They are officers, instruments, organs, servants of the living organism, performing their appointed functions; but though used by her are not the Church. The Church is a living body, as literally and as truly so as the human body itself,—a real, actual, living existence, as much so, at the least, as any other creature of God :—a mysterious existence, indeed, before which we may lose ourselves in wonder and admiration, but which in this life we shall never fully comprehend; for her type, as her fountain of life, is the mysterious union of God and man in our Lord, —the hypostatic union of two distinct natures, the human and the Divine, in the one Divine Person of Christ the Son. She is in some sense the continuation, or rather, a representation or copy of the Incarnation. It is not by a figure of speech merely that we call her the Bride, the Immaculate Spouse of the Lamb. It is not by a mere figure of speech that we speak of her as a person, call her a mother, the joyful mother of all the faithful, our own dear and affectionate mother, on whose bosom we lay our head, and from whose breasts we draw our spiritual nourishment. We mean all we say, for she is in the spiritual order as truly and as literally our mother as she of whom we were born naturally is our mother in the natural order. The

Church lives, moves, and acts. Her life is the life of unity in variety, and her personality is the unity of person in the variety of individuals, each retaining his own personality. Whoever meditates profoundly her existence will find copied or imitated in her all the mystery of God and man,—all the ineffable mystery of the ever-adorable Trinity, and the Incarnation of the Word or Second Person of the Godhead. She is the most wonderful work of God, in which he, as it were, exhausts his wisdom, power, and goodness, and reveals his own ineffable Essence. It is to this grand, sublime, and even awful as well as endearing conception, that our critic must rise before he can say any thing to the purpose against our view of the Church; and when he does, he will wonder at the marvellous simplicity which led him to question our assertion that religion to be a power must be the Christian Church.

The author fancied that we left the turning point of the question without proof or even an attempt at proof, simply because he did not permit himself to rise to the Catholic conception of the Church, and because he recognizes no religion in the Catholic sense. He did not give to our terms the full meaning we gave them, and concluded that they have no deeper meaning than he himself had been in the habit of giving them. The mental position in which he is placed by his Protestantism, has prevented him from conceiving of Christianity as the new creation or supernatural order, lying above, but in some sense parallel to, the natural order. We do not suppose that he would formally deny that God has made a revelation of truth to mankind, but he does not admit that God has created and revealed to us a supernatural order. He may possibly believe that God has communicated, in an extraordinary manner, to the world a knowledge of Christianity, but *the* Christianity of which he holds a knowledge has been thus communicated is not a supernatural religion,—is simply the law of nature, or so-called natural religion. He believes in no order of existence above nature, save God himself. God and nature are for him all that is or exists. He has no conception of Christianity as a substantive existence or second cause. He does not view it as a supernatural order of existence, but simply as a republication of the law of nature. There is for him no spiritual humanity proceeding, by re-

generation, from Christ, as there is a natural humanity, proceeding by natural generation from Adam,—no line of Christ, which is the Church, as there is a line of Adam, which is natural society. He recognizes only the line of Adam, and no Church, save as a form of natural society itself,—never the Church as supernatural society under the supernatural providence of God. This is evident from the following reply to an objection which we urged against Protestantism as the religion needed.

“ Mr. Brownson finds an apt illustration of the absence of uniformity and of independence on the part of Protestantism, in the sectional character of the Protestant denominations in this country :

“ We see this strikingly proved every day, especially in our own country. Public opinion acts on the sects, and the strongest and most numerous sects in the land are obliged to yield to it. Have we not Methodists South and Methodists North, Baptists North and Baptists South, and have we not come very near having Presbyterians South and Presbyterians North, that is, sects dividing geographically, according to public opinion, and holding on one side of an imaginary line, that to be a mortal sin, which, on the other, is almost counted a Christian virtue? What can a religion that divides in this way, that is pro-slavery in one section of the Union, because there public opinion is pro-slavery, and abolitionist in another, because there public opinion is against slavery,—what can such a religion do in those emergencies, when, to maintain the right, public opinion must be resisted, not followed ? ”

“ To unreflecting minds, the argument implied in this complaint of the vacillating character of Protestant creeds, seems plausible, and no doubt operates with much effect. And we admit, that Protestantism does vary with different individuals and with different communities. At the same time, we are confident, that its want of uniformity is not as essential and as marked as a superficial view would lead one to imagine. There is, in fact, but little difference of conviction with reference to what all must concede to be the fundamental principles of religion. *That there is a just and benevolent God, that human beings are subject to his government, and are imperatively required to deal justly, love mercy, and walk humbly before him, and that this accountability is sustained by rewards and punishments,—these things really comprise the essential principles in every form of Christian faith.* Difference of opinion concerns rather the relations and logical forms in which different individuals present these principles. We do indeed believe that it is important that men hold the essentials of religion in their true forms ; but the essence is vastly more important than the form, for the essence of religion is the root of its regenerating power. And particularly, as regards the great rules of rectitude, individualism shows a degree of uniformity quite as emphatic as any thing Catholicism can boast. It is matter of fact, that any departure from these rules, on a great

scale, is matter of wonderment. A nation of thieves, *conscientiously* taught to be such, is looked upon as a monstrous exception to the general character of mankind. Reverence is almost universally felt to be a religious duty; and a teacher whose avocation it has been to inculcate lessons of wanton cruelty, is the abhorrence of every civilized community. We are confident, that if regard is had to the fundamentals of religion and morality, Protestantism is as marked for its uniformity, as a truthful history of Catholicism will claim to present."—pp. 417, 418.

The essential or fundamental principles of the Christian faith here enumerated, and in regard to which the author contends that Protestants are substantially agreed, contain nothing distinctively Christian, nothing but the law of nature, and in fact not the whole even of that, for the enumeration leaves out the immortality of the soul, a future state of existence, and rewards and punishments of some sort, in the life to come, for the deeds done in this,—an integral part of natural religion, and believed by the ancient Pagans as well as by modern Christians. He recognizes no supernatural order of life, no supernatural end of man, and no more, even as amended by us, than can be and is admitted by men who deny the Christian revelation. Lord Herbert, Voltaire, Thomas Paine, and not a few of the Deists of the last century admitted more than he holds to be essential. He includes in his essentials no distinctively Christian doctrine, and does not so much as mention the name of Christ, the Author and Finisher of the Christian's faith. Evidently then, his religion, his Christianity, does not rise above the law of nature or natural religion. It is the natural law, nothing more,—in his particular case something less,—and it is only by an abuse of terms that it can be called Christianity.

Undoubtedly Christianity presupposes and accepts the natural law. We recognize and assert natural religion as fully and as earnestly as any one can. It indeed is not Christianity, but it is its preamble, and the magazine from which we draw our arguments to remove the obstacles in the minds of unbelievers to yielding a rational assent to the revelation of the supernatural. Christianity accepts it, republishes it, and gives it a supernatural sanction, but is itself an order above it, and to which it can never rise. We do not say that this natural religion without the

Christian Church is a pure idea, an opinion, or mere private conviction. God has incorporated it into our very nature, made it integral in reason, and without it reason would not be reason, any more than is the rudimental intelligence manifested by animals. It is natural reason itself, the common sense of mankind, and has its organization in natural society and the individual. It operates not as a naked idea, but as a principle inherent in our natural organism. Its power is the power of natural reason itself, which is at once universal and individual, that which constitutes the individual a man, gives to the human race its unity, and founds natural society, which is in the natural order, what the Church is held by Catholics to be in the supernatural.

Natural religion, or the natural law, is the basis of all natural society, and if it were of itself sufficient to mediate between the state and the individual, and to preserve the just balance of liberty and authority, the author could easily make out his case against us. He thinks that it is, and so think many of our countrymen ; so thought the men who made the French Revolution, and so think Kossuth, Mazzini, and all our modern revolutionists who are seeking the melioration of society and the individual by the subversion of the Church. But happily here we are not left to speculation. We have before us the instructive examples of history. The Gentile nations for we know not how many years tried the experiment, and failed. Of course, since society is founded in the natural order, nothing more is needed to its perfection than the perfect observance and fulfilment of the natural law ; but all history proves that the natural law with only its natural organization in society and the individual has never sufficed for itself. Except with the Jews, who had a gracious and divinely sustained organization of the natural law, you find in no ancient nation the recognition of personal freedom, what we call the rights of man, and no genuine respect for human life. The history of the whole Gentile world, of its most polite, cultivated, and enlightened nations, is the history of unmitigated cruelty and oppression. No rights of man were known, no tenderness for life was cultivated or enjoined ; the exposure of infants was allowed in them all, as it is in China in our own days. In Rome,

in the most virtuous period of the Republic, the pater-familias had the power of life and death over his wife, his children, and his slaves. The new-born infant must wait his permission to live, and if refused must be consigned to death. But why recall the cruelty, inhumanity, and barbarism of the old Gentile world? We gave a sketch of that world so far as necessary for our present purpose in the article our Boston friend is criticizing, and he pronounces our sketch "admirable."

"It will be of assistance in apprehending the distinction between these two elements, to quote our author's admirable statement of the State-element, as represented in the ancient republics of Greece and Rome.

"The ancient Greeks and Romans recognized the city, or State, and asserted its authority. But with them it was supreme and exclusive. They were great statesmen; and so far as organizing the city or State for its own protection, and the maintenance of its supremacy, I can conceive nothing more admirable than the Græco-Roman Republic. It was absolute, it was strong, it was majestic, and its majesty is every where traceable even in its ruins. But under the Græco-Roman civilization there was no such thing as individual liberty. There were rights of the citizen, but no rights of the man. The city was every thing, the man was nothing. The man was absorbed in the citizen, and the citizen in the State. Whatever the State commanded, the individual must do, and it was free to command whatever it pleased. No higher law was known, no higher law was admitted, than the decrees of the State. Rome commands, Athens ordains, and each individual must obey, whether in accordance with justice, or against it. Under that order of civilization, both religion and the individual were entirely subjected to the State; and when it reached its complete development in Imperial Rome, the Emperor assumed to himself all the majesty of the State, all the elements of liberty and authority, and was recognized by the enslaved nations subjugated by Roman arms, as at once, Emperor, Supreme Pontiff, and God. There was no law, no power above him; and though there was freedom for him as the State, there was none for the individual."—p. 404.

Yet the Gentiles had the law of nature with its natural organization, all that our Protestant friend holds to be essential to religion, for all men and nations have it, and cannot be without it, since it is human nature itself. If any doubt could arise on the sufficiency of this law, we need but consult the nations even now lying outside of Christendom. These nations, without exception, are barbarians; and barbarism, which is the domination of passion, in opposition to the dominion of reason, is only another name for violence, disorder, oppression, tyranny, and slavery. If natural religion with its natural organization has sufficed for the maintenance of the just relations between liberty



and authority, how happens it that we never find them maintained in non-Christian nations, and that the limits of Christendom are the limits of civilization? Will you tell me the cause is in the ignorance which these nations have of the law of nature? Whence that ignorance, when the law of nature is their own reason, and is to them all that it alone is to us? Will you refer me to their abominable superstitions, and tell me the cause is to be found in them? But whence these superstitions themselves? I concede them, but they are terrible arguments against you. They obtain in all heathen lands, and were found in their worst forms in the ancient Gentile nations, and that too when those nations were at the culminating point of their power, their greatness, their cultivation, and refinement. They obtained in Rome, in the Augustan Age. A Roman Emperor sacrifices ten thousand slaves to the manes of a murdered friend. The gladiatorial shows, the courses of the circus, the prostitutions of the temples of Venus and Cybele, and the frightful orgies of those of Isis and Bacchus were all religious observances, parts of the solemn worship of the Gods, even in the polite city of Rome, under the greatest and most enlightened Pagan Emperors. Yet the Romans had the law of nature. But passion obscured their understandings, hardened their hearts, and made them deaf to the voice of nature. If natural religion in its natural state is all we need, how explain the origin and persistence of those obscene, cruel, savage, and abominable superstitions, which we invariably find in heathen nations, and which, even in the Roman Empire, slowly and reluctantly retire before the advancing light of the Gospel?

What has been may be again. If Egypt and Assyria, if Greece and Rome, if the whole ancient and modern world abandoned to natural religion with its natural organism alone, but never for one moment without it, have been able to fall so far below it, and to yield themselves up so completely to their passions and lusts, what can be more idle than to look to it alone for support, and to pretend that it can effectually mediate between the state and the individual? Something more is clearly necessary, and the reason why so many of our own countrymen do not see it, is that they live in Christendom, where the natural law

has a supernatural organization in the Catholic Church, and is not found in its purely natural state. They deceive themselves, and ascribe to nature more than belongs to her. The nature on which they rely is not nature abandoned to herself, but nature as she is after ages of Christian training,—nature, in some sort, Christianized.

But our Boston friend is precluded by his own concessions from pleading the sufficiency of natural religion. He complains that we devote fourteen pages out of twenty to proving what he and all Protestants are prepared to admit without proof. He then must stand by what we labored so hard, and so unnecessarily as it seems, to prove. In those fourteen pages we labored to prove, and did prove, the necessity of the Christian religion as a third element in society to mediate between the state and the individual. We proved this historically by appeals to nations, who were assumed to have been without the religion conceded to be necessary. This could not have been simple natural religion with only its natural organization, for no nation has ever even for a moment been without that. We proved also that the dangerous tendencies which we need religion to protect us from, threaten the stability and orderly working even of our own Republic. The author himself cites us with approbation :

“What then is indispensable? The answer is, a third element, independent of the other two, having power over both, and competent to mediate between them and adjust their conflicting tendencies. *On this point, it strikes us that our author's words are as truthful as they are energetic :*

“‘Here, then, we are, exposed to two powerful and dangerous tendencies, rushing, on the one hand, into social despotism, and on the other, into anarchy. What, in this state of things, do we need in order to escape them? We need, it is evident, a power alike independent of the State and of the individual, to step, as it were, in between them and harmonize them,—a power strong enough to restrain the State when it would become despotic, and the individual when he would become disloyal and rebellious. Without such a power we can not save our republic, and have that security for individual and social liberty, it was instituted to protect and vindicate. With only the State and the individual we have, and can have, only antagonism. The two elements are, and will be, pitted one against the other, each struggling for the mastery. They cannot be made to move without collision one with the other, unless there is between them a mediating term, the third element I mentioned as essential to the constitution of society. That term, power, or constituent element, is religion, and *I need not add, the Christian religion.*’”—pp. 405, 406.

As we were describing society as it had existed, and as it exists without the element of religion, we evidently must, unless an egregious blunderhead, have meant by that element, the Christian religion as we said, and by the Christian religion something more than the law of nature, with only its natural organism. As the author concedes all we were contending for in those "fourteen pages," and assures us very distinctly and emphatically that he and all Protestants are prepared to admit it all without proof, he is debarred from asserting now the sufficiency of the natural law alone. Perhaps, after all, we did not devote an undue proportion of our article to proving what needs no proof, for we suspect the real matter to be proved is not what he calls the turning-point of the question, but that the third element demanded must be the Christian religion; the other point follows as a matter of course, as we have seen, for the Christian religion has no existence without the Church.

If we are right in our views of the Gentile world and of the need of religion to mediate between the state and the individual, as it is conceded we are, this religion must be a power independent alike of the national authority and the individual authority, and therefore religion organized, or a religious organism above simple natural religion in its natural state. The Christian Church is, as a fact, the only religious organism of the sort that is or can be alleged. The religious organism to which we must look is then the Christian Church; and as the Protestant Reviewer concedes, that if a religion organized or a Church be necessary, Protestantism cannot serve our purpose, we must add that *the* Christian Church to which we must look is the Catholic Church. Taking what our opponent concedes and what we have proved as our premises, this conclusion is logical and inevitable. It is, moreover, the conclusion to which all intelligent and reflecting minds amongst our countrymen are rapidly coming. They understand that the great danger to which we are exposed is that of lawless or irresponsible will, and that institutions which are based on simple will, whether that of the people collectively or individually, are no sure protection, because at every moment liable themselves to be swept away. They feel the want of some institution that rests on a solid and permanent basis, that can stand alike the shock of popular fury and of

individual license. Such an institution they are beginning to recognize in the Catholic Church, and hence they relax a little in their hostility to her, and become less and less indisposed to investigate her claims. They see that she is the only conservative institution in the country, the only one that is the same North and South, at the East and the West, that speaks with one and the same voice, and teaches one and the same morality throughout the whole extent of the Union. This commands their respect, and is fast winning their love. We have shown, we think, that as a conservative institution, she merits their support, for we have shown that she is alike conservative of liberty and of authority.

But while the arguments we have used prove the necessity of the Catholic Church to the maintenance of our Republic, and therefore refute the popular charge that she is hostile to republican governments, they, of course, do not prove her to be the Church of God, or the supernatural order we hold her to be. Because she is, as we have shown, conservative and answers the wants of our Republic as a mediating power between authority and liberty, it by no means follows that she is supernatural in the Catholic sense, the supernatural order under the supernatural providence of God. To prove that a very different line of argument is necessary. But we have proved the necessity of some religious organization above the natural law even to secure the ends of the natural law, and as the Catholic Church is the only organization of the sort, that can be alleged since the abolition of Judaism, we may conclude not only that she is necessary to the preservation of the Republic, but that she is the medium through which God makes provision for our higher social wants, if he makes any, and that we must look to her, or not find naturally or supernaturally that provision.

In our article we did not institute any formal argument to prove that the religion needed must be the Christian religion, for we were addressing those who profess to be Christians, and we took for granted that if we proved any religion to be necessary, all would concede that it must be the Christian religion. The Protestant Reviewer raises no objection to our assumption that the religious element needed is the *Christian* religion; he objects only to our

assumption that it must be the *Church*, or religion organized. If we have proved, as we think we have, that, if it is the Christian religion at all, it must be that religion organized, or the Church, we have answered his objection, and said all that is necessary to reply to those who profess to be Christians. If he chooses to shift his ground, and allege that some organization above the natural organism of the law of nature, and yet below the supernatural order which we have explained the Church to be, would be sufficient for the special purpose agreed to, we shall not dispute him, but insist on his proving that there is, as a fact, some such organization, before proceeding to conclude against us. We know none such, and none such can be named. That God could, if he had pleased, have provided for society and the individual by such an organization, we concede, but that he has, we deny; for Christianity, if it is any thing, is the supernatural order. The necessity for a religion above natural religion in its natural state for even natural society is not of God's but of man's creation. Man has no right to claim of God as his due any thing more than the natural law, and it is man's sin that has made any thing more than that necessary for the attainment of natural good. But God having compassion on man, did not leave him to the natural consequences of his sin, but resolved to repair it, and to make it the occasion of a higher good than was lost by it. The grace is more abundant than the sin. Hence it is the Catholic belief that, in providing for the reparation of the damage done by sin, God does not stop with its simple reparation, but goes farther, and repairs it by a supernatural order, and by lifting man out of the natural order under his natural providence into the supernatural order under his supernatural providence. Hence the extraordinary provision needed to save man from the consequences of his own sin is not to be found in natural religion, but in the supernatural, and the cause of past and present failures at social organization come from the fact that we seek from the natural what is really supplied only by the supernatural providence of God.

Assuming now that the aid we need is furnished us only by a supernatural religion, which also furnishes us things of infinitely more value, the question raised by our Pro-

testant critic deserves no more attention than we gave it. A supernatural religion once conceded as the medium through which God enables us to secure the good of society, as well as the supernatural end to which he in his supernatural providence destines us, very few will hesitate to say that that religion must be the Christian religion, and if the Christian religion, the Catholic Church. The question between Protestantism, when Protestantism is assumed to be a supernatural religion, and Catholicity, is not in the minds of our countrymen generally a grave question. The real question with the great body of intelligent and reflecting Americans lies not between Protestantism and Catholicity, but between supernatural religion and the simple law or religion of nature. They adhere to Protestantism from habit, fashion, because it is decorous to do so, because they may think that a religion that splits up into a multitude of sects is less to be feared than a grand consolidated Church strong enough to exclude all rivalry, but chiefly because it leaves them virtually to natural religion, and makes no demands on their faith or practice not made by the law of nature. But for Protestantism claiming to be really a supernatural religion, they have no respect. They ridicule its pretensions, and treat its ministers with a superb disdain. Once convinced that there is a supernatural order, a really supernatural religion, they cannot long be detained by Protestantism. If Christianity is to be taken in a supernatural sense, they have no difficulty in identifying it with Catholicity. So taken, Christianity and Catholicity are for them one and the same thing; and hence when any sect approaches any thing distinctively Christian in doctrine or practice they accuse it of "popery," or of "Romanizing."

It may not be amiss, however, to remark in conclusion, that in contending for the necessity of Catholicity to preserve our free institutions, or asserting the power of Catholicity to protect them, we do not contend that to this end it is necessary that every man, woman, and child in the country should become Catholic, or that the Catholicity of the majority must be of that pure and sublime character which in no country is found except with the few. We indulge a hope that the American will ultimately become a Catholic people, and yet we are far from

indulging those extravagant expectations as to their conversion which are sometimes ascribed to us. There never yet has been on earth a whole people thoroughly Catholic in faith and practice. In the best of times, in the most pious of nations, there has always been a large number of what are called "Hickory Catholics," that is, of men who will fight to the death for their faith, and die sooner than live it. We never expect the time when there will be none but Catholics in the land, or when all who are Catholics will be good Catholics. Nor is it necessary for the security of our institutions. To this end it is only necessary that the Church should be here, with her faith, her morality, and the example of her faithful children, and that she have a predominating influence on the ruling mind and heart of the country. She will affect it by diffusing Catholic life, and keeping fresh and living those old Catholic doctrines and traditions of authority and liberty which form the basis of modern civilization, and especially of the civil and political institutions of this country. These doctrines and traditions may and do operate in minds out of the Church; they were vigorous in the minds of the founders of our Republic; but without the Church they become obscure and gradually lose their force, as we see now in all non-Catholic nations. Protestant nations brought them away from the Church with them when they separated from her; but they have used them up, or lost sight of them. Hence the decay of patriotism, of public spirit, and personal and political integrity, the growing dishonesty, and increasing vice and profligacy in public and private life, which are every where now so threatening. They need to be revived and re-invigorated by fresh draughts from their source. But all we need for their revival in force, and to enable Catholicity to protect us, is that they be restored to their dominion, and become the public thought and conscience of the majority of the American people. We want them to form the governing mind of the country, and be acknowledged as the rule of our conduct, whether as individuals or as the state. This may be effected without every body in the Republic being converted, and without any direct intervention of the Church in secular affairs, even while a very considerable portion of the people remain non-Catholic. In this way the Church is doing a

great deal even now to protect us from anarchy and despotism, and would, even with our present numbers do a great deal more, if Catholics would exert the moral and intellectual influence of which they are capable.

In the remarks we have made we have aimed chiefly to answer the objection raised by our Protestant Reviewer. The proofs that the Catholic Church is God's Church, it has been no part of our purpose to adduce. We have simply vindicated our article on *The Church and the Republic*, and await now the response of our Boston Reviewer.

ART. II.—*The Catholic. Letters addressed by a Jurist to a young kinsman, proposing to join the Church of Rome.* By E. H. DERBY. Boston: Jewett & Co. 1856. 12mo. pp. 293.

WE concluded, in our Review for October last, our first article devoted to the dissection of Mr. Derby's Letters to his Son, by some remarks on the comparison he suggests between Catholic and Protestant nations, under the point of view of civilization. We have something more to say on that subject. His argument is the one just now chiefly relied on by English and American Protestants. He says, in summing up his argument:

"Now I submit this argument as to the Romish faith being a departure from the Gospel, that the true design of Christianity was to refine, improve, and civilize, not debase the world; and if we find a system has departed from the simplicity of the Gospel, and has been attended by debasement and degradation, while the Reformation has been attended with different results, that system cannot be true."—pp. 10, 11.

If it were a fact that Catholicity *morally or spiritually* debases and degrades the nations that embrace and faithfully follow it, we should argue, not that it is a departure from the Gospel, but that it is from Satan; for no man can distinguish between the Gospel and Catholicity. But the fact is not, and can not be proved. If on the other hand, it were proved, that Protestant nations are superior to Catholic nations under the point



of view of material civilization, in trade, industry, agriculture, wealth, physical power, all that may be included under the head of the good things of this world, we should not infer that it is Christianity, or true religion, for we have seen a more advanced civilization of that sort than any Protestant nation can boast, obtain among the more renowned nations of antiquity, and because to that sort of civilization nothing distinctively Christian is needed. Great Britain, we take it, is the greatest and most prosperous of all Protestant nations; and yet Great Britain is less advanced in material or natural civilization than were Pagan Greece and Rome, Tyre and Zidon, Egypt and Assyria. If she can claim any superiority over any of them, it is in her moral civilization, which she owes not to her Protestantism, but to Christianity, for which, as far as Christianity she has, she is indebted to the Catholic Church. Protestantism has no doubt aided her material progress, by loosening her from the moral and spiritual restraints imposed by Catholicity, and leaving her free to devote her genius, her skill, and her energy, to the production, exchange, or accumulation of the good things of this world. This is the real sense of the English Protestant's boast, and more than this no Protestant can seriously claim for the Reformation in England. But in this the service rendered by Protestantism is not a service rendered by presenting, but by removing Christianity, and assimilating the nation to a heathen nation, free to devote herself body and soul to the material order. She has needed for her material progress, no distinctively Christian principle, no supernatural religion, nothing, in fact, but her own natural powers.

Great Britain, if she surpasses contemporary Catholic nations, surpasses them only under the point of view of material civilization. Now, if we analyze her alleged superiority, we shall find that it lies in the natural order, and depends on nature alone. The virtues in which she is supposed to excel are the natural virtues, not the peculiarly Christian virtues, unattainable without supernatural revelation, and the infused habit of divine grace. We say not by this that they are not virtues, that in their own order they are not good; we only say that they are not Christian virtues, virtues impossible without

Christianity. The English are a brave and hardy people, and as a military and naval power Great Britain is unsurpassed by any modern nation,—as a naval power equalled by none. But what has Christianity to do with this? Does Christianity, nay, does Protestantism, regarded as a religion, teach and strengthen her to raise, discipline, and marshal troops, to construct ships, man and manœuvre fleets? The ancients did these things on as grand a scale as she does them, and did so without Christianity. Alexander, Hannibal, Julius Cæsar, rank heathens, were as great generals, as perfect masters of tactics or strategics, as Marlborough, Wellington, or my Lord Raglan, and won as remarkable victories as those of Blenheim, Waterloo, or the Alma. I am aware of nothing in the science or the art of war, whether on the sea or the land, that demands the supernatural aid of Christianity, that transcends the natural powers of man, or that has been supplied supernaturally through the Gospel. Gunpowder was a human invention, not a divine revelation, and human genius sufficed to invent Colt's Revolver, and the Minié Rifle. Nelson manœuvred his fleet in the Nile, at Copenhagen, and at Trafalgar, as a man, as a brave man and a good sailor,—not as a Christian, and proceeded on principles learned by human genius, not on principles revealed in the Gospel. I do not say that England owes her military and naval greatness to the violation of Christian principles, or that she has attained it without the concurrence of Divine Providence, but I do say that she has attained it by natural powers,—powers which she derives not from Christianity, but from nature, and holds, in common with the ancient heathen as well as with modern unchristian nations. Whether she has attained to it by a just or an unjust exercise of these powers is not now the question. Some may say that she has attained to it only by exercising them unjustly, and, that, if she had been more observant of the Christian law, she would never have attained to her present military and naval superiority. They may be right; on that point we express no opinion; but what we insist upon is, that she owes it not to religion, but to nature,—to the exercise of her natural powers, not to her natural powers supernaturalized by grace. Therefore, her greatness is

natural greatness, as was that of Greece and Rome, and says nothing in favor of Protestantism as Christianity. It is no argument in favor of her Protestantism as a supernatural religion. It says no more for Protestantism than the military success of Miltiades, Themistocles, Cyrus, Sesostris, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, or Julius Cæsar says for ancient Greek, Persian, Egyptian, Phœnician, or Roman Paganism. We might as well draw an argument in favor of Mahometanism, from the military greatness of the Caliphs, or of the Turkish Sultans, as from the military and naval greatness of Great Britain in favor of Protestantism.

The next thing that strikes us in Great Britain is her commercial and industrial greatness; but what has Christianity to do with this? Did the English learn from the Christian revelation, or from the Church of England, as by law established, to build ships, to navigate the ocean, to buy cheap and sell dear? Did they derive from divine revelation the steam engine, the spinning jenny, and the power loom? Great Britain's trade and industry, commerce and manufactures, depend on her natural genius, skill, and enterprise, to which her Protestantism adds nothing. If these are due to her Protestantism, how do you explain the commercial and industrial greatness of the Phœnicians, the Greeks, and the Carthaginians in the ancient world, and of the Italian Republics, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, in the Middle Ages? or that of Portugal in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and of the Hanseatic Towns, and the Low Countries long before Satan taught Luther that private Masses are sinful, or Luther himself symbolized the rehabilitation of the flesh by espousing the Nun, Catherine Bora? These things do not depend on religion, but on the natural order, the natural genius, powers, habits, tendencies, and opportunities of individuals or of nations. Great Britain has availed herself of her natural powers, of her geographical position, and of the natural genius of her people, and is to-day the first commercial and industrial nation of the world. All you can say of her Protestantism is, that it has left her free to do so. It has not turned her attention to spiritual and heavenly things; it has not restrained her by directing her efforts to the achievement of great-

ness in the order of sanctity, and impressing upon her heart the comparative worthlessness of all she lives and labors for. In this way it has no doubt favored her growth in material wealth, but it has done so, not by virtue of what it gives, but by virtue of what it removes, not by the supernatural aid it brings to our natural powers, but by the freedom it leaves to our worldly and selfish instincts and tendencies.

The last thing we mention in which a certain superiority is claimed for Great Britain is her political constitution. She boasts of her freedom, civil and religious. As to her political and civil constitution, she owes it in great part to Catholic times, and any improvements she has made since the Reformation she has required nothing more to effect them than natural religion, restored by Christianity, and kept alive even in non-Catholic countries by the presence in the world of the Catholic Church. As to religious liberty, the less said the better. She does not recognize it any where in the United Kingdom. Her own Church, the Church of England, is bound hand and foot, is the slave of the State, and has not the least autonomy. It is part and parcel of the political and civil constitution of the kingdom. No modern state has been so cruel and unrelenting a persecutor as England. After two hundred years and more of cruel persecution she has during the last half century been trying the policy, not of religious liberty, but of religious toleration,—a policy which she seems half inclined to abandon. Her civil liberty is maintained not by her Protestantism, but in spite of it, for it cannot be forgotten that it was English Protestantism that sustained the absolutist pretensions of the Tudors and the Stuarts, and taught the doctrine of the divine right of kings, passive obedience, and the irresponsibility of power. Whatever ameliorations we note in the English government, whether in relation to civil or religious liberty, we find they have been effected, not by English Protestantism, but chiefly in spite of it, in opposition to it, by men who have a natural sense of justice, but very little belief in any revealed religion. If the truth must be told, the progress of religious toleration in Great Britain and of religious liberty in this country during the last and

present centuries, is due far more to the great infidel writers and statesmen of the time than to Protestants or Protestantism, that is, due far more to men who recognize the natural order, and rely on natural reason and virtue, than to those Protestants who still adhere to Protestantism as a supernatural religion,—to the men who, weary of theological discussions, have discarded all belief in the supernatural, who are indifferent, and, like Gallo, care for none of these things.

In any point of view, then, in which we may consider the greatness of the British nation, we must ascribe it first to the Catholic traditions which she has not wholly rejected, and secondly to her natural virtues, as we ascribe the greatness of Pagan Rome to her bravery, fortitude, prudence, and energy. It all lies in the natural order, and requires only the natural powers of man to produce it, as was the case with the greatness of ancient Pagan nations. However much superior the material civilization of Great Britain may be to that of any Catholic nation, it affords and can afford no argument to prove that Protestantism is Christianity; for if any thing be certain, it is that Christianity was not given to promote material civilization, and that that civilization is easily explained without it, on simple natural principles. It contains nothing which excelled the natural powers of man.

"The true design of Christianity," says Mr. Derby, "was to refine, improve, and civilize, not debase the world." "Not debase the world," we agree; but that its true design, the end for which it was given, was to refine, improve, and civilize the world, if you understand material civilization, we deny. That Christianity does refine, improve, and civilize the world, in a moral and spiritual sense, is certainly true; but its true design is to redeem men from sin, to sanctify them, and elevate them to union with God in the beatific vision; and it regards this world only as it may be made subservient to that design,—this life only in its relation to that which is to come—the life after death. Its direct object is the glory of God in the salvation and everlasting happiness of men hereafter. It is in this world, but it operates always and every where in relation to another, and affects the condition of men in this world, and in relation to this life, only incidentally,

indirectly, or as a means to an end. It does not come into the world as a political or social reformer, a merchant, a manufacturer, a broker, or a railroad financier; and has nothing to do with them, further than to tell them it profits a man nothing, if he gains the whole world and loses his own soul; and to impress upon them their obligations to maintain justice and honesty in all their transactions. Christianity, Mr. Derby himself will concede, if he reflects a moment, is a spiritual kingdom, the kingdom of God on earth,—instituted for the direction and government of men in this world indeed, but not for this world; and the goods it proposes, and commands and aids us to seek are not the goods of this earthly life, but the goods of the life to come. Its mission is not to make us rich in this world's wealth, but to make us godly. Hence our Lord bids us seek, not the goods of this life, for that is what the heathen do, but the kingdom of God and His justice,—to set our affections on things above, to labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life; and says, "Lay not up for yourselves treasures on earth; where the rust and the moth consume, and thieves dig through and steal; but lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither the rust nor the moth doth consume, and where thieves neither dig through nor steal."\* This is undeniably the teaching of Christianity, and its influence is undoubtedly to make us prefer spiritual to material goods, to detach us from this world, and moderate our desires for the much-boasted material civilization of our age. It is true, our Lord says, "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and *all these things*—the goods of this life—*shall be added unto you*." But the *adjicienda* are not proposed as the end, or as the reason why we are to seek the kingdom of God and His justice. They are not offered as the prize to be run after, and are not added because sought, but because they are not sought. No doubt the Christian is a happier man in this world than the non-Christian, but he is so precisely because he lives not for this world, is above it while in it, and has in living for another world, a never-failing source of internal joy and

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\* St. Matt. vi. 19, 20, 31-33.

consolation which this world can neither give nor take away. In teaching and aiding men to live for truth and justice, for God and heaven, in filling their hearts with Christian love and humility, in moderating their worldly desires, and in subduing their passions, it undoubtedly refines, improves, and civilizes the world, as an incidental or indirect effect, so that human society even in this world is in fact a great gainer by Christianity. But this is not its direct aim, its direct end, the end for which our Lord came into the world, instituted and sustains his religion. To suppose it, were to suppose Christians had no higher aim than had the heathen, and to fall into the error of the old carnal Jews, who applied the prophecies to this life, expected in the Messiah a temporal prince, and rejected our Lord because he came only as a spiritual prince, teaching self-denial and detachment from the world, and promising his followers, not temporal greatness and prosperity as their reward, but eternal life in the world to come.

If this be so, the Christian criterion for judging the respective merits of Catholic and Protestant countries is not that which our jurist and railroad financier has chosen, nay, not that which is chosen by most of the enemies of the Church in Great Britain and the United States. The Christian test is not and cannot be that of material civilization. Be it true, if you will it, that Protestant nations surpass in material greatness and prosperity Catholic nations, it does not move us. The question turns not on that civilization, for that is in the natural order, and not in the Christian order, even when not opposed to it; but it turns on the moral and spiritual virtues of Catholics and Protestants respectively. In examining a Catholic country we are to form our judgment from the moral and spiritual virtues, the sanctity, the heavenly tone and temper, the pure and elevated spirit of the individuals who belong to the Catholic communion, and who believe firmly what the Church teaches and observe faithfully whatever she directs or commands. If we find in her communion a single saint made so by believing her doctrines and obedience to her precepts and her counsels, she must be accepted as the Christian Church, for the forming of one saint is, in the Christian

judgment, a greater work of God than all His other works besides. Now take this criterion, a criterion, which not even Mr. Derby will dare refuse to accept, and we shall find that the assumption that Catholicity is attended by debasement and degradation, and Protestantism by the reverse, or by different results, is rashly made, and is wholly unwarranted by the facts in the case.

We do not suppose that Mr. Derby consciously holds that material civilization is the real end of Christianity, or the supreme good of man or of society. No man born and bred in a community once Christianized can believe any such thing. He no doubt holds that the moral is above the material, and the eternal above the temporal. But some how or other he blends the two together, and regards them either as inseparably connected, or one as uniformly the measure of the other. His difficulty is to separate worldly prosperity and material greatness from Christian sanctity, and poverty from degradation, vice, and crime. He is unable to separate thrift and godliness, and to comprehend that godliness is itself a great gain. He cannot grasp the radical distinction between Christianity and Judaism as a national institution. The Jew was promised a temporal reward for his fidelity to the law given by Moses, and Mr. Derby has a confused thought that it must be the same with the Christian ; that he too is promised temporal prosperity as his reward for fidelity to the law of Christ. The Mosaic law was a temporary and a temporal institution, and therefore obedience to it was rewarded by temporal prosperity, and disobedience by temporal adversity; but Christianity is spiritual, and the rewards and punishments it contemplates are like itself spiritual and eternal. Under the Christian law men are judged for what they are in themselves, not by their worldly position or possessions. Our Lord nowhere connects poverty with vice or disgrace, or riches with sanctity and honor. He judges not as the world judges. There was a certain man whose grounds brought forth abundantly, and who had to enlarge his barns and storehouses. Having filled them, he said to himself, Soul, cat, drink, and enjoy thyself, for thou hast goods laid up for thee for many years. Thou fool, said our Lord, this night shall God demand thy soul. Here, what the world calls wisdom God



calls folly. Let us understand that the Gospel neither proposes, encourages, nor smiles upon this material civilization, and never confounds it or inseparably connects it with moral and spiritual civilization,—that practice of justice and charity, that love of truth and sanctity which characterize the truly Christian nation. Let us understand this. Christianity judges not the eternal by the temporal, but the temporal by the eternal, the seen by the unseen, the human by the divine, and counts a thing good or evil as it does or does not contribute to the ultimate end of man, union with God in the beatific vision. In the judgment of the true Christian, that social or civilized state will rank highest which offers fewest obstacles to the growth of individuals in the peculiarly Christian virtues, and that nation will stand highest in which these virtues are most abundant, although it may be lowest in regard to trade, manufactures, agriculture, the mechanic arts, and military power. That poor beggar woman who truly loves her God, and lives the life of faith and hope, stands infinitely above that proud lordling, rolling in wealth and thinking only of his own gratifications. Lazarus was infinitely above the rich man at whose gate he lay, and with the crumbs from whose table he begged to be fed. This is a solemn truth, if there be any truth in Christianity. Mr. Derby does not perhaps, any more than thousands of others, lay this to heart, and he may be unconsciously regarding his worldly prosperity as the measure of his growth in sanctity; but even he dare not deny the superiority in the sight of God of Lazarus whose sores the dogs came and licked, to the rich man who fared sumptuously every day, and who when he died went to hell. Like too many of his countrymen, he no doubt associates poverty and sin, and wealth and virtue, but he knows that in doing so he is not judging as a Christian, hardly as a man of natural good sense.

Now let us as Christians compare Catholic and non-Catholic nations. Mr. Derby asserts that the Catholic system has been attended by debasement and degradation, and that the Reformation has been attended with different results. Is this the fact? We will take a case the most favorable to the Protestant and the least favorable to the Catholic, that can be selected. We will take Protestant

England and Catholic Ireland. England is the country of all others in which Protestantism has had the fairest scope for its development, and where it has been best able during three hundred years to prove its capabilities. Catholic Ireland is the country of all others where Catholicity has labored under the greatest worldly disadvantages. Catholic Ireland has been governed as a conquered country, and governed too by Protestants. The government for three hundred years has been Protestant, and till within the last quarter of a century has done all in its power to trammel the Catholic religion, and to debase and degrade the Catholic population. It deprived Catholics of all political power; it robbed them of all their churches, schools, and seminaries, outlawed their religion, hunted down their clergy as wild beasts, and prohibited, by heavy penalties, all education by Catholics, even the teaching of letters to his child by a Catholic father. It seized all the revenues of the Church, confiscated the estates of Catholic proprietors, even prohibited Catholics from acquiring landed property, or of owning a horse of more than five pounds value. In a word, the Protestant government aided by a Protestant faction in Ireland, far worse than the government itself, has during three hundred years done all in its power to impoverish, to debase, and brutalize the Catholic population. Well, compare Catholic Ireland and Protestant England as we find them to-day, and say which stands highest, judged by the Christian standard? I deny not that there are many Irishmen at home and abroad who are no credit to their religion; I deny not that there are many Irishisms which are not to my taste, and that sometimes annoy me; but no man competent to judge can for one moment hesitate to assert that in a moral and religious point of view, in moral dignity of character, and in the peculiar Christian virtues, those which have the promise of eternal life, the pre-eminence belongs unmistakably to the Catholic Irish. Catholic Ireland is far more moral than Protestant England, has absolutely and relatively fewer crimes, fewer vices, and far less intemperance. You look in vain for that moral debasement and degradation among the Irish peasantry that you meet at every step in the English peasantry, operatives, and miners. Your humblest Irishman who has not lost his religion, has a self-

respect, a politeness, an elevation of feeling, a true manliness, a moral perception, a nobility of sentiment, that an Englishman of the same rank in life, not only has not, but is usually unable even to conceive. In all Catholic countries you cannot fail to remark in the lower classes, if they retain their faith, that they are never so low as the corresponding classes in other countries. They never feel that because they are poor they cease to be human, or that they are of a different nature from the rich.

Catholic Ireland, I concede, is not as rich as Protestant England ; but when you take into consideration the circumstances in which the Catholic Irish have been placed, the legislation that for so long a time rendered their property, if they had any, insecure, and operated to prevent them from acquiring property, you must concede that in true industry and thrift, those cardinal virtues in the estimation of New Englanders, they have proved themselves in no sense inferior to the English. We are more struck by the fact that they have been able to live, have contrived to keep soul and body together, than we are by the immense accumulations of Protestant England. In strength of body, in physical courage, in all manly exercises, in ingenuity, in all that tries or develops one's manhood, the Irishman is at least equal to the Englishman of the same class. The English are superior to the Irish, only in the genius of organization,—a natural, not an acquired superiority. The Irish genius, like that of all the Celtic tribes, is disintegrating, and in politics yields to the English, as the old Gallic tribes yielded to the Romans, although surpassing them in numbers, and equalling them in courage and military ardor. The reason of this difference I cannot explain, but it is not owing to difference of religion, for it was as striking when England and Ireland were both Catholic as it is now. This genius of organization, which makes a people a king-people, and fits it to be a robber as well as a moral people, and its material conquests and accumulations, with the physical power growing out of them, are all that Protestant England can boast over Catholic Ireland. In all else, the Catholic Irish, allowance made for the oppression they have suffered from power in the hands of Protestants, are far above the Protestant English. The Protestant Englishman is

prouder ; does not doubt that he is a greater and a better man ; he walks the earth with a sturdier step, and speaks in a louder and a gruffer tone ; but he will be found on examination to be inferior to the Catholic Irishman in mental quickness and activity, in intelligence, wisdom, virtue, politeness, and grace.

But this is not all, nor the most. We would ask Mr. Derby to tell us what has during these three hundred years sustained the Catholic Irish, and saved them from utter moral debasement and degradation. The high moral character, the deep sense of religion, the stern virtues, the noble sentiments which mark the majority of the Catholic Irish, must be conceded ; but how have they maintained them in spite of the efforts made for three hundred years to brutalize them, and to crush the life out of them ? How have they been able to preserve one of the finest national characters in the world, and to give to the humblest shealing a dignity and moral grandeur and beauty which not one of England's proudest palaces can surpass ? No man can for one moment doubt that it has been the Catholic religion, the Catholic faith, the Catholic Church. A Protestant people under similar circumstances, would have sunk to a condition but one remove from that of the brute creation. That it is Catholicity which has sustained the Irish in their virtues and noble sentiments is evident from the fact that the Irishman loses them the moment he loses his religion, or turns his back upon the old Church. The Protestant Irish have no superiority over the Protestant English. If, as is undeniable, the Catholic Irish are not utterly debased and degraded, and if it is due to the Catholic religion that they are not, how can Mr. Derby pretend that debasement and degradation necessarily attend the Catholic system ? The Jurist would have a good case, if the facts did not happen to be dead against him. As long as stands Catholic Ireland, so long he must concede that a Catholic people cannot by all the arts and contrivances, by all the malice and force of earth and hell, be utterly debased and degraded. Catholic Ireland, say what you will of her, stands there a living answer to the proud conceited Protestant's charge that Catholicity is unfavorable to the refinement, the improvement, the civilization of the world, and we ask no

other answer to Mr. Derby's ill-considered and ill-chosen argument against our religion.

We are far from pretending that all in Catholic States satisfies us, and have no disposition to deny to Protestant States any thing good which they can claim as their own; but we tell Mr. Derby that if he speaks as a Christian, the refining, civilizing effects of the Reformation he assumes exist only in his imagination, or the exigencies of his argument. They are nowhere to be seen. In Protestant countries you find in the middle classes a certain rough energy, a certain barbaric pride, which talks large, and which owing to its devotion to the world commands a certain measure of material success, not ordinarily to be met with in Catholics devoted to their religion, but in the arts, graces, refinements, and charms of civilized life, the latter are every where in advance of the former. A careful comparison of the two will establish the fact that in material civilization, in the purely material order, in which infidels and Christians stand on the same footing, Protestants take the precedence, though still behind the more advanced heathen nations of antiquity; but in that higher civilization which regards the heart and soul, and demands for its attainment and maintenance the Christian virtues, temper, and spirit, the only civilization the Christian prizes, Catholics take the precedence, in reality stand alone. We conclude, therefore, that the Reformation, while it gives free scope to the material splendor and aggrandizement of a nation, tends directly to its moral debasement and degradation, and that Catholicity, while it detaches men from the world, moderates the desire for worldly goods, and therefore in some measure checks the growth of a rank and poisonous material civilization, fosters the spiritual, ennobles the soul, purifies the affections, elevates the sentiments, and renders man a higher and a more dignified being, and society more simple, just, and humane, in which moral worth is held in higher honor, and the poor and unfortunate are treated with more consideration, gentleness, and affection, nay, respect.

We have treated this argument at greater length than its intrinsic importance demands, because it contains the only objection to Catholicity that has much practical weight with our non-Catholic countrymen, and because we

have wished to show that it is at bottom, so far as it is an argument at all, an argument against Christianity itself, and based upon principles which every one who believes in the Gospel does and must reject. Mr. Derby does not see this, because he does not see any difficulty in serving, at the same time, both God and mammon, or very clearly distinguish the worship of mammon from the worship of God. Yet nothing is more certain than that this devotion to the world, to the development and advancement of material civilization, which leads us to estimate nations and individuals by their wealth and worldly greatness, which treats the poor as vicious or criminal, and regards them as the curse and opprobrium of a country, which even our Protestant ministers eulogize from the pulpit, the press, and the rostrum, as an evidence of our enlightenment and true wisdom, is incompatible with the spirit of the Gospel, offensive to God, and injurious to society itself. It implies a forgetfulness of God, and the nations that forget God must sooner or later experience the fate of all the great nations of pagan antiquity. The men who live for this world, in the long run, lose this world and that which is to come; and all experience proves that you can never increase a man's happiness by enlarging his material possessions. One of our old New England worthies, who amassed a large estate, and was a man of note in his day, used to say that he and his wife when married were both poor, that he told her he wished to be rich, but she told him that she did not wish to be rich, she only wished to be comfortable. "I have," he would add, "long since had my wish, but she has not yet had hers." He was a wiser man than Mr. Derby who said, "If you would enrich a man, study not to increase his possessions, but to moderate his desires." The contented poor man is richer than he whom the world calls rich, is in fact more independent, and can do more as he likes. Our desires increase with the increase of our riches, riches bring cares and responsibilities which render them a snare to the bad man, and a burden to the good man.

But enough of this. We must proceed in our dissection to other, though hardly graver matters.

"Again, let me recur to the origin of the Romish Church. Its basis should be the Gospel. Here we have a safe starting-point.

All denominations recognize the mission of our Saviour, and the authority of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. Now how far do these sacred books establish the faith, doctrines, and usages of the Romish Church? First, the Church of Rome relies upon the sixteenth chapter of St. Matthew, eighteenth verse, in which our Saviour says, 'Thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my Church.' But we must remember that in the same chapter, verse twenty-third, our Saviour *rebukes* Peter in terms stronger than he used to any apostle, save Judas, who betrayed him, saying, 'Get thee behind me, Satan, thou art an offence unto me.' And we must not forget that in the hour of trial Peter faltered, that he thrice denied our Lord, and, drawing a sword against the wishes of our Saviour, wounded a servant of the high-priest, because he stated the truth."—p. 11.

Mr. Derby would do well to remember that Catholics hold that our Lord himself founded the Church, not that men have founded it, whether on the Gospel or any thing else. In the mind of the Catholic the Church is Jesus Christ's own institution of the Gospel, and it is the Gospel instituted as a living kingdom, not as an abstract idea, or a dead book, that we embrace and hold to be authoritative. Out of the Church, and distinguished from her, there is no Gospel for men to appeal to, or to recognize as authority. The Gospel is what the Church teaches and administers. The written word can be cited against her only for the purpose of convicting her of contradicting herself. For such a purpose you may cite it against her, but for no other. Mr. Derby is a lawyer, and should understand this. She is the court, and he must dispossess her before he can make her amenable to his reading of the law. But this by the way.

Where our Lord says to Peter, "Thou art Peter, and on this Rock I will build my Church," he does not mean, Mr. Derby thinks, what he says, because he subsequently rebukes Peter in severer terms than he used to any other disciple save Judas. But did not our Lord know very well when he said, "Blessed art thou, Simon, son of Jonas, and I say unto thee, thou art Peter and upon this rock will I build my Church," that he would also have occasion very soon to say unto him, "Go behind me, Satan?" Whence then does it follow from the rebuke that the promise so formally made was not made, or that it was to be of none effect? Mr. Derby must concede that, not-

withstanding the rebuke, Peter remained one of the twelve, and was commissioned and sent forth as an inspired Apostle, and, it seems to me, that if his reasoning is good against the Primacy, it is equally good against the Apostleship of Peter. Peter denied his Lord thrice, and even cursed and swore. In that he proved himself as unworthy of being an Apostle even as of being the prince of the Apostles. Yet our Lord did not exclude him from the Apostolic college. The learned jurist forgets that our Lord in the promise spoke in the future, and that it was not till converted that Peter was to confirm his brethren. It was possible for Peter, through divine grace, to repent, and I have never heard it maintained that our Lord chose Peter because he was naturally a perfect character. "Ye have not chosen me," said our Lord to all his Apostles, "but I have chosen you." Their Apostleship stood not in human virtue, but in divine appointment, divine grace, and the inspiration of the Holy Ghost. So also the Primacy of Peter, and whatever the natural imperfections of Peter's character, we suppose it lay in our Lord's power to qualify him for the office to which he designated him, whether that office was the Primacy or some other.

There is something hard-hearted and unchristian in our Protestant Jurist. We fear he has never learned to temper justice with mercy, and is very far from duly appreciating the infinite tenderness of the Gospel, or from sounding the depth of the riches of divine grace. He sees in our Lord's severe language only an evidence of his anger to Peter, and concludes that our Lord could not have rebuked him without withdrawing the blessing he had pronounced upon him. He cannot understand that our Lord may rebuke in love, and chastise without anger. He will allow no space for repentance, no scope for mercy and forgiveness. He would have been greatly scandalized had he been present when our Lord dined with the Pharisee, and had seen him permit, while he sat at table, Mary Magdalen, the woman who had been a sinner, to wash his feet with her tears and wipe them with her hair. He most likely would have called for the police to transport her to the House of Correction. Alas! the smile of innocence can no longer light up any of our faces, but the tears of penitence may stream from the eyes of us all, and dear are



these tears to our Lord, who came to call not the just, but sinners to repentance, and who while we were yet sinners died for us, and opens his arms and his heart to the very chiefest of sinners, if he repents. He did not spurn the penitent Magdalen, but received her homage, bestowed on her the riches of his grace, and made her as conspicuous for her burning charity as she had been for her disorderly love. Mr. Derby, ourselves, and thousands of others need this example of the Magdalen, this assurance that the tears of the penitent sinner can cleanse, through grace, the soul from its pollutions, and open to us the doors of Paradise, to save us from despair, and to permit us to feel that, if, like her, we repent and bedew the feet of our Lord with our tears, he will not spurn us, but enrich us with his love.

It is true, our Lord reproved Peter after he had blessed him and given him the promise; but not angrily, as if Peter had done something to forfeit his love. When our Lord said to his disciples that he "must go to Jerusalem, and suffer many things from the ancients and the scribes and the chief priests, and be put to death, and the third day rise again," Peter rebuked him, and said, Lord, be it far from thee; this shall not be unto thee. But Peter said this, no doubt, as not understanding, at that time, that Christ must needs suffer, and from a tender love and respect to his Master. The reply of our Lord need not be taken in a harsh sense, and necessarily means no more than, Nay, Peter, in wishing these things not to befall me, thou savorest the things that be of men, not the things that be of God, and art opposed to me. These things must be, and instead of wishing to avert them, prepare to follow me, and suffer after my example. But be this as it may, why may it not be that our Lord chose Peter to be the prince of the Apostles, and the rock on which he would build his Church, because he was not free from human weakness, because he needed at times repentance and pardon, so that his elevation should not seem to be awarded to his natural virtues, so that he should find in it no temptation against humility, and so that it should be seen that his Church does not stand in human sagacity, wisdom, strength, or virtue, but in Divine grace, and the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost?

"Again, the Romish Church adverts to the gift of keys and relies on the nineteenth verse of the same chapter, but the ancient fathers attached little importance to this verse which so closely precedes the rebuke. Tertullian, of Carthage, who flourished in the next century after the apostles, says, '*Clavem interpretationem legis.*' Chrysostom, bishop of Constantinople, says, '*Clavis est scientia scripturarum per quam aperitur janua veritatis.*' Chrysostom lived in 393. Eusebius, who lived in 290, born in Palestine in 265, an able and voluminous writer, calls the keys "the word of God." These seem to be the earliest and most authentic of ancient expositors, and I can refer you to these passages and all others I may cite. What becomes, then, of the express delegation to St. Peter, claimed by the Romanists, of the exclusive custody of the gates of heaven."—pp. 11, 12.

Suppose this were so, what then? Tertullian and Eusebius were no saints; the former lapsed into the Montanist heresy, and the latter was affected by Arianism. Whether they say what Mr. Derby alleges, we are unable to say, as he gives no reference, and we have not deemed it worth our while to search through their voluminous works to see if we could find the alleged passages. According to Mr. Derby, or rather the Anglican divine from whom he cites him, Tertullian says, the "key is the interpretation of the Law." This, if it means any thing, must mean that the key is that which unlocks, or discloses the sense or true meaning of the law. If then Tertullian refers to the keys which our Lord said he would give to Peter, he must mean that our Lord gave to Peter the power to interpret and declare the true sense of the Law, that is, constituted him the judge of the law, as all Catholics hold. If Tertullian says what is alleged, he says nothing against the Catholic interpretation of the power of the keys. Eusebius, we are told, calls the keys "the word of God." This hardly agrees with what Tertullian says, for the interpretation of the word, and the word of God itself, are not precisely the same; but, suppose Eusebius does so call the keys, and that the keys are the word of God, it follows that as they were given to Peter, Peter received the word of God, and is constituted its keeper and interpreter. I see nothing in this inconsistent with the Catholic interpretation of the text.

I have not been able to verify the alleged citation from St. Chrysostom, and therefore know not, if he says it,

whether he is speaking of the keys given to Peter, or of some other key. He might very well say what is alleged, for the science of the Scriptures must have been included in the gift of the keys; but St. Chrysostom repeatedly calls St. Peter the "Mouth of the Disciples," the "Prince of the Apostles," the "Foundation of the Church," and distinctly asserts his primacy. In his third Homily on Penance, he says, "*Petrus ille apostolorum princeps, in Ecclesia primus, amicus Christi, qui revelationem ab hominibus non accepit, sed a Patre.... hic Petrus (Petrum cum dico, Petram nomino infragilem, crepidinem immobilem, apostolum magnum, primum discipulorum, primum vocatum, et primum obedientem): ille non parvum facinus admisit, sed maximum, qui Dominum negavit: hoc dico, non justum accusans, sed tibi pœnitentiæ præbens occasionem, &c.*"\* St. Chrysostom says, also, what is very much to our purpose, in his seventh Oration, *Adversus Judæos*, "Petrus itaque post gravem illam negationem, quoniam celeriter suum ipsius peccatum recordatus est. Nulloque accusante dixit peccatum, flevitque amare; sic abluit illam abnegationem, ut etiam *primus* apostolorum fuerit factus, *eique totus terrarum orbis commissus fuerit.*"† Again, arguing against the Anomæans and Arians, the holy doctor says, "Nam Pater revelationem Filii Petro dedit. Filius vero et Patris et suam revelationem per totum orbem disseminavit, ac mortali homini omnem in cœlo potestatem dedit, dum claves illi dedit." "He gave to mortal man all power in heaven, when he delivered to him (Peter) the keys."‡ This is sufficient to show how St. Chrysostom understood the keys, and the primacy of Peter, and as Mr. Derby concedes his authority, we hope he will be satisfied. It is a good thing to go to the "fountain heads," and perhaps had Mr. Derby gone there, he would not have written his Letters. But there was no need of citing the Fathers on this question. Every body knows that to deliver to one the keys, is symbolical of conferring power,

\* Tom. 11. p. 353. C. D. I cite the Latin, after Mr. Derby's example, and not the Greek.

† Tom. 1. pp. 828, 829. C. D. I cite the edition of Gaume Fratres. Paris, 1839.

‡ In *Matthæum*, Homil. LIV al. LV, Tom. VII. p. 617. D. See, also, p. 616. A. et seq.

and what power our Lord conferred on Peter under the emblem of the keys is manifest from His own words: "And I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth, it shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth, it shall be loosed also in heaven."\* This needs no comment. It is the unlimited power of binding and loosing, and that is all that I have ever understood the Church to mean by the power of the keys.

The assertion of Mr. Derby that the Fathers do not seem to attach much importance to the text in question, may go for what it is worth. A gratuitous assertion requires no refutation. In the early ages of the Church, it was not necessary to defend the primacy of Peter, or of the Apostolic See, for it was not disputed, and hence St. Augustine says, "Rome has spoken, sentence is pronounced, the cause is finished." The tradition was too fresh in men's minds to be questioned, and we should naturally expect to find little in the early Fathers in defence of it. The Church teaches orally, and her doctors do not ordinarily write in defence of her doctrines unless they are misapprehended or controverted. But the primacy of Peter never rested on this text alone, and the Fathers may have found other arguments more to their purpose, and even though they understood this as the Church now understands it, they may, without meaning to question or to obscure that understanding, have, as they have so many other texts, accommodated it to other senses.

"Again, the Romish Church relies on the words spoken to St. Peter, 'feed my sheep, feed my lambs,' the words of our Saviour. But our Saviour said to all his apostles, indifferently, 'feed ye,' 'go into the whole world,' 'teach ye the gospel.' Whatever power was given to St. Peter was not delegated to his successors by any words I find in the gospel. The Romish Church look principally to St. Peter, but it appears by holy writ that St. Paul was the *great apostle to the Gentiles*, and the principal if not the sole founder of the Church of Rome."—p. 12.

Suppose Mr. Derby is not able to find any words in the Gospel,—he means the Gospels,—which prove that the power, whatever it was, given to Peter was delegated

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\* St. Matt. xvi. 19.

to his successors, what does that prove? The Church is older than the Gospels, and was as completely constituted in all that is essential to her before a single one of the Gospels was written as she is now. If there is any truth at all in the Catholic Church, she receives her doctrine, her constitution, her laws, and her powers immediately from God, not through the medium of any written word whatever. This is her profession at any rate, and it is this profession you have to combat. The Church claims to have *received* the written word, but she must have existed before she received it, or else she could not have been its recipient. She does not concede that she has been created or constituted by the written word, as Mahometanism was instituted by the Koran. Our Lord, according to Catholics, founded a Church, instead of writing a book as the Arabian impostor did, and as Protestants, against all the reasons and facts in the case, pretend. Our learned jurist misconceives the case, and his evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible. Nothing can be concluded against the Church from the silence of the Gospels. If Mr. Derby could find in them any text that expressly, or by implication, denies that the power given to Peter descended to his successors, it would be to his purpose; for it would convict the Church of contradicting herself, since she teaches that the Gospels were given by divine inspiration. But their silence proves nothing, any more than a witness testifying that he did not see the accused commit a certain crime, proves that he did not commit it. Yet we do not concede that the Gospels are absolutely silent on the point. The words of our Lord, "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it," plainly imply the continuance of Peter as its foundation. And how was he to continue, but in his successors?

The author promised to "test the claims and faith of the Church by those authorities on which the Church herself relies, the early Saints, Fathers, and Popes, such as Augustine, Clement, Irenæus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Eusebius, Jerome, Athanasius, Leo, and others, whom the Church reveres." From these he was to draw his proofs, and only his *illustrations* from the Scriptures. That is, he undertook to refute the claims and faith of the Church

by those whom we regard as Catholic writers, and recognize as authorities in argument. Has he done it? Has he cited a single authority to the effect that the Church falsely claims that the power given to Peter as the Prince of the Apostles, as the Primate and visible head of the Church, descends to his successors? Not as we have seen. It is evident to common sense, if such Primacy was necessary to the Church in the time of Peter, when the Apostles were all living, all directed by the Holy Ghost, and all clothed with Apostolical authority in the whole Church, it was far more necessary after their death, and there remained, aside from the Apostolic See, no Apostolic power, as distinguished from the ordinary Episcopal power. The Bishops succeed to the Apostles in the Episcopacy, in so far as the Apostles were Bishops, but not in the Apostleship, in so far as they were Apostles; they succeed to the Episcopal, but not to the Apostolic power, and unless the successors of Peter succeeded to him in his Apostleship and Primacy, the Primacy and Apostleship expired with him and the rest of the Apostles, and no Apostolic power remains in the Church. The reason for continuing the Primacy of Peter after his death was far stronger than the reason for instituting it in his person. Hence, we find all the Fathers asserting its continuance in Peter's successors. Thus St. Chrysostom, speaking of our Lord, says, "Cur sanguinem effudit? Ut has emeret oves, quas Petro et successoribus ejus tradidit."\* "Manet," says St. Leo Magnus, as cited by Father Cercia, "dispositio veritatis, et Beatus Petrus in accepta fortitudine Petræ perseverans, suscepta Ecclesia gubernacula non reliquit: perseverat videlicet Petrus et vivit in successoribus suis."†

That the bishops of Rome are the legitimate successors of Peter, and that he lives and speaks in them with the plenitude of the Apostolic authority, is the uniform tradition of the Church. To this fact may be cited St. Irenæus, Tertullian, St. Cyprian, Eusebius, St. Athanasius, Sozomen, Eulogius Alexandrinus, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, Prudentius, St. Prosper, Sulpitius,

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\* *De Sacerdotis*, Lib. II., Tom. 1, p. 454.

† *Sermo. II., de Anniv. Assumpt. suæ*, Tract. de Romano Pontifice, Sect. 1, Lect. XL. Neapoli, 1850.

Theodoret, Isidore, Freculphus, Addo Vienensis, the Popes Damasus, Innocent I., Leo Magnus, Gelasius, John III., Gregory Magnus, Adrian I., Nicholas I., indeed all the Popes who have written any thing touching the question, for they all with one accord claim to be successors of St. Peter, and to hold their authority on the ground of their being the occupants of his See. And to these we may add the testimony of the first five councils, which comprise together more than twelve hundred ancient bishops, the great majority of whom were Greeks.\* This is enough to satisfy any reasonable man acquainted with the subject, and a sufficient answer to Mr. Derby on his own grounds, for he promised to prove his case from our own witnesses.

Mr. Derby pretends that whatever power was given to Peter, the same power was given to all the Apostles alike, because he said to all indifferently, "feed ye," "go into all the world," "teach the Gospel." But he forgets that our Lord did not say to all indifferently, "feed my lambs," "feed my sheep," but to Peter only. He said, indeed, to them all, go into all the world and teach the Gospel, and thus gave them Apostolic power, but to none of them save Peter did he deliver the keys, to none of them save Peter did he say, "when thou art converted confirm thy brethren," to no other did he give the special charge of his lambs, his sheep, his whole flock; and therefore St. Chrysostom, who probably understood the Scriptures and traditions of the Church as well as our New England jurist, calls Peter the Coryphæus of the Apostles, and the head and mouth, *caput et os*, of the Apostolic body.

Mr. Derby, furthermore, thinks that Paul, not Peter, planted the Church of Rome, and the primacy, if affirmed of any one should be affirmed of Paul and not of Peter. "The Romish Church,—why could he not have written *Roman*, and thus have written good English?—look

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\* See Father Cerci's work, just referred to, Sect. II., Lect. I., where the testimony of all these is cited at length, and which we would also give at length did our limits permit; and most of whom we shall have, perhaps, occasion to cite, as we proceed. On this whole question we refer Mr. Derby to the work we have cited, and also to the learned work on *The Primacy of the Apostolic See*, by Archbishop Kenrick. 4th edition, Baltimore. 1855.

(looks) principally to Peter, but it appears from Holy writ that St. Paul was the great Apostle of the Gentiles, and the principal, if not the sole founder of the Church of Rome." He labors in the remainder of this second letter to prove this. We cite his proofs at length.

"It is true the Lord appeared in a vision to St. Peter, to dispel his impressions as to the impurity of the Gentiles, but it does not appear that St. Peter, for many years, went out of Asia, while St. Paul, enlightened by a heavenly vision, and highly educated, having been reared at Tarsus, distinguished for its schools, and at the feet of Gamaliel, a learned and leading Pharisee, and being born a Roman citizen, was converted to the faith, and sent forth the eloquent expounder of Christianity, and endowed also with the power of miracles. Refer to the Acts and Epistles. Who was the principal actor and author? St. Paul. How often did he visit Rome, and how long did he reside there? He was there twice or thrice and for years. His epistles most of them bear date from *Rome*. Look at their conclusion. Read them all, and you will find he was in Asia, Egypt, Arabia, Thrace, Greece, Macedonia, Italy, Spain, and many other regions, founding churches and preaching the Gospel. Examine his Epistle to the Galatians from Rome, chapters one and two, from the fourteenth verse of the first, to the sixteenth verse of the second chapter, and note his remarkable narrative of the heavenly vision, and his mission to the Gentiles. How it was three years after he commenced that mission, before he visited the disciples in Jerusalem, where he conferred with Peter and James, (the first bishop of Jerusalem,) the Lord's brother, and after a visit of but fifteen days to Peter, left Judea for Cilicia and Syria; how he travelled on his mission for fourteen years, and then returned to Jerusalem where he found James and John, as well as Cephas, 'pillars of the Church,' and Peter performing his mission to the *circumcised*; how he met Peter at Antioch; how Peter at first associated with the Gentiles at meals, and when the Jews appeared withdrew, and how severely Paul reproved him for this *tergiversation*, 'and withstood him to the face because he was to be blamed.' See Galatians 11: 11, 14, and note that he afterwards returned to Rome, and thence addressed his apostolic letters to the *bishops* of various churches. Does not all this show *any supremacy or infallibility* on the part of St. Peter in the days of the Apostles? He may have subsequently visited Rome, and his martyrdom may have occurred there, and his blood have cemented the foundations of the Church which St. Paul had reared there, but St. Paul was the bold, learned, eloquent, and effective preacher of the Gospel to the heathen, and at least coördinate with St. Peter, the oldest and probably least instructed of the Disciples, who must have been an old



man when he reached Rome more than eighteen years after the death of our Saviour."—pp. 12—14.

Is it not a little singular, if our jurist is right, that the Church of Rome never thought of claiming the Primacy for St. Paul instead of St. Peter? She must have known, if such was the fact, that St. Paul was her founder and first Bishop; how do you account, then, for her fixing upon Peter, according to Mr. Derby, a far less worthy character, and altogether inferior as a man and a scholar? How do you account for the uniform tradition of the Church throughout the whole world, a tradition never questioned, so far as known, before the heretic Marsilius of Padua, in the fourteenth century, that Peter was the first Bishop of Rome? How account for the fact that, with such preponderating evidence as Mr. Derby supposes, in favor of St. Paul, there is not a vestige of proof that any one ever thought of calling the See of Rome St. Paul's See? Is it not the most rational solution of the difficulty, after all, to conclude that the Church of Rome had no option in the case, that she called the Roman See, Peter's See, simply because it was his See, —a fact about which she could no more be mistaken than we about the fact who is at this moment Archbishop of New York. Perhaps the early Christians were not such blunderheads as Mr. Derby would have us believe. The heretics of the early ages, like heretics in all ages, were an ignorant, blundering set, no doubt, and the remains we have of their writings and speculations indicate, as Clement of Alexandria said of the Greeks, that "they could believe any thing save the truth;" but all the remains we have of the early orthodox Christians, prove that they had, with the poor, the simple, the oppressed, the best talent of their age on their side. We do great injustice to the men who immediately succeeded the Apostles, if we suppose there were among them none who were men of enlarged and cultivated minds, of liberal education, and who were inferior to none in their times, or even in succeeding times. The fragments of their works which have escaped the wreck of time prove it. The second century was almost ushered in before the last of the Apostles, St. John, departed this life, and the men who

were formed in that century, and wrote in it, or at the opening of the third, were men of learning, ability, and some of them of vast attainments. These were all men of whom the Christian world even to-day might be proud. When we come down later to the last half of the third century and to the fourth we find the Christian writers were the great men in genius, in talent, in learning, in philosophy, and eloquence of their age, and of an age by no means sunk in gross ignorance and enveloped in thick darkness. Mr. Derby forgets that the Christian Church was founded in the most enlightened and cultivated epoch of antiquity, and was established in the most enlightened centres of the Roman empire, amidst the most violent opposition of the heathen world. If her first Apostles were chosen from the humbler classes of Judea, we must remember that they were supernaturally endowed, and not presume on their ignorance or that of the primitive believers. The Acts of the early martyrs and confessors betray no such ignorance or credulity as is often supposed. Numerous councils had been held by the Christians prior to Constantine, and we find that when the Bishops from all parts of the world assembled at Nice in the beginning of the fourth century, they were all well aware of the faith and discipline of the Church, and that the Church herself was as thoroughly organized, had as regular an order, whether as to her government, her liturgy, or her modes of conducting her affairs, as at any subsequent period. Never was there a theory invented less necessary to explain the phenomena of Church history than the Theory of Development.

Does Mr. Derby doubt that Luther performed as to the Reformation the part usually ascribed to him? Does he consider it uncertain whether Luther did or did not publish his theses at Wittenberg, in 1517, and that he burnt at the same place the Papal Bull condemning his heresies? Which was the greater event, the acts of Luther or the establishing of the Chair of Peter at Rome, the founding of the Church in the capital of heathenism? What was to prevent St. Cyprian, St. Chrysostom, or St. Ambrose from being as well informed of the latter as Mr. Derby is of the former? They were nearer in space and time to the event than he is to Luther. They lived in

one and the same empire, under one and the same government, and the means of communication of all parts of the empire with Rome, prior to the irruption of the Barbarians, were neither few nor difficult, nor even dilatory. Just suppose, what is very supposable, that the early Christians of the empire took a deep interest in their religion, and that they knew as well what they were about as Mr. Derby knows what he is about, and the tradition that the See of Rome was Peter's See becomes conclusive, and can be questioned by no honest man capable of reasoning on such subjects.

Mr. Derby concludes that St. Peter did not, and that St. Paul did, plant the Church of Rome. But he adduces no evidence that St. Paul was ever Bishop of Rome, or that St. Peter was not the first Bishop, and therefore the founder of the See. To establish the claims of Peter it is not necessary to suppose that he was the first who proclaimed the Gospel in the city of Rome, or that when he transferred his chair from Antioch to Rome, there were no Christian converts there. It is only necessary to prove that he established his See there. Certain it is that St. Paul was not the first to plant the Christian faith in the Eternal City; for we learn from his Epistle to the Romans, written before he had visited Rome, that there were Christians and converts both from the Jews and Gentiles there, whose faith was spoken of in all the world. St. Paul, indeed, resided some time at Rome, and labored as an Apostle there, but that does not prove that he was or that St. Peter was not the Bishop, any more than the labors of Archbishop Bedini as Secretary of the Propaganda prove that he is and that Pius the Ninth is not the Supreme Pontiff. St. Paul was the Apostle of the Gentiles, but that does not make him the Primate of the Church, or make it not true that our Lord committed to Peter the care of the whole flock, both Jews and Gentiles. That he labored with Peter in founding the Church of Rome we do not deny, and therefore to this day Rome honors him as one of the patrons of her See, and the Popes in their official documents invoke him along with St. Peter.

That St. Peter was guilty of "tergiversation" at Antioch and that St. Paul withstood him to the face is not

certain, and till its certainty is established we cannot be called upon to respond to the allegation. It is not certain that the Cephas spoken of in the text was Peter the Apostle, and if he was, it does not follow that Paul reprehended him otherwise than as an inferior may reprehend a superior. We know elsewhere that St. Peter and St. Paul agreed as to the binding nature of the Jewish law, and the dispute between them at Antioch, if dispute there was, did not concern doctrine, but the propriety or impropriety of Peter's avoiding, in the presence of the Jews, eating with the Gentiles. The very worst that can be said is that the conduct of Cephas was reprehensible. Even if this Cephas was Peter the Apostle, it proves nothing against his *infallibility*, and at most would only prove that he was not *impeccable*. Now no man, however strongly he asserts the infallibility of the Pope in teaching, maintains that he is impeccable in his personal conduct. Popes go to confession, and to simple priests, as the rest of us. But Mr. Derby forgets that St. Peter was an inspired Apostle, and that therefore his teaching was infallible, even on Protestant principles. If he believes the Apostles were inspired by the Holy Ghost and divinely assisted to teach, he must take care how he impugns Peter's infallibility.

But enough for the present. We have dwelt at great length upon the second letter of Mr. Derby, because we have wished to meet fairly and to the advantage of our readers the points he has made. Nearly all the important matter of his whole book he touches upon in this Letter. We shall pass more lightly and more rapidly over the rest. But our readers must have patience with us, for we write not solely for Mr. Derby's special benefit, or for the sole purpose of refuting his assertions in the respect that they are his. In refuting him, we refute the whole class of popular anti-Popery writers, and perform a disagreeable, though perhaps not a useless task.

ART. III.—*Philosophie et Religion. Dignité de la Raison humaine et Nécessité de la Révélation Divine.*  
Par H. L. C. MARET. Paris: Leroux et Jouby. 1856.  
8vo., pp. 554.

M. MARET is dean of the Theological Faculty of Paris and a professor of the Sorbonne. He is favorably known as the author of an Essay on Pantheism in Modern Society, published in 1840, and a more recent work, entitled *Theodicée Chrétienne*, a work, however, which we have not seen. The volume before us, briefly noticed in this Review for last October, is the first volume of a great work on *Philosophy and Religion*, intended to be completed in six volumes. It is in the form of lectures, and occasionally recalls by its language, its thoughts, and its method of exposition the philosophical lectures of the eloquent and brilliant Cousin, really, with all his errors, one of the greatest philosophers France has hitherto produced. Inferior to Cousin in power and originality of genius, in vigor and freshness of thought, he is superior to him in the soundness of his judgment and the justness of his views. He has evidently profited largely by the labors of the Eclectic School, especially in the history of philosophical systems, and follows it more closely in some respects than we could wish; but he is, after all, a truer Eclectic than Cousin, whom we must always respect as our former master, and really has a doctrine which solves all systems and reintegrates their several elements of truth in a higher unity. He steers clear in his principles alike of modern psychologism and the ontologism of the heterodox Germans, and avoids the exaggerations of the Traditionalists on the one hand, and of the Rationalists on the other. We know no work of the sort that, upon the whole, we can more conscientiously recommend to our young students of philosophy.

The present volume, though really introductory to those which are to follow, is complete in itself. It is devoted to the discussion of the Dignity of human Reason against the Skeptics and the Traditionalists, and the insufficiency of reason and the necessity of Divine Revelation against the Rationalists and those who assert the

sufficiency of nature. The first part is chiefly taken up with the assertion and vindication of the prerogatives of reason, and an exposition and criticism of the several philosophical systems which have obtained from Plato down to Cousin. In the history and exposition of systems, the author falls into the error, as we regard it, of explaining them by their dominant psychological principle, and of classifying them according to their respective views of the origin of human knowledge, rather than according to their respective manners of viewing and explaining reality, and therefore of making philosophy a doctrine of science, rather than the science of things and their causes, human or divine. It is only since Descartes that philosophy has been reduced to a mere doctrine of science, a miserable psychologism. With the ancients it was the science of things, and sought to explain reality. Plato's problem was not, "How, or by what faculty do we know? but, what must we know in order to have real science or knowledge?" His purpose was not to prove that we have a faculty of knowing the non-sensible, but that all real knowledge consists in knowing the non-sensible, ideas, or intelligibles, which, according to him, are the essences of things, the real things or existences themselves.

We should, also, differ with M. Maret and others as to the true historical starting-point of philosophy. He supposes, as do many others, that philosophy, properly so called, originated with the Greeks, and had its first feeble beginnings in the crude speculations of the Ionian school. We are unable to believe this, and could as easily believe that modern philosophy began with the materialism of the last century, and that there were no philosophers, properly so called, before Locke and Condillac. Truth is older than error, and men begin in the true, not the false. Philosophy did not begin with the Greeks, comparatively a modern people. Plato draws from an older school than that of Socrates, older even than the school of Pythagoras, or that of Thales, and is to be regarded as a restorer of the ancient wisdom rather than an original inventor. His great master was Pythagoras, and both he and his master travelled in the mysterious East, and drew from a learning which flourished long ages before either of them was born. M. Maret, though teaching a philosophy quite

new in relation to the reigning French school of the last century, does nothing in reality but continue the tradition of sound philosophy in all times, from which the greater part of Gentile philosophy, as well as modern Cartesianism and its psychologic offspring, was a departure.

We agree, for the most part, with the learned author in his estimate of the several systems he analyzes, with the exception of the Cartesian. It may be all our fault, but we fear it is not in the power of mortal man to persuade us that Descartes deserved even to be named among philosophers. He was what Père Gratry calls a Sophist. Even as expounded by M. Maret, his system is nothing but a modified conceptualism, resting entirely on thought regarded as a purely psychological fact. We see in its author no indications of a true metaphysical genius, and no respectable philosophic erudition. There are no doubt true things in his system, for the human mind can never be wholly false, but he holds what truth he has as an inconsequence. Take his starting-point, free his system from its inconsequences and inconsistencies, and it is the pure subjective Idealism of Kant, or the pure Egoism of Fichte. He places all evidence in ideas, and makes all ideas, when consistent with himself, pure conceptions; and conceptions, as he defines them, are modes or affections of the subject. M. Maret has affinities with Père Malebranche, but he has, in reality, none with Descartes. He is in his system,—perhaps not always in his method or manner of explaining himself,—an intuitionist, therefore a realist, holding that the mind has and can have no pure conceptions. We were sorry to find Balmes forming a favorable estimate of Descartes, and we cannot excuse Père Gratry's excessive admiration of this shallow sophist. Père Malebranche we respect as a philosopher. He was infinitely superior to Descartes, and ought never to be reckoned as a Cartesian. He retained, indeed, grave errors from Cartesianism, but his own philosophy is of another order, rests on a different basis, and follows a different method. But these dissidences,—as well as some others, we shall express before we close,—from our truly learned and philosophic author, are of no great importance, and detract nothing from the substantial merits

of his work. His philosophy, at bottom, is what we ourselves hold, and have defended for years in the pages of this Review.

M. Maret's great merit, and a great merit it is, consists in his maintaining, after Plato, the objectivity of ideas, and after St. Augustine, the identity of ideas, objectively taken, with the Divine Intelligence, and in adopting and defending the intuitive method, which requires us to treat the dialectic and syllogistic methods as secondary, or as simply two forms of reasoning operating on intuitive *data*, and never transcending them. The syllogism, or method of deduction, is simply analysis, and can give only the contents of the subject analyzed. It cannot itself furnish premises or advance science, as to its matter, beyond the premises from which it operates. It distinguishes, clears up, or draws forth the matter contained in them, and renders explicit what before was implicit, but it can do nothing more. Dialectics, or the inductive method, by which, in contemplation, we pass from the consideration of particulars to that of universals, cannot itself, any more than the syllogism, furnish premises, Père Gratry to the contrary notwithstanding, for it cannot ascend to or introduce to the mind a universal not given intuitively along with the particulars. Both processes are legitimate, are necessary in their place ; but both are secondary, both are in the reflective order, and dependent on intuition without or beyond which neither of them can operate.

According to a recent decision of the Congregation of the Index against the Traditionalists, or in the question between them and the Rationalists, the existence of God may be proved with certainty by natural reason. This decision, in our judgment, imposes upon us the necessity of adopting and defending the intuitive method, for without intuition of God, or of that which ontologically is God, we cannot in any possible way prove or demonstrate by natural reason that God exists. The syllogistic, deductive, or analytic process is that by which from universals we deduce or descend to particulars ; but we cannot deduce or descend to particulars from a universal not given in intuition, or any particulars not contained in the universal. God cannot be deduced from a universal,



given or not given, for he is not a particular, since he is himself universal, the universal of universals. Dialectics or induction, defined to be the process of ascending from particulars to the universal, and therefore called the synthetic method, cannot enable us to ascend to a universal not intuitively given along with the particulars. A universal not so given, or formed from the intuition of only particulars, would be only a generalization or a classification, a pure mental conception, an abstraction, and no objective reality at all, as we proved at length in our criticism of Père Gratry's *Logic*, in this Review for July, 1856.

Here is the difficulty. Neither deduction nor induction can give us any objective reality not intuitively presented. Balmes feels the difficulty, but afraid to say that we have intuition of real and necessary being, for that would imply that we have intuition of God, confesses, though aware that the conception of real and necessary being underlies all our conceptions, that he does not know how to answer it, and thus leaves the fundamental problem of science unsolved, with an intimation that it cannot be solved. Some of our psychological friends, in happy unconsciousness of any difficulty in the case, restrict all intuition to particulars, to the finite and the contingent. But they would oblige us, if they would explain how it is possible to prove, inductively or deductively, the existence of a reality which transcends the finite and the contingent, and which is in no form or manner intuitively presented to the mind; for we very frankly confess that we have and can conceive no process of reasoning that is possible without intuitive *data*, or by which we can attain to a reality which is not, either synthetically or analytically, contained in them. If God is not given in the intuitive *data*, we can neither rise nor descend from them to him; if he is given in them, we have intuition of him in our intuition of them.

Many worthy persons, we are aware, hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, because they fear that it would require them to maintain that we can have the intuitive vision of God enjoyed by the Saints in Heaven by our simple natural light, which all our theologians teach is possible only by the light of glory or *ens supernaturale*.

We respect their hesitation, but their fear is unfounded. No man in his senses maintains that the intuitive vision of God enjoyed by the Blest is possible by the simple light of natural reason, or even by natural reason illumined by the supernatural light of faith. We assert by the natural intuition of God nothing of the sort. That vision is intrinsic, the view of God as he is in himself, his own interior life and essence ; but our natural intuition of God is extrinsic, apprehensive, not comprehensive, and is a view of God as he is in relation to our intellect, as the principle and immediate object of our intelligence, not as he is in himself, or in his essence. We see him only as the Idea, the Intelligible, the type and cause of creatures, and therefore as the principle and necessary element of our intelligence. This element to which is reducible what philosophers call necessary ideas, necessary truths, first truths, eternal truths, &c., is intuitively presented, for without it there is and can be no intellectual operation, and in point of fact no human intellect itself ; and hence it is that we are never able to stop with the finite and the contingent, but are obliged, as the inductive philosophers allege, to assert at every moment the infinite and the necessary, not as an abstraction, a mental conception, but as an objective reality. All the reasonings ever adopted or that ever can be adopted to prove the existence of God demand, as their principle, the conception of the infinite and the necessary, and this conception, if formed by the mind from the generalization of the finite and the contingent, without intuition of real and necessary being, is an abstraction, and like all abstractions, objectively null.

The failure to recognize this intuition is what ruined the dialectic philosophy of the seventeenth century, which Père Gratry is laboring so enthusiastically to revive, and the logical consequences of which are to be seen in the Sensism and Atheism which followed, and from which we are even now only slowly recovering. That philosophy overlooks intuition and founds all on conceptions defined to be modes or affections of the subject. Hence the God it asserts is simply a mental conception, an abstraction, and no real, living God at all. Descartes no doubt labored hard to prove that the idea in the mind of the

infinite and the necessary, is not a purely mental conception, but his success did not respond to his industry or his good intention. Conceptions can give only conceptions,— $0 \times 0 = 0$ . As a man, as a Christian, Descartes believed, no doubt, in a living God ; but as a philosopher he asserted only an abstract God.

Others, again, hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, because they fail to observe that nobody pretends that we can know without reflection, study, or instruction, that the Idea, the Intelligible, the necessary entity, or real and necessary being, affirmed to us in intuition, is God, or that it can be proved to be God without reasoning, both inductive and deductive, that is, without dialectics and the syllogism. No one thinks of superseding the necessity of reasoning on the subject, and we certainly do not dispute, in its place and with its proper conditions, the validity of the reasoning of St. Anselm, St. Thomas, or even the Bridgewater Treatises in proof of the existence of God. We only say that to the validity of that reasoning a prior fact, tacitly assumed by it, but of which it takes no account, must be recognized, namely, the intuition of the Intelligible, the infinite, the necessary, the perfect, that is, real and necessary being, the intelligible element of all thought and the principle of all reasoning. That must be intuitively presented, but we do not say that we do or that we must know intuitively that it is God. St. Anselm concludes the existence of God from the idea of the most perfect being, than which nothing greater can be conceived. If he stops there, he concludes only an abstract God, and offers no refutation of Atheism. St. Thomas sees this, and hence refutes and rejects St. Anselm's argument, as he understands it. The conclusion is valid only on the condition that the idea is taken to be the intuition of most perfect or real and necessary being. Taking the idea as an intuition, the argument is conclusive; taking it as a mental conception, or as a conception formed from the intuition of the finite, the imperfect, or the contingent alone, it is not so much as an ingenious sophism. St. Anselm, Descartes, and all Père Gratry's dialectic philosophers, fail to recognize distinctly the fact that conceptions or ideas without intuitions are null, are abstractions, and affirm no reality beyond the human mind itself. This

point Kant has for ever settled, and it is really one of the most important steps made by modern philosophy.

Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, concludes the existence of God from the necessity of a prime-mover or of the actual to reduce the potential to act. We accept the argument, providing you concede us intuition of the principle on which it rests, namely, the *necessity* alleged. This necessity is, in the argument, the universal, and must itself be intuitive, or nothing can be concluded from it. But this necessity itself, what is it? Does it exist only in the mind, or does it exist out of it? If only in the mind, it is subjective, and your conclusion contains no objective reality. If out of the mind, it must be being, real and necessary being, and intuition of it is intuition of that which is God, therefore, in reality, of God himself. Either then we have intuition of real and necessary being, which is God, or his existence cannot be proved by natural reason, since every conceivable argument for his existence demands that intuition as its principle. No doubt, the judgment, real and necessary being is, and the judgment, God is, or real and necessary being is God, are formally or subjectively distinguishable; and it is precisely on this fact that the conceptualists found their objections to the intuitionists. The judgment, real and necessary being is, is an intuitive judgment; the judgment, real and necessary being is God, or God is, is not an intuitive, but a reflective judgment. Hence as this formal judgment is obtained only by reflection, by reasoning, by argument, the conceptualists assert truly, from the psychological point of view, that the existence of God is not intuitively given. Not intuitively given as a conception, conceded, for no conception is intuitive; but not really given, or given intuitively as an objective reality we deny; for objectively, in the real order, the judgment, real and necessary being is, and the judgment God is, are one and the same, since all theologians agree that God is real and necessary being—*ens necessarium et reale*, or *ens simpliciter*, as distinguished from *ens secundum quid*,—creature, or created existence; and this is all that the intuitionist ever dreams of asserting, when he asserts that God affirms himself to us in direct and immediate intuition. We never pretend that he affirms himself, conceptually as God, but really, as real and necessary being, as the Idea, or

the Intelligible. The difficulty of the conceptualists or psychologists arises from the fact that they confound intuition with conception, and will not allow that any thing is given in the intuition, which is not formally embraced in the conception. In other words, they confound the intuitive order with the reflective, and the ontological with the psychological.

The conceptualists would be relieved of this and many other difficulties, if they could for once place themselves at the point of view of the intuitionists or ontologists, or if they would take the pains to understand before attempting to refute them. Ontologists profess to speak according to the order of things, not according to the order of conceptions. When Gioberti speaks of the ideal formula, defines it to be *ens creat existentias*, and calls it the *primum philosophicum*, he speaks of the real, intuitive formula, not of the conceptual. He presents this formula as the *primum* both of things and of science. Therefore concludes a psychological friend of ours, "When the baby tumbles over the leg of a table, the formula by which he expresses the fact is, *ens creat existentiam*, Being creates existence." This may pass as a witticism with the multitude, but as an argument or an illustration it is not remarkably clever. Our esteemed friend would find, perhaps, if he were to analyze the fact which he adduces, and reduce it to its elements, that it contains as its ideal element, the formula which appears to him so absurd. Yet what he should have noted is that the formula in question is asserted as the ideal or real formula, and the real not the conceptional principle, the non-empirical not the empirical element of all human thought. The formula is what Kant would call a synthetic judgment a priori, not an empirical judgment, but a judgment which precedes all experience, and is the necessary condition of all experience, or that which renders experience possible. It enters into all experience as its ideal principle and basis. It is at once the *primum* of things and the *primum* of science, the *primum ontologicum* and the *primum psychologicum*,—ontological in that it is real and necessary being affirming itself, and psychological in that it is real and necessary being affirming itself to our intellect, which it in affirming itself creates and constitutes. It is the permanent ideal element

of all our knowledge, but not therefore does it follow that every conception, every fact of experience, takes the form, Being creates existence, or existences. Perhaps the majority of men never in their whole lives conceive it distinctly, or distinguish it from the facts of experience. Our friend to whom we refer, notwithstanding all the pains we have taken with him, does not yet understand it, and we are afraid he never will. But that does not prevent him from saving his soul, or being in many departments of life a very useful man in his day and generation. All men have not the same gifts.

The ideal formula is intended, by those who defend it, to express the intuitive principle of all our judgments, the Divine judgment which all our judgments copy or imitate. As the ideal, the intelligible, it is the basis of all our knowledge, and enters into all our judgments; but not therefore is it the empirical form of all our judgments, nor are all our judgments intuitive. It is not *our* judgment at all, but is precisely that in our judgments which is not *ours*. Our judgments demand it, presuppose it, but in so far as ours they are formed by reflection, by contemplation, by experience.

The conceptualists find it difficult to understand the intuitive method because they do not regard ideas as objective, or if they do, they fail to perceive their identity with the Divine Intelligence, and therefore with God himself. They regard them as affections or products of our intellect, or it may be, as something distinct from God which he implants in our minds, and therefore termed innate. The psychological friend already cited, thinks that he sufficiently explains the matter by saying that they are furnished by the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, asserted by the Peripatetics. But what is this intellectus agens itself? Is it our intellect, the noetic faculty of the human soul? Then the ideas, the intelligibles, the necessary truths it furnishes, are products of the subject, the mind's own products or affections, not objects apprehended by it, and therefore introduce us to no objective reality at all. Is the intellectus agens the Divine Intellect, presenting us the necessary ideas in presenting itself? Then you must accept the intuitive method, and the very ideal formula you seek to cover with ridicule. You assert the very

doctrine you labor to refute. Is it neither one nor the other,—the *ens in genere* of Rosmini, the impersonal reason of Cousin, which is Divine and yet not God? But what is neither God nor creature is not at all. Between God and creature there is and can be no middle existence,<sup>3</sup> and no middle term but the creative act of God. What is not God is creature, and what is not creature is God. There is no *mundus logicus* between them. The possible world exists only in God, and what exists in God is God himself. The world of abstractions which is sometimes talked about as if it were neither God nor creature, but something independent of both, and even governing both, is, in so far as neither one nor the other, nothing. There are no abstractions in nature, and abstractions are simply the conceptions of our own minds operating on intuition. The scholastics, though not careful always to note this fact, do not maintain any thing to the contrary, and usually take it for granted. St. Thomas, if we understand him, does not regard the *intellectus agens* as a created intellect, but as our participation of the Divine, uncreated Intellect, that is to say, God himself in his relation to our intellect, or as we say, God as the Intelligible. It is not every man who calls himself a Thomist that understands St. Thomas.

But our psychologists proceed on the supposition that in the facts of knowledge, man, supposing him to be sustained in existence, suffices for himself, and they never understand that the Divine concurrence as the Intelligible is as necessary in order to enable him to know, as is the Divine concurrence as Being in order to enable him to exist. As profoundly as many of them have investigated the conditions of knowledge on the side of the subject, they have forgotten generally to investigate them on the side of the object. They make all facts of knowledge purely human, and leave God out of the account, and they, furthermore, make them all purely psychological, and recognize no activity in their production, but the activity of the soul itself. Here is their capital mistake,—a mistake as capital as would be that of regarding the soul as an independent existence. There can no more be a fact of knowledge without an objective activity, than there can be without a subjective activity. This is recognized by

Cousin, and has been proved, although abused, by Pierre Leroux, and in proving it, he has made a contribution to modern philosophy that his wildness and extravagance in regard to other matters have prevented from being generally appreciated according to its merits. In consequence of overlooking the activity of the Intelligible in the fact of intuition, and placing all the activity on the side of the subject in intuition as well as in conception, the psychologists have failed to recognize the objectivity of ideas, which Plato had long ago clearly established, and which Aristotle really accepts, though he rejects the term *idea*, and substitutes that of *principle*.

We are not writing for tyros in philosophy, and therefore do not deem it necessary to enumerate the ideas and principles which compose the ideal or intelligible world. Every body likely to read our philosophical articles knows that there is in some form and in some manner present to our minds a non-sensible world, a world of necessary ideas, or eternal truths, which enters into all our intellectual operations, and is the principle and basis of all our sciences, physical, metaphysical, and ethical. We cannot speak of an effect without thinking cause, of a particular cause without thinking a universal cause; of the contingent without thinking the necessary; of the finite without thinking the infinite; of beautiful things without thinking beauty, that by which all beautiful things are beautiful—the beautiful in itself; of good actions without thinking goodness, that by which all good actions are good, the good in itself, and so in many other instances, which will readily occur to the reader. The question to be settled is, what are these absolute, these necessary ideas? Are they objects of the human mind, realities existing independent of it? Or, are they the necessary forms or conceptions of our understanding? The psychologists or conceptualists hold the latter, and this we regard as their fundamental error, an error held by Abelard, and opposed by Guillaume de Champeaux and the old Realists. Plato held them to be objects of the noetic faculty of the soul, really existing independently of the human mind. This was the doctrine of St. Augustine, of St. Anselm, and in reality of St. Thomas, although St. Thomas seems at times to regard them as



representatives of the objective realities rather than as those realities themselves. Balmes regards them generally as representatives of the object, seldom as the object itself. He appears to have been led to take this view by the old Peripatetic doctrine, that the soul knows only in itself, and therefore never sees immediately things themselves, and sees them at all only through their representatives, their *species* or *phantasms*. This Peripatetic doctrine seems to have originated in the truth, not well comprehended by Aristotle and his followers, that created or contingent things are not intelligible in or of themselves, and hence cannot be apprehended by the mind without an intelligible medium. This we hold to be true, but not precisely in the Aristotelian sense. Reid dispelled, forever, the Peripatetic phantasms, and proved that in sensibles we perceive the things themselves, not their images, phantasms, or immaterial representatives. Malebranche, after Plato and St. Augustine and others, had previously done the same thing in regard to the non-sensible world. The things supposed to be represented by the intelligible species, or by ideas, are themselves intelligibles, and therefore cognizable or evident *per se*. They are all resolvable, as far as we are now considering them, into real and necessary being, and real and necessary being is intelligible by its own light, and all that is intelligible by its own light. It needs only to be presented to the mind to be beheld. There is no need and no room between it and our mind for representative ideas. The being itself is as intelligible as can be its idea or representation. Nothing can make it plainer, more intelligible, or bring it into closer contact with the mind. In a word the realities, if realities, represented by the ideas we speak of, are themselves as near and as open to the mind as the ideas or representatives. The *intellectus agens*, supposed to furnish the representative ideas, if not the human intellect, as St. Thomas certainly did not hold it to be, is itself the idea, and the idea is not the representative of the intelligible reality, but that reality itself. The ideas are in that intellect, and it presents them in presenting itself intuitively to our intellect, and hence the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle and the schoolmen is identically the Intelligible, or God affirming himself intuitively as the

Intelligible, as maintained by Gioberti, and virtually by Cousin, who represents these ideas to be constitutive of the impersonal or objective reason, which he calls Divine. The only error of Cousin on this point is, first, in not sufficiently distinguishing the objective from the subjective reason, and second, in hesitating to assert the identity of the objective reason with the Divine Intelligence, and therefore with God himself. What is necessary to place philosophy on a solid basis is to explode entirely the representative theory, invented by Aristotle to reconcile his maxim, *nihil in intellectu, quod prius non fuerit in sensu*, with the undeniable truth in the Platonic theory, and retained by St. Thomas, in his unsuccessful attempt to harmonize Aristotle and St. Augustine.

M. Maret has discussed this whole question in a masterly manner, and has once for all disposed of the representative theory, as well as of the sensist theory, and that of the conceptualists. Having shown that there are present to our minds ideas which cannot be derived from the senses, he says:—

“But there are ideas, the noblest, the most beautiful, and the most pregnant, which can never be considered as simple conceptions, simple perceptions of our minds, and conceptualism or psychology is as impotent to explain the nature of these ideas as sensism itself. These ideas are an *object* of knowledge wholly different from the subject that knows them. Shall we say that our ideas of genus and species are only pure mental conceptions, with no real foundation in the nature of things? But, then, will not all our natural sciences be vain and chimerical? We have the firm conviction that these sciences reproduce, in an abridged picture, the natural world itself. They seek to retrace the plan of the Creator, and to rise to the types of the various beings that compose it, and these types are imperishable. Shall we say that our moral ideas are only mental conceptions? Then there will be for us no longer a justice necessary, eternal, absolute, unchangeable, perfect, and the moral order of this world will have no basis to stand upon. All our metaphysical ideas of number, magnitude, proportion, beauty, perfection, participate in these same characters of necessity, eternity, immutability, universality. In fine, in the most elevated region of the intelligible world, we perceive the grand idea of the infinite, which enlightens and dazzles us, which overwhelms us with its greatness, and unceasingly elevates us above ourselves.

“Is it possible to see in all these ideas only simple mental conceptions? Were they only conceptions of our minds our soul

would contain in itself the necessary, the absolute, the eternal, the immutable, the infinite! What! the soul in its limited duration contains the eternal, in its emptiness, perfection, in its limitedness the infinite! The soul is to itself its own light! I would rather place the sun all entire in the eye which it enlightens. All these necessary, absolute, eternal, immutable, universal ideas, then, exist outside of the soul, above it, independently of it, and conceptualism is reduced to silence.

"It is necessary to reason of principles as we have reasoned of ideas. Principles being the expression of the relations which exist between ideas, they participate in their nature. It would be madness to attempt to explain them by sensation. The senses and experience give us only individual facts, wanting in all the characteristics of principles. An effect is produced before me; I attribute it to a cause, for I know that there is no effect without a cause. Between this particular fact and this necessary, absolute, and universal principle, there is an abyss which reason alone can pass over. On the occurrence of the fact, reason perceives the universal truth, there is no effect without a cause, which is the law of the fact. What I say of my personal experience, I affirm equally of universal experience, and of all the facts produced on the theatre of the world. The spectacle of the finite world, that is to say, of the contingent, temporal, relative, and changing world, cannot give me necessary, absolute, universal, and immutable principles. Nothing more evident.

"Psychologism is as impotent to explain these principles as sensism itself. Bear in mind, however, that we are not speaking here of the abstract and logical form of principles, such as may be given them by science, but merely of their natural apprehension, as they enter into all the primitive and necessary judgments of nature. In that they are judgments, principles are no doubt acts, operations of our minds. But every judgment is enlightened by a light of truth which gives to the principle all its value, and so little are these truth-principles (*vérités-principes*) the pure conceptions of my mind, that I recognize in them laws which bind my intellect and my conscience with an absolute authority. They were before me and will be after me. They reign over all minds. Were there no finite mind to affirm them, no world for them to govern, they would none the less exist in themselves, necessary, eternal, absolute, immutable. Principles, as ideas, are therefore wholly independent of the created mind which apprehends them, and of which they are the light and the law.

"We are forced, then, to confess that necessary ideas and principles are *objects* of knowledge, realities independent of our mind which knows them. But shall we therefore fall into an absurd realism, and attribute to these ideas a separate, an individual existence? The human mind has long been disabused of that error,

possible only in the darkness of polytheism. Let us repeat for the last time that ideas, principles, necessary truths, exist as the conceptions and thoughts of infinite intelligence, of God himself. Being necessary, eternal, universal, immutable, they need for their support a substance which has these same characters, and this substance can be only the Divine substance, God. They are in God the types of creatures that he conceives in his infinite intelligence, the laws which he assigns them in his supreme wisdom. Living in God, identical with his own essence, they are loaned to intelligent creatures, and are in them without belonging to them. The world and human reason form, therefore, as it were, a mirror in which God deigns to reflect some features of his infinite perfection, some rays of his light. Then let us say with all great minds, with our masters, that the true nature of necessary ideas and principles consists in appertaining to the substance of God, in being of God, and in God. Bossuet and the greatest theologians, following St. Augustine, have not hesitated to affirm that eternal truths are in a certain manner God himself."—pp. 243–247.

This conclusion is strictly just, for what is in God is God, and God only is eternal, universal, necessary, and immutable being. St. Augustine says: "Sunt ideæ principales formæ quædam, vel rationes rerum stabiles atque incommutabiles, quæ ipsæ formatæ non sunt, ac per hoc æternæ ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quæ in divina intelligentia continentur," and St. Thomas says: *Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei*. No man can be really so mad as to affirm that the human mind supplies the principles of things, or even of reasoning, for it cannot operate without them. Ideas are necessarily predicated of some intelligence, and can exist only in some mind. Ideas which are the eternal types of things can exist only in the Divine intelligence, and are therefore indistinguishable, *in re*, from God himself. In having intuition of them we have intuition of him. The ideas being identified with the Divine intelligence, their intuitive origin in our minds follows as a necessary consequence.

"We have proved," continues M. Maret, after some remarks which we would qualify, "that these ideas and these truths, in their true nature, are in God and appertain to his essence. They come then from God and their origin is in him.

"But here arises a grave question. How do ideas come from God? Does he form them in us? Does he deposite them as

germs in our souls to be developed with them? You will recognize here the famous theory of innate ideas. In antiquity this theory was attached to that of reminiscence taught by Plato, a pure hypothesis based on mythologic *data*. In modern times Descartes asserted it, but when pressed to explain himself, he answered that he did not pretend that the idea exists in the soul prior to its perception, and that he only maintained that we have an innate faculty of perceiving the idea of God, or the infinite. Innate ideas were thus reduced to ideas natural to the mind, or which it has the natural power of perceiving. Leibnitz took up the question of innate ideas against Locke, and maintained that they are drawn from our own stock. I have already stated and discussed the theory of Leibnitz, and indicated the correctives which he himself has applied to it. He did well to restrict his theory, for it is absolutely false that all ideas are drawn from our own stock. We have already insisted too much on this point to need to return to it. All ideas, the most important ideas, those which alone, properly speaking, merit the name, cannot be innate. You may, if you will, call innate those ideas which depend on us as their efficient cause. There is no inconvenience in that; but the ideas which play the grand part in intelligence do not belong to this category. Yet, if by innate ideas you understand only natural ideas every body will agree with you, since the ideas constitutive of intelligence must be natural to it. But in that case the question of innate ideas becomes a question of mere words.

"It can be nothing else, for there is one consideration decisive against the hypothesis. If God deposited in our souls necessary ideas as germs, if he formed them himself within us, they would be, considered in themselves, not in their subject, a real creation. But it is manifest that ideas and principles are necessary, eternal, absolute, immutable, universal truths. Truths of this kind are not and cannot be created. What is created begins and may end, but these truths are without beginning and without end. Being the light and the law of intelligent creatures they cannot themselves be creatures, and does not all tradition of sound philosophy unanimously proclaim the uncreated character of eternal and necessary truth? We have in our previous lectures passed in review the texts which prove it, and it is unnecessary to produce them again.

"Necessary truths being uncreate are in God, come from God; nothing more certain; and the only conceivable way in which they can come from God is that they are communicated by him to us. Who can show them to us but he who possesses them? And where can we perceive them except in him in whom they reside?

"Conceive, then, that these truths are manifested by God himself to our reason, and that our intelligence, according to its capacity, is a participation in infinite truth. We pronounce with love this great word, *participation*, repeated by all the great masters of Christian theology. The manifestation of this truth is a sort of interior natu-

ral revelation,—and the word is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world,—although we must not use the word revelation to designate this phenomenon, since it is consecrated by theology to a particular and distinct order of divine manifestations.

“The natural illumination of reason by a ray of eternal truth is the foundation of the *Vision in God*, asserted by Malebranche, divested of all system, and brought back to its legitimate sense, and as it has been held by the greatest philosophers and the greatest Christian doctors. This vision in God supposes necessarily in man the *faculty* of intuition in and by the divine light; and it is in this faculty of intuition that reside the power and dignity of reason.

“Such then is the origin of ideas, of principles, of necessary truths. On the side of God, the manifestation of this light; on the side of man, the faculty of receiving and reflecting it.

“Thus all absolute and necessary truths, all those which constitute the order and beauty of the world, govern reason, oblige conscience, found science and the arts. All these truths, all these laws are manifestations of God, and reveal to us something of his thoughts, something of his will. All the truths we possess, all we can acquire, make us in some manner see God, and every step in advance in the order of truth, in the order of science, is an ascension towards God. Wonderful society of our minds with God! How beautiful this participation in divine truth! Should it not be the subject of our frequent meditations, and we never think of it!”—pp. 248–251.

M. Maret establishes fully the intuitive origin of ideas, but we do not quite agree that man has a faculty of intuition distinct from the general faculty of intelligence. The intuitive faculty is the faculty of intelligence itself, and conception, reflection, reasoning, judging, comparing, abstracting, &c., are only the different modes in which we apply this faculty; but intuition itself is a fact, not a faculty, and it is not, like conception, primarily a psychological fact. It is not by our faculty taking the initiative that the object is beheld. The immediate intuitive object is always and every where the Intelligible, and the intuition is the Intelligible affirming itself to us, not we affirming immediately the Intelligible. In intuition it is not the human mind that by its own inherent power immediately seizes hold of the Intelligible, but the Intelligible immediately affirming itself and thereby constituting our intelligence. Hence the intuition is primarily an ontological fact, though affirming simultaneously the ontological and the psychological. M. Maret does not seem to us to place this onto-

logical character of the fact of intuition in so clear and so strong a light as is desirable, and we seem after all to detect in his expression, if not in his thought, a reminiscence of that psychologism against which he so justly protests. The fact is, the Intelligible is God creating, and in the fact of intuition he creates our intellect, or makes it an actually existing intellect, capable of acting, of apprehending. Our intellect is created, constituted in the fact of intuition, and cannot be conceived as acting or even as existing prior to it. In like manner as we depend on God, as being, for our existence, do we depend on him, as the intelligible, for our intelligence, and he is as immanent and must be as immanent in us under the one relation as the other. This is what is implied in the scholastic doctrine of the *intellectus agens*, what Balmes himself really teaches, and what all the philosophers and theologians mean when they speak of reason as a participation in the Divine Reason. This is the great doctrine of St. Augustine in those remarkable words: "*Præsens est eis, quantum id capere possunt, lumen rationis æternæ in quo incommutabilia vera conspiciunt.*" Psychologism springs from an attempt to dispense with the creative act denied or misconceived by Aristotle still more than by Plato, or from overlooking the fact that the immanence of God in his creatures, or his presence in his works, which all theologians admit, is a creative immanence or creative presence,—is his immanence or presence in his creative act. It, if it admits God at all, relegates him from his works, regards him as a watchmaker, and man as a watch, which when once wound up will go of itself until run down.

Cousin has in his Lectures on the True, the Beautiful and the Good, or Absolute Ideas, admirably proved what he terms the objective reason, that in every fact of consciousness or of intelligence there is the active presence of an objective element, which is independent of our personal reason, above it, over it, and without which our reason is not. This is what in our old English writers is called simply reason, and what we all refer to when we say *reason* teaches this, *reason* demands that, this accords with *reason*, that is contrary to *reason*. Now reason in this sense, objective reason, is precisely what we mean by the

Idea, the Intelligible. This reason operating in us, and constituting us rational beings, is precisely what we mean by the Idea, or the Intelligible affirming itself to us in immediate intuition. It is the intuitive presence of God in all our intellectual acts. But here is the danger of pantheism, which can be escaped only by understanding this presence to be strictly a creative or creating presence. It was assuming God to be immanent as being only, not also in his creative act, that led Spinoza into his pantheism. It is not sufficiently noting the fact that objective reason creates the subjective reason, that has given a pantheistic tendency to the Eclecticism of Cousin. Understand that the intelligible, the intellectus agens, the objective reason, is truly and literally God immanent in our intellect, and that his immanence is his creative immanence or presence, or that his permanent affirmation of himself in intuition is his presence creating the intellect at the same time that it is its object, and you will escape pantheism and assert the principle of science, as it is in the real order. Here we may see why it is necessary to include in our *principium* the creative act of God, why our *primum philosophicum* must be a synthesis, and the real synthesis of things,—Being creates existence or existences, as Gioberti asserts in his ideal formula,—a formula which so few seem to have understood, and which the odium attached to his name prevents most people from seeking to understand. M. Maret is no pantheist, but he will permit us to remark that he has hardly given sufficient prominence in his exposition to the creative act. He asserts the presence of God in our reason, but does not take care to note with sufficient distinctness that this presence is a creative presence actually creating our reason. Plato, Aristotle, most ancient and modern philosophers, undertake to explain our knowledge without including the intuition of the divine creative act, the key to the whole.

M. Maret very properly represents necessary, eternal, and immutable ideas as intuitive, but he seems to regard their correlatives as empirical. In the categories we have two lines. In the first, being, the infinite, the necessary, the absolute, the eternal, the immutable, the universal, the perfect, all reducible to the category of real and



necessary being ; in the second, existence, the finite, the contingent, the relative, the temporal, the variable, the imperfect, all reducible to the category of existence, or the contingent. The first, he unhesitatingly asserts, are intuitive, but he seems to regard the second as derived from experience. But Kant has proved that both lines, those included in the category of existence,—*ens secundum quid*,—as well as those included in the category of being,—*ens simpliciter*,—are alike the necessary *a priori* conditions of experience, without which no experience is possible. Then the distinction as to origin between the two categories is inadmissible. Consequently the category of existence as well as that of being must be intuitive, and included in our ideal formula, or *primum philosophicum*. But as all science consists in the knowledge of the two categories in their real relations, it is necessary that the real ontological relation between them should also be given intuitively. As this relation, the copula, or *nexus* between being and existence is, in the real order, the creative act of being, the relation between Creator and creature, either then no real science, or this creative act also affirms itself in the intuition. Clearly, then, the condition of all experience, of all intelligence, of all science, is the intuition of the three terms of the ideal formula, the ideal synthesis, or the divine judgment affirming itself immediately in all our intellectual operations, *ens creat existentiam, vel existentias*, as we never fail to contend. M. Maret does not deny this synthesis as the *primum philosophicum*; he in fact implies it, but he does not seem aware of its importance, and dwells almost exclusively on the first term. In most respects, however, we agree with him, and in no respect have we found him positively teaching any thing we should be disposed to reject. Bearing in mind that we are to understand the presence of God in reason to be a creative presence, and that in the primitive intuition it is constitutive of our intelligence, the reader will find the author's Twelfth Lecture very much to the purpose, and we take the liberty of laying liberal extracts from it before him.

“The most important character of this presence of divine truth in reason is that it is immediate and direct. Nothing is more easy than to convince ourselves of this grand fact. The proof is in the qual-

ity of truth to enlighten by itself the understanding. When we apprehend a necessary, absolute, eternal, universal, and immutable truth, what is there between it and our intelligence? Seek an intermediary, you will find none. There is only this truth, which shows itself, which enlightens you, and which your mind perceives and affirms. Every body asserts that the action of evidence on the mind is immediate and direct. Now what is evidence, but the light itself of certain ideas and of certain principles contained in the divine truth present to our minds? Undoubtedly the truth does not at first show itself isolated from the facts of consciousness and experience. In every perception of divine truth there is a deep sense of our own existence and of that of the external world; we cannot separate it totally either from ourselves or the world; but from these facts it does not follow that the existence of the world and that of ourselves are an intermediary between the divine truth and our reason. The soul is always the subject, and may become the object of knowledge, but never the intermediary between it and the object. The world may also be an object of knowledge, but not, any more than the soul, its intermediary. How is it that I pass from the personal sense of my own existence and of the world to the rational knowledge of myself and the world, if it be not by the necessary ideas and principles which are in reason? Divine truth is not then transmitted to me through the medium of the soul and the world; it does not traverse them in order to reach my reason. It enlightens my reason directly, immediately, on the occasion, and on the condition of the facts of external and internal experience. . . . .

"This immediate and direct presence of divine truth in reason leads to a consequence which at once confounds and ravishes us, which is at once formidable and consoling, worthy of our admiration, rather of our profound adoration. This consequence is that God is present to our reason in a direct and immediate manner. If Divine truth is present to our reason, God is present to it, as we have already proved at length. If it is present in a direct and immediate manner, he is present in a direct and immediate manner, in the same measure that it is present, neither greater nor less.

"This direct and immediate presence of God in reason has been recognized by the highest philosophy and by the highest theology. St. Augustine says, 'Inter mentem nostram qua illum intelligimus Patrem et veritatem, id est lucem interiorem per quam illum intelligimus, nulla interposita creatura est.\* Cum homo possit particeps esse sapientiæ secundum interiorem hominem, secundum ipsum ita est ad imaginem (Dei), ut nulla natura interposita formetur; et ideo nihil sit Deo conjunctius. . . . Ad imaginem (Dei) mentem factam volunt, quæ nulla interposita substantia, ab ipsa veritate formatur. . . . Iste spiritus ad imaginem Dei nullo dubitante factus accipitur, in quo est

\* *De Vera Relig.* c. lii. in finem.

intelligentia veritatis; *Hæret enim veritati nulla interposita creatura.*”\*

“Notwithstanding some difficulties presented by the theory of St. Thomas, it will be impossible to see a doctrine different from St. Augustine’s in these words: ‘Omnia dicimur in Deo videre et secundum ipsum de omnibus judicare, in quantum per participationem sui luminis omnia cognoscimus et judicamus. Nam et ipsum lumen naturale rationis participatio quædam est divini luminis, sicut etiam omnia sensibilia dicimur videre et in sole, id est, per lumen solis. Unde dicit Augustinus, primo Soliloquiorum, disciplinarum spectamina videri non possunt nisi aliquo velut suo sole illustrentur, videlicet Deo.’† When the sun enlightens us, it is immediately present to our eyes by its rays. The true Sun of our souls, God is as immediately present to our reason as the sun is to our bodily eyes. This, it seems, is the meaning of St. Thomas.

“Has not Bossuet also recognized this immediate and direct presence of God to natural reason? ‘We have seen,’ he says, ‘that the soul which seeks and finds the truth in God, turns herself towards him to conceive it. What then is this turning herself towards God? Is it that the soul moves as a body, and changes her place? Certainly such movement has nothing in common with understanding. To begin to understand what is not understood is not to be transported from one place to another. It is not as a body the soul draws near to God who is always and every where invisibly present. The soul has him always present in herself, for it is by him that she subsists. But in order to see, it is not enough to have the light present; it is necessary to turn towards it, to open the eyes to it. The soul, also, has her manner of turning towards God, who is her light, because he is truth; and to turn herself to that light, that is to say, to the truth, is to will to understand.’‡ It seems to me that it is impossible to express more explicitly the immediate and direct presence of God as truth in the soul it enlightens.”—pp. 254–258.

We are not quite so certain of this in regard to Bossuet as is the learned Professor. Bossuet, indeed, asserts the immediate and direct presence of God in the soul, but not, what is equally important to M. Maret’s purpose, that he affirms himself in direct and immediate intuition. He makes the actual perception of this presence depend on the act of the soul turning towards him, opening the eyes of the understanding to the light, which is to misconceive the in-

\* *Lib. de divers. Quæst.* lxxxiii. Quæst. 51.

† *Summa*, pars prima, Quæst. xii. art. 11.

‡ *Connaissance de Dieu et de Soi-Même.* Chap. x.

tuitive fact, and to confound intuition with conception. Intuition, according to Bossuet, and we fear according to our author himself, would be *seeing* by *looking*, whereas the intuition proper is seeing without looking, without any voluntary activity on our part, prior to the affirmation of the intelligible by itself. The seeing precedes the looking, and we look because we see, that we may see more clearly, more distinctly, or that we may understand what is presented in the intuition. Nevertheless, the passage from Bossuet undoubtedly *implies* the immediate and direct intuition of truth, though we confess it does not expressly assert it to our understanding. But the author continues :

"Fénelon is full of this same doctrine. He declares that 'the immediate object of all our universal cognitions is God himself.' He terminates an admirable exposition of the idea of the infinite by the words, 'It is therefore necessary to conclude invincibly that it is Being infinitely perfect that presents itself to my mind when I conceive the infinite. O God, O only true Being, before whom I am as if I were not! Thou showest me thyself, and nothing of all that which thou art not can be like thee. I behold thee, thyself, and this ray that darts from thy countenance feasts my heart while I am waiting to behold thee in the noonday of truth.'\*

"The most rigorous conclusions of logic are then borne out by the gravest authorities,—authorities equally dear to religion and to philosophy. Thus, gentlemen, in the natural order, in the intelligible and rational order, there is an immediate and direct presence of God, which itself implies a certain view of God, or rather, of the Divine truth he communicates to us.†

\* *Existence de Dieu*, pp. 270–272.

† Wherefore this qualification, since the Divine Truth communicated is God, and indistinguishable, *in re*, from him? Does not M. Maret know that God is *ens simplicissimum*, and that there is no distinction in him between him and his intelligence, between his intelligence and his essence, as there is none between his essence and his existence? When I see Divine truth, just so far as I see it, and in precisely the sense in which I see it, I see God, though I may not at all times be aware, nay, may not ordinarily be aware that it is God. This, if we understand him, is the doctrine the author is all along endeavoring to establish, and why, then, envelop it in a psychological mist, and lose the results of all his labor? Psychologically, or *quoad nos*, the distinction he makes is admissible, but not ontologically, not *quoad Deum*, not in the real order, and he professes to speak as an ontologist, not as a psychologist, and to present the real and not the conceptual order. Indeed, we are obliged throughout to complain of M. Maret, that while the doctrine he contends for is sound, is ontological, his language and exposition smack a little of psychologism, which

"But here certain difficulties are raised against us, which it is necessary to discuss. The first comes from the Kantian school, and has been revived, in 1850, by M. Haureau in his *De la Philosophie Scholastique*. It is pretended that to refer the truth which enlightens us to God himself, to consider the absolute, necessary, and immutable truths of reason as thoughts or attributes of God, is to make God like man, and to fall into anthropomorphism. God, say the philosophers of this school, is the great Unknown, the Mystery of mysteries, and not without sacrilege can we raise the veil from the sanctuary in which he conceals himself from all mortal eyes. We know that he is, we know not what he is. We should be content to assert his existence, to adore his grandeur, without attributing to him modes of existence which must be wholly unworthy of him, without transferring to him the imperfections of our own ideas and cognitions.

"I confess I very much mistrust that respect towards God which would render him wholly inaccessible, and deny every sort of relation or analogy between him and man. If we can form no conception of God, what reason can we have for asserting his existence? If this were so, skepticism as to his existence would be inevitable, and from skepticism to downright atheism there is but a step. As soon as we have the right to assert that God is, we have in us an idea of him, and this idea is necessarily a relation of our finite intelligence with infinite intelligence. We certainly know much more than that God is what is, although we never comprehend all that he is. But between this perfect comprehension and the absolute ignorance in which these philosophers would retain us, there is a distance. We see clearly that God must possess and does possess all the perfections diffused in creation; and without fearing to degrade him, we ascribe to him all those perfections in the infinite degree which comports with his nature. What, I find in my reason ideas, principles, a necessary, absolute, universal, eternal, and immutable truth, and yet I am not to refer this truth to a Being, necessary, absolute, eternal, and immutable like itself? Is it forbidden me to attribute the laws of reason, of conscience, and of nature to the Supreme Legislator? You might as well forbid me to attribute to God wisdom and goodness because I find proofs of wisdom and goodness in creation, and in free and intelligent creatures! In refusing thus to go out of man, to transport out of him truth, wisdom, goodness, and to see in God their cause and substance, I degrade my own reason, and confine it within purely subjective limits, and inevitably doom myself to skepticism.

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we are sure he holds in as much abhorrence as we do. He cannot, let him do his best, exhibit the truth in the method of Descartes, nor properly express it in Cartesian language. We pray him to pardon us these criticisms, which touch the form but not the substance of his doctrines.

We are afraid the Professor in this last sentence will be thought instead of answering the objection to have got a little confused and to have conceded it. The idea, the divine truth, is the principle or medium of the demonstration, or proof, but not of the knowledge of the existence of God, for it is God, and its existence is known immediately and directly prior to the commencement of the demonstration, as it has been throughout the object of the author to prove. What he really means, however, is that the idea, our own existence, and that of the world are an intermediary between the existence of God and our knowledge of his existence in the order of reflection, not in the order of intuition, and in this he is substantially correct. Intuition gives us the real order, and in the real order necessary truth or the Idea and God are identical, but we do not know intuitively that the idea, real and necessary being, is what in the order of reflection is meant by the word God. This identity is precisely what requires to be demonstrated, and the demonstration of this is what is meant by the demonstration of the existence of God. The process of demonstration suggested by the author, so understood, is legitimate and conclusive. He has right to add :—

“Therefore the doctrine of the presence of God in reason in no sense enfeebles any of the proofs of the existence of God, and in no respect disturbs the ordinary method of demonstrating it. On the contrary, it explains and justifies it. It is still true to say with the Scriptures, with St. Paul and St. Thomas, that we know God, and raise ourselves to him by the spectacle of the world and the human soul.”—p. 266.

The last objection the author considers is the most formidable of all in the minds of our theologians. We have briefly answered it ourselves in the beginning of the present article, but it may be well to hear the answer of the author, who is a theologian, as well as a philosopher.

“It is a principle of faith that in this life and by our natural powers we do not and cannot see the Divine essence ; that the sight of this essence is disproportioned to our forces, and to our merits, that it is the essential object of supernatural grace, and that it is reserved, in its perfection, to a future life, as the recompense of faith and charity. This high doctrine is clearly taught in the Sacred Scriptures : ‘ Deum nemo vidit unquam. . . . Videmus nunc per speculum

object, as Cousin does by representing what he calls the impersonal reason as divine, and yet representing it as that within us which knows. We know by means of that reason, objectively present in the fact of knowledge. From this objection the author proceeds to objections of another order, urged by theologians. The first of these objections is that we see God only mediately through creation and creatures,—*Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur*, as St. Paul says. This objection has been so often answered in these pages, that it may seem like a sheer waste of time and space to answer it again; but it may still be acceptable to our readers to see what so reserved and judicious an author as M. Maret replies to it. From the words of St. Paul, the theologians, he says,—

“Conclude that it is not by a direct light that we know God, or at least that his existence is not the first truth in the order of knowledge. Here important distinctions become necessary. We undoubtedly raise ourselves to God by the contemplation of nature and ourselves, and thus ascend, as it were, from effect to cause. This is a process of the human mind that gives admirable proofs of the existence of God. But in all these proofs, so beautiful and so certain, is not the idea of God presupposed? Is not the idea of God anterior to the reasonings by which we prove his existence? I have, in the first place, the idea of myself, of the world, of the finite, but at the same time I conceive myself, the world, the finite, I conceive the infinite. These two ideas are primitive, contemporaneous, simultaneous in my mind. I begin not by an abstract idea of being, which would give me only an abstract being. I pass not from the finite to the infinite, nor from the infinite to the finite, which would be a contradiction. With these two primitive ideas, which I find in my mind, the other ideas and principles are necessary. . . . But necessary ideas and principles, although they are the Divine Light, do not at first give us a reflective or reflex knowledge of the existence and perfections of God. We attain to that only by reasoning. For example, I have a certain view of necessary truth, and I see at the same time that it must be referred to (that it is) a necessary substance, and to a necessary intelligence, to which it belongs, and which manifests it. Then this intelligence, this substance exists, and therefore God is. From a certain view of God, implied in the intuition of necessary truth, I conclude his existence, as from the sense of myself I conclude my own personal existence. The existence of God is not then the first truth known by us; between our reason and the affirmation of his existence, there is an intermediary, and this intermediary is at once the Divine truth, the soul which it enlightens, and the world which reflects it.”  
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in ænigmate, tunc autem facie ad faciem. . . Nunc cognosco ex parte, tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum. . . Cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est.' The possibility and the gratuity of this vision of the divine essence is a doctrinal point attested and preserved by a unanimous tradition, and established by St. Thomas in the twelfth Question of the first part of his *Summa*, with the superiority and power of his reason.

"But it is, on the other hand, no less certain by scriptures and tradition, that divine truth, the Divine Word himself, is the real teacher of our souls. He is the light which enlighteneth every man coming into this world; *Lux quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundo*. Before St. John, the psalmist had said that God had stamped our souls with an impression of his light: *Signasti super nos lumen vultus tui*. This second truth has been established by us in the whole of this Course. Our only object has been to prove it to conscience and reason, and to show that it is the true philosophical tradition. The point now is to reconcile these two truths, which appear, at first sight, to contradict one another. But there is no contradiction in the case. The direct view of divine truth and of God himself in this truth is not and cannot be the vision of the Divine Essence, because that vision consists in seeing God face to face : and in knowing him as he is in himself. Now this natural view of divine truth is essentially distinct from this perfect, this sublime vision. In fact, the view face to face is not only a direct view, but also a perfect view, without clouds or shadows. But the natural view is very imperfect; by it we see only a few essences, a few laws, and these only dimly and with great difficulty.

"But it may, nevertheless, be objected that the supernatural and beatific vision of God differs from the natural view only in degree, and then the two modes of participation, and consequently the natural and the supernatural are not essentially different. This objection would indeed appear formidable, if the supernatural vision were the participation in the divine only as it is representative of creatures. But it is something more than that; it is the view of God such as he is in himself, *sicuti est*; *cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum*. A profound theology distinguishes, in fact, in the Divinity two different aspects: God in himself, that is to say, in his simplicity and his Trinity, his interior life, and God in his relations with creation, God the archetype of creation, that is to say, bearing in his intelligence the ideas and laws of real and possible creations. The divine truth which enlightens us here below manifests to us some few of these ideas, some few of these laws. We know that both are images of the Divine Essence; but in them we recognize rather the essence of creatures than the Divine Essence itself. We in no sense see that essence in itself, for we do not see the relation of infinite multiplicity to infinite unity. The view of the infinite Essence would show

us on the contrary how the infinite multiplicity of ideas and laws which are in the divine thought, in so much as it conceives creations, forms only one and the same perfectly simple idea, proceeds always from a single act always immanent. We should see, as far as it is given to the creature to see, how this multiplicity is resolved into the most perfect unity, how when we rise to the highest thoughts we conceive, indeed, that God sees in himself, in his perfect simplicity, an infinity of degrees of being, all which are an image, a representation of his essence; we conceive, indeed, that he sees out of him, in real or possible creations, the limits or relations implied by this infinite multitude of copies of pure and unalterable essence; we conceive, in fine, that this multiplicity introduces no division, no composition, no limit into infinite simplicity; our reason conceives the strict necessity of this infinite perfection, but without being able to explain and comprehend it.

"The view of the Divine Essence would not only unveil in part the relations of God with creation, it would also enable us, as far as given to the creature, to penetrate the mystery of the divine life itself, to see how the divine substance is common to the three infinite and equal Persons, who form only one and the same Divinity."—pp. 266–270.

We see in this answer a satisfactory refutation of the objection, but the author, we hope, will pardon us, if we say we also find in it some looseness of expression, and some inexactness even of thought. Will he forgive us, if we say that he does not appear to us to be fully master of the ontological method, and sometimes speaks as a conceptualist rather than as an intuitionist? The distinction of aspects in God is a *distinctio rationis ratiocinate*, as say the theologians, not a distinction *in re*, in our manner of conceiving, not in the manner in which God really exists and is intuitively affirmed to us. The ideas in the Divine mind, which are the types and possibilities of creatures, are not images or representations of the Divine Essence, but that Essence itself, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, when he says: "*Idea in Deo nihil est aliud quam essentia Dei.*" To make them the image of the Divine Essence would, it seems to us, place them in the Word or second Person distinctively, and deny intelligence to the Father and the Holy Ghost. Intelligence and will belong to the essence, the nature, and are, therefore, one in the three Persons of the Godhead. Ideas in the Divine mind are types, not of the Divine Essence, but of existences which God does or may create, and hence St. Thomas says, "*Deus simi-*

litudo est rerum omnium." The Divine intelligence is not representative of the Divine Essence, but is that essence itself. This is the doctrine the learned author holds as well as we, and is the same sense in which he says St. Augustine and the Christian Fathers generally understood Plato against Aristotle and some others who pretend that Plato held ideas to be separate individual existences. The real answer to the objection is not that we do not intuitively apprehend the essence of God, for in God no distinction between his essence and his existence,—his *essentia* and his *esse*,—is admissible, but that we see his essence only extrinsically, only in its relation to creatures, not intrinsically, as it is in itself; and therefore we are quite willing to say that we see God only in seeing his works, as in external vision we see the light only in seeing the objects it illumines and renders visible. The ideal formula—*Ens creat existentias*—contains indeed the three terms of a judgment, subject, predicate and copula; but the three terms are not given distinctly, in three separate intuitions; they are given as a synthesis in one and the same intuition. God—Ens—is given not alone, but as the subject of the predicate, *existentias* or creation. Now the view of God as the subject of the predicate creature,—a predicate joined to him by his own free voluntary act *ad extra*, placing or creating it, can hardly be confounded with that intrinsic view of God as he is in himself, in his own interior life and being enjoyed as their reward by the Saints in heaven. If the ideal formula be accepted, we see God, in natural intuition, only as the subject of the predicate, and therefore only in conjunction with the creatures placed and illumined by the light of his own being. This is the way we understand our natural intuition of God, and it seems to us to harmonize perfectly with the teachings of St. Paul. Understanding now that real and necessary being, though intuitively given, is distinguished from the other two terms of the formula, and proved to be God, only discursively, or by reflection and reasoning, we cannot for the life of us see any reason why the discursionists should hesitate to adopt the intuitive method, or why they should wish to keep up any longer a controversy with the ontologists. Every theologian, however psychologically inclined,

is obliged, the very moment he comes to set forth and explain theology, natural or supernatural, to adopt the ontological method, and all great theologians, as M. Maret proves in the volume before us, have been avowedly ontologists.

We have dwelt so long on the first part of M. Maret's volume, the presence of God in reason, and the exposition and defence of the intuitive method, or the Platonic doctrine of ideas as rectified by St. Augustine and Christian theology, that we must reluctantly reserve to a future article the consideration of the still more important second part, which treats of the insufficiency of reason, and the necessity of Divine Revelation. The necessity of Divine Revelation and the character of the supernatural is for our age and country the question of questions, for the real doubt we have to combat is the doubt of Christianity as the supernatural order. The age accepts Christianity as the best expression of natural religion that has been made, but it refuses to believe in the reality of a supernatural order properly so called. M. Maret sees this, and seeks to remove the doubt of the supernatural without producing a deeper and more fatal doubt, that of the natural. In establishing the presence of God in reason as its principle and light, he has established the high prerogative of reason, indicated its dignity, and obtained a solid basis for his demonstrations. He has asserted and defended the necessary preamble to faith, and notwithstanding the few criticisms we have offered, certainly in no captious or disrespectful spirit, has given us a book of solid merit, and rendered to philosophy a service which those who best understand the subject will appreciate the highest.

ART. IV.—*The Incoming Administration,—Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Central America.*

THE Democratic party have succeeded in electing their candidates for the presidency and vice-presidency of the Union. They have won the victory at the polls, but the far more difficult task awaits them of turning that victory to the common good of the country. Mr. Buchanan is a

man of experience and ability, but he assumes the reins of government in circumstances of no ordinary difficulty, and which are well fitted to try the best of men, and to call forth the firmness, energy, and decision of the greatest. If he proves equal to his position, carries the government safely through the present crisis, and leaves at the end of four years the party of the Union united and strong enough to administer the government on constitutional principles in spite of all sectional opposition, he will render his administration memorable in our annals, and deserve to be ranked as the second Father of his country.

The most of us who at the North voted for Mr. Buchanan did so on Union principles, for the purpose of defeating what we regarded as a Northern sectional party on the one hand, and an intolerant, un-American party on the other. We ourselves supported him not from any attachment to the Democratic party as such, but as the candidate opposed to Know-Nothingism and Abolitionism, the two most threatening dangers that existed prior to the election. But there are other extremes also to be guarded against. Know-Nothingism we regard as dead and buried. The danger now arises almost solely from the question of negro-slavery,—a question which has no place rightfully in our Federal politics, but which has found a place there through the fault of the South as well as of the North, and cannot without a fearful struggle now be excluded. The incoming administration cannot prudently stave off this question, but must meet it boldly, firmly, and dispose of it, or it will dispose of the Democratic party. The Cincinnati platform endorses the policy embodied in the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, but unless the administration gives to that policy a very liberal interpretation, it will prove the rock on which the party will split, and perhaps the Union itself.

The Kansas-Nebraska policy, not, however, adopted for the first time, in the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, was designed to combine the Slave States as a solid phalanx in support of the Democratic party, so as by the aid of two or three Democratic States in the non-slaveholding section of the Union, to secure the election of its candidates for the presidency against all the rest, and even against the majority of the popular vote. There may be

political conjunctures, when such a policy is excusable, but regarded as the permanent policy of a party that professes to consult the welfare of the whole Union, we want language to express the abhorrence in which it should be held.

We shall be believed when we say that we do not oppose this policy on slavery or anti-slavery grounds. We condemn that policy solely for its bearing on the distribution of power, and on the administration of the government. The Slave States constitute not the strongest section of the Union, but the slave interest is stronger than any other one interest in the country, and is more than a match for all the others taken singly. It can combine a larger political minority in its favor than any other, though after all only a minority. To combine all the slaveholding States around that interest, and secure them the administration of the government by the aid of one, two, or three Democratic Free States against the votes of all the rest, is really to place the government in the hands of the sectional, slaveholding minority, because that minority is the immense majority of the party that elects the President. To suppose such a policy to be permanent is to suppose that the slave interest is to govern the country, and that the majority of the Union is to submit to the slaveholding minority. If fully carried out and consolidated, the policy would virtually disfranchise, as to the general government, the majority of the American people, and render the non-slaveholding States the subjects, ultimately the slaves, of the minority, held together by a particular interest, and that too an interest which has no right to enter into the politics of the Union. No statesman, worthy of the name, can for one moment believe the Free States would long submit to be thus deprived of their legitimate influence in the affairs of the country, and quietly acquiesce in the domination of some three hundred thousand slaveholders, in a single geographical section. Having, as they well know, the absolute majority, having also, as they fully believe, the power, they would rebel against their Southern masters, and form a Northern sectional party, do their best to defeat and subject the slave interest, and in their turn attempt to bring the slaveholding States under the domination of

Northern manufacturers, bankers, brokers, and stock-jobbers.

There are anti-slavery men at the North,—and we have found anti-slavery men also at the South,—but it would be a great mistake to suppose that it is a real anti-slavery feeling that has in the late elections given the so-called Republicans their immense majorities in the Free States. It is no such thing. The large majority of the electors in the non-slaveholding States are neither “nigger-drivers” nor “nigger-worshippers,” to use the homely but expressive terms of the *New York Herald*, and while strongly opposed to the extension of the area of slavery, they have no disposition to interfere with it where it now legally exists. It is in the power of the South to make every man, woman, and child, north of Mason and Dixon’s line, an abolitionist, but as yet the majority are not so, and are willing to leave slavery to the disposition of the several States in which it exists. The real struggle between the North and South is a struggle for power. The South seeks to extend and consolidate the slave interest, because that interest gives her a power in the Union to which she is not entitled by her numbers, and the North opposes slavery, not because of its alleged sinfulness, but because it would prevent it from becoming predominant, and excluding the Free States from their legitimate influence in the Union. Here is the significance of the struggle that is now raging, and which the incoming administration will be obliged to face as best it may.

The Kansas-Nebraska policy may be thought to have elected Mr. Buchanan, and his natural temptation may be to administer the government in accordance with the Southern interest which has contributed the most to his election. The Southern minority is the immense majority of the party that has elected him. In all except two or three Free States the Democratic party is for the present in a hopeless minority; a very large majority of the popular vote of the Union was cast against it, and without the union of the South, where is Mr. Buchanan to look for support for his administration? And how is he to retain the South united, without supporting the policy of the slave interest? But, if he does support that policy, if he makes it a point to favor that interest, and carry out

the views of those who aim through it to control the administration, as Nicholas Biddle hoped to control the credit system of the world by buying up the cotton crop of the South, he will not only administer the government as a Southern Sectional President, but inevitably prepare the way for the accession of a Northern Sectional President in 1860. The experiment of the last election is one that cannot be repeated with success. There is a spirit aroused at the North, whether good or bad, that cannot prudently be tampered with, and Mr. Buchanan's safety lies alone in administering the government on strictly Union principles,—justice to all sections of the Union, but partiality to none. He must interpret the Kansas-Nebraska policy to mean really and truly the non-intervention of Congress in the question of slavery, the complete exclusion of that question from Federal politics.

The Kansas-Nebraska Bill professed, but falsely professed, to be framed on the principle of non-intervention. Slavery, we hold, is a local institution, and not placed within the province of the Federal government. That government is bound to respect it where it legally exists, as it is bound to respect all the laws and institutions of the several States, not in derogation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and to provide for reclaiming by their owners persons held to service in one State and escaping into another ; but further than that it has no constitutional power over it. It can neither abolish it where it exists, nor authorize it where it does not exist, unless it be in the District of Columbia. The Kansas-Nebraska Bill is opposed to this principle, and is an attempt on the part of Congress to enable slavery to gain a legal introduction into new territory, under the pretence of leaving it to the Territorial people to decide for themselves whether they will have slaves or not. But the people of a Territory not yet erected into a State, have no political or civil powers, except those conferred by Congress, and Congress can confer no power which it does not itself possess, or authorize them to do any thing which it has not the constitutional right to do itself. Congress having itself no right to say whether slavery shall or shall not be allowed, it cannot, of course, authorize the people to do so.

The attempt to get over the lack of power on the part



of Congress, by the recognition of so-called "squatter sovereignty," is unworthy of high-minded and honorable statesmen. Squatter sovereignty is an absurdity, and repugnant to the first principles of all legal order. Under our system of government the people as States possess original and underived sovereignty, and sovereignty, under God, in its plenitude, save so far as by their own free and irrevocable act they have delegated its exercise to the Union. But the inhabitants of a Territory have no original and underived sovereignty at all; they have no existence as a sovereign people, and no inherent political or civil rights and powers. Whatever legislative authority the territorial legislature may have, it holds it as a grant from Congress. To recognize in the people of the Territory original and underived legislative power is a contradiction in terms; for it is to recognize them as a State, while they are only a Territory. When they receive permission from Congress to organize themselves as a State, and to form a State Constitution preparatory to admission into the Union, they may authorize slavery or not as it seems to them good, for then they act as a State, from their own inherent sovereignty, but not till then; for till then, they can act only under the authority of Congress. The clause in the Bill remitting the decision of the question of slavery to the Territorial people is, therefore, in our judgment, totally unconstitutional, and all acts done under it are null and void from the beginning.

Congress can neither legislate slavery into a Territory nor out of it, because slavery is not within the scope of its constitutional powers, and is a matter over which the States have supreme and exclusive jurisdiction. This, as we understand it, is Southern doctrine, and we believe it sound. Let the South and the North each have its advantages and submit to its disadvantages. The slaveholding States ought to be satisfied with it, and the Free States, if they love the Constitution, have no reason to object to it, for it excludes slavery from all territory under the Union, till it becomes a State. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided that slavery is a local institution, and exists only by virtue of local law. The right of the master, then, to his slave is not a right that adheres to him, and which he can carry with him into other territory, or

a foreign locality. Hence all our courts hold that a slave brought by his owner into a Free State ceases to be a slave, and he would be free the moment his master carried him across the frontier even into another Slave State, if the positive law of this latter State did not renew and confirm the master's right. The principle on which our courts proceed is, that every man is born free, and can be deprived of his natural freedom only by a positive local law. Every man is in presumption of law a freeman, and no one can be treated otherwise than as a freeman, except where a local law making him a slave can be pleaded. The slave carried by his master, or were it not for the constitutional provision with regard to Fugitive slaves, escaping from that locality into another where no such local positive law can be pleaded, resumes his natural freedom, and re-enters the class of freemen. Nature knows no slaves. By the law of nature all men are born free and equal, and man has no *jus domini* in man. The Common Law, in so far as it does not consist of local customs and usages, is coincident with the law of nature or natural right, and customs and usages have the force of law, only in their particular locality. There is no American law common to the whole Union that authorizes slavery in the absence of the statute law prohibiting it, because such law could proceed only from some act of the States forming the Union, and no such act can be pretended. The argument based on the obligation of Congress to protect the right of property, which we used in 1847, in our article on *Slavery and the Mexican War*, is rendered invalid by the decision of the Supreme Court, of which we were then ignorant, that slavery exists only by virtue of local law. Therefore the right of property held by the master in his slave is a local right, and has no existence out of that locality. If we understand the decision, the Federal Courts can recognize the right of the master only in cases that come under the *lex loci*. Hence the courts of law in Kansas, were a suit brought involving the point, would be obliged, we doubt not, to declare the alleged slave a free man, whatever may have been the action of the people or the Territorial Legislature. We deny that slavery does or can legally exist in Kansas, so long as Kansas remains a Territory under the United States.

The great objection to the Kansas-Nebraska Bill is to the clause authorizing the people of the Territory to decide whether they will allow slavery or not. We deny the power of Congress to authorize them to do so. In so far as the Bill touches slavery, it provides for its possible introduction into territory where it can not go legally or constitutionally. It was an attempt to impose upon the Democracy, by confounding the people as a Territory with the people as a State, although by no means the first attempt of the kind. It hoped, because the people as a State are sovereign, to have it pass without opposition that they are sovereign as a Territory, or have as a Territory inherent and underived legislative authority,—an absurdity equalled only by the so-called Missouri Compromise, which we are glad to see struck from our statute books. We reject with indignation this abominable doctrine of “squatter sovereignty,” and oppose the Kansas-Nebraska policy still more for its recognition of this doctrine than for any advantage it is likely to secure to the slave interest. Yet, as a recognition of it in favor of that interest, it is also objectionable.

Our readers know that we are no abolitionists, and no one can suspect us of any sympathy with them. We say distinctly that we are strongly opposed to all efforts made in the non-slaveholding States to abolish slavery where it now legally exists. We have no right or wish to interfere with it in a single Slave State. It is, in those States, an affair of their own, and to their disposition of it we feel ourselves bound to leave it. We always have defended, and always shall scrupulously defend, to the best of our feeble abilities, all the constitutional rights of slaveholders as well as of non-slaveholders; we will not interfere with the free development and expansion of slavery within its legal limits; but we are not and never have been the champion of slavery; we have never been and never expect to be captivated by its beauties; and, in common with the great body of the people of the Free States, we are personally opposed to its extension beyond the limits of the States in which it now legally exists, and we cannot condemn those who believe themselves bound to use all their constitutional rights to resist its further extension. We will scrupulously respect all the rights of the Slave States, but we

expect them to respect equally all the rights of the Free States, and we are unable to see why it is not as honorable and as chivalric to labor to extend the area of freedom as it is to labor to extend the area of slavery. If we are opposed to the subjection of the South by the North, we are equally opposed to the subjection of the North by the South. We deem it the part of all wise American statesmanship to resist by all constitutional and honorable means, the building up in any section of the Union of a great consolidated sectional interest, able to control and subject all others. The slave interest is as legitimate as the banking or the mercantile interest, but it is every where one and identical, and is already the most powerful interest in the country, and if it comes into Federal politics, it is able, through the division of other interests, to control the policy of the General Government. As far as this interest is legitimate, and is wielded in a constitutional way, we have nothing to allege against it; but as a citizen, looking to the welfare of the whole Union, we may well be opposed to its growth and expansion beyond its legal limits; we may well be disposed to use all our constitutional rights to restrict it and to keep it out of the arena of politics, and on the same principle, and for nearly the same reasons that General Jackson was opposed the old United States Bank.

We enter here into no inquiry as to the party that first brought slavery into Federal politics. Very likely the North in this respect is the principal offender. But whoever was the first aggressor, the question has now to be met on its merits, as at present before the public, and treated in reference to its bearing on the future peace and integrity of the Union. There is a party at the North, resolved at all hazards to effect the complete abolition of slavery,—a party that may become strong, but which as yet is comparatively weak. There is also a party at the South, or a so-called Southern party, that avails itself of the aggressions of the North as a plea for extending and consolidating the slave interest. Its members are called disunionists, and perhaps do now and then threaten secession; but their real policy, as we regard it, is not disunion, but, through the slave interest, supremacy. It enters into their calculation by filibustering or other means to annex Cuba, all

Southern Mexico, and Central America, as Slave States, and they are taking their measures to force the North to aid them, apparently to take the lead, in doing it. Cuba is to be annexed to prevent it from becoming a free colony, and also to add another Slave State to the Union. If the Spanish laws and edicts on slavery were executed in Cuba there would remain very few slaves in that island. I am told that by far the larger part of the black population of the island are legally entitled to their freedom, and that the reason why the Cuban Creoles wish to be annexed to the Union, is the fear that the mother country, the moment she gets matters settled at home, may take it into her head to see that her laws and edicts in favor of freedom are enforced, and thus deprive them of their slaves. This is the Spanish tyranny of which we hear so much. It is pretty certain that slavery will not much longer exist in Cuba, if it remains a colony of Spain. Hence the desire of the Cuban slaveholders to be annexed to the Union; and to avoid another example of emancipation in their immediate neighborhood is one strong reason why the people of the South-Western States entertain the same desire. Re-open the slave trade, annex Cuba, Mexico, and Central America, these last after having been first organized into a Southern Republic by Walker or some other equally worthy adventurer, apparently hostile to the United States, so as not to excite the opposition of France and England, and the slave interest will have so extended and consolidated itself that it can not only defy, as it is trusted, the attacks of Northern abolitionism, but also dictate as a master the policy of the Federal Administration. This, we take it, is what the so-called Southern party, really not more Southern than Northern in its composition, is pursuing. It is, also, a policy not absolutely impracticable, if its abettors can, by alarming the friends of the Union as to the danger of Northern sectionalism, prevent the sound portion of the people from interposing in time to thwart it. Northern speculation has a hand in it, and its most efficient supporters we presume are to be found in this city. The Cincinnati Platform, with its endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, the strong emphasis placed on the so-called "Monroe doctrine," and the recent movement towards the revival of slavery by Walker in Nicaragua,

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are all significant, and indicate pretty plainly what is intended and what is expected.

We do not pretend that this policy finds its support only at the South, or that there are not Northern demagogues and speculators in abundance leagued with the Southern ; nor do we pretend that the South is unanimously in favor of it. The mass of the people both South and North are really and firmly attached to the Union, and ask nothing more than to have the government administered in accordance with Union principles, leaving all sectional interests to be disposed of by the several State governments. But the advocates of the policy we have under consideration are laboring through the slave interest to combine the whole Southern people in its favor, by making them generally believe that their only security for their slave property is in its realization. The leaders of the party are, perhaps, Northern, rather than Southern men, and the whole scheme looks to us like the product of a Northern, rather than a Southern brain. It smells of Wall street. These leaders care no more for one section of the Union than another, and their aim is simply to use the South through the slave interest to further the purposes of their own selfish ambition and personal aggrandizement. They wish to build up a single permanent interest strong enough to dictate the policy of the government, and the slave interest is the one which seems to them to have the requisite capabilities. By combining slavery with democracy, and democracy with the extension of territory and therefore with the interest of the speculators, they hope to succeed in their plans.

The danger in this case, as in most others, comes from creating false issues. The party we oppose labor at the South to confound the security of slave property, where it is legally recognized, and which is all that the great body of the Southern people ask, with slavery extension, or the enlargement of the area of slavery ; while at the North they labor to confound opposition to the extension of slavery into new territory, with abolitionism, or a determination to interfere with slavery in the Slave States themselves. They will not suffer either at the South or at the North the proper issue to be made before the public. Hence the danger. The first thing for Mr. Buchanan

to do, is so to shape his administration as to bring the question in its proper form before the American people. He must show the South that the security of slave property and the extension of slave territory have no necessary connection, perhaps are incompatible one with the other, and the North that opposition to the extension of slavery into territory where it cannot go constitutionally does not involve abolitionism, and may be consistent with the most scrupulous respect for the rights of slave property in its own locality. All the great body of the Southern people want is security for their property in slaves; all the great body of the Northern people think of asking is security that slavery shall not leap its present bounds, and become the dominant interest of the country. Mr. Buchanan, then, must make his appeal distinctly to the great body of the people both North and South, and show by his appointments and the measures he adopts or recommends that, as far as depends on his government, the slaveholding States shall be protected in all their constitutional rights, and no countenance will be given either to the party of abolition or the party of extension. This is what is imposed upon him as a constitutional President, and if distinctly adopted and carried out with resolution and impartiality, the administration will be brought back to Union principles, and the demagogues whether Northern or Southern will be defeated. This is the work Mr. Buchanan has been elected to perform, and which he must perform if he means even to retain power in the hands of the Democratic party.

In urging this Union policy upon the incoming administration against the abolition party on the one hand and the slavery extension party on the other, we are warring against the just rights of no section, we are simply warring against sectionalism, whether Northern or Southern. The Federal government was instituted for the common weal of all the States, and its utility depends on its confining itself to the interests common to all sections of the Union. We do not, in asking the administration to discountenance the slavery extension party, ask it to interfere positively to prevent the extension of slavery to new territory, but not to interfere to favor it. Slavery cannot extend legally beyond the present Slave States into territory not yet erect-

ed into States, without the positive action of the Federal government ; and the only concession to the North we ask is, that that action shall be withheld, for it is both dangerous and unconstitutional. All the concession we ask for the South is, that the question of slavery be excluded from Federal politics, and left to be disposed of by the States, by each State, when a State, for itself, and as regards the Territories by the Federal Courts. More than this neither the North nor the South has any real interest in demanding, and to demand more may be to get less.

The admirers of slavery, whether Northern or Southern, must know that they stand very much alone, and that it is too late to attempt to make converts to the slave system. Say what we will, slavery is regarded by the civilized world as an odious institution, as well as by the great mass of the people of the Free States, and even the people of the Slave States themselves are very far from being unanimous in their admiration of it. We have found as much genuine, honest abolition sentiment in the Slave States as we have ever found in the Free States, and the Southern politicians, who talk so violently against the Northern Yankees, know very well that it requires the most strenuous efforts on their part to retain their hold on their constituents. Most of their declamation is intended for effect at home rather than abroad. For ourselves personally, we would not emancipate the slave population at the South, if we had the power, not, indeed, because we like slavery, but because, with all the study we have been able to give to the subject, we can discover no condition possible at present for the mass of that population superior to that in which they now are. Humanity towards that population, if nothing else, would prevent us from being an abolitionist. But the South cannot be ignorant that she has the civilized world against her, and, if she seeks in earnest to foist her domestic institutions on territory under the Constitution now free, she will meet in the Free States a resistance, which even her chivalry will not be able to withstand. The Free States are determined that there shall be no further extension of slave territory to the North or to the South, and the immense pluralities in the late election for Colonel Fremont prove that their resolution in this respect is not to be despised ; and yet Colonel Fremont himself did not command



the full vote of the party opposed to slavery extension. If his election had turned on that question alone, he would have swept by overwhelming majorities every non-slaveholding State in the Union, and perhaps have carried two or three even of the Slave States. This should admonish the incoming administration that no strengthening and consolidating of the slave interest beyond its strict constitutional rights, can be prudently attempted. The Free States will not consent to be governed by that interest. Southern politicians and Southern journals may threaten secession, may talk disunion, may advocate a Southern slaveholding confederacy, but it will not move the mass of the people in the Free States. If the controversy proceeds to blows, they will give as well as receive, and perhaps not be the first to yield. If worst comes to worst, the old battle of the Puritans and the Cavaliers will be fought over again, and the party opposed to slavery extension will then, in spite of all that can be said, be an abolition party, and the cry will be "freedom to the slave," instead of the old cry of "a godly reformation of the Church and State." The South cannot afford to provoke such a conflict, for in it the moral sense of the civilized world would be with the North, which would be cheered on as the champion of freedom.

But we have not the slightest fear of a civil war. There is too much good sense and good feeling in all sections, and too ardent a love for the Union to permit it; and on neither side will it get beyond the bullying point. Yet the South can no more safely press slavery extension than the North can abolition principles and movements. Either is pregnant with danger, and should be abandoned. Let the abolition movement be restrained, and the slavery extension movement can be easily defeated; let the slavery extension policy be withdrawn, and we can easily confine abolitionism to a few harmless men and women who find their dissipation in philanthropy instead of theatres, routs, and balls. Both movements must be suppressed, and the policy of the incoming administration must be to suppress them by favoring neither, and by resisting each when it seeks either to control or to embarrass it. In doing so, we do not say Mr. Buchanan will escape opposition or obloquy; he will no doubt be accused of want of fidelity to the Cincinnati Platform, of betraying the South, or of

courting the North ; but he will, if he does it openly, decidedly, bravely, be sustained, for the people know that the only Platform he is at liberty to consult is the Constitution, and the only party to which he is responsible is the party of the Union. He has not been elected to carry out the will of any sectional party, Northern or Southern, Eastern or Western ; but to administer the government for four years on constitutional principles, and with sole reference to those rights and interests which are common to all the States. Let him feel that, and take his stand above party, command party, not serve it, and the country will sustain him, and honor him as one of her greatest and most deserving Presidents.

We know the slavery question is one of great delicacy, but it must be resolutely faced, and both sections must give up something. The South must yield its assumed right to transport slave property into Territories not yet erected into States, and the North must yield its pretension to the right of Congress to refuse to admit a State into the Union, whose constitution does not exclude slavery. The Southern claim is unfounded because the right of property in slaves is local, not general ; and the Northern pretension is unconstitutional, because Congress has no right to examine the constitution of a sovereign State any farther than to ascertain that it is not anti-republican or incompatible with the Constitution of the United States. Under our system it is neither anti-republican nor unconstitutional for a State to authorize slavery. The people of the State, not of the Territory, have the undoubted constitutional right, within its own jurisdiction, to establish or to prohibit slavery as they please ; and to the people of the State,—not of the Territory, as says the Kansas-Nebraska Bill,—the disposition of the question must be left. This may not prevent the extension of slavery into new States after their formation as States ; but it will prevent its extension by the aid of the Federal government, which is all that the anti-slavery extension party can constitutionally insist upon, or attempt by political action. With this both sections must be contented. Any claim on either side beyond will only provoke exaggeration on the other, and render internal peace impracticable.

There must, again, be no talk of reviving the African slave trade. The slave trade is placed by the Constitution under the authority of Congress, and the Union has the constitutional right to act on it. No doubt our Northern and Eastern cities swarm with Mammon-worshippers anxious to have the trade re-opened, and ready to enter into it with all their Yankee energy and perseverance; but that traffic is infamous, and by nearly all civilized nations is declared to be piracy. Were we to re-open it we should become for ever infamous. It is almost enough to make an honest man turn abolitionist to find slavery so blunting the moral sense as to permit men otherwise honorable and high-minded to broach, even in conversation, a thing so infamous. We confess what we have read in respectable Southern journals, and heard talked by men of high character in regard to re-opening the African slave trade has shocked us, and greatly modified our feelings on the subject of slavery. That traffic was condemned by the Church as long ago as 1482, and the condemnation has been renewed by successive Popes down to our own times. The Catholic who engages in it, who reduces the African negro to slavery, or who buys and holds as a slave any one so reduced from a state of freedom, is *ipso facto* excommunicated. No class of citizens have more uniformly or more faithfully supported the constitutional rights of the slaveholding States than Catholics, both North and South. With us it has been a point of conscience, of religion to be loyal to the Union, loyal to the Constitution, and it has been a sense of duty to the Union, to the Constitution, that has made us here at the North vote in almost one solid phalanx for Mr. Buchanan, against what we regarded as Northern sectionalism. None of us like slavery, none of us wish to perpetuate it; we all of us love freedom, and hold all men to be equal under the law of nature; but we all respect vested rights, and our respect for the constitutional rights of the slaveholding States, has led us to vote, often much against our personal interests, with the South. But we can never support any party in so infamous a project as that of re-opening the African slave trade, a trade which our religion condemns, and which has brought a curse upon every Catholic State that has permitted it. We regard it with horror, and must oppose

it to the last gasp, let the cost be to us what it may. If you insist on it, you will compel us to vote as Catholics, as well as citizens, against you, for you then insist on a matter that our religion as Catholics condemns. You touch our consciences, and compel us for religion's sake to cast our votes against you, and there is not a non-slaveholding State in the Union, without us, on whose vote you can count. You would make a Northern sectional party a duty as well as a necessity, and commit the honor of the country to the keeping of the North. This were moonlight madness, and we do not believe that the high-minded and chivalric, the moral and Christian South will itself consent to it.

The project of re-opening the slave trade, advocated, we regret to see, by the Governor of South Carolina in his recent Message to the Legislature of that State, if seriously entertained, will give to the question of slavery a new face, as well as new and startling dimensions, and convert every Northern Union man into a decided anti-slavery man. Northern Union men do not love slavery, and they submit to it where it legally exists, only as they submit to a lesser in order to avoid a greater evil. Impose upon them the additional burden of bearing the infamy of the slave trade, and you will find them entirely unmanageable. They will, in their indignation, throw off that burden and the other too. Constitutional scruples will no longer restrain them, and they will pour down upon the South as an army of veritable Northern Berserkirs, whose fury no earthly power can restrain or withstand. Is it prudent on the part of the friends of slavery to push us so far, to exact so much of us? Is it wise to take away from us all middle ground, and force us either to become propagandists of slavery or to join with the abolitionists? Can they not see that, if compelled to take sides, we shall deem it more Christian, more honorable, more chivalric even to make common cause with the abolition movement than with a movement for reviving and legalizing the African slave trade? Cannot these so-called "fire-eaters" understand that we at the North, especially we who have always stood by the Union and resisted all encroachments on the constitutional rights of the slave interest, have the principles of religion

and of honor in as high a degree at least as they have? Can they not understand that we have defended the South from loyalty to the Constitution, and not from any good will we have to slavery? Do they expect to convert us to their slavery worship, and to make us admirers of the concealed beauties of negro-slavery? If they have so expected, it is time for them to be undeceived.

We know the enemies of the Union at the South and at the North labor with all their might to force the party whose candidate Mr. Buchanan was into one extreme or the other, and to compel it to be either an abolitionist or a pro-slavery party. They are determined that there shall be no Union men. The wider they can make the breach the better are they pleased. The abolitionists hope by so doing to compel all the Free States to take up their cause, and the pro-slavery men hope by the same means to combine all the Slave States, and through them either rule or split the Union, and form a grand Southern Republic in which slavery may be developed and expanded without the restraints necessarily imposed by their connections with the Free States. But if the South follows the lead of these "fire-eaters," who look for a grand field for slavery expansion in yet unannexed Mexico, Central America, and the West Indies, the abolitionists will prove the successful party, for they will have the Federal government and the moral sympathy of the world on their side. Cotton, rice, and tobacco are very important, we own, in regulating our exchanges, but not so important as they were before the California gold discoveries, and California will not go with the Slavery Republic. The immense Republican vote in the Free States proves, among other things, that exchanges do not depend as exclusively on Southern products as they did a few years ago. The great West is opened, and its products are every day becoming a more and more important element in trade, domestic and foreign. The great agricultural Free States in the valley of the Mississippi, all Republican States, with two exceptions, not to be counted on, will never suffer the mouth of the Mississippi and the southern outlets of their trade to be held by a foreign State, though of kindred blood, especially if that foreign State depends on slave labor. The Southern Confederacy would find itself

opposed not only by the North-east, but by the still more formidable North-west, and brave as are the Southern chivalry, and as handy as they are in using gutta-percha canes, they would be powerless before the two united, acting by authority of the Federal government, with the war-cry of Freedom.

No ; the interest of the South as well as of the North is in loyalty to the Union, and she should be as careful to avoid the issue the "fire-eaters" and abolitionists are forcing upon her as we of the North, and perhaps even more so. She must, then, for her own sake discountenance all movements towards reviving and legalizing the slave trade, and be contented with our fidelity to our constitutional engagements. If she finds the slave interest too weak for her ambition, it is a misfortune from which she has no right to expect the Free States to relieve her. She takes her chance with the rest, and must bear her share of her own burdens. We do not reproach her with her slavery, but we owe her no aid beyond letting it alone where it is. With that she must make up her mind to be satisfied, and so much the Free States are, in that case, bound to give her.

We have been discussing slavery merely as a political question, in relation to Federal politics ; we have not felt called upon to consider it in its moral aspects. As a Catholic the moral question has long since been settled for us. We have no vague, floating, or uncertain doctrines on the subject. We do not agree with the abolitionists that slavery is *malum in se*, and that one cannot with a good conscience be a slaveholder. We do not any more believe that slavery is an unmixed evil, or that in private morals, or the Christian virtues, the Southern people are one whit inferior to their Northern brethren. As a general rule, we believe the slaves are treated with kindness and humanity, sufficiently fed and clothed, and not over-worked. We believe they are morally and physically better off, with individual exceptions, than they would be if emancipated ; and therefore we would not, as we have said, disturb the relation which exists between them and their masters, if we had the power and the constitutional right. Nevertheless, the more we have seen of slavery under its most favorable aspects, the more satis-

fied are we that it is an evil to be borne, rather than a good to be sought, to be confined rather than extended.

We are not writing in a spirit hostile to Southern interests. We have dwelt indeed more on the danger of movements to strengthen and consolidate the slave power than on that of the Northern Abolition movements, because we have for years dwelt on the latter, and because we think it always the part of wisdom to guard first against the danger that is nearest and most pressing. The nearest and most pressing danger is that of converting the party which in the late election supported Colonel Fremont into a strictly anti-slavery party, and this can be guarded against by no efforts so to extend and strengthen the slave power as to secure to it the administration. All efforts of that sort will tend only to precipitate the danger, for it is precisely against such extending and strengthening of the slave power that that party is organized. The moment the United States Bank entered the arena of politics and attempted to obtain a power too strong for the government to resist, although apparently in self-defence, its doom was sealed, because the people, moved by an instinct of freedom, would not suffer the existence of a moneyed power outside of the government strong enough to control it. It will be the same with slavery. Its safety depends on its weakness, not in having or in appearing to have the power to shape the policy of the government. It has reached the extent of its power, and to seek to make it more powerful, is precisely to excite a more determined hostility to it, and a hostility that under no circumstances it will become strong enough to subdue. If slavery, where it exists, cannot find security without governing the Union, it will not be permitted to exist in the Union at all.

It must never be forgotten that slavery is repugnant to the moral sense of the civilized world. It belongs to a past age, to the heathen rather than the Christian republic, and no Free State will consent to place the interest of slave labor on a par with the interest of free labor. The thing is not to be thought of. To administer the government in the interest of the free laboring classes is wise and just, in harmony with the best and strongest spirit of modern times; to administer it solely in the interest

of capital, especially when that capital consists of slaves, human beings, men like ourselves, descended from the same stock, and redeemed by the same God become man, is repugnant to that spirit, and to the uniform tendencies of our holy religion. Such is the fact, war against it as you will. It is, then, in vain that you brand as aggressive any constitutional action of the government intended to affect favorably the interests of free labor, or claim in the name of equal rights a like action in favor of slave labor. The equality in the case is not and will not be conceded, for freedom is the natural right of every man, and slavery its abridgment by positive law. In the case of free labor the law must be interpreted liberally in its favor; in the case of slave labor it must be construed strictly, and favor as little as possible the owner of that labor. The policy of the law is to favor freedom and to restrict slavery. This being the case, free labor may develop and expand itself any where and to any extent not prohibited; slave labor only where and to the extent authorized by positive law. There is no aggression on the rights of slave labor in seeking to keep slavery out of all territory now free, while there is a direct aggression on free labor in seeking to subject that territory to the slave interest, for in all cases slavery is the abridgment of the natural rights of man. Hence the efforts of the South to expand her system of slave labor against free labor, where free labor has not been by law deprived of its natural freedom, will be counted a positive aggression and resisted as such. Therefore we maintain that the security of slave property consists in its not attempting to extend or strengthen itself beyond its present limits, and in submitting without resistance to the free and full development of free labor within its constitutional bounds. To do otherwise were to provoke a contest in which slave labor would be deprived of all its rights, even where it now has rights. Any man who knows the country and is capable of putting two ideas together cannot fail to see and admit this.

We, therefore, regret the policy shadowed forth in the Cincinnati Platform, which, under pretence of non-intervention by Congress in the question of slavery, contemplates in reality the strengthening of slavery by the addi-



tion of new slave territory not as yet within the limits of the Union. The Ostend Conference, the emphasis laid on the so-called "Monroe doctrine," the obvious wish on the part of our late Minister to England to break up the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and the filibustering clauses of the Cincinnati Platform taken in connection with Walker's movements in Central America, the effort made by General Quitman and others in Congress for the repeal of the Neutrality Laws, and the advocacy at the South of the revival of the African slave trade, all indicate a policy, the character of which it is impossible to mistake. The policy is not to press the extension of slavery in any of the present territory of the Union now free, but to indemnify the slave interest by annexing, at the earliest practicable moment, Cuba, Central America, and Mexico as Slave States. This will give the South the predominance in the Union, or at least afford her security against any growth or expansion of the Free States. The national greediness for territorial aggrandizement, the filibustering spirit now so rife, the speculators now so numerous in all sections of the Union, the strength of the existing slave interest, the love of democracy of the American people, and their confidence in their manifest destiny, it has been supposed would, all combined, secure the adoption of this policy against all possible opposition.

It would now seem that the plan is, in the first place, by the aid of the filibusters, Transit Companies, or other corporations and speculators, to organize Mexico and Central America into a great Anglo-Saxon Republic, as a duplicate of our own. In the beginning, in order not to excite the hostility of Great Britain and France, it will be organized ostensibly for the purpose of interposing a barrier to the further progress of the Union to the south. It contemplates, we presume, adding to this Southern Republic California and all the territory of the Union west of the Rocky Mountains, and as many of the Southern States as choose to secede, and aid in forming a slaveholding republic. But ultimately it is to be joined to the present Union, so as to extend the Union over the whole North American continent, together with the West India Islands. A grand scheme, we admit, and one which we do not doubt is seriously entertained by men who are not yet in a madhouse.

Even were this policy practicable, it should be opposed by every patriot, every friend of morality, by every man who has the least regard for national honor. The true policy of this country is undoubtedly to prevent Cuba from passing into the hands of a first-class European power, but not to take possession of it ourselves, even if we could do so with the consent of Spain herself. It would add nothing to our strength, and in fact as an outlying post, incapable, in case of war with a great European power, of defending itself, would much extend and weaken our system of military defences. In regard to Central America, through which lies one of the great highways of the future commerce of the world, all we want is that it should not be held by a power able to close that highway to us. Of course, we cannot consent to let Great Britain, France, or Russia have possession of that highway, and for the same reason we can never suffer to grow up a rival power, Anglo-Saxon or not, able to dispute with us the transit across the Isthmus. These are fixed points in our national policy, which we shall maintain, if need be, with the whole moral and material force of the Union. But beyond we need nothing. A free transit across the Isthmus for our commerce we demand, and we shall do our best to exclude the settlement of any power there strong enough to deny it to us. Our interest requires nothing more, and this interest would exclude the grand Walker empire just now talked about, as much as it would England or France. The policy of our government has never gone, and we much doubt if it will go any further. General Pierce came into power with certain filibuster proclivities, and his foreign appointments were all such as to create the impression that he intended to pursue a policy of territorial aggrandizement. But events proved too strong for him, or experience soon taught him a sounder policy. He has succeeded in giving his administration, with a few exceptions, the right position in regard to foreign powers; the end of his government has well-nigh retrieved the errors of its beginning, and we regret that he is not to be at the head of the administration for the next four years, unless Mr. Marcy be retained as Secretary of State. But whatever may have been Mr. Buchanan's views at the Ostend Conference, or as Minister to England, we cannot believe he will aim at more in re-

gard to Cuba or Central America, than to simply carry out as occasion may require, and as he has power, the so-called "Monroe doctrine," and this much even we should insist upon.

The free transit across the Isthmus for our commerce is necessary to enable us to keep up the balance of the New World with the Old. Great Britain is not at present ambitious of extending her power in the New World. She has turned her attention to the East, and hopes to monopolize the trade of entire Asia. She is aiming at the commerce of the Black Sea, and to gain a position in Sicily and also on the Persian Gulf, so as to check Russian advances towards India, and to neutralize France in Africa, Syria, and Egypt, and by means of the Euphrates railroad, and a railroad, or a canal, if she can control it, across the Isthmus of Suez, to place Asia in competition with America. This is the only way in which she can maintain herself for any great length of time against our commercial rivalry. We can meet her policy only by a ship canal across the Isthmus of Central America, and a railroad through our own territory to the Pacific Ocean enabling us to compete advantageously with her in Eastern Asia. Great Britain having turned her attention eastward, and being likely for some time to come to have her hands full with France and Russia, whom in the late war she adroitly played off one against the other, our filibusters seem to fancy that there is a chance of founding, by aid of the slave interest, a Southern Republic unconnected with the Free States of this Union, and of securing the commercial advantages to which Central America is the key. Hence the opposition of the South to the Pacific Railroad, unless it is made so far South as to come within what is intended to be the Southern Republic. But this Southern Republic is a dream that will never be realized. The whole power of the Federal government in the hands of the Free States, will be exerted, if necessary, to prevent it. Those Southern States, not yet within the limits of the Union will, if they change their present condition, be annexed to our confederacy. No matter what the journals may say. No administration will favor or suffer such a republic independent of the Union.

To the annexation of these States there are several

weighty objections. One is that we have no right to them, and cannot do it without tarnishing our national honor. Another reason is, the South will oppose their annexation unless they are annexed as Slave States, and to their annexation as Slave States the North will never consent, and the North is wrought up to that degree of heat, and is so confident of its strength, that it will have its way. It counts its late defeat a victory, and it will yield hereafter to slavery nothing not contained in the bond. In all the Spanish American Republics slavery has been abolished, and we shall never consent to take the retrograde step of reëstablishing it. The progress of the whole civilized world since the introduction of Christianity has been towards the abolition of slavery. To reëstablish it where it has been abolished is to take a step backwards towards barbarism and paganism. It would be a fine compliment to American Democracy to say that wherever it extends it carries slavery with it. It will do very well for our Southern "fire eaters" to tell us slavery is the basis of freedom, and the cement of the Union, but no man of ordinary intelligence and right feeling can be expected to believe it. The States in question may ultimately be annexed to the Union, but not till they can be annexed as Free States. Some of the Slave States may threaten secession, and may even take measures to secede; but they will soon be glad enough to return, for if they secede they will leave the Union behind them, and by no means carry it with them. We have confidence that this grand filibuster and annexation scheme will find no favor with the incoming administration.

The true policy for us towards our Spanish American neighbors is to respect their rights as independent states, to suppress all invasions of them by our citizens, to protect them, aid them to recover from their internal distractions, and stimulate them by our trade and good offices to maintain well ordered governments, and to develop their internal resources. In this way we shall best promote both their interest and our own. At any rate, the incoming administration must put down filibustering. Filibusters are simply freebooters, pirates, thieves, robbers, murderers, and it is any thing but creditable to us, that they are able to awaken the sympathies of a people like the Ameri-

can. They are corrupt and corrupting, and already have they had a most deleterious effect on both the public and private conscience of large masses of our citizens. No doubt they have gained sympathy chiefly because they have given themselves out as the soldiers,—irregular soldiers it may be,—but the soldiers of liberty. Walker's conduct in Nicaragua in revoking the decree abolishing slavery, and practising the most cruel despotism, strips them of that mask, and they will henceforth, we hope, be held in the horror and detestation they deserve.

Some things more we had intended to say, but we have said enough. We have written for the purpose of throwing out a few suggestions which we hope the incoming administration will regard as those of a friend and not an enemy, but as those of one who loves truth and justice even more than the material interests of his country, and his country more than party, and who asks nothing of any administration for himself. Wiser suggestions may be made ; none more honest or disinterested will be offered. We follow no party lead ; we go with party as far as it goes with us, and no further. We reluctantly voted against Colonel Fremont, for we feared the influence of the abolition leaders who surrounded him, but we are as loath to support a Southern as a Northern sectional party, and though we voted for Mr. Buchanan, we will support him only so far as he proves himself a Union President.

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ART. V.—*Reflections and Suggestions in Regard to what is called the Catholic Press in the United States.* By the MOST REV. JOHN HUGHES, D. D., Archbishop of New York. New York : Dunigan & Bro. 1856. 8vo. pp. 34.

JOURNALISM in its present sense is of modern origin, and dates, according to *La Civiltà Cattolica*, only from the beginning of the French Revolution in the last century. Before that world-event there were gazettes, newspapers, and even literary and scientific periodicals, but no journals established for the purpose of acting directly on society, and effecting by the formation and force of public

opinion great political, social, moral, or religious ends. Catholic Journalism, or Journalism devoted to Catholic interests, is of a still more recent origin, and hardly dates from a period anterior to the fall of the first French Empire ; but the encouragement it has received from the Catholic Prelates in most countries and even from the Vicar of our Lord himself, permits us to regard it as a legitimate calling, in which every Catholic is as free to engage, under a proper sense of responsibility, as in any other secular business. Journalism did not, it is true, originate with Catholics, or in the interests of religion, but with the enemies of the Church, for revolutionary purposes ; yet since it is in itself indifferent, and may be used for good as well as for evil, there is, as far as we can see, no solid reason why the Church should not avail herself of its capabilities for good, and suffer it to be used for the promotion of her interests, as she does the printing press itself, steamboats, railroads, lightning telegraphs, progress in legislation, or any other invention or improvement in the natural order.

Before the institution of Journalism the Church got along very well without it, and she could continue to get along very well were it suppressed. It enters not into her constitution, and is in no sense essential to her existence or to her efficient operation as the Church of God. But it is one of the most striking characteristics of our age and especially of our country, and the chosen medium of acting on the public mind. The ablest, the most energetic, and living writers of the day, instead of writing folios, or pamphlets as formerly, write leaders in the journals, or contribute articles to Reviews and Magazines. Journalism has undeniably become the most approved and the most efficient means through which modern thought is expressed, and the public mind is formed and directed. Every party, almost every fragment of a party has its public journal as the organ of its peculiar doctrines, opinions, purposes, hopes, or aspirations. It becomes necessary therefore for Catholics to have their journals, and to use them as a means of neutralizing the effects of the non-Catholic press, and of promoting what may be called the external interests of religion. It seems but right that they should do what they can to turn the weapon invented for their

destruction against their enemies, and to convert what was designed for evil into good ; and we know from the encouragement which the Holy Father has deigned to extend to us personally, and also from that so generously extended to us by the illustrious hierarchy of our country, that it is so. With the generous coöperation of the Catholic laity with their clergy, we see no reason why the Catholic press, in a very short time, should not become in the hands of Catholics even more efficient for good than it has hitherto been for evil in the hands of our enemies.

As yet, Catholic Journalism is in its infancy, and is far from having developed all its capabilities. The Catholic public have not yet given it full play, and are as yet hardly prepared to regard it as an approved mode of promoting Catholic interests. They find it, in some measure, foreign to their habits as Catholics, and distrust it the moment that it goes beyond the province of the gazette or the mere newspaper, or aims at something more than the publication of interesting items of intelligence, or the refutation of some foul calumny on Catholic persons or Catholic institutions, and attempts to enter into the discussion of the great living questions of the day and to obtain for them a Catholic solution. They have not taken a sufficiently broad and elevated view of its real province, and are startled rather than edified by its rising to the level of its mission. They but imperfectly appreciate its liberty in matters of opinion, and are too ready to visit an error or what they suppose to be an error in matters of opinion with a severity due only to an error in matters of faith. The conductors of Catholic Journalism are to a great extent uncertain as to the legitimate sphere of the Catholic journalist, and are sometimes weak and inefficient through a laudable fear of encroaching on the prerogatives of authority, and sometimes mischievous through their rash assumption of the province of the pastors and doctors of the Church. But these defects and errors of both people and journalists are due to the infancy of Catholic Journalism, and to the want of clear, distinct, and definite views of its legitimate sphere. They will be corrected with time, and disappear in proportion as Catholic Journalism comes to be more fully and more universally recog-

nized as a lawful calling, and its rights and duties are better understood and more clearly defined. For a long time to come, Catholic Journalism is likely to be an approved institution for the defence and support of Catholic interests. It will always be outside the Church, below the Church, and in the natural order ; but still, as the representative of a just public opinion it will come, like true civilization, to the defence and support of religion against her external enemies. It has and can have no spiritual authority ; it is and can be no institution in the Church, but is and may be an institution outside the Church, devoted to her interests, and capable of rendering her valuable external service, through its action in forming and directing public opinion.

Our own so-called Catholic Press has, no doubt, the errors and imperfections incident to its youth, and the heterogeneous character of our Catholic population. As Catholics, in all that pertains to religion proper, they are homogeneous, and of one mind and one heart ; but in all other respects they are about as diverse as it is possible to conceive them, and nothing is more natural, if nothing is more to be regretted, than that the diversity which obtains among them should have its representatives in the press. That this diversity has had its representatives, and that the utility of the press has been impaired thereby, and some injury done to Catholic interests, must be conceded. His Grace, the Archbishop of New York, ever vigilant as becomes the faithful and zealous pastor, sees and deplors it, and with a view to remedying the evil, and preventing the press in future from fostering any divergent tendencies there may be among us, has written and published the highly interesting and important document now before us. His Grace's aim has evidently been to restore harmony where it has been disturbed, and to remind the press that Catholics should live and act in unity, and that it forgets its duty when it sows divisions among them. He is deeply impressed with the dangers that threaten our internal peace ; he thinks these dangers, partly incidental to the diversity of our Catholic population, have been greatly increased by certain journals conducted by persons professing to be Catholics, but never recognized as Catholic by the proper authorities, and he has wished to disclaim



them, and to warn the Catholic public against encouraging them. Thus he says :

"The only ground on which the writer of this paper would feel himself authorized to present his views in relation to the Catholic press, is a ground of zeal and interest for the universal harmony and union, not only in faith, but also in charity, of all the scattered members of the Church of God, who are to be found spread over the surface of this now great empire, extending from the southern boundaries of Canada to the northern limits of Mexico, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. These Catholics are not homogeneous in the order of natural birth, inasmuch as not all have been born in any one country ; but they are homogeneous in the supernatural order, by which God has provided that they should be spiritually born into the *one* Church, which is not the church of any nation, but of all nations without distinction—holy, Catholic, apostolical.

"One of the greatest calamities that could fall on the Catholic people of the United States, would be, if allusions to variety of natural origin should ever be allowed to distract their minds from that unity of hope and mutual charity which results from the communion of saints.

"For some time past it has been observable that this so-called Catholic press has exhibited, especially in the North, divergencies well calculated to excite attention, if not alarm. On the one side it has been assumed that the success of religion in this country depends on the continuous influx of emigrants, especially those of Irish origin, and that religion vanishes in proportion as the Celtic feeling dies out in this country—that the national character of the American people, and more particularly as it affects the 'first and second generation of emigrants,' is hostile to the Catholic religion—that the best method of perpetuating the faith in this country, so far as the Celtic race is concerned, is to keep up and perpetuate a species of Irishism in connection with the faith.

"On the other hand, it has been assumed with equal confidence, but not on any better foundation, that our holy faith will labor under great disadvantages, and can hardly be expected to make much impression on our countrymen, until it can be presented under more favorable auspices than those which surround foreigners. In short, that, if it were rightly understood, its principles are in close harmony with those of our Constitution and laws—that it requires only a skilful architect to dovetail the one into the other, and to show how the Catholic religion and the American Constitution would really fit each other as a key fits a lock—that without any change in regard to faith or morals, the doctrines of the Catholic Church may be, so to speak, Americanized—that is, represented in such a manner as to attract the attention and win the admiration of the American people.

Now, in the opinion of the writer, the prevalence of either of these two systems would be disastrous to the cause of the Church.

"The Church is not a foreigner on any continent or island of this globe. The Church is of all nations, and for all nations as much as the sunbeams of heaven, which are not repudiated as foreign under any sky. In fact, truth, no matter by whom represented, is at home in all climes; and this not simply in matters of religion, but in matters of history, arts, and science."—pp. 5-7.

We are unable to conceive any thing more Catholic or more in accordance with Catholic interests than the purpose here expressed. We have ourselves, as our readers well know, written several articles with the same purpose, and we will not affect to conceal the gratification it affords us to find his Grace adding the weight of his position and character, and the aid of his powerful pen to a cause which we have had so much at heart, and which is so intimately connected with the peace and prosperity of our Catholic community. We have labored earnestly to prevent the division of our Catholic population into classes according to their respective birthplace or national origin. The lesson we, in our humble way, have done our best to impress on our readers is, as his Grace so happily expresses it, that "the Church is not a foreigner on any continent, or island of this globe. The Church is of all nations, and for all nations, as much as the sunbeams of heaven, which are not repudiated as foreign under any sky." There are no national distinctions in the Church, no distinction between Jews and Gentiles, Greeks and Barbarians, for God hath made of one blood all the nations of men, to dwell on all the face of the earth. This lesson we have repeated almost *ad nauseam*, so anxious have we been to impress it on the minds of our readers. His Grace expresses our own views far better than we could ourselves express them, in the following truly Catholic passage:

"Now, in view of these facts, neither clergy nor laity can afford, as Catholics, to have any distinction drawn among them in our periodicals, as among natives and foreigners. In the Catholic Church there are no natives. There is the nativity of baptism subsequent to the natural birth. There is the adoption by grace of every soul, whether introduced into her communion during the period of infancy or in adult life. Neither are there foreigners in the Church of God—it is one Lord, one faith, one baptism."—pp. 10, 11.

Thus we wrote, in perfect accordance with this, in our Review for last October, p. 521:—"In religion we know no national distinctions, and if we ever allude to them, it is to rebuke the ill-judged and dangerous attempt to bring them into the Church, or to make the Church in this country the monopoly of any nationality. We censure no man for his nationality; we judge no man by his nationality.... Religion is Catholic, not national." We had previously written: \* "Catholicity asserts the unity of the race, the common origin and brotherhood of all men, and nothing is more repugnant to its spirit than to judge men by the race from which they have sprung, or the nation in which they were born. Never should we treat any race with contempt, or claim every virtue under heaven for our own. Away with these petty distinctions and petty jealousies. What is it to the Catholic that the blood that flows in his brother's veins has flowed from Adam down through an Anglo-Saxon or a Celtic channel? Through whichever channel it has flowed, it is the same blood, and has flowed from the same source. All men are brothers, with one and the same Father, and one and the same Redeemer." If there is any one thing more than another that we have felt it our duty to do all in our power to repress, it has been precisely the disposition that we saw fostered in certain quarters to insist on national distinctions, and to renew here on this continent and among Catholics the old war of races, and it is no little consolation, amid the misapprehension to which we have been subject, and the abuse we have received, to find the illustrious Archbishop of New York laboring expressly and avowedly, with earnestness and vigor to the same end.

His Grace speaks of two divergent tendencies, of two opposing systems, and seems to imply that there is springing up amongst us an American Catholic party opposed to Catholics of foreign birth. Whether such be or be not the fact his Grace is a better judge than we, and it is a matter that we shall not allow ourselves to discuss. We only wish to have it distinctly understood that, if there is any such party, we have no connection with it, have never been and shall never be its organ. We are

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\* Quarterly Review, October, 1854, p. 454.

American by birth, education, connection, habit, and sentiment, and intend to remain so ; but we should deprecate the formation of a party hostile to foreign born Catholics, as much as his Grace does the formation of a party hostile to American born Catholics. Undoubtedly, as an American convert we have our mind and heart principally set on the conversion of our non-Catholic countrymen, and are in the habit of looking upon Catholic questions and proceedings in their bearing on these countrymen of ours, whom we so ardently desire to see converted ; but never with feelings of hostility or indifference to our Catholic brethren of foreign birth. We have heard individuals, some of native, some of foreign birth, contend that the Church will never take root here and prosper as she might till we have an indigenous clergy, but we have never entered into the discussion of that question. As we understand it, the uniform policy of the Church has been, in all ages and countries, to provide for each country, at the earliest practicable moment, a native clergy, and such, we are assured, is the policy, as far as practicable under the circumstances, pursued by our own venerable hierarchy. It has never entered into our head or our heart, we own, to question the wisdom of that policy, or to arraign the Church at the bar of public opinion for having uniformly pursued it ; but we have never suffered ourselves to draw or to suggest comparisons between American born and foreign born clergymen, and we have never forgotten that a large proportion of our laity are foreign born, and that for them an American born and educated clergy would not be a native clergy. We beg permission to reproduce here what we wrote on this whole question of nativism and foreignism in our Review for April, 1856.

“ We have thus far, as every body knows, depended chiefly on the immigration of Catholic foreigners for the growth and prosperity of the Church in the United States, and on the Irish more than on any other class of immigrants. The Irish immigrants are not the only Catholics in the country, as some good people imagine, but they, and their children born here, are a very large majority. In the greater number of places they make up the principal part of our congregations, and are the most active, energetic, and devoted part, and the most liberal in supporting Catholic interests and institutions. No Catholic American is, or can be, insensible to what we owe to Catholics born in Ireland for our present numbers and posi-

tion. But, we think, the time has come when we should cease to speak of ourselves as Irish, German, English, French, or even as American Catholics, and accustom ourselves to think and speak of ourselves in religion simply as Catholics, and in all else as men and Americans. These foreign national distinctions, though naturally dear to the immigrants themselves, who are not expected to forget their fatherland, cannot be kept up in this country, even if it were desirable that they should be. The children of foreign born parents do and will grow up Americans, and as American in thought, affection, and interest, as the descendants of the first settlers of Virginia, Massachusetts, Maryland, or our own Empire State. The foreign national distinctions are, for the most part, obliterated with the first generation, and all attempts to perpetuate them, especially where English is the mother tongue, are and must be fruitless. Catholics in this country, of whatever national origin, are in general heartily tired of them. They serve only to divide and weaken our forces, to place us in a false position in the country, and prevent us from feeling and acting as one homogeneous body. We are all Catholics; we are all Americans; and our duty and our interest alike require us to avoid all expressions that must excite in ourselves or in others a feeling to the contrary. If a man is a good Catholic, and does his duty as a loyal American citizen, it is nothing to me where he or his parents were born; and if I do my duty as a Catholic, and as an American citizen, nobody has any right to object to me that this is my native land. The only man for us, as Catholics, to mark and avoid, is he, *whether American born or foreign born*, who labors to stir up prejudices of race or nation amongst us, draws odious comparisons between native born and foreign born Catholics, and seeks to divide us according to the race or nation from which we have sprung. Such a man is an emissary of Satan, and no Catholic; no lover of the country should bid him good morrow. *Nolite recipere eum in domum, nec Ave ei dixeritis.* He is worse than a heretic. Let the most worthy fill the most exalted places; let no one be chosen or rejected solely for his birthplace, or that of his progenitors. Undoubtedly, we want a national clergy, that is, national in the sense that they understand and appreciate the real interests and wants of Catholicity in the United States, and will labor for them with enlightened and true-hearted zeal; but it is not therefore necessary they should all be born or educated in the country. We have never yet sympathized, and trust we never shall sympathize, with that spirit, formerly so strong in Poland and England, which would suffer none but natives of the land to receive preferment in the National Church; we will never stop to ask the nationality of the priest before consenting to receive the sacraments at his hands, or to inquire whether the prelate whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us be Saxon or Celt, before begging his blessing, or yielding him the reverence and obedience due to his pastoral office. This is

the view we have always taken ever since we have had the honor to conduct a Catholic Review, and it is the only view, in our judgment, proper to be entertained by any Catholic in the Union."—*Quarterly Review*, 195–197.

In our Review for last July we say, p. 403 : " We are not aware that, at the present time, the foreign born clergy are much out of proportion to the foreign born laity." And in our Review for October last, we say, p. 518 : " We are as much opposed to the introduction of Know-Nothingism into the Church, as we are to its introduction into the state." It is but simple justice to us to regard passages, like these, which abound in all our articles touching the subject, as qualifying what might otherwise seem to favor exclusive Americanism. They should be taken as indicative of our real sentiments, and if the same weight had been attached to them by our readers, which we ourselves attached to them when writing, nobody would ever have dreamed of ranking us with a party, even supposing such a party to exist, that seeks the exclusion of foreign born clergymen or foreign born laymen ; and we are sure that it is owing to their having been overlooked, or being regarded as insignificant, although designed expressly to save us from being misunderstood, that we have been so widely and so strangely misapprehended. Let those who have interpreted our articles as unfriendly to foreigners, or as unduly American, re-read them, and regard the qualifications which are always inserted, and suppose that we really mean by them what we say, and they will be as much surprised as we have been by their misapprehension of our sentiments.

We speak not for others ; but, speaking for ourselves, we assure his Grace that we have never contended that the principles of our religion may, by a skilful architect, be dovetailed into our civil and political principles, or that the doctrines of the Catholic Church can or should be *Americanized*. The system he speaks of and justly reprobates, has always been entirely foreign to our habits of thought. As an American and a convert, and therefore thinking we might understand non-Catholic Americans better than persons who have not been born and brought up in this country, we have, presumptuously perhaps, ventured, we own, to throw out, from time to time, various suggestions as to

the best manner of presenting the arguments for Catholic truth to the non-Catholic American mind. We have not hesitated to suggest, nay, to maintain, that the method usually adopted by our popular works of controversy, is not the one best adapted to make the most favorable impression. We have contended that the *arguments* for the Church, not her *doctrines*, may be presented, and even ought to be presented, in a manner better fitted to affect favorably the mind of our non-Catholic countrymen. We have, also, ventured to express our conviction, that various things, not of faith, nor of universal discipline,—things usually regulated, in other countries, by concordats between the Ecclesiastical and Civil authorities,—may be, and need to be modified here, if we wish to secure to the Church, in her temporalities, the full benefit of our civil laws. We have gone no further. We have never been in the habit of contending that the Church should be conformed to the secular order, and it has, as our readers well know, been made a grave charge against us, and we have even been half-menaced,—in jest, we presume,—with excommunication for it, that we assert too absolutely the supremacy of the spiritual over the temporal.

We have never represented the principles of Catholicity as peculiarly adapted to those of our civil and political institutions, but we have labored to prove that there is no necessary mutual repugnance between them; and therefore have concluded, on the one hand, that we may be good Catholics and loyal Americans, and on the other, that we may be loyal Americans and good Catholics. We have done even this, not for the purpose of assigning a reason why men should be either Catholics or republicans, but to refute the popular objection, that the Church is incompatible with our political and civil institutions.

Undoubtedly, we have contended and still believe that there opens in this country a glorious field for the spread of Catholicity, and for the Church to exert her full influence on civilization. But we have never dreamed of a neo-Catholicism, or even of a new development of Catholicity; yet we have hoped and believed, and still hope and believe, that there will be effected here, under the influence of

Catholicity, a new development of *civilization*, or a higher and truer civilization, which we never confound with Christianity, than the world has hitherto enjoyed, because we believe the Church has here a fairer field for the exercise of her social and civilizing influences than she has ever heretofore found. In this we do not seem to ourselves to differ at all from his Grace, who himself says :—

“But in the annals of Church history, there has never been a country which, in its civil and social relations, has exhibited so fair an opportunity for developing the practical harmonies of Catholic faith, and of Catholic charity, as the United States.”—p. 8.

We have believed and believe that this opportunity will not be neglected, and have done what we could to urge our Catholic brethren to avail themselves of it, and thus realize on this continent, not a new and better *religion*, but a new and higher *civilization* for the world.

His Grace does us the honor of commenting on some opinions which we are supposed to entertain, and which he appears to regard as too hopeful in respect of our countrymen. Alluding to us he says, p. 20, “Whilst he, in his zeal, is sanguine of hope, that the predispositions of his countrymen, whom he knows well, are especially adapted to the reception of the Catholic religion, we fear that the reality will not correspond to the anticipation.” Yet he cannot mean this as a reproach, for he asserts, p. 26, “it is a relief and a consolation to believe that one who knows his country and his countrymen so well as Dr. Brownson, should cherish such hopeful anticipations of the future, in regard to the Church of God.” We presume his Grace will agree with us that, as a general rule, hope is a better counsellor than fear, and that it is better to err by being too hopeful than by being too desponding. We are not aware of having represented the predispositions of the American people as specially favorable to the reception of Catholicity ; we have always represented the great body of them as hostile or at least as indifferent to our religion ; but we have believed them disposed to have some sort of religion and not likely to be much longer contented with their Protestantism. The progress of the American mind, we believe, will force them before long to choose between Catholicity and no religion, and brought to that point, they will prefer the Catholic religion to none at all. We have



represented our countrymen as greatly in need of the Catholic religion, even under a political and social point of view, to cherish their patriotism and to preserve the republican liberty they so ardently love, and we have believed that, if once converted, they would carry into their Catholic life those natural virtues of boldness, energy, enterprise, and perseverance for which they are now so remarkable, because our religion does not destroy the natural, but elevates, purifies, and directs it. His Grace is not the man to reproach us for this.

Moreover, we are not aware that, since the first year after our conversion, we have expressed any very sanguine expectations as to the speedy conversion of our countrymen. We have, indeed, combated the discouragement, almost despair, into which the Know-Nothing movement, very unnecessarily, as it seems to us, drove some of our Catholic brethren, and have done what we could to stimulate hope and zeal for the conversion of our countrymen. Undoubtedly we have continued to hope not only in spite of all untoward appearances, but even in consequence of them. The Know-Nothing movement has done more in two years to bring our religion before the American people and to force them to examine it, than all our journals could have done in twenty. Why should we not hope? Does not God want this country converted? Do not the Church, the Saints, and all good Angels pray for its conversion? Is not God, is not all heaven, is not all that is good on earth on our side, not only to encourage us to hope, but to stimulate us to exertion? What need we for the conversion of the country, but that the Catholics in it should set about effecting its conversion with all the strength of Catholic faith, Catholic charity, and Catholic zeal? Undoubtedly it will not be converted if Catholics despair of its conversion, cease to make efforts for it, and, instead of keeping alive their hope and quickening their zeal by fixing their eyes on every favorable symptom, and availing themselves of every favorable opening, they only express the hopelessness of the task, or suffer their minds to dwell only on the discouragements the enemy throws in our way, or the obstacles that are to be overcome. In a work of this sort hope tends to fulfil its own prophecy. Why shall we damp the zeal, chill the hopes, and unnerve, by our fears, the

efforts of our friends? No doubt the conversion of this great country to the Church is as difficult as it would be glorious; but what then? We are not obliged to do it, or to undertake it in our own name or strength alone. When we engage with pure hearts, sincere zeal, and ardent hope in God's work,—and the conversion of non-Catholics is always God's work,—we have the right, in virtue of his goodness and his promises, to count on his working with us, and preventing our working from being in vain.

His Grace may be thought to be less hopeful than we, but we think this would be unjust to him. We are not more hopeful than his own remarks on the Catholic press warrant us in being. He proves that the first generation have not been neglected, nor the second generation lost, as it has sometimes been alleged, and, furthermore, that under all the disadvantages under which our religion has thus far labored the Church has been making progress in the country. We beg his permission to call the attention of our readers to the following extract from his well matured and eloquent pages:—

“In reference to this topic of the actual condition of the Catholic Church in this country, it is necessary to make just discriminations, before arriving at fixed conclusions. That the Catholic religion has lost not a few of the first generation, and still more of the second, is undeniable. But is this the only country in which such things have happened? Are we not inundated with reports of apostasies in various parts of Ireland itself? We know the agencies by which these temporary apostasies are brought about. The progressive and awfully persuasive powers of starvation render even a false religion, which offers bread and Bibles, less odious from day to day, to the wretched beings who have, at last, no alternative but a choice between death and falsehood.

“The loss to the faith in this country is of a somewhat analogous character. Among grown up and instructed Catholics, an instance of deliberate apostasy—that is, renouncing the Catholic faith, and professing some other nominal creed, is exceedingly rare. But in vast numbers of instances the parents of children, who had emigrated to this country, died before they were able to make any provision for their unhappy offspring. In other instances, they lived, or rather languished, under the trials incident to their condition, without having the ability to imbue the minds of their children with the principles of Christian doctrine. The consequence has been, that these children, taken charge of by the public, grew up entirely ignorant, and sometimes ashamed of the creed of their fathers. Under similar

circumstances, similar results would occur in any country; and no one who is impartial, will for a moment pretend that results of this kind are necessarily an evidence of the withering influence which some of our editors suppose to be exercised on the growth of Catholicity, by the civil and political institutions of the United States. There is a sense in which the Church may be said to have lost those children, but a truer form of expression would be to say that she had never gained them—inasmuch as the Providence of God permitted that they never had an opportunity of knowing their religion. Consequently, in their case, there has been no such thing as a renunciation of the doctrines of Catholic faith, with which it was their misfortune never to have been acquainted.

“If, on the other hand, we turn our attention to what would be a much truer test of the progress of the Catholic religion, there are abundant evidences to show that it is not retrograding. If we can point to instances in every state, in every diocese, almost in every parish, so called, in which Protestants of the most cultivated minds, most unblemished personal characters, have borne their testimony, actuated necessarily by the grace of God, to the overwhelming evidences of the truth of the Catholic religion; if this testimony has not been in theory only, but reduced to practice by their renouncing doctrines in which they had been reared, and embracing those of the one, holy, Catholic and apostolic communion, at the sacrifice of temporal interests, of long and cherished friendships, rising by that same grace of God superior to the tyranny of human respect; then who will say that our religion is not making progress in the United States, or that there is essentially any thing in its requirements incompatible with the genius and feelings of the American people? Compare these witnesses, who in mature life bear such testimony to the truth of the Catholic religion, which they embrace, with the alleged falling off of the unfortunate offspring of emigrants or others, who really never had an opportunity of knowing what that faith is, and who consequently never could, as a moral act, renounce it, and the impartial reader will be enabled to judge, so far as the power and honor of the Catholic religion are concerned, how the balance might be adjusted between loss and gain.

“Now it is certain, that the converts to the Catholic faith in the United States are very numerous; and, in point of respectability, many, if not all of them, entitled to rank in the first class of American citizens—natives of the soil.

“Should we not, in gratitude to God but in deep humility at the same time, feel great satisfaction at this result? These persons give a species of worldly standing to our religion, which, however, its Divine Founder did not leave to be dependent on the great ones of the earth. Among professional men, officers of the army and of the navy, lawyers, physicians, jurists, geologists, merchants, &c. &c., including a very considerable number of Protestant clergymen, the,

Catholic Church has welcomed to her fold, and taken to her bosom no small number of distinguished converts."—pp. 17–20.

To perceive the full force of this extract we must consider what we had to do and what we have done. Here we must be permitted to cite a passage from our Review for April last—

"Owing to the multitude of immigrants pouring in upon us before we had had time or means to prepare for their reception, to the poverty, and we may say little education, of large numbers of them, to our want of churches, priests, and proper teachers, and the absolute necessity of providing for the administration of the Sacraments to those ready to perish for the lack of them, we have not been able to do all for our children that we could wish, nor all that was necessary; but we cannot, whether native born or foreign born, be justly accused of having been indifferent to Catholic education; and an impartial judgment will honor us for what we have thus far done, rather than condemn us because we have not done more. That some of our children have been lost for the lack of proper looking after, we cannot deny; but all have not been lost, as is evident from the fact that the majority of us now living have been born in the country. In an old Catholic country, with permanent congregations, plenty of churches, a full supply of priests, and a completely organized hierarchy, there is all the machinery for education at hand, and it is easily placed in operation. But here all is new, and we have had every thing to create at once, in a moment, and with very inadequate means at our disposal. No suitable provision could be made for the young without the hierarchy, without priests, churches, and fixed congregations. Without these, where was to be our centre of operations, who were to be our teachers, and who were to furnish the means? We have thus far had, it would seem, enough to do to effect the ecclesiastical organization of the country, to gather congregations, erect churches, provide for the education of the clergy, and to get ourselves into a position in which we could devote ourselves to looking after and educating the children.

"We doubt if even our well-informed friends have duly considered what has been done by Catholics here since 1785, five years before the first bishop for the United States was consecrated. At that time we numbered only about thirty thousand, now we count at least two millions and a half. Then there were only four or five churches in the Union, now there are nineteen hundred and ten; then there was no bishop, now there are seven archbishops and thirty-five bishops; then there were only twenty-two or twenty-three priests, now there are seventeen hundred and sixty-one. We had then no Theological Seminaries; we have now thirty-three, besides five preparatory seminaries. We had no college; we have now twenty-six incorporated, and nine unincorporated colleges. There was then no female aca-

demy, and now we have one hundred and thirty-seven. Now when it is considered that three fifths of these churches have been built, and these seminaries, colleges and academies have been founded, during the last sixteen years, it must be conceded that we have not been wholly idle, or sparing of our means. When we take into the account that our colleges exceed in number those of any Protestant sect, and surpass, with three or four exceptions, in the beauty and extent of their edifices, any others in the country; that our churches number among them not a few of the largest, most splendid and costly in the Union; and add our convents, nunneries, female academies, hospitals, and orphan asylums, we are ourselves at a loss to determine whence have come the means to erect them. The means must have come, in chief part, from those who within the last thirty years have come into the country, with little except their hands and industrious dispositions. Some help has, indeed, come from abroad, but far less than has been represented, and by no means so much as we have contributed to pious, charitable, and other objects in Ireland alone, to say nothing of any other foreign nation. While engaged in building these churches, colleges, academies, hospitals, orphan asylums, &c., we could not be expected to provide equally for the education of all our children, especially the children of the very poor; and before we had erected them, had permanent congregations organized, a spiritual home for Catholic parents provided, the hierarchy established, and a supply of priests and teachers obtained, we neither had nor could put in operation the necessary machinery for looking after and educating the mass of poor children whose parents were unable themselves, no matter from what cause or causes, to give them a proper religious training. Looking at the difficulties we have had to contend with, the much we have had to do, and the unsettled and moving character of a large portion of our population, our poverty, and our comparatively few priests and still fewer teachers, it would be unjust to blame us for the past, or to cast the shadow of a reproach upon those who have thus far labored to provide for our Catholic wants. We have done much, far more than could reasonably have been expected; and if we are still behind Lower Canada, which is substantially a Catholic province, we are, as to the life, vigor, energy, and prosperity of our Catholicity, behind no other Catholic population on this continent."—*Quarterly Review*, 1856, pp. 199-201.

Now in doing all this our clergy have had their time and energies so engrossed that they could not direct their attention or their efforts specially to the great work of converting the country. One would think they had as much as they could do in providing the material means so essential to the preservation and prosperity of religion. Now if without the advantages we now possess, and while

engaged in procuring these advantages, these material supports for the future, it is still true, as his Grace maintains, that instances of deliberate apostasy with adults are exceedingly rare, and none of our children have been lost except those who, in consequence of the poverty or death of their parents or the inability of the clergy to reach them, were never gained to the Church, or instructed in the Catholic faith; if there is no withering influence exercised by our civil and political institutions on the growth of Catholicity, and there is essentially nothing in the requirements of our religion incompatible with the genius and feelings of the American people; if the converts have been numerous, and the Church has been able to gather into her fold converts from the most intelligent classes, and of the highest respectability, officers of the army and navy, lawyers, physicians, jurists, merchants, &c., including a considerable number of Protestant ministers, have we not every reason to indulge the most cheering hopes for the future? If, as his Grace asserts, the Church, under all the disadvantages of the past, has not only held her own, but has continued to make progress in the country, what is to hinder her, now these disadvantages are in great measure removed, and we have gained a vantage ground of churches, seminaries, colleges, schools, religious houses, hospitals, asylums, and a clergy far nearer in number to our wants, from making a still greater and a more rapid progress hereafter; our losses will be fewer, and what is to hinder the conversions from being more? Evidently, it would be to misinterpret his Grace, and to do him great injustice, to represent him as desponding, or to assume that he has not written with an express view to rebuking the complaints sometimes heard as to our alleged losses, and to establishing the fact that Catholicity is really advancing in the country. Certainly it has been his intention to encourage, not discourage, us in regard to the future of our religion in the United States. He is not, if he will permit us to say so, by any means as wanting in hopefulness as one or two of his expressions would seem at first sight to indicate. He is as hopeful as we have ever expressed ourselves, and if he thinks to the contrary, he must permit us to believe that it is because he has been led to believe that we have expressed our-

selves in stronger terms than we really have. If the facts are as he himself presents them, we see nothing to prevent us from hoping that this country in time will become substantially a Catholic country.

His Grace further alludes to us in this connection, and seems to assign us a position which we are not willing to hold, and which we have already disclaimed :—

“ The learned editor of the Review, so far from being discouraged at the gloomy prospect pictured forth by one or two others in regard to the prospective decline of the Catholic religion from the period when European, especially Irish emigration, shall have ceased, or been sensibly diminished, is, on the other hand, buoyant in his anticipations of the progress which the Church is destined to make, as soon as she will be more generally and more widely represented by natives of the soil and less so by foreigners, who indeed, in a worldly point of view, must appear under disadvantages.”—p. 22.

His Grace may be thought by this to imply that we stand on the side of the second system he began by describing, and that we regard the foreign immigration as an obstacle rather than as a help to the conversion of our countrymen, or to the prosperity of our religion in the United States. If such be his intention, he does us great injustice, and we respectfully, but most earnestly protest against it. In regard to those two systems, our position is precisely that which his Grace himself, as we understand him, occupies. Like him we reject them both. Certainly, we believe that the Church has taken such deep root in our country that it could survive were immigration to cease, and certainly, also, we believe native born and bred Catholics have many advantages in dealing with their countrymen that foreigners ordinarily have not ; but we have never doubted that foreign born Catholics have other advantages which may overbalance these. Here is how we expressed ourselves on this very point last April :—

“ We have, undoubtedly, reached a crisis in Catholic affairs in this country. Hitherto we have had foreign immigration, not only to provide for, but to rely upon, and the most thus far done has been done by foreign born Catholics. Immigration is now rapidly diminishing, and seems likely to become in a few years too insignificant to mention. The future of Catholicity here, as his Grace of this city has well remarked, depends, under God, on the Catholics now in the country, the majority of whom are native born Americans. The

responsibility now rests on us. We can no longer hope for accessions from abroad to make up for losses at home. In a short time, we shall be deprived of the wisdom, the experience, the sterling piety, zeal, and energy of those foreign born Catholics to whom we owe our present commanding and prosperous condition. We are to be thrown back on ourselves, and left to our own resources, as native Americans. How we shall meet the crisis we know not. *We contemplate it not without some misgivings.* Yet, when we remember that the God of our fathers is our God, and that God is here as well as in old Europe, we hope we shall not suffer the good work to languish in our hands. We trust the good God will not desert us, and we hope we shall do our best to prove ourselves not wholly unworthy of the trust committed to us. Yet we have a great work before us, and not easily shall we be able to prove at the end of seventy years a progress relatively as great as that made since 1785. *We are saddened as well as gladdened at the prospect before us, and fear that the children will hardly make good the places of the fathers.*" — *Quarterly Review*, 1856. pp. 211, 212.

His Grace cites, with disapprobation, the following paragraph from the article on the *Mission of America* in our last Review :—

"When the end we have to consult is not simply to hold our own, but to advance, to make new conquests, or to take possession of new fields of enterprise, we must draw largely upon young men whose is the future. These Catholic young men, who now feel that they have no place and find no outlet for their activity, are the future, the men who are to take our places, and carry on the work committed to us. We must inspire them with faith in the future, and encourage them to live for it. Instead of snubbing them for their inexperience, mocking them for their greenness, quizzing them for their zeal, damping their hopes, pouring cold water on their enthusiasm, brushing the flour from their young hearts, or freezing up the well-springs of their life, we must renew our own youth and freshness in theirs, encourage them with our confidence and sympathy, raise them up if they fall, soothe them when they fail, and cheer them on always to new and nobler efforts. Oh, for the love of God and of man, do not discourage them, force them to be mute and inactive, or suffer them, in the name of Catholicity, to separate themselves in their affections from the country and her glorious mission. Let them feel and act as American citizens; let them feel that this country is their country, its institutions their institutions, its mission their mission, its glory their glory. Bear with them, tread lightly on their involuntary errors, forgive the ebullitions of a zeal not always according to knowledge, and they will not refuse to listen to the counsels of age and experience; they will take advice, and will amply repay us by making themselves felt in the country, by elevat-



ing the standard of intelligence, raising the tone of moral feeling, and directing public and private activity to just and noble ends."—pp. 24, 25.

Belonging as we do to the class of old men, we rather piqued ourselves on our generosity in this appeal in behalf of young men. His Grace, as we understand him, does not object to the principle or doctrine of this appeal; he only objects to it as uncalled for, because there was no occasion for it, since the things it impliedly censures have and have had no existence. Then the worst is that we made a needless appeal, and threw away our eloquence. This may mortify us, but it cannot be charged as a sin against faith, morals, or discipline. If, however, his Grace has suspected in it a personal application he does us injustice, and if it has given him a moment's pain we deeply regret it, and ask his pardon. We fear he has given it an application never intended or dreamed of by us, for when we wrote this paragraph we had in our mind certain facts totally unconnected with the Archbishop of New York. We are a layman, and do not regard it as within our province either to rebuke or to advise the authorities of the Church in what is their own affair. We allow ourselves no liberty of the sort, and we would tolerate it in no journalist. We allow ourselves only those general remarks and appeals which we suppose any well-intentioned man, who has the interest of religion at heart, is free to make. It is possible that we less frequently have a sinister meaning in what we write than every one supposes, for we not seldom find our own simple obvious meaning overlooked, and a meaning extracted from our language and assigned to us that we never dreamed of. We regard ourselves as an honest, straightforward writer, and to suspect us of another meaning in what we say, than the one we express, is to do us great injustice. The paragraph cited has no meaning, but the one obvious on its face. If that is uncatholic, or not within our province as a journalist to express, we beg his Grace to regard it as withdrawn.

We have touched upon all the faults his Grace can be supposed by our unfriends to have indicated in our career as a Catholic Journalist, and they are in substance: 1st, Dr. Brownson takes too hopeful a view of the predispositions of his countrymen, and of the prospect of their conversion;

2d, he thinks that when the European immigration shall have ceased, or sensibly diminished, and the Church is more widely represented by natives of the soil, the progress of Catholicity with his countrymen will be greater; and, 3d, he has made a solemn, almost an awful appeal for young men that was quite uncalled for. The first we have explained, so as to place us and his Grace very nearly in the same opinion, and the second we have shown is a misconception of our real position and sentiments. But, supposing them all well founded, they allege nothing of a very serious character against us. Not one of them is a sin against faith, against morals, or against discipline. The most that can be said of them is, that they betray a slight error of judgment, and a rather sanguine temperament. Now, considering that we have conducted our Review as a Catholic periodical for twelve years, and have written for it two hundred and forty or more essays, some of them on the most difficult and delicate matters in the whole range of philosophy and Catholic theology, and considering also our extremely limited knowledge of Catholic theology, and of Catholic persons and things in the outset, the ill health, the depression of spirits, and the haste in which we have often been obliged to write, to say nothing of the distracting cares of a numerous family to provide for, educate, and settle in the world, we think we may well congratulate ourselves that his Grace has found no graver faults to allege against us; and we cannot but believe, that had he read our Review with a severer disposition, he would not have let us off so easily. Certainly we find far more in ourselves to blame and regret; and that, too, without recognizing the justice of any of the objections that have been raised against us, in relation to the question of nativism and foreignism which we have felt it necessary on several occasions to discuss.

But it is no little consolation to us to know, that whatever our faults, errors, or short-comings, his Grace does not regard them as any serious drawback on the merits or utility of our Review; for if he did, he would not have spoken so warmly in its praise, so heartily commended it to the Catholic public, or expressed so much regret at the prejudices that, in certain quarters, have

been so unjustly excited against it. We shall be pardoned for citing his remarks in our favor :

"We regret exceedingly that many persons, at least so we have been told, are dissatisfied with some of the views put forward by Dr. Brownson. And we would regret it the more, if in reality he had given occasion for this dissatisfaction, by viewing the whole question from something like what might be called an original stand-point. At all events, there is this to be said, that if we have Catholic writers at all, their heads and their hands, their thoughts and their pens, must be guided not by another, but by themselves. in their individual capacity, and under their individual responsibility. It may be added farther, that the liberty of the press on all subjects is not to be questioned in a country like this. At the same time, there is a censorship in this as well as in other nations. The difference is, that in other countries the censorship of the press, through the medium of government agents, is exercised, in general, previously to, or simultaneously with the publication of an article—here it comes after. There, it is the judgment of an individual who acts under state authority—here, it is the censure of many individuals acting each one under the dictation of his own private judgment. Catholic editors, therefore, need not be surprised if, when they trespass too largely on the feelings of their subscribers, the circulation of their periodicals should be occasionally abridged.

"We should be exceedingly sorry if any thing of this kind should occur in the case of Brownson's Review. It is known to himself, at least, that several paragraphs in his writings have not been such as to merit our poor approbation. But we are told by astronomers that there are spots on the sun. And if he has written and published some things that might be offensive, he has written many others that are destined to perish never. When he and all of us shall have been consigned to the dust, writers amongst those who are to succeed us will go forth among the pages of his Catholic Review, 'prospecting,' as they say in California, for the best 'diggings.' Nor will they be disappointed, if they have tact and talent for profound philosophical, literary and religious 'mining.' *But they will not give him credit.*

"But even should all other portions of his works pass away, there is one declaration of his that the writer quotes from memory, which is destined to be quoted throughout Christendom, just as long as the declaration of Fenelon, on a certain occasion, when he condemned some of his own writings, because they were disapproved by the head of the Catholic Church. The circumstances and the persons differ from each other in several respects. Fenelon was an Archbishop; Brownson is a layman. Fenelon condemned what he had written,—nothing that Brownson has written has been condemned; but the declaration to which we have referred, and which

is imperishable, was the honorable and gratuitous proclamation from Brownson's own pen, when he embraced the Catholic faith—when he had already acquired a philosophical and literary reputation sufficient to make a proud man vain—he did not hesitate to give an example of humility that will be an edification to the Catholics of future ages as well as of the present, in stating that he 'had brought nothing into the Catholic Church except his sins.' Now there is no great eloquence in this language. It amounts to a mere truism, for whether it be the infant of three days old or the adult convert to the faith, it is all the same. Brownson brought much to the Catholic faith, but his humility would permit only the foregoing declaration to be put on record.

"We do not think, therefore, that the Catholics of New York and of the United States can afford to see Brownson's Review languishing or dying out for want of support. Suppose there are passages in it which some of us may not have approved of, what of that? There is not even among these a single passage, from the perusal of which a judicious reader may not have gleaned knowledge and information. It has been useful, and we think it destined to become more and more useful, as its learned editor shall be more and more cheered in his labors by the hearty support of Catholic patronage."—pp. 26–29.

We copy the pamphlet edition before us, re-printed, with corrections, from *The Metropolitan*. As it appeared in *The Metropolitan*, and has been copied into several journals, it gave us some pain, for we feared a few of its expressions might be misapprehended, but as it appears in the pamphlet, with the author's corrections, it gives us none, except the pain of being thought by our Archbishop, who has known us so long and so intimately, capable of allowing our national feelings to drive us into a movement in any degree hostile to Catholics not of American birth. In the *Metropolitan* edition, the Archbishop is made to say, that it is known to ourselves at least, that our Review has contained "many articles" that have not met his approbation; in the pamphlet this is corrected: for "many articles," "several paragraphs" is substituted. The former would not be accurate; the latter is true in a general sense, although we cannot lay our finger on a single paragraph, with the exception of the one copied from our Review for last October, and say, this particular paragraph has been disapproved by the Archbishop of New York. We know, in a general way, that our Review has contained paragraphs which

have not met his approbation, especially on the subject of education ; but we do not know what are the particular paragraphs, doctrines, propositions, or opinions, to which he objects.

We say this lest some persons should draw from his Grace's remarks, what we are sure he never intended, the conclusion, so unfavorable to us, that his Grace has privately censured us for some articles or paragraphs in our Review. Such has never in a single instance been the fact. Nothing he has ever said or written to us has amounted to a censure. He has, as taking a deep interest in the prosperity of religion and in our own personal welfare, for which we can never be sufficiently thankful, from time to time, in conversation and by letter, offered us his paternal advice, and made such suggestions and observations to us as occurred to his zeal, his experience, his wisdom, and personal friendship. Differences of opinion there have from time to time existed between us, but none that we have not found him ready to tolerate or overlook. We are bound to say that we have always found him exceedingly delicate with regard to the liberty of the press, and disposed to maintain for Catholic Journalists all the freedom they can have the hardihood to ask. We have always found him in relation to those questions in regard to which there might be differences of opinion between us, disposed to concede us full liberty to follow our own judgment ; and it is but simple justice to his Grace to say that as far as we have had any relations with him, he has freely, frankly, spontaneously, given us all the liberty as an editor and writer that we can, without forgetting our Catholicity, pretend to, and we are aware of no instance in which he has shown the slightest disposition to remind us of his Episcopal authority.

In the pamphlet before us, he says distinctly, " If we are to have Catholic writers at all, their heads and their hands, their thoughts and their pens must be guided, not by another, but by themselves, in their individual capacity, and under their individual responsibility." In a letter addressed to us, the 29th of last August, and from which we are at liberty to make some extracts, he says, speaking of our Review, " Since its publication in this city, it has been my wish that your pen should be unguided by any

other head or hand than your own,—under, of course, a deep sense, which I know you entertain, of the responsibility devolved on a Catholic layman who conducts so important a periodical as yours.” Nothing can be more liberal or more just than the doctrine his Grace here asserts, that liberty and responsibility go together, that where one is responsible he must be free, and where free he must be responsible.

We write freely, from our own mind, not from any man’s dictation ; but we are responsible for the use we make of our freedom. Whether we properly use, or whether we abuse our freedom, it is not for us, but for authority alone, to judge, and to its judgment, formally pronounced, we owe, and we trust shall always yield, unreserved submission. We are free within our legitimate sphere as a Catholic Journalist, and authority cannot censure us, though the father may counsel us, unless we step beyond that sphere, and offend against faith, morals, or discipline. But whether we do or do not step beyond that sphere and so offend, belongs not to us but to authority to determine. If the Bishop or Archbishop who judges in the first instance does us wrong, our remedy is not in disobedience, resistance, or public discussion, but in appeal to Rome, to the highest tribunal of the Church. The law that governs journalists is, we take it, the same law that governs Catholics in all lawful secular pursuits. His Grace has always been even punctilious, in our case, to acknowledge our full Catholic freedom, and he has always treated us in this respect with the greatest possible delicacy. Thus in the letter just cited, alluding to an address by the editor, given at Fordham, on occasion of the commencement of St. John’s College last July, he says, “You are aware that I did not agree with you in some of the statements contained in your address, but that right of difference of opinion is what is mutually acknowledged wherever essential principles of faith and morals are not immediately involved.” The differences there have been between his Grace and ourselves, be they more or be they less, we have always regarded, and have understood him to regard, as coming within the sphere of free opinions, where he allowed us the same right to differ from him, that he claimed for himself to differ from us ; and

that these differences have not diminished his interest in us personally, or impaired his confidence in our Review, we are assured by the letter already spoken of, addressed to us without our solicitation, and it is with sincere gratitude to his Grace that we quote his encouraging words: "You are aware, my dear Doctor, that as regards yourself and the Review, no substantial change has come over my mind from the publication of its first number. My desire is that it should increase and prosper."

There has been, in consequence of a singular misapprehension of the position and tendencies of the Review in relation to Catholics of foreign birth, some clamor raised and some prejudice excited against it, but as far as our knowledge extends, the good feelings and wishes expressed by his Grace are those entertained by all our Archbishops and Bishops without exception. Differences of opinion on some points not of faith, and in regard to the expedience or policy of broaching certain discussions, have certainly existed, and very likely still exist; but no Prelate in the Union has signified to us, directly or indirectly, any loss of confidence in us or in our Review. The illustrious Bishop of Pittsburg, who has always been one of its best friends, and for whom we have the profoundest respect, requested us to withdraw his name from the cover of the Review, not because he disapproved it, not because he wished the Review to be discontinued, but because the secular press persisted in holding the Bishops who had kindly given us their names, by way of encouragement, responsible for all the opinions we advanced. This placed them in a false position, and was unjust, because while we enjoyed the freedom, they were made to share the responsibility. Unwilling to be the occasion of so gross an injustice to them, we, of our own accord, omitted at the beginning of the last year their names from the Review, so that nothing we might write should compromise them, so that the freedom and responsibility should go together, and while we took the liberty of writing what we thought proper, we alone should be held responsible. We write, as all the world knows, what we please, and we think it no more than just that we should bear the responsibility.

We have, as will be seen, commented at length on the topics presented by his Grace in so far as related to us per-

sonally or to our Review, and have made such remarks, disclaimers, and explanations as seemed to us alike due to him, to ourselves, and the Catholic public. We trust we have taken no improper liberty, and have said nothing that can be construed into an offence to any one. We certainly have intended nothing of the sort. As far as we ourselves are concerned, his Grace's publication has been kindly meant, and demands our respectful and even our grateful consideration. We thank him for the interest he has taken in our welfare, and the earnest appeal he has made in our behalf. The Review has at times its trials, its struggles, its ups and its downs, but we do not think the Catholic public are as yet disposed to suffer it to fail for the want of support. The feeling against it in certain quarters is not so deep as might be supposed, and is at worst only temporary. There is in the Catholic community, in the laity as well as in the clergy, a deep sense of justice, and they will never fail to come to the aid of him who they see has been wronged. They have, what is more to our purpose, a deep and abiding love for every thing Catholic, and they will make almost any sacrifice to sustain a work that is sincerely Catholic and really useful to Catholic interests. As long as such is the case with our Review, they will sustain it, and we should regret to have them sustain it one moment longer. We look upon the crisis in our case as past. The opposition, which has been somewhat severe, and has, no doubt, at times irritated us, for we are human, is not likely to increase. The discussions which have occasioned it, have all been gone through with, and are not likely to come up again. Other topics will engage our attention, and though we shall neither try nor expect to avoid all collision of opinion, for we are and will be free spoken, we trust the current will run smoother for the future, and passion on all sides have time to subside, and mutual confidence have an opportunity to revive. With even renewed cheerfulness and hope we enter upon the fourteenth year of our Review, and send out the first number of its fourteenth volume, with the compliments of the season to all our friends, who we will not believe are not as numerous as ever.



## ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Catholic Church in the United States; Pages from its History.* By HENRY DE COURCEY. Translated and enlarged, by John Gilmary Shea. Second edition, revised. New-York: Dunigan & Brother. 1857. 12mo. pp. 589.

WE are not surprised that a second edition of this work has been so soon called for. With all its imperfections and errors it has some merits, and meets a want, better than any other work of the sort we have, which is deeply felt, of knowing something of our Catholic history. The objections we feel to it, are not felt by all, and to some persons these objections are a recommendation even. What we have said against it will put people on their guard, and go far towards neutralizing the mischief it might seem fitted to do. Nobody will think of relying on it, where its statements are not corroborated, as an authority. We are sorry, however, that Mr. Shea, its translator, and Mr. De Courcy's fellow-laborer in its concoction, should have suffered himself to write such a paragraph as this in the preface: "The first edition was generally well received, and it was with no little amazement that I found one or two periodicals disposed to make it the ground for assailing the private character of the author, his motives, and his honesty. Those vague charges launched forth in the accents of passion and wrath, so evidently betray their source, that it would be folly to regard them." We fear the translator's own "passion and wrath" have made him, for a moment, forget himself. If it were folly to regard these charges, he should have passed them over in dignified silence; and if he felt it necessary to refer to them at all, he should have named the periodicals intended, specified their charges, and, if false, contradicted them. He should remember that it is as wrong to assail the motives of an editor, and to bring vague charges against him, as it is to assail the motives of an author, and to make vague charges against his private character. If the learned gentleman alludes to us, we deny in toto his charge. We have never assailed Mr. De Courcy's private character, his motives, or his honesty, as a man. In what we said of his private character, we made no statement to his discredit. We merely said he was a Frenchman, who, ten or a dozen years ago, came to this country to make his fortune as an agent or partner of a French commercial house in this city, and expressed ourselves happy to learn that he had effected his purpose and returned to his native France. What is there in this to his discredit? All else we said was said of him as a writer, and as a correspondent of French journals, on American persons and affairs. He may have been, and no doubt was, a very estimable man in private life, and had we known him personally, we might ourselves have esteemed him in his private and social relations. As a writer and correspondent, especially of the *Univers*, we undoubtedly spoke of him in severe terms, but not in so severe terms as he seemed to us to deserve. Let his friends specify any particular in which they regard us as judging him too severely or unjustly, and show us that we really have done so, we will most cheerfully retract it, and make him all the amends possible in the case. But they must not forget that Mr. De Courcy while here, traduced us personally and our country in the *Univers*, and had laid himself open to

severe censure, not for doing wrong intentionally, for we doubt not his honesty of purpose, but for not taking the proper pains to inform himself, and for the blundering use he made of such information as he received. Our readers ought by this time to know that we seldom make statements against a writer, without having tolerable reasons for so doing. We have never yet written a word in this Review from passion, wrath, or revenge, or censured in it a living mortal from a sense of personal wrong, from personal motives, or from any other than public reasons. The manner in which a class of scribblers allow themselves to write of us and our Review, has never been adopted by us towards others, and never will be. Time will show that we have suffered wrong, but that as a Reviewer we have wronged no one, unless through a very pardonable error of judgment; and whenever we have discovered such error, we have always been prompt to acknowledge it, and to make all the amends in our power. We claim no credit for this; it was our duty.

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2. *The Life of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots.* By M. DE MOERLÈS. From the French. With an Appendix, containing fifteen of Mary's Letters, and additional Notes. By M. L. Ryan. Boston: Donahoe. 1857. 12mo. pp. 391.

An interesting work, which deserved to be done into English, as well as out of French. It is a vindication, and a successful vindication of Mary, and as such, we highly esteem it.

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3. *Fundamental Philosophy.* By Rev. JAMES BALMES. Translated from the Spanish, by Henry F. Brownson, M. A. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1856. 2 vols. 12mo.

We think the reader will find these volumes well translated, into good English, and reading as well in English as in the original Spanish. Of the merits of the work, we have spoken in the Introduction. The book has been translated by one of our sons, at our suggestion, and we need not say that we commend it to the public as decidedly the best work on the grounds of philosophy, to be found in our language, original or translated.

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4. *Histoire de l'Eglise de Rome sous les Pontificats de St. Victor, de St. Zéphirin, et de St. Calliste, de l'An 192 à l'An 224. Un Siècle avant le Concile de Nicée.* Par l'Abbé M. P. CRUICE. Paris: Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Ce. 1856. 8vo. pp. 424.

This is a work of solid learning, on a most interesting period of Ecclesiastical History, hitherto but imperfectly studied. We will not say that the Abbé Cruice's book leaves no gaps to be filled up, no further information to be desired, but it throws new light on the period of which it traces the history, and proves that the Church of Rome, or the Catholic Church, was as completely organized at the end of the second century as she is now, and that the Papacy was as fully developed, and her doctrines as distinctly taught, and as fully believed. It is impossible for Protestants to read this work and honestly deny that Catholicity as taught and believed to-day, dates from the Apostolic Age. We shall have more to say of this volume hereafter.

5. *The Genius of Christianity, or The Spirit and Beauty of the Christian Religion.* By Viscount CHATEAUBRIAND. A new and complete Translation from the French, with a Preface, Biographical Notice of the Author, and Critical and Explanatory Notes. By Charles I. White, D. D. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1856. 8vo. pp. 768.

This is a celebrated work, and was the earliest of the works written to defend Christianity on simply human grounds,—the only grounds on which, in our times, it is seriously attacked. Something of the aroma of the original seems to us to have escaped in the translation, but it is honestly and faithfully rendered, and Dr. White deserves our thanks for his labor. Of the original work we cannot speak in terms of unqualified praise. Its argument is not absolutely conclusive, but its effect on the mind and heart of the reader is favorable. The work has certainly done good, and we owe, personally, a debt of gratitude to the author; for this very work many years ago, falling into our hands while we were an avowed unbeliever, had the effect to remove the hostility we felt to the Christian religion, and to make us able to study its evidences without prejudice. We are, therefore, glad that it is now placed within the reach of every English reader.

6. *Pauline Seward. A Tale of Real Life.* By J. D. BRYANT, M. D. Fifth Edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1856. 2 vols. 12mo.

We had a squabble with the author of this book when it was first published, and were obliged, in self-defence, to criticise it with some severity. We presume neither party has any disposition to renew the squabble. We never supposed that our criticism would injure the sale of the book, and are not sorry to learn that it has reached a fifth edition.

7. *Grantley Manor. A Tale.* By Lady GEORGIANA FULLERTON. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1856. 12mo. pp. 320.

A new edition of a work heretofore reviewed by us, and, in a literary point of view, deserving high praise.

8. *Life of Mrs. Eliza A. Seton, Foundress and first Superior of the Sisters or Daughters of Charity in the United States of America.* By CHARLES I. WHITE, D. D. Second revised edition. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1856. 12mo. pp. 462.

This work has already received two elaborate reviews in our pages, and we need only commend it anew to the Catholic public.

9. *Principles of Government; or, Meditations in Exile.* By WILLIAM SMITH O'BRIEN. With notes to the American Edition. Boston: Donahoe. 1856. 12mo. pp. 460.

We have no great admiration for Mr. Smith O'Brien; but his book, though not very original or profound, is one that we shall be glad to see circulate among his and our countrymen. We hope to be able to return to it, and speak of it at length.

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

APRIL, 1857.

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ART. I.—*The Catholic Letters addressed by a Jurist to a Young Kinsman proposing to join the Church of Rome.*  
By E. H. DERBY. Boston : Jewett & Co. 1856. 12mo.  
pp. 293.

WE resume from our last Review our dissection of Mr. Derby's Letters. The learned jurist opens his third letter by assuring his young kinsman that :—

"In my last letter I showed you that Peter, in the days of our Saviour and the Apostles, was not superior to his associates ; that the "keys" are the "Word of God" given to all the disciples ; that James became the first bishop of Jerusalem to the exclusion of Peter ; that Paul, after his heavenly vision, without taking counsel of the disciples, began his mission to the heathen, and became the builder of that Church of which Christ himself was the chief corner-stone ; that Paul planted the great churches in Ephesus, Smyrna, and Rome, chief cities of the Roman Empire, and in tracing the progress of the bishops of Rome, we must remember that Rome was the seat of empire, the mistress of the world, and it was to be expected that her bishops should be aspiring, that they should feel, like the Romish bishop of New York, the metropolis of our country, disposed to outrank their fellows and enlarge their jurisdiction. It was natural that they should struggle for supremacy, and by no means surprising they should attain to power. Six centuries, however, expired before they acquired a positive ascendancy, as appears by the concurrent testimony of the *fathers* and *historians* both of *Church* and *state*. Bishops were placed over hundreds of churches in Europe, Asia, and Africa, who for six centuries exercised the power of the Apostles, met in council, and by discussion and by concurrent votes regulated the *faith* and directed the *worship* of the Catholic Church."—pp. 15, 16.

That St. James was the first bishop of Jerusalem is conceded ; but how does that prove that St. Peter was not the first bishop of Rome, or that the primacy was not given to him or to his successors in that See ? Whence has the learned jurist obtained his information that St. Paul "began his mission to the heathen without taking counsel of the disciples," or without the authorization of Peter as head of the Apostolic college ? St. Paul himself tells him nothing of the sort ; we know he was with the disciples at Damascus ; he tells us that he "went up to Jerusalem to see Peter, and abode with him fifteen days," and there is no evidence that he had commenced his mission to the heathen prior to that interview with the Prince of the Apostles. That St. Paul alone planted the Church of Rome, Mr. Derby fails to prove, and that it was planted by him and St. Peter all Catholics assert. Ephesus and Smyrna ranked in the Roman Empire below Antioch and Alexandria.

What authority has Mr. Derby for asserting that the "Romish" bishop of New York feels disposed to "outrank his fellows and enlarge his jurisdiction" ? Has our Archbishop confided to him his feelings ? Has he learned it from his Grace's "fellows" ? Is he aware of a single fact which indicates such a disposition ? Of course not, for no such fact exists ; and the whole Church in the country would treat with derision any attempt on the part of any bishop to extend his jurisdiction or to claim precedence of his brother bishops, on the ground of the political, civil, or commercial importance of his see. If the learned jurist err so ridiculously with regard to the Archbishop of New York, his contemporary, and his own Metropolitan, what confidence can he expect us to place in his unsupported assertions with regard to the early bishops of Rome, so much more distant from him in both place and time ?

"Rome was the seat of empire, the mistress of the world, and it was to be expected that her bishops would be aspiring and...feel disposed to outrank their fellows, and enlarge their jurisdiction." *Expected*,—by whom ? "It was natural." *Natural*,—to whom ? To a Christian bishop who knew that his authority depended on his divine commission, was derived from God, and in no sense

from the political or civil power, and who found in that power not a friend, but a bitter enemy and ruthless persecutor? Mr. Derby may think it would have been natural to him had he been in the place of those early bishops; but *Argumentum a genere ad genus, non valet*, say the logicians. Between a railroad financier and an early bishop of Rome there is a disparity which vitiates all reasoning from the one to the other.

"Six centuries, however, expired before they acquired any positive ascendancy." That is, the bishops of Rome had no positive ascendancy in the Church till nearly three hundred years after Rome had ceased to be the residence of the Emperors and the seat of empire, and till a century and over after the Barbarians had overthrown the Empire of the West and seated themselves on its ruins. Six centuries bring us to the opening of the seventh century, when the city of Rome had lost all her political importance, and yet her bishops owed their ascendancy in the Church to the political supremacy of their see! Decidedly, our illustrious jurist has a rare genius for the philosophy of history.

"Bishops were placed over hundreds of churches in Europe, Asia, and Africa." No doubt of it. But who placed them over those churches, confirmed them in their sees, and defined their jurisdiction? "Exercised the power of the Apostles." In communion with the bishop of Rome their head, certainly; without him? That is the point for Mr. Derby to prove, which he has not yet done. "Met in council." By the authority or consent of the Bishop of Rome, agreed; without that authority or consent, denied; for a meeting of bishops without the consent of the Apostolic See, is no more a council, than with us a political caucus is a legislature. "By discussion and by concurrent votes regulated the faith and directed the worship of the Catholic Church." I do not know precisely what the jurist means by *regulating* faith and *directing* worship; but if he means defining the faith and regulating the worship, we accept the statement. They did so, and do so still; but without the assent and approbation of the bishop of Rome, were their definitions and canons binding on the faithful? This is the point Mr. Derby must prove in order to prove any thing to his purpose, and this he does not even attempt to prove, while

we could easily, if it accorded with our present purpose, prove the contrary. There is no council without the Apostolic power, and there is, since the death of the Apostles, no Apostolic power, but in the Apostolic See, for bishops in their own right have no authority out of their own sees. At least such is the present constitution of the Catholic Church, and if Mr. Derby asserts that it was different in the early ages, it is for him to prove it. Thus far, we may say, the learned jurist either proves nothing at all, or nothing to his purpose, and we are forced to conclude that, lawyer as he is, he is not aware that an allegation counts for nothing till it is substantiated by evidence, and evidence pertinent to the case. We hope he manages better in court than he does in his letters. If not, we pity his clients.

"The first authority on whom the Romish Church places any reliance is Irenæus, who lived about the year 170, and was a friend of Polycarp, the disciple of St. John. He wrote a treatise against the Gnostics, who claimed to know certain *mysteries* which the Apostles disclosed only to the perfect. In arguing against these heretics in his essay,\* he says, if the Apostles had known any such mysteries, they would have intrusted them to those to whom they intrusted the Apostolic Churches they founded, and to confute the Gnostics cites the doctrines and faith derived from the Apostles by a succession of bishops in the great, most ancient, and universally known Church, founded at Rome by the glorious Apostles Peter and Paul, in which the faithful around it have always preserved the Apostolic doctrine, and adds, that not only Polycarp taught by the Apostles, and by them constituted bishop of Smyrna, but also the Church of Ephesus, founded by Paul, but in which John remained until the time of Trajan, are *true witnesses* of the faith transmitted by the Apostles.

"Irenæus gives to the Church of Rome the prominence she deserves from her position, size, importance, and founders, but brings in also the churches of Smyrna and Ephesus, as alike true witnesses against the heretics he is confuting, thus placing them on the same footing."—p. 16.

The jurist does not write good English. *Romish* is not an English adjective. The proper adjective is *Roman*. St. Irenæus is not our earliest witness after the Holy Scriptures. St. Ignatius, bishop of Antioch, on his way to martyrdom, in 107, addressed a letter to the Roman

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\* L. 2, c. 3.

Church, in which he styles it the Church which PRE-  
SIDES, that is, the governing or ruling Church. The  
learned jurist, by *not* going to the fountain-heads, as  
he would have us believe he has done, has been de-  
ceived as to the testimony of St. Irenæus, for we cannot  
suppose that he would wilfully misrepresent it. St. Irenæus  
does not place the Churches of Ephesus and Smyrna,—  
the two pet churches of our author,—on the same footing  
with the Church of Rome. He is arguing against the  
Gnostics, and other heretics of his time, from the tradition  
of the Church. He says all who wish to see the truth,  
may see in the entire Church throughout the world the  
Apostolic tradition. But there is no need of consulting  
all the churches to collect it, it suffices to confound all  
heretics to appeal to the greatest of the Apostolic Churches,  
the Church of Rome, founded by Peter and Paul, because  
“with that Church, on account of the primacy,—*propter  
potentiorē principalitatem*, every church, that is, all the  
faithful every where must agree.”\* This is the testimony of  
St. Irenæus, the holy bishop of Lyons, who suffered mar-  
tyrdom in 202, and who had known St. Polycarp, the dis-  
ciple of St. John, and the attempt to weaken its force by  
applying the preëminence he asserts for the *Church* of  
Rome to the *City* of Rome, then a pagan city, hostile to  
the Gospel, and without consideration in the kingdom of  
Christ, is too obviously absurd to require refutation.

The next witness whose testimony Mr. Derby seeks to  
explain away is Tertullian.

“Tertullian, one century afterwards, in his essay against Marcion,  
refers his opponent to his standard authorities against him, saying,  
‘Run over the Apostolic churches in which the Apostles’ chairs  
are still continued, in which their authentic letters are recited,  
sounding out the voice and representing the face of each one of  
them. In Achaia, nearest to you, you have Corinth. If you be not  
far from Macedonia, you have the Philippians and Thessalonians.  
If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus. If you border on Italy,  
you have Rome, whence we also (namely, the Africans) can have  
authority.’

“Thus the ancient fathers taught the people to reform their  
doctrine, not only by the Church of Rome, but also by other  
notable Apostolic churches.”—pp. 16, 17.

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\* S. Irenæus, adv. Hær. Lib. iii. Cap. iii.



The learned jurist again proves the vanity of his assertion that he has gone to "the fountain-heads." The work from which the passage he cites is taken is not from Tertullian's "Essay against Marcion," but his admirable work entitled *De Præscriptionibus adversus Hæreticos*, a work our author would do well to read and digest. Tertullian uses against heretics the argument from prescription. He confounds them by showing that Catholics were in possession before them, and had been in possession from beginning. Heretics, like our friend Derby, are new comers, and can show no titles. They have no ancestry, and cannot make out their descent from the Apostles or from Apostolic churches, and therefore are not to be listened to. Consult any of these churches nearest at hand and it will condemn you. His purpose was not to assert the equality of other churches with the Church of Rome, or to deny the Church of Rome to be the mother and mistress of all the churches, but to direct the heretic to the Apostolic tradition preserved by the churches founded by Apostles, and in the one that happens to be nearest him, as sufficient to confound him. We infer this from the fact that he actually asserts the supremacy of Rome. "Latuit aliquid Petrum," he asks, "ædificandæ Ecclesiæ Petram dictum (Matt. xvi. 18, 19), claves regni cælorum consecutum et solvendi et alligandi in cælis, et in terris potestatem?"\*

"The ancient fathers taught the people to reform their doctrine not only by the Church of Rome, but also by other notable Apostolic churches." The statement would have been more conformable to what he proves, if Mr. Derby had said that St. Irenæus and Tertullian confound heretics by appealing to tradition as preserved in any of the churches founded by Apostles, and especially the Church of Rome. This is all that he can pretend to have proved, and this is nothing to his purpose, or against the claims or the faith of the Catholic Church at the present time. None of the "notable" Apostolic churches, when St. Irenæus and Tertullian wrote, had fallen from the faith or ceased to be in communion with Rome. The Apostolic tradition was still living, fresh and vigorous, and the

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\* De Præscrip. c. xxii. Ed. Migne.

same in them all, as it is even now in all the churches, by whomsoever founded, in communion with the Apostolic See. What was to confound the heretic was the doctrine delivered by the Apostles and deposited with the churches they founded, and that in the time of Tertullian, was sufficient, as found in any of them, for that purpose.

"Again, the blessed martyr, Cyprian, bishop of Carthage, under the emperor Decius, A. D. 249, in his treatise of '*Cyprianus de simplicitate Prælatorum*,' says, 'All the Apostles were of *like* power among themselves, and the rest were the *same* that *Peter* was' and adds, 'there is but *one bishopric* and a piece thereof is holden by each particular bishop.' What paramount power does this saint of the church accord to the church of Rome?"—p. 17.

St. Cyprian did not suffer martyrdom in the Decian persecution of 249. His martyrdom did not take place till 258. The work of St. Cyprian, from which the first passage is cited, or something like it, is his excellent tract *de Unitate Ecclesiæ*, rarely called *de Simplicitate Prælatorum*. It is mutilated and, as given, entirely perverts the meaning of the author. It is found near the conclusion of a passage in which St. Cyprian asserts in the most clear and explicit manner the Primacy of Peter and his chair. "Et quamvis," he says, "Apostolis omnibus post resurrectionem suam parem potestatem tribuat et dicat; sicut missit me pater, et ego mitto vos; Accipite Spiritum sanctum: si cujus remiseritis peccata, remittentur illi; si cujus tenueritis, tenebuntur: tamen, ut unitatem manifestaret, unam Cathedram constituit, unitatis ejusdem originem, ab uno incipientem, sua auctoritate disposuit. Hoc erant utique et cæteri Apostoli quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio præditi et honoris et potestatis, sed exordium ab unitate profisciscitur, et primatus Petro datur, ut una Christi Ecclesia et una Cathedra monstretur."\* The equality of the Apostles with one another, and their equal participation in honor and power with Peter, must therefore be understood so as not to exclude the Primacy given to Peter, which is the origin of unity, the centre whence the unity of the Church starts, and is manifested. We must reconcile the equality asserted with the Primacy, not the Primacy with the equality, because the Primacy is what the

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\* De Unitate Ecclesiæ, c. 4.

Saint is establishing as the origin, the beginning, the centre of unity. This can easily be done. All the Apostles were equal as bishops, all were equal as Apostles, equally endowed with both the Episcopal and Apostolic honor and power, but not therefore did they share equally the honor and power of the Primacy. That was given, as the Saint had just asserted and proved, to Peter alone. The rest of the Apostles were equal in Apostolic dignity and power to Peter, for they were Apostles as well as Peter, and they received their Apostolate not from Peter, but immediately from Jesus Christ himself. In this way we must understand St. Cyprian, unless we would make him contradict himself, or make him deny the Primacy of Peter, which he asserts, and asserts as something which exists, notwithstanding, *quavis*, the other Apostles were in a certain sense equals, and what Peter was.

Our readers may see in this citation from St. Cyprian, by Mr. Derby, a fair specimen of the way in which Anglicans and other Protestants usually deal with the Fathers. The words taken alone sustain them, taken as they stand in the father with their context they contradict them. It is from some of these controversialists, no doubt, that Mr. Derby has obtained the citation, for we will not do him the injustice to believe that he himself is capable of making so dishonest a quotation, or that if he had himself read and understood St. Cyprian, he could have tried to persuade his son that this great saint does not recognize the Primacy of Peter and the supremacy of the See of Rome.

But St. Cyprian, Mr. Derby tells us, adds, "there is but one bishopric, and a piece thereof is held by particular bishops." The passage to which he probably refers is, "Episcopatus unus est, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur,"\* which we translate, The Episcopate is one, and a part thereof is held by individuals *in solido*. That is, the Saint asserts the unity of the Episcopate, and the solidarity of bishops, which follows necessarily from his doctrine of the unity of the Church beginning from the Primacy of Peter. *In solido* or *in solidum*, Mr. Derby hardly need be informed, is a law phrase that desig-

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\* Ibid. c. v.

nates those obligations in which all are bound for each, and each for each and for all. It is from this phrase that is derived, through the French, the term *solidarity*, used so frequently by Kossuth in his speeches, and which, we believe, we were ourselves the first to give in an English dress, and to use as an English word. The passage, as given by Mr. Derby, makes nonsense, or at least no sense to his purpose. If there is but one bishopric, there can be but one bishop; and if those he calls particular bishops hold each only a piece of it, then each particular bishop is only the piece of a bishop, and we run the risk of having no integral bishop at all. Did the learned jurist stop to ask what was the real meaning of the passage he lends to St. Cyprian? But in any case, what has the assertion that "there is only one bishopric and a piece thereof is held by particular bishops," to do with the author's doctrine of the equality and independence of bishops against the Primacy of Peter, or of Peter's See?

It is not our present purpose to prove the claims or the faith of the Church of Rome against Mr. Derby; we cannot do him that honor. We are only dissecting his reasons for rejecting them; otherwise we would bring from St. Cyprian alone ample testimony to prove that this saint accepted them both. Mr. Derby's allusion to St. Cyprian has set us to studying the writings of that great saint and martyr more attentively than we had before done, and we have been surprised at the barefaced impudence of Protestants, even knowing them as well as we do, in pretending to find in him a witness against the Papacy. He is as decidedly Papal in his doctrine as Bellarmine, and as for his practice, we know not enough of it to say that it was not Catholic. On the question of baptism by heretics it is evident he erred, if the Letters on that subject ascribed to him, are genuine; of which, however, St. Augustine doubted, and we too may be permitted to doubt. The Donatists had an interest in ascribing them to him, and we have no reason to suppose them incapable of doing so falsely. But we must return to Mr. Derby.

"The blessed Jerome, Hieronymus, born A. D. 331, in his '*Litera ad Evagrium*,' speaking of the usage and order of the Church of Rome, says, 'Why allegest thou to me the usage of one city?' Again, he says, 'not only the bishops of one city, (that is, Rome,) but

the bishops of all the world err.' Surely, then, the bishop of Rome had no *infinite* or *universal* power. The Church was then governed by councils, and heretics were put down by general councils, and heretics were then numerous. St. Augustine enumerates more than eighty varieties, and at one time the *Arians*, favored by an emperor, were supposed to be in the ascendant. The first *general council* was called by Constantine, the emperor, at Nice. Three hundred and eighteen bishops attended to put down the Arian heresy. It is intimated both by St. Jerome and St. Augustine that Liberius, bishop or pope of Rome, took part with the Arians. St. Jerome states this in his treatise,\* and Cardinal Casanus, a Romish writer, in the first half of the fifteenth century, a favored friend of Pope Eugenius IV., and legate under several pontiffs, represents St. Augustine to have said that 'Pope Liberius gave his hand and consent to the Arians.†' But the great Council of Nice put down the Arians, and with them condemned virtually Liberius, the heretic pope, and the other bishops who favored them. An eminent Roman Catholic writer is here our authority. When councils thus condemn the Roman bishop, or pope, where was his infallibility, and how was it manifested to the world? Further, by the sixth canon of the first Council of Nice, the whole of Christendom was divided into four patriarchships, whereof the first was Rome, the second Alexandria, the third Antioch, the fourth Jerusalem; each was limited, and Rome was confined to Italy and the West. Neither had power over the other, and down to a much later period, the *idea* of a *universal* Bishop was scouted by the bishops of Rome as well as others. Gregory I., a bishop of Rome, and a saint of the Romish Church, says,‡ 'He is antichrist that shall claim to be called universal bishop, or chief of the priests.' The emperor Gratian did the same, and allowed the bishop of Rome to be called no more than bishop of the first seat."—pp. 17–19.

What in the world is one to say to this long string of assertions without proof, without principle, and bearing upon no point but a foregone conclusion? We really cannot follow Mr. Derby in all his pretended authorities. He evidently knows nothing of the fathers but what he has picked up from the hasty perusal of some anti-Catholic writers, and in no instance in which we have attempted to verify his quotations have we found them trustworthy. We have either not been able to verify them at all or have found them unfair, dishonest, and mere perversions of the real

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\* Hieron. de Eccles. Scriptor. † In his book de Concord. L. II. c. 5.

‡ Epistolæ 84, L. IV.

sense of the father quoted. What are we to think of a writer who has the audacity to cite St. Jerome, himself the Secretary of a Pope, and Cardinal of the Holy Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, against the Primacy of Peter, which he asserts in the most positive terms? Suppose that St. Jerome did assert that the bishop of Rome had erred, what then? Who claims infallibility for the Pope as 'a private doctor, or as the bishop of the particular diocese of Rome?' What Catholics claim for the Pope is infallibility, by virtue of the supernatural assistance of the Holy Ghost, in deciding questions of faith and morals for the whole Church. When you cite a passage from St. Jerome asserting that the Pope has erred in some such question, we will then consider it, and give you an answer.

"Surely then the bishop of Rome had no *infinite* or *universal* power." Who ever said he had? Pray, do not call refuting your own ignorance or misrepresentation refuting us. The Pope is not God, and only God has or can have infinite or universal power. We should suppose even Protestants could understand that. If they can, why not we? "The Church was then governed by councils, and heretics were put down by general councils, and heretics were then numerous." Indeed? So they are now, and so they were before, and so, we presume, they will be to the end of the world. What do you conclude from all that? Pray how was the Church governed before the first council, which according to you was that of Nice, and which, if I recollect aright, was not celebrated till the early part of the fourth century.

"The Arians, favored by an emperor, were supposed to be in the ascendant." *Were supposed*, by whom? Were in *the ascendant*, in the State or the Church? If in the State, it is nothing to the purpose, for Paganism up to the time of Constantine had been in the ascendancy in the State, and was so even after him, and favored, too, by an Emperor, Julian the Apostate; if you mean in the Church, we deny it; for the Arians were condemned as heretics by the Council of Nice, and by their refusal to subscribe the Nicene Creed were excluded from the Church, and therefore could not be in the ascendant in it. It was not the Church, but the empire, that, St. Jerome says, was astonished to find itself Arian.

Liberius did not take part with the Arians, but resisted them, and condemned the bishops who, at Rimini, so far yielded to threats and persecutions as to subscribe a Semiarian formula. He was accused, not in his lifetime, by the Arians, of having also yielded, but his whole conduct after his return from exile, as well as the joy of the Roman people who were devoted to the Nicene Creed, refutes the calumny. He was sent into exile because he would not commune with Arian bishops, and because he firmly and perseveringly refused his assent to the condemnation of St. Athanasius. Both before and after his exile he was firm in his orthodoxy, and most decided against the Arians, proving as clearly and as conclusively as man can prove any thing that he had no Arian tendencies or sympathies. It has been, indeed, thought by some Catholics, like Baronius, Bossuet, Cardinal Cusanus,—not Casanus, as Mr. Derby has it,—and others, that worn out by the fatigues of his exile, and overcome by violence, he so far yielded as to subscribe a formula orthodox on its face but susceptible of an Arian interpretation; yet of this there is no evidence but an accusation first made, nobody knows by whom, long after his death. The charge rested on authorities now proved to have been forged, and after a passably thorough investigation of the question, we are satisfied for ourselves that the charge is simply an Arian fabrication.

The Council of Nice did not divide the world into four great Patriarchates, it was so divided before the celebration of that Council. It only regulated and defined the powers of the Patriarchs of Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem; "The Patriarchate of Rome was confined to Italy and the West," if you please; but what if it was? The diocese of Rome was confined to the city of Rome. But the question is not of the powers of the bishop of Rome as bishop, or as Patriarch, but as Pope. The Council did not attempt to take away the Primacy, to give it to another, nor to restrict it, and it could not confer it, for that had already been done by our Lord himself. As Patriarch he was not superior to the Patriarchs of the East, but as Pope, or Primate of the whole Church, he was their superior, and could and did entertain appeals from them, could and did judge them, as we may see in the case of St. Athanasius, Patriarch of Alexandria, judged, but acquitted by Liberius.

"Neither had power over the other." As Patriarchs—granted ; but the Pope had power to judge the Patriarchs of the East, or else the lawyers of those times were far inferior even to ours.

St. Gregory I., as his immediate predecessor, Pelagius II., scouted, if you will, the title of "universal bishop," which the author's friends, the Patriarchs of Constantinople, began to give themselves, and it is certainly true, that no bishop of Rome, down to that time, had ever assumed or borne it ; but it is equally true, that no one has ever assumed or borne it since. The Pope is not universal bishop, or bishop of bishops ; he is simply bishop of Rome. To call him universal bishop would be to assume that there is only one diocese, and only one bishop in the whole Catholic world, the doctrine Mr. Derby makes St. Cyprian teach in opposition to the Papacy. It would deny the other bishops to be bishops, and make them simply the vicars of the bishop of Rome, which is not and never has been the doctrine of the Catholic Church, or the pretension of the Sovereign Pontiff. "The idea of a universal bishop was scouted by the bishops of Rome, as well as by others." Certainly, and even more so ; we have never found an instance in which a Pope has entertained it.

Mr. Derby cites St. John to prove that "the number of the beast is 666," and St. Irenæus to prove that "the name of Antichrist is expressed by a number *Ἀρεῖρος*, equivalent to Latinus. The Greek letters indicate 666." Well, what then ? Is Latinus the name of the Pope ? or are we to assume that he is Antichrist, because he speaks or writes Latin ? Pastorini finds the number 666 in Luterus, the Latinized name of Luther, originally Luder, from the same root as our word *lewd* ; shall we therefore conclude that Luther was Antichrist, *in propria persona* ? It is time to have done with this nonsense.

"Early in the seventh century, John, bishop of Constantinople, claimed from the emperor Maurice, the title of 'universal bishop,' and Gregory objected. Soon after Maurice, with his family, was murdered by the centurion Phocas, who was raised by the soldiery to the imperial throne. At the instance of Boniface II., bishop of Rome, a successor of Gregory, the usurper Phocas conferred this 'ungodly name,' as it was termed by Gregory, on Boniface. Building on this frail title, derived not from St. Peter, but from the *felon*



and *usurper* Phocas, the popes soon enlarged their power, so that in another century pope Boniface VIII. announced, 'that every creature must submit itself to the bishop of Rome, upon the pain of everlasting damnation.' So much for the origin and foundations of the papal power in the church of Rome. In another letter I shall point out its departure from the teachings of our Saviour."—pp. 19, 20.

We know not on what authority the learned jurist puts forth this precious piece of scandal, but so far as it affects the Popes it is wholly unfounded. Phocas could not have conferred the "ungodly name" at the instance of Boniface II. for that Pope died in 532, and Phocas was not elected emperor till seventy years afterwards. Mr. Derby means Boniface III. It is said that he obtained from Phocas a decree conferring on the bishop of Rome the title in question, but on no adequate authority. Such a title had been offered to Leo Magnus, who rejected it, as St. Gregory relates, and all I can find is that Boniface III. obtained from Phocas a decree recognizing the See of Peter as the head of all the churches. Anastasius, the Librarian, in his Life of Boniface III., says: "*Hic obtinuit apud Phocam principem, ut sedes Apostolica beati Petri Apostoli caput esset omnium Ecclesiarum, id est, Ecclesia Romana, quia Ecclesia Constantinopolitana primam se omnium Ecclesiarum scribebat.*" Paulus Diaconus says the same. There was nothing objectionable in this. The patriarchs of Constantinople, John and Cyriacus, arrogated to themselves the title of "Œcumenical Bishop or Patriarch," to the great scandal of the Church, with the sanction or connivance of the Emperor Maurice; and neither Pelagius nor Gregory was able to induce Maurice to recognize its injustice. Boniface, whom Gregory had sent as his nuncio and commended to Phocas, obtained, on becoming Pope, from that Emperor, a decree, not conferring a title which his predecessors had rejected and no Pope assumes or bears, but *recognizing*, against the pretensions of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, the Roman Church as *caput omnium Ecclesiarum*, or head of all the Churches, as had been always asserted, and especially by Pelagius II. and St. Gregory I. It was simply a legal recognition of the fact of the supremacy, in ecclesiastical causes, of the See of Peter, not an act conferring that supremacy. Phocas appears to have been a bad man, and a bad em-

peror, but he was emperor *de facto*, and all he did was to confirm a previous edict of Justinian to the same effect, or to confirm what was already the law of the empire, and necessary to enable the Pope to take cognizance of the causes which by the Canons of the Church were reserved to the Papal chair. To pretend that the bishops of Rome built upon that edict of a bad emperor the whole fabric of their power is to betray great want of honesty or of knowledge of history, for the claims of the Popes, whether well or ill founded, had been put forth as distinctly as they are now, and admitted and acted on centuries before Phocas became Emperor.

But it is time to pass to the author's *fourth* Letter, in which he attempts to set up a theory of his own, safer and solidier than that of Rome.

"I propose now to consider the '*means*' which Christ provided for the guidance of his church in after ages, which 'have not fallen short' of the object, or failed, when properly used, to preserve the church from error. Those means were the four Gospels, the authentic record of Christ's mission, faith, and precepts, and the Acts and Epistles of his chosen disciples, confided to the bishops of the apostolic churches. These bishops met in council from time to time, to put down heresy by the authority of Holy Writ, when individuals yielded to error. This was a safe and reliable system, and the same standards, the Gospels, Epistles, and Acts, are transmitted to us."—p. 22.

Here is a new serving up of the old dish of Protestant cant and nonsense, so often brought upon the table, as to be nauseating to the strongest stomachs. "This is a safe and *reliable* system." *Reliable*, Mr. Derby, is newspaper, not classical English. But does the author really believe what he says? or does he simply bring it forward, because he must bring forward something, and he knows not what else to bring? "These bishops met in council from time to time and put down heresy by authority of Holy Writ." Who authorized them to do so? who convokes the Council, presides over its deliberations, confirms and promulgates its acts? Is every assembly of bishops a Council? If not, how distinguish the assembly that is a Council from one that is not? Why has one assembly of Bishops at Ephesus been called an Œcumenical Council, and another, a *Latro-*

*cinium*, or a den of thieves? What constitutes the assembly a Council, and renders its acts legal and binding?

Then how does the Council put down heresy by the authority of Holy Writ? By simply asserting the authority of Holy Writ, or defining and applying that authority to the question before it? Does it put its own construction on Holy Writ, and condemn that put upon it by heretics? or does it recognize the right of every one to construe the Scriptures for himself, in his own way? If Mr. Derby says the former, he rejects his Protestantism; if the latter, he makes the action of the Council a farce, for all heretics recognize, or profess to recognize, the authority of Holy Writ as they understand it, as General Jackson said of the Constitution. The dispute is as to what Holy Writ really teaches on a given question. Mr. Derby may, though it is hardly supposable, believe that Holy Writ authorizes his Protestantism. I believe with all my soul that it does no such thing, but condemns it. Which of us is the heretic? Suppose a Council of bishops is called to settle the question. It meets; is organized, and ready for action. The question comes before it, is argued pro and con, each bishop gives his opinion or does not give it, the president collects the suffrages, and with solemn gravity declares as the decision of the Council that Mr. Derby and Mr. Brownson must submit to the authority of Holy Writ, and if either will not, let him be anathema. Who sees not that this decision would touch no matter in dispute? Mr. Derby is a lawyer, he calls himself a jurist; what, then, would he think, were he to bring or defend an action in a court of law, if the court should, after hearing the evidence and the arguments on both sides, gravely deliver its opinion that the case is determined by the law, and judgment must be rendered against the party that has not the authority of law on his side, without defining the law or applying it to the case, and leaving both parties free, each to construe the law for himself?

The Council must, therefore, define the sense of Holy Writ, and apply it to the case before it; that is, it must define and declare what it is, on the point raised, the Scriptures really teach, otherwise it can do nothing to put down heresy. But in defining, declaring, and applying the sense of Holy Writ, is the Council fallible or infallible?

Mr. Derby, as a Protestant, cannot admit the infallibility of Councils, for that would be to admit an infallible Church. He must, then, hold that the Council is fallible. Then it may err, and condemn the truth, the orthodox faith, while professing to condemn heresy. How, then, can he pretend that the system he alleges Christ has provided is a "safe and reliable system?"

Let us take a case in point. The assembly of bishops, called by Protestant writers, the second Council of Ephesus, sustained Eutyches and the Monophysite theory; the Council of Chalcedon, two years after, condemned Eutyches, and anathematized his doctrine as a heresy. Here "these bishops" decided both ways on the same question. Ephesus says Eutyches is right, pronounces his doctrine orthodox, and falls upon St. Flavian and beats him nearly to death; Chalcedon says Eutyches is wrong, judges his doctrine a damnable heresy, and drives out Dioscorus and his faction who sustained it. Now, dear Derby, which side will you take? Which is the orthodox doctrine? Here is a difficult question for you, who maintain that all bishops have Apostolic authority, and deny that one has it more than another. To us the question presents no difficulty; for we recognize an Apostolic authority present in the acts of Chalcedon, which was wanting in those of Ephesus. You had the Episcopal authority at Ephesus as fully as you had at Chalcedon, and at Chalcedon as fully as you had at Ephesus, and if, as you allege, the Episcopal authority is the highest authority Christ has instituted, you have and can have no reason for following one of those assemblies of bishops in preference to the other. Before them you must be in the predicament of the famous scholastic ass between two equal bundles of hay. Your system, then, with your leave, is impracticable, and neither safe or "reliable." But we hold that our Lord founded his Church on the Apostles, not on the bishops, and that he continues in Peter, through his successors, the Apostolic power in the See of Rome. Hence, we call that See the Apostolic See, and the Church in communion with it the Apostolic Church, not simply Episcopal, after the manner of the Anglicans, who, having cast off the authority of the Apostolic See, confess by the very name they give themselves that their Church is not Apostolic. There is a philosophy in names,

Mr. Derby, which you would do well to study. The Episcopal power, *minus* the Apostolic, is not competent to define the faith or to establish canons for the government of the faithful. They are teachers and legislators only by virtue of their communion with the Apostolic power in the successors of Peter. Hence, there is no Council general, plenary, or provincial, without the Pope. Now, we reject the acts of Ephesus, because they were not approved by the Pope, and we accept those of Chalcedon, because they were so approved. St. Leo condemned the former, and approved the latter, with the exception of the twenty-eighth Canon, which we do not accept, and by approving, gave them the Apostolic sanction and authority.

But there is even another difficulty for Mr. Derby's theory. The government of the Church was not, during the first two centuries and a half, by the system of Councils. The earliest Council, after that held at Jerusalem by the Apostles themselves, of which we have any record, was the first held at Carthage under St. Cyprian, about the middle of the third century, and the first General Council was that of Nicæa in 325. Yet there were many heresies to be put down before either of these. Moreover, Mr. Derby is a Protestant of some sort, and must hold to the sufficiency of the Scriptures. Now, so far as I recollect, there is nothing at all in the Scriptures about governing by Councils, and I do not recollect that they give any rules about convoking Councils, or for determining their organization, their legitimacy, or the legality of their acts. How will Mr. Derby get over this difficulty?

Mr. Derby proceeds to cite various authorities, as he alleges, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, and other fathers, to show that great importance in early times was attached to the Holy Scriptures. He might have spared himself all labor of this sort. These authorities are not to his purpose, for the Church reverences and teaches her children to reverence the Holy Scriptures as the inspired Word of God. Nay, more; she says to him, and to all like him, "Search the Scriptures, for they testify of me. You pretend that you have eternal life in them, and make a tremendous fuss about reading them. Do be so good as really to read them, believe them, and understand them, and you will believe me, for they speak of me, and bear witness for me that I am

the spouse of Him who died to redeem the world." But let us hear this learned pundit, who really at times seems to forget for which side he is retained, or what will prove or disprove his case :

"But the *Romish Church* drives the people from these Scriptures, as something dangerous, and has dared to style them '*a bare letter, uncertain, unprofitable, killing, and dead.*' How much more reliable was the *interpretation* of a traitor, a profligate, a heretic, the tool of an usurper, or the '*godless*' man, whom a *Roman Pontiff* designates as *antichrist* himself?

"The Romish Church has withdrawn the Holy Scriptures as far as possible from the people. Witness the late acts of the Pope, and the recent prosecutions in Tuscany and Piedmont, and refer to the history of Europe for the last twelve centuries. Even while I write, the evening papers inform me that within the last thirty days the Romish Priests have *imprisoned* a whole *family* in Piedmont, for presuming to read the translated Scriptures, and even our national flag has been lately violated by the seizure of the Bibles in an American ship in Sicily."—pp. 25, 26.

The Church, no doubt, forbids the indiscriminate reading of mutilated copies and dishonest versions of the Scriptures made from a corrupt text, like those circulated by the Bible Societies, and condemns the cant and hypocrisy or superstition and idolatry of the Bible, which meet us at every step among Protestants; but she has never withdrawn, and does not withdraw the Scriptures from any who show a disposition to use without misusing them. It is the misuse of the Scriptures by Protestants that has led to the adoption of some restrictions on the reading of them by persons who certainly would not and could not profit by them. The imprisonment of a family in Tuscany for simply reading the Scriptures, reported by the newspapers, is not true, if, as we suppose, the allusion is to the Madiari family. The less Mr. Derby stirs that question the more discretion he will show. But why strain at a gnat and swallow a camel? How long is it since Catholic priests were hung, drawn, and quartered by Protestants for saying mass? Nay, let him look at the statutes of England to-day, he will find that the law forbids the exercise of the Catholic religion in the land of our ancestors, although the penalty of death for saying mass has been repealed. There is not a country in the world where

the government professes to be Protestant in which our religion is free. With regard to the violation of the American flag, I suppose it is only a fair offset to the attempt of the Bible Society, or some of its agents, to violate, under its cover, the laws of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.

"For the first two centuries before the decree of the usurper Phocas, the primitive and universal usage of the Catholic Church was the stated reading of the Scriptures in public worship." p. 26. Not only for the first two, but the first five, and is so still. The reading of the Scriptures always has been, and is a part of the public worship of the Church in communion with the See of Rome.

"Origen says, Would to God, we would all do according as it is written, Search the Scriptures." p. 27. Therefore it is doubtful whether Peter had any thing to do with founding the Church of Rome, and that Church is false and corrupt! This is the reasoning of a Boston jurist to his son. Really does the man know what he is talking about? Does Mr. Derby really believe that the Roman Catholic Church objects to the very reasonable wish he ascribes to Origen? Why did not the learned jurist take the pains to learn what that Church really teaches before undertaking to prove her corrupt, and imposing upon the ingenuousness, and perilling the soul of his son? Mr. Derby is not only free, but is in duty bound to search the Scriptures till he finds the Church to which they were given, and of which they testify. So is every Protestant and every non-Catholic. The Scriptures testify of the Church, and confirm the Catholic faith she teaches. To pretend that the Church is opposed to the Scriptures or fears them, is sheer nonsense. Who has preserved the Scriptures? Who still labors to preserve them in their purity and integrity, and to secure for them the reverence due to the word of God? Who but that very Church which you would persuade your son, against fact and reason, withdraws them from the people, and treats them with contempt? If the Scriptures are against her, she must know it as well as the Massachusetts railroad financier, and if she knows them to be against her, why does she preserve them with such pious care, and teach all her children to reverence them as written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost? The Holy Scriptures, about which Protestants talk so much and which they

read so little, or which, if they read them, it is not to find the truth contained in them, but support for their preconceived opinions, have been preserved by the Church you revile, and you have them, or know them only through her. What base ingratitude and brazen-faced impudence to pretend that she is hostile to them, and treats them as worthless !

In his *fifth* Letter Mr. Derby proceeds to consider some of the doctrines and practices of the Church which he alleges prove her a corrupt Church. He must pardon us, but he appears alike ignorant of his own meaning and that of the authorities he cites. He complains that the cup is withheld from the laity, and that the people at private masses are excluded even from the bread, which last is news to us, as it will be to all Catholics. But why does he complain ? He denies the Real Presence, denies Transubstantiation, and contends that in Holy Communion nothing is really given or received, but literal bread and wine, which might, for aught we can see, be served up to him by his cook and butler at home as well as by the minister in the meeting-house. If he believed in the Real Presence he would not complain, for he would understand that, as the flesh and blood of our Lord are no longer separate, the whole Sacrament is received entire under either species, and that they who receive under the species of bread alone receive all they would were they to receive the cup also. If after consecration the elements remain bread and wine, as before, there is simply no sacrament in the case, and Mr. Derby is making a great ado about nothing. If they are by the words of consecration transubstantiated into the body and blood of our Lord, no harm is done to the laity in withholding from them the cup, for they receive as much as the priest himself who receives under both species.

Suppose that in the early ages the cup was given to the laity, that the Church has changed the original discipline on that point, what then ? The Church has therefore erred, or usurped powers not given her by our Lord ? Before you can be entitled to that conclusion, you must first determine that no such power was given her, or that the discipline, which you say was the original, was intended



by our Lord to be unalterable,—a thing you have by no means done as yet.

The author complains as if he really believed in the Sacrament of the Altar; but it is no such thing. With an inconsistency, which is as inexcusable as it is laughable, after having complained of the great wrong done to the laity by withholding from them the cup, and excluding them, as he says, though falsely, at private masses from the bread, he proceeds to deny the Sacrament itself, by attempting to disprove Transubstantiation and the Real Presence. He has a long string of authorities, as he would persuade us, from the fathers, asserting that the bread and the wine remain unchanged, simple bread and wine after consecration as before, without perceiving that if no change takes place in the symbols there is simply no sacrament. These pretended authorities, as far as we have been able to verify them are, when not for us, invariably miscited or misapplied, so as completely to pervert the obvious sense of the father quoted. Some of them are nothing to his purpose, and those apparently most to his purpose we have been unable to find in the authors referred to. The dishonesty of these citations is all but incredible. Mr. Derby is personally a total stranger to the general sense and spirit of the fathers he pretends to quote; he has neither read the fathers for himself nor, as a general thing, verified the passages he pretends to cite from them, and therefore we do not charge him so much with dishonesty as with a too easy confidence in the honesty and morality of the Anglican controversialists from whom he takes them at second or third hand, and unscrupulousness in telling his son that he has gone to the “fountain-heads,” when the slightest perusal of his work proves that the nearest approach he has made to them is Hopkins, Barrow, and Jewell. We have seen what work he has made of St. Cyprian on the Primacy; perhaps then our readers may believe that he has the temerity to cite Theodoret, Origen Tertullian, St. Cyprian, St. Cyril of Alexandria, St. Leo I., and St. Augustine to disprove Transubstantiation.

“St. Ambrose denies the doctrine in his treatise.

“Gelasius, bishop of Rome, A.D. 492, says, ‘Neither the substance of the bread, nor the nature of the wine ceases to be;’ conclusive

evidence from Rome herself, and yet she rejects the testimony and authority of her *infallible* pontiff.

"Theodoret, bishop of Cyricus, in Syria, A. D. 420, uses this clear and strong language: 'After the consecration, the mystical signs do not cast off their own proper nature, for they remain still in their former *substance, nature, and kind*.'

"Origen confirms this view in his Commentaries on Matthew, c. 15.

"The eloquent and learned Tertullian, in his article, De Resurrectione, says: 'Christ is to be received in the cause of life; to be devoured by hearing; to be ruminated upon by the mind, and digested by faith.'

"Saint Cyprian (de Cœna Domini) says: 'Faith is for the soul the same that food is for the flesh.'

"Saint Cyril, bishop of Alexandria from A. D. 412 to A. D. 444, writes as follows: 'Dost thou say our sacrament is the *eating of a man*, and dost thou irreverently force the mind of the faithful into gross cogitations, and goest thou about with natural imaginations, to deal with those things that are to be received by only pure and perfect faith.'

"Leo, bishop of Rome, A. D. 440-461, says: 'About this body gather eagles, which fly with spiritual wings, the wings of faith.'

"To finish this point, let us consult Augustine that saint of the Romish calendar, a devout man and a clear witness, as *you* describe him. He tells us, 'What we see is bread; what the eyes present to us is the cup; but that which faith would teach is, that the bread is the body of Christ, and the cup his blood.' And again he says, 'Christ has lifted up his body into heaven, from which he shall come to judge the quick and the dead. There he is now sitting at the right hand of the Father. How then is the bread his body, and the cup, or what is in the cup, how is it his blood?' Again, 'We have no special regard to the bread, wine, or water, for they are *creatures corruptible*, as well after consecration as they were before, but we direct our faith only unto the very body of Christ, not as being there really and fleshly present, but as sitting in heaven at the right of God the Father.'"—pp. 31, 32.

Turn now to the work of St. Ambrose cited, and what do we find? The denial of the doctrine of Transubstantiation? By no means; but such expressions as these: "Panis iste, panis est ante verba sacramentorum; ubi accesserit consecratio de pane fit caro Christi." "Quomodo potest qui panis est, esse corpus Christi? Consecratione?" "Ergo, tibi ut respondeam, non erat corpus Christi ante consecrationem; sed post consecrationem, dico tibi quod jam corpus est Christi." Here is an express assertion of the very con-

trary of what Mr. Derby alleges,—as clear and as explicit a statement as can be made in language, that what was bread is by the words of consecration, not by the faith of the recipient, changed into the body of Christ.

The work from which the passage ascribed to Pope St. Gelasius is taken, is not the work of that illustrious Pontiff, but of Gelasius Cyzicenus; and it is enough to say that the terms *natura ac substantia* are used by the writer not to express the essence of the thing, but, after the manner of the Greeks, to designate its natural sensible qualities or properties, which, as all Catholics hold, remain unchanged after consecration.

The passage cited from Theodoret is both miscited and misapplied. Theodoret does not use the words *nature* and *kind*, but *figura et forma*. Besides, his purpose is not to deny Transubstantiation, but to refute the argument his Eutychian opponent draws from it in favor of the Monophysite heresy. The passage referred to occurs in his second Dialogue, where he is reasoning against the Eutychians. The dialogue is between a Catholic, Orthodoxus, and a Eutychian, Eranistes. Eranistes asks of his opponent: Quomodo post sanctificationem symbola appellantur? Orthodoxus replies: Corpus Christi et sanguis Christi. Eranistes: Et credis te corpus Christi et sanguinem percipere? Orthodoxus: Ita credo. Eranistes: Sicut ergo symbola Dominici corporis et sanguinis, alia sunt ante sacerdotis invocationem, vero mutantur, et alia fiunt, ita Dominicum corpus post ascensionem in divinam substantiam mutatum est. Orthodoxus: Retibus quæ ipse texuisti captus es. Neque enim symbola mystica post sanctificationem recedunt a sua natura; manent enim in priore substantia et figura et forma, et videri tangique possunt, sicut et prius: intelliguntur autem ea esse quæ facta sunt, et creduntur, et adorantur, ut quæ illa sunt quæ creduntur. Confer igitur imaginem cum archetypo, et videbis similitudinem. Oportet enim figuram similem esse veritati. Illud enim corpus habet priorem figuram et circumscriptionem, et semel dicam, corporis substantiam: immortale autem post resurrectionem, et immune a corruptione factum est, sedemque a dextris adeptum, et ab omni creatura adoratur, quia Domini naturæ corpus appellatur." The Eutychian argues from the fact of the conversion of the bread and

wine into the very body and blood of Christ after the invocation of the priest, which both admitted, that the body of Christ after his ascension is converted into the divine substance ; but the Catholic tells him the analogy from which he reasons is against him ; for as the mystical symbols, though changed into the body and blood of Christ, do not lose their natural properties of bread and wine, but retain their proper figure and form, whatever is visible and palpable, and what is worshipped in them is not what is sensible, seen and touched, but those things which are understood and which faith teaches they are made, so the body of Christ after the resurrection, though made immortal and fortified against corruption, retains its prior form and circumscription, its natural properties of body, and is to be adored by every creature because it is called the Lord's body, or by virtue of the hypostatic union. The whole point in the Eutychian's argument and in the Catholic's retort would be lost if we supposed Theodoret denied the substantial conversion of the symbols into the body and blood of our Lord. Theodoret does not deny the conversion, but assumes it, and argues from it against his Eutychian opponent ; what he denies is, that in the conversion there is any conversion of the natural properties, or sensible qualities of the bread and wine, and that we all deny. We are forced to this interpretation, unless we would make Theodoret contradict himself, for he expressly asserts the doctrine as we hold it, in his commentary on 1 Cor. xi., where he says, that not only the Eleven received the precious body of our Lord, but also the traitor Judas.\*

Mr. Derby refers to Origen, but he makes no quotation from his works. Origen is one of our witnesses, and a strong one in our favor. The words ascribed to Tertullian make nothing to the purpose, for the reception he asserts does not exclude the sacramental reception asserted by the Church. The same may be said of the passage alleged from St. Cyprian, "What food is to the body faith is to the soul." Who denies it ? St. Cyril of Alexandria main-

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\* Consult on Theodoret Kenric. *Theolog. Dogmat. de Transubstant.* The chapter on Transubstantiation is one of the very best tracts on that subject we are acquainted with.

tains the doctrine as we hold it. The passage alleged from him is not to Mr. Derby's purpose, for it is evident on its face, that what it condemns is what every Catholic condemns, the gross notion of the unbelieving Jews, that the eating of the flesh and drinking of the blood of our Lord is to be understood in a carnal, not a sacramental sense, as we eat flesh bought in the market. Dr. Kenrick cites, in his *Theologia Dogmatica*, in the chapter already referred to, St. Cyril as saying: Ne horreremus carnem et sanguinem apposita sacris altaribus, condescendens Deus nostris fragilitatibus, influit oblatis vim vitæ, CONVERTENS EA IN VERITATEM PROPRIÆ CARNIS, ut corpus vitæ, quasi quoddam semen, inveniatur in nobis.\* The passage ascribed to St. Leo I. says nothing against Transubstantiation.

The first authority from St. Augustine is decidedly in our favor, and against Mr. Derby. The Saint is instructing children in regard to the Sacrament of the Altar. "Hoc quod," he says, "videtis in altari Dei, etiam transacta nocte vidistis; sed quid esset, quid sibi vellet, quam magnæ rei sacramentum contineret, nondum audistis. Quod ergo videtis, panis est et calix; quod vobis etiam oculi vestri renuntiant: quod autem fides vestra postulat instruenda, panis est Christi, et calix sanguis Christi." What you see, what your eyes announce to you, is the bread and the cup; what your faith needs to be instructed in, is, that the bread is the body of Christ, and the cup is the blood of Christ, precisely what Mr. Derby himself needs to be taught. The Saint continues, "Breviter quidem hoc dictum est, quod fidei forte sufficiat; sed fides instructionem desiderat. Dicit enim propheta: *nisi credideritis, non intelligetis*. Potestis enim modo dicere mihi; præcipisti ut credamus, expone ut intelligamus. Potest enim in animo cujusquam cogitatio talis suboriri: Dominus noster Jesus Christus, novimus unde acceperit carnem; de virgine Maria. Infans lactatus est, nutritus est, crevit, ad juvenilem ætatem perductus est, a Judæis persecutionem passus est, ligno suspensus est, in ligno interfectus est, de ligno depositus est, sepultus est, tertia die resurrexit, quo die voluit, in cælum ascendit, illuc levavit corpus suum; inde

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\* Epis. ad Cælosyrium, c. iv. de Fide.

est venturus ut judicet vivos et mortuos ; ibi est modo sedens ad dexteram Patris : Quomodo est panis corpus ejus ? et calix, vel quod habet calix, quomodo est sanguis ejus ? ” Here are the questions Mr. Derby cites, and which he would have us believe the Saint regarded as unanswerable. But St. Augustine replies to these questions immediately ; “ Ista, fratres, ideo sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur.”\*

The other passage ascribed to St. Augustine I have not found. Mr. Derby’s reference, *In Genes. Hom.* 24, is to a work I do not find enumerated among those of St. Augustine. The passage, however, offers no difficulty, even supposing it to be St. Augustine’s, and fairly given. In the Sacrament, we of course pay no especial regard to the bread, the wine, or the water, for they are corruptible creatures after consecration as before, and what we adore is not their species, or what in the Sacrament is visible, but we direct our attention from that which is seen to that which is understood, that is, we direct our faith only unto the very body and blood of Christ, not as really and fleshly present, not present with the real and natural properties of his body, as he walked the earth, or as he is in heaven sitting at the right hand of his Father. We must understand the passage of the species of the bread and the wine, and of the presence of Christ in the Sacrament with the natural, sensible properties or species of his body, or else we shall make St. Augustine contradict himself. What the author of the passage would warn us against is that the species, the sensible qualities of the symbols are the object of our attention or our adoration, and the gross conception that Christ is carnally present in the Sacrament, and that his body and blood are there with their natural properties. Thus he says in treating the text, “The flesh profiteth nothing.” O, Domine, magister bone, quomodo caro non prodest quidquam, cum tu dixeris, *Nisi quis manducaverit carnem meam, et biberit sanguinem meum, non habebit in se vitam?* An vita non prodest quidquam ? et propter quid sumus quod sumus, nisi ut habeamus vitam æternam, quam tua carne promittis ? quid est ergo, non prodest quidquam caro ? Non prodest quid-

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\* *Ad Infantes ; de Sacramento.* Serm. cclxxii.

quam, *sed quomodo illi intellexerunt: carnem quippe sic intellexerunt, quomodo in cadavere dilaniatur, aut in macello venditur*, non quomodo spiritu vegetatur. Proinde sic dictum est. *Caro non prodest quidquam*: quomodo dictum est: *Scientia inflat*. Jam ergo debemus odisse scientiam? Absit. Et quid est, *Scientia inflat*? Sola, sine charitate: ideo adjunxit, *Charitas vero ædificat*. Adde ergo scientiæ charitatem, et utilis erit scientia; non per se, sed per charitatem. Sic etiam nunc, *caro non prodest quidquam*, sed sola caro; accedat spiritus ad carnem, quomodo accedit charitas ad scientiam, et prodest plurimum. Nam si caro nihil prodesset, Verbum caro non fieret, ut inhabitaret in nobis. Si per carnem nobis multum profuit Christus, quomodo caro nihil prodest? Sed per carnem Spiritus aliquid pro salute nostra egit. Caro vas fuit; quod habebat attende, non quod erat.\*

St. Augustine in the Sermon before cited and elsewhere teaches that the Sacraments consist of two things, one visible, and present to the senses, the other invisible, not seen or touched, but understood. "In eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur." The visible part of the Sacrament of the Altar is the species of bread and wine; the invisible part, the noetic part, understood, not seen, is the body and blood of our Lord, yet not with the species, the natural, sensible properties of his body. "Quod videtur speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligitur, fructum habet spiritualem." The corporal St. Augustine restricts to the visible species, to what we call the sensible, and hence the presence of the body and blood of our Lord, as the invisible part of the Sacrament, is not their corporal or sensible presence, but their spiritual or sacramental presence, which, as we understand it, is strictly the doctrine of the Church.

Mr. Derby's difficulty, as well as that of many others, in understanding certain expressions of the fathers, grows out of their misunderstanding of the Catholic dogma, and their failure to appreciate the profound philosophy of the early Christian doctors. In the earliest ages, we know the mystery of the Blessed Eucharist was placed under the *disciplina arcani*, and was clearly and distinctly expounded only to the initiated, in order to save it from being profaned by the heathen; but enough is said in the

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\* In Joan. Tract. xxvii., No. 5.

earliest writers who touch the subject to satisfy any fair-minded reader, who knows the doctrine as it is taught by the Church, that they held it as the Church now holds it. But one who does not know the doctrine as really taught now, who conceives that we assert a sensible presence of the body and blood of our Lord in the Sacrament, find various expressions in the fathers which do really deny the dogma in that sense. But the Church does not teach, and never has taught, that there is any conversion of the species or sensible properties or qualities of the bread and wine. These retain their original natural character unaffected by the words of consecration. The Church has never taught, and does not teach, that our Lord is corporally present, that is, present with the natural, sensible qualities or properties of his body, or the body which he carried with him to heaven, and which is seated at the right hand of the Father. His body is present spiritually, not corporally, as St. Augustine would say, that is, sacramentally, not visibly, that is, again, present by faith to the intellect, not by intuition or tact to the senses. This distinction between the *visibilia* and *intelligibilia*, between the *νόηματα* and *αἰσθηματα*, in one and the same body, common to the great fathers of the Church, belongs to a philosophy a little too profound for the modern non-Catholic mind, and it is unable to conceive it possible for a body to be intelligibly present and not also sensibly present. The reason of this is that modern non-Catholics place the whole body, its very substance or essence, in the sensible species, and do not admit an intelligible substance distinguishable from the sensible. When they hear us affirm the Real Presence of the body and blood of our Lord in the Sacrament, they immediately understand us to assert a sensible presence. Therefore when they find a father or doctor of the Church denying the sensible presence, they conclude at once that he denies the real substantial or essential presence, and is a witness against us. A profounder philosophy would teach these gentlemen that the essence or substance even of material things is immaterial, non-sensible, and to be ranked with the *intelligibilia*. Hence we may say with strict propriety of language that the very body and blood of our Lord are substantially present in the Sacrament of the Altar, and yet not sensibly or even materially present.



The intelligible, not the sensible, body is present. So in the consecration of the bread and the wine there is a conversion of the substance, the essence, the *intelligibilia* of the bread and the wine, but no conversion, in the language of the schoolmen, of the species or accidents, that is, of what in the bread and wine is sensible. Hence we may, referring to the sensible qualities of the bread and wine, call them bread and wine even after consecration, and speak of them as "creatures corruptible." So also we may deny that Christ is corporally, that is, sensibly, present in the Sacrament, and assert that in that sense he is in heaven only.

If this distinction were attended to, the alleged difficulties of the fathers would vanish at once, for the fathers always imply it, though they do not always express it. It would also relieve many honest people of the trouble they find in conceiving it possible for the body of Christ to be in heaven and whole and entire on a thousand altars on earth at once. The intelligible is not subject to the laws of sensible space. The *Where* belongs to the sensible, not to the intelligible order, which is inextended. Nobody pretends that Christ's body is sensibly present in heaven and at the same time sensibly present on our altars. He is sensibly present in heaven, if you will, as Theodoret teaches, but simply intelligibly present in the Sacrament of the Blessed Eucharist. Attention to this same distinction would help us to understand what the fathers say about the presence of the Lord's body by faith, and its reception by faith. Faith in this as in all the Sacraments performs the office of sensible intuition. The substantial presence is not in the natural order, and can be intuitively apprehended neither by sense nor by intellect, and we intellectually apprehend that the body and blood of our Lord are substantially present only by faith. Faith alone presents them to the understanding, and by faith alone do we know that we receive them, and it is through faith as well as love that we receive, not the Sacrament, but the fruit of the Sacrament. Certainly the power of the Sacrament is not derived from the virtue of the recipient, but it is necessary to its practical effect that we interpose no obstruction to the inflowing of its grace. The doctrine, however, that Mr. Derby's friends hold, that the body and blood of our

Lord are received only by faith and the faithful, or that the communion of our Lord's body and blood is only a spiritual communion, finds no countenance either in the Scriptures or the fathers and doctors of the Church. Passages enough may be cited to prove the necessity of faith to a good communion, enough to prove that the reception of the body and blood of our Lord is a spiritual or sacramental reception, as distinguished from the gross carnal reception understood by the unbelieving Jews, or the reception with their natural species or sensible properties ; but these passages are in strict accordance with the Catholic faith, and teach only what the Church teaches and always has taught.

From Transubstantiation the learned jurist passes to the consideration of Purgatory :

" This brings me to another usurpation, the strange doctrine of Purgatory. Until the Council of Trent, three centuries since, a Roman Catholic was not required to receive it as an article of faith, but the sale of masses, pardons, and indulgencies, to raise funds for Rome, had been so extensive that the Church of Rome was then compelled, under the pressure of the Reformers, to endeavor to sustain itself by adopting Purgatory as an article of faith.

" You rest Purgatory on St. Peter's 1st Epistle,\* in substance as follows : ' That Christ died for our sins, but enlivened in the spirit, *preached to those spirits that were in prison.*' To my mind this verse is made clear by the verse which follows, in which ' spirits ' are spoken of as disobedient in the time of Noah, in consequence of which only eight souls were saved. St. Peter speaks, also, in his second Epistle, of ' being in this tabernacle,' of ' putting off this tabernacle himself, as his Lord Jesus had shown him.† He speaks of those ' who walk after the flesh, in the lust of uncleanness, as servants of corruption, for of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage.' The exposition of the verses you cite, is, to my mind, perfectly easy. In the time of Noah, those spirits imprisoned in the flesh, were disobedient, and all perished, except the eight souls saved with Noah. But in the days of the apostles, our Saviour having put off the flesh, appeared in his spiritual nature to his disciples, who were spirits still in the prison of the flesh, and preached to them in their prison, and by his baptism, previously conferred, and his resurrection and ascent into heaven, where he has power over all, saved them as God saved Noah and his associates in the ark.

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\* 1 Peter 3 : 18, 19.

† 2 Peter 2 : 19.

"This is my exposition as a jurist, and I expound the passage as I would a deed, by the context, and other deeds of the grantor."—pp. 33, 34.

The assertion that no Roman Catholic was obliged to believe the doctrine of Purgatory prior to the Council of Trent is simply false, as is also that about the sale of masses, pardons, indulgences, &c. No such sale was ever authorized by the Church, or could be effected without the grossest violation of her doctrine and discipline. If individuals without and against her doctrine and authority had done it, she would not be responsible, but there is not a particle of evidence that any one ever has done so. We make this statement with a full knowledge of the charge brought by Luther and his adherents against Tetzel; but that charge did not go to the extent of Mr. Derby's, and besides, it was never proved, and never at any time rested on any better authority than that of Luther himself, which is none at all. Indeed it is worse than none, for the fact that Dr. Martin Luther makes a charge is *prima facie* evidence that it is false. To any man who knows the Catholic doctrine of pardons and indulgences the charge is ridiculous and absurd. The learned jurist puts the cart before the horse, in supposing the doctrine of Purgatory was adopted in order to justify the practice of granting indulgences. The practice presupposes the doctrine and never could have obtained without it.

Mr. Derby says he gives his exposition of 1 Pet. iii. 18, 19, "as a jurist," and that he expounds it as he would a deed. If so, we shall beg to be excused, if we have a deed to be expounded, from employing him to expound it. We have known all along that he was a poor theologian, and we begin now to suspect that he is hardly a better jurist. In my Protestant days I understood the text as I do now, and the doctrine of Purgatory always seemed to me, supposing the truth of Christianity, a very reasonable and necessary doctrine. If it comes to private interpretation I shall not yield to Mr. Derby, since for nearly twenty years I was a Protestant Minister, and he even in the estimation of Protestants is only a layman.

Mr. Derby tells us (p. 34), that the Greek or Eastern Church, meaning the Schismatic or Non-United Christians of the Greek rite, does not believe the doctrine of Purga-

tory. This is about as true as his statement that that church is established in Austria. There are Schismatists of the Greek rite in Austria, no doubt, and there may be Greek Schismatists who do not believe the doctrine of Purgatory ; but we know the Greeks believed it in the fifteenth century and subscribed to the definition of it by the Council of Florence in the Act of Union. Difference on that subject has never been one of the causes of separation or one of the obstacles to re-union.

Mr. Derby tells us again (*ibid.*), "that Eastern and Western Bishops differed principally, if not entirely, on the question of Easter day, when the two churches separated." Does he mean the principal, if not the entire difference between the East and the West, at the time of the separation, was on the question of Easter-day ? Or does he mean they differed at that time almost entirely on that question ? Let him mean either, his statement is untrue, for whether he speaks of the earliest, of the latest, or an intermediate separation, there was no difference on the question as to the time of keeping Easter. Pope St. Victor, near the close of the second century, excommunicated certain Asiatic bishops, or at least threatened to do so, but the Eastern Church was never at war with the Western on that question. There is even now no difference between the East and the West as to the time when Easter ought to be kept, there is only a difference as to the manner of computing the time. This difference has been occasioned by the introduction, long since the last separation, into the West of the Gregorian Calendar or New Style, which the East has hitherto refused to adopt, preferring, as some one says, "rather to disagree with the stars than to agree with the Pope." Mr. Derby does not seem to be better as a historian than he is as a logician, theologian, or jurist.

"You think," he says to his son (*ibid.*), "that Purgatory has been admitted by the fathers. If so, when and where ?" Is Mr. Derby really so ignorant of the subject on which he speaks with so much confidence, as actually to imagine that his demand cannot be answered ? Were we proving the doctrines of the Church we would bring forward authorities enough to the contrary of his assertion to make even him blush for his ignorance and recklessness.

"St. Augustine certainly knew of no such admission, and could not convince himself of its truth; he says, 'that such a thing may be after this life, is not incredible.' 'But what means this,' he adds, 'and what sins be there which so prevent men from coming into the kingdom of God that they may notwithstanding obtain pardon by the merits of holy friends, it is very hard to find, and very dangerous to determine. Certainly, I myself, notwithstanding great study and travail in that behalf, could never attain to the knowledge of it.' Again, he says, 'For such as every man in this day shall die, even such on that day shall he be judged.'"

"And to this effect elsewhere."\*—pp. 34, 35.

Mr. Derby is unfortunate in his references. St. Augustine wrote no work entitled, *De Comitatu Dei*. The work intended is, most likely, *De Civitate Dei*, but I do not find in that the alleged passages. *Epistolæ* 80, if it means *Epistola* 80, does not contain them. *Hom.* 11, in *Apocalypsis*, refers to a work not by St. Augustine. So also does *Ad Petrum*, Cap. 3. In *Johan.* 49, contains nothing bearing on the question. The first two passages are the only ones of importance, and these I do not recollect in my reading of the works of the Saint, and I am unable to find them by means of the very full index of the Benedictines. Something the Saint may have said has most probably, by miscitation, misapplication, or mistranslation, or all these at once, been worked up into them, but that they express as they stand his doctrine on the subject is absolutely impossible, for that St. Augustine held the doctrine of Purgatory, and held it too as a tradition of the fathers, is undeniable. Mr. Derby's mistake, whether original with him or copied by him from some of his Protestant friends, has probably been occasioned by the fact that St. Augustine denies that *all* punishments after death are purgatorial, or that faith alone, prayers of the Saints, and almsdeeds can avail those who have died in sin. This he may have understood, *more Anglicano*, to be the denial of Purgatory; but the Saint himself did not so understand it. After telling us that prayers for the devil and his angels, or for those who have died infidels and impious, will not be heard, he adds, "pro defunctis quibusdam, vel ipsius Ecclesiæ, vel quorundam piorum exauditur oratio; sed

\* De comitatu Dei, Epistolæ 80, Hom. 11, In apocalypsis. Ad Petrum, Cap. 3, In Johan. Tract. 49.

pro his quorum in Christo regenerantium, nec usque adeo vita in corpore male gesta est, ut tali misericordia iudicentur digni non esse; nec usque adeo bene ut talem misericordiam reperiantur necessariam non habere. . . . . Neque enim quibusdam veraciter diceretur, quod non eis remittatur neque in hoc sæculo, neque in futuro, nisi essent quibus, etsi non in isto, tamen, remittetur in futuro.”\* This is sufficient to prove that St. Augustine held the doctrine of Purgatory. But he says again, “Non sunt præmittendæ supplicationes pro spiritibus mortuorum; quas faciendas pro omnibus in Christiana et Catholica societate defunctis etiam tacitis nominibus quorumcumque sub generali commemoratione suscepit ecclesia.”† He says this in answer to those who thought it a damage to the dead not to have known sepulchres, on the ground that it might prevent prayers from being offered for the repose of their souls.

To the same effect, he says in another place,‡ “Proinde pompæ funeris, agmina exsequiarum, sumptuosa diligentia sepulturæ, monumentorum opulenta constructio, vivorum sunt qualiacumque solatia, non adjutoria mortuorum. Orationibus vero sanctæ Ecclesiæ, et sacrificio salutari, et elemosynis, quæ pro eorum spiritibus erogantur, non est dubitandum mortuos adjuvari; ut cum eis misericordius agatur a Domino, quam eorum peccata meruerunt. Hoc enim a patribus traditum universa observat Ecclesia, ut pro eis qui in corporis et sanguinis Christi communione defuncti sunt, cum ad ipsum sacrificium loco suo commemorantur, oretur, ac pro illis quoque id offerri commemoretur. Cum vero eorum commendandorum causa opera misericordiæ celebrantur, quis eis dubitat suffragari pro quibus orationes Deo non inaniter allegantur? Non omnino ambigendum est ista prodesse defunctis, sed talibus qui ita vixerint ante mortem, ut possint eis hæc utilia esse post mortem.”

What could Mr. Derby have known of the matter, when he represented St. Augustine as doubtful and unable to convince himself of the truth of the doctrine of Purgatory? These extracts are decisive, and we could adduce several

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\* *De Civitat. Dei*, Lib. xxi., cap. 24.

† *De Cura pro Mortuis*, cap. iv.

‡ *Serm. clxxii. de Verbis Apostoli*. Edit. Gaume Fratres.

more equally express to our purpose. They prove that he held, without any doubt, that the souls of the dead, who have died, as we say, in a state of grace, are aided by the prayers of the Church and those of the pious, by the sacrifice of the altar, that is, masses, and by almsdeeds, and surely this involves the whole doctrine of Purgatory. Never was a more rash or a more unfounded assertion than that which Mr. Derby makes to his son, and no language of ours would be strong enough to describe his turpitude, if he had, as he falsely asserts, gone to the "fountain heads." He has, with an inexcusable weakness and credulity, relied on mere hearsay, and introduced what, if he knows any thing of the legal profession, is neither competent nor credible evidence. It is the one standing complaint against him. His report of the fathers, as they say of Rail-road reports, has been "cooked," though we willingly acquit him of having been personally the cook.

Mr. Derby begins his *sixth* Letter by summing up what he professes to have proved in the fifth, of which, we have shown, he has proved nothing. But assuming with admirable self-complacency that he has proved that our Church has erred in withholding the cup from the laity, and in making Purgatory an article of faith,—doctrines, he says, of which St. Augustine knew nothing, he proceeds to "consider the supremacy and infallibility claimed for the Pope." Very well ; but what has Mr. Derby to say against them?

"The man who joins the Roman Catholic Church is obliged publicly to repeat and certify his assent to its creed without qualification or restriction." p. 31. Mr. Derby quotes as his authority Dr. Hopkins, Protestant *Episcopal* Bishop of Vermont. Is Dr. Hopkins one of "those early saints, fathers, and popes, revered by the Church itself?" and one of those "authorities on which the Church of Rome relies?" Did you not tell us in your Introduction that you had not resorted to the "writings of the opponents" of that Church? And yet did you not tell us that when you knew you had confined yourself all but exclusively to the writings of her opponents? What are we to think of a man so reckless in his assertions? Why, we fear we must think that he has in very deed been taking lessons in the school of the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Vermont, that rare compound of pretension, arrogance, self-complacency, ignorance,

vanity, and unscrupulousness, as a scholar. We are loath to believe that even Mr. Derby in his hatred of Catholicity, or rather in his devotion to "Respectability," or as Carlyle has it, "Gigmanity," could descend so low as to take lessons of Dr. Hopkins.

But "the man who joins the Roman Catholic Church, is obliged publicly to repeat and certify his assent to its creed, without qualification and restriction." Well, what if he is? Would you have a man join a church without a creed, or if the church he joins has a creed, join it without believing its creed—thus act a lie? Every man who joins a church that has a creed, by the very act of joining certifies his assent to its creed without qualification or restriction. When a man joins a church he either believes it is God's Church with authority to teach what he is and what he is not to believe, or he does not. If he does not, what business has he to join it? Such a church is no church at all; it may be a voluntary association, a parliamentary or a royal establishment, a conventicle of fanatics, or a synagogue of Satan, but church in the good sense of the word, it is not. If he believes it to be God's Church, where is the hardship in his being required to certify his assent to whatever she teaches? For any Protestant church to require such a certification, would be intolerable, and yet the Presbyterian Church does it, and the Protestant Episcopal Church, we presume, would, if it had any creed, or any teaching faculty. But if the church really be the Church of God, really be commissioned by him to teach, what impropriety is there in her demanding the unqualified and unreserved assent of the man who joins her to the creed she believes? I joined the Catholic Church because I had the highest reason possible in any case whatever to believe her God's Church, authorized by him to teach me, and assisted by him to teach me the truth, and incapable of teaching me any thing but the truth. I could therefore with the greatest propriety in the world certify my assent to all she teaches, nay, swear to believe it without qualification or restriction. I believed her totally different in origin, nature, character, and powers, from any and all your Protestant establishments, sects, or conventicles, or I should never have joined her. Prove, if you can, that she is not God's Church, but do not think to prove it by prov-



ing that she does things which would be improper, if she were a Protestant sect, but perfectly proper on the supposition that she is God's Church.

"Pius V. by a bull issued under his plenary power undertook to depose Elizabeth and absolve her subjects." p. 37. What if he did? Did not the American Congress of 1776, so far as respected the American colonies, do the same to George the Third? If he did do so, what can you say against him, if he had plenary power? Elizabeth professed to be a Catholic, ascended the English throne as a Catholic, was crowned and took her coronation oath as a Catholic, and the Pope as the visible head of the Catholic Church, of which she professed herself a member, and which she had solemnly sworn to protect, had the right to depose her for her perjury, her persecution of Catholics, and her murder of Mary Queen of Scots. Elizabeth was a perjurer, a murderer, a relentless persecutor of Catholics, and richly deserved deposition, and you must prove that the Pope had no right to depose her, before you can conclude from his deposition of her, that the power claimed for the Pope by the Transalpine party, as you term them, is odious, or not given him by Jesus Christ, who is King of kings and Lord of lords.

Mr. Derby (p. 33) pretends to cite a Catholic writer who declares the authority of the Pope to be greater than that of the Scriptures. This is malice without sense. No Catholic writer ever said any thing of the kind. The authority of the Pope in defining the sense of the Scriptures is greater than yours or mine; but it is never greater than the authority of Scripture, when you once have it and know authoritatively that you have it.

But we must stop for the present number. We have dissected the jurist's statements thus far as thoroughly as they deserved. We shall continue to do so yet longer, but we confess, the game is hardly worth the candle, and our stock of patience is beginning to run low. We wish we could find some man among our Protestant brethren, who would really make himself master of the subject and discuss it with solid learning, manly thought, and fair argument, so that one could reply without feeling himself humiliated in his own eyes. How happens it that the discussion of the great question between Catholics and Protestants,

falls on the Protestant side into the hands of men of very moderate abilities and still more attainments, men without solid learning, without ordinary fairness, without, we must say it, ordinary honesty, men whose whole strength lies in the recklessness of their statements, the audacity of their falsehoods, and the low pettifogging skill with which they can appeal to the passions and prejudices of the ignorant but conceited vulgar. We have not thus far found in Mr. Derby an honest quotation, a candid statement, a true assertion, or a respectable argument. Is it not lamentable to have to deal with such men, men whom with the best dispositions in the world you cannot treat as gentlemen, or as fair-minded and honorable opponents, and with whom it is impossible to maintain dignified and profitable controversy?

Yet it is works like the one before us, works which are but a tissue of falsifications, falsehoods, and miserable sophistries, chicaneries from beginning to end, that perpetuate the anti-Catholic prejudices in the community, render the people ready to join the No-popery cry, and break out in open acts of violence, or to form in secret Know-Nothing lodges conspiracies against peaceable and unoffending Catholics. It is degrading to one's manhood to find that men can be found base enough to write such books; it is mortifying to one's patriotism to know that there are masses of his countrymen capable of being influenced by them. What strange infatuation has come over the Protestant world that they are able to regard themselves as the enlightened portion of mankind! Their controversial literature is marked by the most deplorable ignorance, and yet it is popular. It bears falsehood and absurdity stamped on every page, and yet there are whole multitudes of Protestants who read and devour it as if it were all Gospel truth. Is it possible to reach these people, to make them see themselves as they are, to persuade them to get wisdom, and with all their getting to get understanding? With God it is possible, with men it is impossible. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in a mortar, yet will not his folly depart from him." Yet we suffer not ourselves to despond. These people who can believe any thing but the truth, are, after all, not the whole non-Catholic world, and there are not a few in the Protestant ranks who are beginning to be

disgusted with the sort of books we refer to. They doubt the honesty, the sincerity, as well as the learning and ability of the writers against the Church, and in the end distrust of the popular anti-Catholic literature will spread far and wide in the Protestant ranks.

Meanwhile, though they are not worth it, these books must be refuted, and their real character shown up. It is a fatiguing and a disgusting labor to do it, but possibly some good may come of it. One good result we have already obtained from it, that is, a clearer view of the Catholic character of the fathers than we before had. We knew before that the fathers were on our side, but we had no adequate conception before the examination Mr. Derby's books have led us to make of them, of the barefaced impudence and dishonesty of those writers who read them and undertake to press them into the service of Protestantism. The Catholicity as held by the Church is not only in here and there a passage, but it pervades them, and is their very spirit and essence. Catholicity, as we understand it, is the life and soul of the great fathers and doctors, the atmosphere in which they lived, moved, and breathed. Talk of *Romish* corruptions and innovations, it is miserable cant and dishonesty. The fact is, they were more Catholic, if any thing, than we, and it is necessary for us to return often to them to refresh ourselves, and to find an antidote to the prevailing Protestantism of the age and country.

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ART. II.—1. *L'Ange Conducteur dans les Prières, à Liège*, 1782.

2. *Manual de Orações*. Anno 1756. Lisboa.

3. *The Key of Paradise*. London : 1772.

4. *Instructions and Devotions for hearing Mass*, printed in the year 1699.

5. *A Dayly Exercise of the Devout Christian*, printed 1673.

We place these ancient prayer-books, written in French, Portuguese, and English, at the head of some remarks which we feel prompted to make, not wishing to excite jealousy

or pain, by selecting as the subject of our observations any of the numerous devotional works recently issued by our enterprising publishers. To these we willingly accord the praise of taste and elegance, although the bulk of several of the works does not catch our fancy, since we desire greater simplicity in the exercise of piety. We do not, however, blame the publishers for seeking to gratify their patrons by every variety of devotion, which is their duty as well as interest, in all those matters which the ecclesiastical authority sanctions, or leaves free. The approval obtained from the prelates in whose respective dioceses these works have been published, shows that the publishers acted with all due regard for superiors, unless, as in some cases we know has happened, the approval be alleged without foundation. It has been presumed as a matter of course, by some who merely republished a prayer-book stated to have been already approved of by the prelate, or his predecessor. We suggest, however, the propriety of obtaining an express approval, whenever the actual prelate has not already given it, since it is incongruous and irregular to publish a work on the authority of one who has passed from this sublunary world. The same should be understood of a bishop who has been translated. As the authority of a bishop over the diocese ceases by his translation, it is a want of respect to his successor, if any devotional work appear with such sanction. For the same reason, the practice of soliciting and alleging on the title-page the approval of other bishops beside the ordinary, is indecorous, unless a higher authority intervene, especially the Sovereign Pontiff. Although this display of names, which savors of puffing, may promote in some degree the sale of the work, it is not altogether consistent with the respect due to the local authority, and it gives the bishops the appearance of easy patrons rather than of impartial judges. In the mode hitherto followed, we discover no intentional want of respect on the part of the publishers, but a natural solicitude for their own interests, which, we believe, can be as effectually promoted by a method more strictly canonical. The bishops who, through courtesy for their colleagues, decline allowing their names to be used in conjunction with that of the Ordinary, have many ways of making known to their dio-

cesans their high estimate of works that may be circulated with advantage.

Whoever has travelled in Italy, Spain, or other Catholic countries, has not failed to observe how deficient the people appear to be in prayer-books. The recital of the beads seems the most popular form of devotion, even during the celebration of Mass, at which comparatively few use books, containing, for the most part, short meditations on the mysteries, or prayers suited to the occasion. The Portuguese Manual, which lies before us, is of this character. It consists of little more than a hundred pages of 24mo., with a number of wood-cuts, representing the various parts of the Mass, and the corresponding scenes in the Passion, Resurrection, and Ascension of our Saviour, which are commemorated and represented. Meagre as this supply to the spiritual appetite may appear, we deem it quite sufficient, and better calculated to foster piety, than the lengthened and elaborate devotions of our ordinary prayer-books. It arrests and fixes the attention, without fatiguing the reader, leaving him free scope to exercise his mind in reflection. The endeavor to read all that is in the prayer-book often occupies the worshipper, so as to make him almost unconscious of the meaning of that which he hastily recites. The best manner of hearing Mass, doubtless, is to recall to our minds the Passion of our Lord, and plead with him for our wants and necessities. This can be done mentally without the aid of any book, or by availing ourselves of some book, or image, to excite our memory and affection. The shorter form pleases us most, but we have no objection to the use of long prayers, such as are found in our popular works. We only observe that it is by no means necessary to read them all, and that whoever feels moved to reflect, meditate, and pray from the heart, will profit more by laying aside his book, than by continuing its perusal. Prayer and worship are the chief objects to be attended to.

It may appear to some, that the most exact and profitable manner of hearing Mass is to have before one the very words recited by the priest, and to accompany him in their recital. This may have led to the translation of the Ordinary of the Mass in "The Key of Paradise" and other prayer-books, which, however, may also be accounted for

by the desire to meet the objection of our worshipping in an unknown tongue. Strange as it may appear, the Popes have always discountenanced and forbidden such translations. So late as 6 June, 1851, the present Pontiff directed the Bishop of Langres to cause it to be discontinued. Is it that Rome fears exposure? The world knows already all that is contained in our Liturgy: but the reverence due to the mysterious rite has led the chief bishop to seek to prevent its details becoming too familiar, lest words full of awe be pronounced with levity and profaneness. Besides, what suits the priest in his character of minister and representative of Christ, does not suit the faithful who concur and share in the oblation. As far as instruction and edification are in question, they are provided for by the Scriptural lessons which are read from the pulpit in the vernacular tongue, and are otherwise within reach of the people generally, together with the explanations of the various rites of the Mass, which the Council of Trent directs to be given frequently. No objection exists to this information being contained in our prayer-books, unless, perhaps, that it unnecessarily swells their bulk, and obliges the faithful to carry with them always to church that which it is sufficient to have once read and understood, in order to perform an enlightened worship. Respect for the authority of the Holy See, whose judgment is unbiassed by the petty apprehensions which disturb our peace, should exclude from our prayer-books the Ordinary of the Mass. Do we condemn those who have hitherto inserted it? The prohibitory rule was doubtless unknown to several, and appeared to others abrogated by contrary usage; but the doubt entertained by the venerable Bishop of Langres, and the earnestness wherewith his present Holiness insisted on the prohibition should determine our submission. The zeal which seeks to promote the interests of religion, by means disapproved of by the Ruler of the Church, is not enlightened. *Habent zelum Dei, sed non secundum scientiam.*

The hearing of Mass is, we may say, the exclusive object of the devotions in one of the English, and the Portuguese Prayer-book noted above: "*Para assistir a o sacrificio da Missa.*" The English Prayer-book contains three different methods for this purpose, and subjoins a fourth, whereby the absent may share in the advantages of the sacrifice.

Although it is much larger than that in Portuguese, it contains only 168 pages in 18mo. quite a small affair compared with the monster prayer-books now in use. We do not object to some additions which detract nothing from the simplicity of devotion, such as Morning and Evening Prayers, Prayers before Confession and Communion, the Psalms of Vespers, with the various Church hymns, which may be given in English, as well as Latin, without violating any disciplinary rule with which we are acquainted. We doubt the propriety of admitting into prayer-books any hymns not sanctioned by the public usage of the Church. The beauty and tenderness of the poetic effusions of Faber are present to our mind no less than the sweet *canso-nette* of Saint Alphonsus in honor of the Immaculate Virgin, and all the popular hymns of France and Germany, to the recital of which, apart from the solemn services of the Church, we should not object ; but a prayer-book, like the Liturgy itself, should not easily admit what has not passed the ordeal of authority. We should vote for the retrenchment of all prayers to Saints which had not the like sanction, and although we might thus deprive the pious of some consolation, the service rendered to religion by removing much that forms a stumblingblock to inquirers, and affords to the enemies of the Church an occasion of calumny, would amply compensate for the sacrifice. Respect for the Holy See, independently of these important considerations, would determine us unsparingly to excise the numerous Litanies which fill our books, in direct opposition to the constant and actual discipline of the Apostolic See, which up to this moment unrelentingly proscribes all of them, but the ancient Litanies of the Saints, found in the *Missals* and *Breviaries*, and the Litany of the Blessed Virgin. The devotion which seeks expression in forms condemned by the judgment of the Vicegerent of Christ, cannot be otherwise regarded than as morbid and delusive. We have no confidence in the success of petitions having a black mark from St. Peter.

The French prayer-book published at Liege shows that already various Litanies were in vogue besides those sanctioned by the Holy See ; of which further evidence is presented in a small work in Latin published at Antwerp in 1697, styled *Sacræ Litanæ Variæ*. The jealousy long

entertained in France of the exercise of Papal authority, especially through the various Congregations of Cardinals, easily accounts for this apparent disregard of a point of discipline not solemnly urged on the Universal Church by a formal decree of the Pontiff himself. The same may be said in regard to Holland and other countries in which the prohibited Litanies have had a currency. If it be contended that contrary usage, with the knowledge of the Holy See, has abrogated the prohibition, we shall not lose time in disputing the assertion. Were we engaged in adjusting the conscience of a publisher, who has on hand a large supply of prayer-books, all of which contain them, we should not raise a scruple as to his disposal of them in the best way he could, in order to escape a great loss, although they class with prohibited books, whose retention or circulation subjects publishers and purchasers to the penalties of the Index, wherever its laws are in force. Our object here is not to disturb consciences, or demand great sacrifices : it is to challenge respect for a discipline tenaciously adhered to by the Holy See, despite of every contrary usage, and in itself marked with wisdom. The recent application made by the Bishop of Langres proves that a better spirit, manifesting itself in profound reverence for Rome, animates the French hierarchy. Leaving then to others to discuss the obligation of conforming to the law as repeatedly inculcated and still maintained by the actual Pontiff, we content ourselves with urging its expediency, by pointing to the inconveniences, not to say extravagancies which result from its neglect. Our prayer-books would be freed from exaggerations which disfigure them, and instead of the inflated epithets which are so freely bestowed on favorite Saints, we should have formularies alike commended by simplicity and antiquity. The reduction of the books themselves to a smaller size would also be no inconsiderable advantage, as rendering them more portable and less ostentatious.

If, however, our publishers choose to give their patrons large manuals, they can find abundant materials, without inserting any prohibited or exceptionable matter. "The Daily Exercise," placed last on our list, "published by T. V., monk of the holy order of St. Benedict," contains above 500 pages of small duodecimo ; yet nothing in it has met our eye to which we would object. It has morning and



evening exercises, directions for meditation, exercises on the chief virtues, instructions and devotions for Confession and Communion, and various other practices of piety. Without catering to a vitiated taste a large prayer-book can be formed, abounding in instruction and edification.

The remedy of the abuse to which we point attention may be thought to rest with the bishops, who are fully authorized to prohibit any book containing the forbidden Litanies, or other objectionable matter; yet it is easily seen that this exercise of authority cannot be ventured on without great reluctance. The immediate prohibition would subject the publishers to considerable loss, and a provisorial measure to take effect after a time might appear to legalize and sanction what the chief pastor has condemned absolutely and without qualification. A less formal notification of the approved discipline may prepare the way for its general observance, and publishers fully advised of its character may procure some competent clergyman, acquainted with all the decisions that have emanated on the subject, and approved of by the bishop, to make a judicious selection of devotional exercises. Such a prayer-book may not all at once be popular; but if religious communities and institutions adopt it to the exclusion of all that contain prohibited matter, it will amply reward the enterprise of the publisher. The religious orders, cherished with such marked affection by the Holy See, will feel bound to respect its ordinances on this point. Confessors will necessarily abstain from enjoining on their penitents any formulary stamped with the disapproval of superiors. The faithful, persuaded that no devotion can prove acceptable to God which the Church rejects as frivolous or dangerous, will cease to use those exercises. Thus a reform may be effected without the sacrifice of any interests and without any odious exercise of authority. K.

ART. III.—*Spiritual Despotism.* Methodist Quarterly Review. New York: Carlton & Porter. January, 1857.

WE find in the January number of the *Methodist Quarterly Review*, an article headed *Spiritual Despotism*, which we are disposed to make the subject of a few comments. The Quarterly named is the organ of the Methodists, and while under the editorial supervision of Dr. M'Clinck, was conducted with spirit and ability. It is now under the editorial charge of a Dr. Whedon, of whom we know nothing; but judging from the number before us, we think he is likely to sustain its former character. In learning it must yield to the *Bibliotheca Sacra* published at Andover; in classical taste and finish it is far inferior to the *Christian Examiner*, the organ of the New England Unitarians; in manly thought, independence of spirit, and theological science, it is not to be named on the same day with the *Mercersburg Review*, but with these exceptions, it compares we believe not unfavorably with the ablest of our Protestant religious periodicals. It is, as a matter of course, strongly anti-Catholic, violently "No-Popery," but we do not object to a good hater, and rather like to see a man who is not ashamed to express his wrath and prejudices in good round terms. It shows that he has some stuff in him, though not well worked up.

The article we have designated, is rather too declamatory for our taste, and better adapted to produce a catalepsy in its readers than to give them any valuable or trustworthy information on the subject discussed, but it is in its way thoroughgoing and outspoken. The writer is embarrassed by no facts opposed to his theory, but marches on in spite of both fact and reason with a free step to the end he proposes,—the assertion of Protestantism as the representative of all that is good, and Catholicity as the synonyme of all that is bad. In this he commands our esteem. The two systems certainly stand opposed to one another throughout, and if the one is good, the other certainly is bad, if the one be from God, the other is from the Devil. The writer is not one to halt between two opinions. If Baal be God, he would say, serve Baal; if the Lord be God, then

serve the Lord ; and having made up his mind that Baal is God, he very consistently devotes himself to his service, heart and soul, body and mind. But we must let him speak for himself and define his own position.

“ The sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the Reformation. This right, so natural, and with us so indefeasible, was then denied. The pope claimed absolute sovereignty in the world of opinion. The temporal powers aimed also to control both the thought and action of the subject. Conformity to the views of the monarch, not only in matters of state policy, but even in religion, was enforced upon the people as coming within the prerogatives of the *Jus Divinum*. But the successful assertion by Luther of the rights of conscience in opposition to this, broke not alone the religious thralldom of the age. Both philosophy and science felt the liberating spell. Mind in general was emancipated. From that single act went forth an impulse whose wave is still in vigorous motion, and the productive results of which, upon the world's development and progress, no human mind can yet foretell. New ideas in faith, philosophy, popular rights, government, and progress in general, at once sprang forth. It was the torch of Prometheus, or rather, it was more. That gave life to a statue ; this to an age. The dead forms of social, political, and religious life at once felt the inspiration. It was the inauguration of the modern era of civil and religious liberty.

“ From that day, Protestant Christianity has been the representative of freedom, freedom first in the domain of conscience, and then, consequently, in philosophy, art, science, Church, and State. In a word, it reared the throne of reason upon the broken power of bigotry and intolerance, and supported it by order, justice, and truth. It is now more than three hundred years that Protestant liberty has been working out its results. The nations are witnesses, and the scale of operation has been of sufficient magnitude to make the experiment a fair one. What now are the results which so abundantly declare themselves ? Let history answer. Let the superior commercial and political condition of the Protestant states of Europe and America answer. Where are prosperity and progress ? where security of life and property ? where liberty of speech and opinion combined with reverence for law and a steady support of public order ? where are schools, Bibles, an unfettered press, and general education ? where the highest tone of morality and the purest form of Christianity which the world has yet seen ? All these things are patent to observation, and of a kind so calculated to catch the attention, that sophistry must be artful, and judgment perverse, if the mind fails to be convinced.

“ Opposed to this principle, is Spiritual Despotism in deadly

conflict with Protestant freedom, and rallying for the most part under the standard of the pope. Poorly disguised under the mask of Christianity, the Roman Catholic hierarchy stands demonstrated by its history, its principles and assumptions to be a grand consolidated conspiracy against both religion and liberty. It is worldly, ungodly *ambition*, covered with the mere *skin* of *piety*, a system defiant of God, and the most deadly enemy of man. There is no study more profound, or worthy the attention of philosophic minds, than the progressive and insidious development of this politico-spiritual system. In the name of Christ, it has remorselessly grasped power which Christ refused. Claiming to be his vicegerent on earth, it has proclaimed doctrines which Christ never taught, and sanctioned enormities which drew forth his severest invectives. In the name of a religion which was designed to bring relief to oppressed and down-trodden humanity, it has imposed upon it burdens intolerable to be borne. Instead of peace, it has brought the sword. Instead of consolation, wretchedness and despair. And yet its pernicious errors are so artfully interwoven with the truth, and its monstrous usurpations so covered with the sacred form of Christ, that the eyes of a large proportion of Christendom are still held that they see not its true character.

"The battle of these contending systems hitherto has been waged at a distance from us. Confidence in our own safety, and belief in the impossibility of disturbing the strong foundations on which our religious liberties rest, have made us in a measure indifferent to the struggles of liberty abroad. We have not forgotten, too, that our fathers suffered. We do not see with our own eyes the streaming blood or the burning fagot. History, it is true, tells something of the past; but the voice of receding centuries, like the sound of receding footsteps, becomes fainter and fainter, as time and distance separate us from danger. Remote from the scenes of danger, we have looked on with the calmness of philosophy, rather than the stirring interest of battle when it is pushed even to our own gates." —pp. 34-36.

Our readers will not fail to perceive the *Baalic* character of the writer's theory, and the truth of what we so often assert, that Protestantism has lapsed into carnal Judaism or heathenism, and really objects to the Church because she seeks rather to secure a paradise for the soul hereafter than to create a paradise for the body on the earth, because she is spiritual, not carnal, and places the eternal above the temporal. Our Lord said, "Be not anxious for what ye shall eat, for what ye shall drink, or wherewithal ye shall be clothed; for after all these things do the heathen seek." He admonished his disciples to be not like the heathen, not

3 to labor for the meat that perisheth, but to seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, to lay up treasures in heaven, and to strive after spiritual perfection. Protestantism reverses all this, and bids us be like the heathen, and pronounces a system of religion true or false as it does or as it does not promote the earthly prosperity of men, and assure them the goods of this life. Undoubtedly Protestants use at times Christian language, and even urge Christian principles, when they forget their Protestantism and speak according to Christian tradition preserved by the Church; but when they turn their arms against Catholicity, and seek to vindicate their Protestantism, they take their stand on heathen ground, and reproduce against the Church the arguments of the unbelieving Jews against our Lord, and crucify him afresh. "If we let this man go on the Romans will come and take away our name and nation," and so they crucified him between two thieves, yet they did not save their nation. The Romans, notwithstanding, came and took it away.

If we analyze the extract we have made, we shall find the writer is a devout worshipper of Baal, that is, of a false god, or the god of falsehood. It contains scarcely a single statement that is true, and the whole theory put forth is in the face and eyes of well-known facts. The writer labors under a strange hallucination, and sees what is not and is struck blind to what is. "The sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the Reformation." Strictly construed this asserts that conscience itself is a matter of opinion, and that every man has the sacred right to follow his opinion in all things, and consequently, that there is for man no right independent of his opinion to which he is bound to conform his conscience, and from which he cannot deviate without sin, unless excused by invincible ignorance. This strikes at the foundation of all religion and all morals, by virtually denying all law, and all objective distinction between right and wrong, virtue and vice. But understanding it more liberally, as meaning the freedom of conscience before all human authority, or the incompetency of all mere human authority in spirituals, every body knows that it is not true. Liberty of conscience in this sense was not "the principle on which Luther fought the Refor-

mation," or defended his rebellion. He never asserted the unrestricted right of private judgment. He asserted *his* right to resist the authority of the Pope and Councils, and the right of others to agree with him, Martin Luther, and to take him for their pope and leader ; but I do not recollect that he ever asserted or recognized the rights of others to differ from him in any matter which he declared to be of faith. Did he not persecute Carlostadt ? Did he not denounce in the most savage manner Zuinglius and Oecolampadius ? Did he not thunder his anathemas against the Anabaptists, and call upon the princes to arm and put them down, nay, exterminate them ?

None of the Reformers asserted the principle in question. John Calvin exercised the most oppressive tyranny over conscience, caused Michael Servetus to be burned at Geneva over a fire made of green wood, and afterwards wrote a book in defence of burning heretics. Henry VIII. of England put to death both Catholics and Lutherans for their religion, and James I. in his famous speech in the Star Chamber, orders the judges to punish Protestant Dissenters from the Royal Church without mercy, and to hang Catholic priests, if they escape from prison. Our Puritan fathers in the Massachusetts colony hung Quakers, banished Baptists, and bored the ears and tongues of dissenters from their colonial Church. Protestant Maryland and Episcopalian Virginia enacted the most stringent laws against Catholics, and almost in the memory of persons still living, priests were hunted in the Old Dominion as wild beasts.

The principle of religious liberty asserted by the Reviewer is as applicable to Catholics as to Protestants. If the right of conscience is sacred, my right to be a Catholic is as sacred as yours to be a Protestant. Conscience is, to say the least, as good a plea for me as for you, and you violate the liberty you assert when you persecute me for being a Catholic as much as I should were I to persecute you for being a Protestant. Yet the Reformers never respected, they never acknowledged, in principle or in fact, the freedom of the Catholic conscience. Wherever Protestants gained the civil power they used it to enact laws prohibiting the free exercise of the Catholic religion. They dispossessed Catholics of their churches, their colleges, their

hospitals, their foundations for the poor, robbed them of all their church property, outlawed them, and massacred them by thousands and tens of thousands. In every country in which Protestantism in the sixteenth century gained an establishment, it gained it by violence, by plundering and oppressing, fining, imprisoning, exiling, hanging, or massacring Catholics, in many cases by a cruelty hardly matched by the Arian conquerors of Africa, or the Mussulman devastators of the East. And what is more to the purpose, there is not a country even to-day whose government professes to be Protestant, or to adhere to the glorious Reformation, that recognizes and guarantees full and entire religious equality for Catholics with Protestants before the State. A few weeks since the Diet of Sweden, influenced by the Protestant clergy, refused to repeal the old laws against Catholics, and to recognize religious liberty. Denmark is Lutheran, and forbids, under pain of perpetual exile and confiscation of goods, a member of the national church to become a Catholic. The Prussian government not long since imprisoned the Archbishops of Cologne and Posen because they would not violate their Catholic consciences; Great Britain, since 1850, has passed the Ecclesiastical Titles Act, which declares, virtually, if not formally, the Catholic religion illegal, contrary to the civil law in the United Kingdom; and we have a dark-lantern movement in this country, supported, perhaps, more generally by the Methodists than by any other sect, expressly designed to deprive Catholics of their political and civil rights, unless they renounce their religion. Several of the State Legislatures have proposed, and one State, I believe, has adopted, a law intended to disfranchise every Catholic, and to make them political pariahs in the very land of their birth. Nay, the whole spirit, tendency, and design of this very article on which we are commenting, is to rouse up the Protestant prejudices of the country and inaugurate a legal persecution of Catholics. With all these facts and many more like them before him, this Methodist Reviewer does not blush to tell us that "the sacred right of individual free opinion in matters of conscience is the principle on which Luther fought the Reformation!" Can it be possible that Protestants are so blinded as really to believe that Pro-

testantism is the representative of freedom,—Protestantism which in its very essence is a persecutor, which was begotten in violence, born in robbery and massacre, and whose history is written in the blood of Catholics, and against which a whole army of martyrs in the Judgment Day will come to bear their testimony ?

“The Pope claimed absolute sovereignty in the world of opinion.” This is untrue. The world of opinion is free, and the Pope does not and never did claim any sovereignty at all in that world. Does the Reviewer make no distinction between opinion and faith ? Or is all faith with him simply opinion ? The Pope is the guardian and defender of the faith once delivered to the saints, but with opinions as long as they are confined to the world of opinion and are not put forth as faith or against faith he does not interfere. In the world of opinion you are as a Catholic free to hold what opinions you please, but no man can be so foolish as to claim the liberty of opinion in matters of faith, that is, in matters where he has not opinion but certainty, the objective truth. Who ever heard of liberty of opinion in regard to the proposition, the three angles of an equilateral triangle are equal to two right angles ? Who demands liberty of opinion where he has the word of God ? Is it a matter of opinion whether God’s word is true or not ?

“The temporal powers aimed also to control both the thought and action of the subject.” And succeeded in those countries which threw off the Papal authority, and embraced the Reformation. “Conformity to the views of the monarch, not only in state policy but even in religion, was enforced upon the people as coming within the prerogatives of the *jus divinum*.” After Luther, in countries that rejected the Papacy, conceded ; in those that remained Catholic, denied. Monarchs and their courtiers attempted to enforce the doctrine here justly objected to ; but they were met by the Popes, the Gregories, the Innocents, the Bonifaces, and other great Pontiffs, the special objects of Protestant calumny and vituperation, and made aware that the crown has no competency in spirituals. It was not till Luther appeared, and invoked the princes against the Pope, and prepared the way for national churches instead of one Catholic Church, that the monarchs and courtiers succeeded. Then religion fell indeed under the control of the



State in every Protestant country. The German Protestant princes and the Scandinavian monarchs determined the faith and worship of their subjects. Henry VIII. by an obsequious parliament is declared within the realm supreme in spirituals as well as in temporals, and the king or queen and parliament define the faith and regulate the worship of Englishmen,—yes, of Englishmen who boast of their freedom and manliness. The same was true in Holland, and the attempt to force the Belgian Catholics to conform in religion to the views of the Calvinistic monarch, lost in 1830 the crown of the Netherlands what is now the kingdom of Belgium. This same Methodist Reviewer in the article before us is laboring, if he did but know it, to deprive religion of its freedom and independence, and to subject it to the political authority even in our own country, yet he would fain persuade the world that it is Protestantism that has emancipated religion from the despotism of the State! A more absurd or impudent pretence cannot be made. The champion of religious freedom against the State or the temporal power has in all times been the Papacy, and this is in reality the standing charge of Protestants against the Popes; for it is what is implied in that spiritual supremacy in regard to the temporal power, which has been the theme of so much sound Protestant declamation against them.

“But the successful assertion by Luther of the rights of conscience.” The Reviewer labors under a great mistake. Luther never asserted successfully, or unsuccessfully, the rights of conscience. “Broke not alone the religious thralldom of that Age.” All you can pretend is that for Protestant countries Luther’s movement emancipated religion from the authority of the spiritual power, and subjected it to the temporal. “Both philosophy and science felt the liberating spell.” Mere cant, and not a word of truth in it. That more attention has been paid to the physical sciences since the sixteenth century than was for some centuries before is possible, but that Luther’s Reformation has had any thing to do with it is not proved nor provable. The principal contributions to modern science have been made in countries which did not accept Protestantism. Protestants have no philosophy, have done much to bring philosophical studies into disrepute, and few, if any, of them

have been or are able to understand the great masters who philosophized before Luther. Germany is the only country in which Protestants have shown any philosophical aptitude, but even Germany has produced no philosophical system not already exploded, and no philosophers to compare with Vico, Galluppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, and Balmes.

"New ideas in faith, philosophy, popular rights, government, and progress in general, at once sprang forth." Were they true, those new ideas? and are any of them living now? I have observed that your new ideas of one age are usually exploded in the next; and those which possess you one day, and which you call us narrow-minded and ignorant for not accepting, are most likely to be rejected the day after. What mean you, moreover, by "new ideas" in faith? I thought faith was revealed in the beginning and delivered to the saints once for all. I did not know that ideas excogitated by the human mind could become faith. The pretence of the Reformers was not progress, not the discovery or development of new ideas in faith, but a return to the purity and simplicity of primitive Christianity, from which, it was alleged, that the Church by her new ideas or inventions had departed. Your doctrine of progress is in direct contradiction to the ground they assumed. If they were right, you are wrong. After all, this talk about the emancipation of mind, and the progress of philosophy, science, government, &c., is mere rhetoric founded on the cant of the day. It is, moreover, with Protestants, of recent origin. Nothing was heard of it in my boyhood, and I believe no small share of the shame or the credit of introducing it to my countrymen belongs to my own labors in my Protestant nonage. I took this ground, not because I believed it the ground actually taken by the Reformers, but because I saw no other ground on which their movement could be defended, and because I wished to establish a principle on which I could defend my own departures from so-called orthodox Protestantism. Yet the theory has no foundation in the facts of the case. What is new is not always true, and changes are not always improvements. There is not an idea, sound or unsound, put forth by the Reformers or by Protestants since the Reformation, that is really new, or that cannot be traced to individuals who lived long before

Luther was born. Solomon said ages ago, "there is nothing new under the sun." Protestants have not done even so much as to invent a new error or a new blasphemy. The Reformation has done nothing for progress, but to misdirect and retard it. The progress effected since the Reformation bears no comparison with that effected from the sixth to the ninth, or from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, when you consider the difference in the starting point at the two epochs. From the state of Europe at the beginning of the Barbarian era and its state near the end of the reign of the Emperor Charlemagne, the progress of society was far greater and more difficult to effect than that which has been effected by European society since Luther. Take European society at as low a point in the sixteenth century as the Reviewer can suppose, and that point was not so low as that at which the Church took it at the commencement of any three hundred years previous, from the fall of the Western Empire; and granting him all that he claims for his Protestantism, it will not have effected so much as the Church effected in any previous period of three hundred years.

There is a gross fallacy in all the Protestant reasonings on this subject. They reason as if society had been constantly deteriorating from the sixth to the sixteenth century, that it was the influence of the Church that caused it to deteriorate, that it has been constantly advancing since the Reformation, and that its progress subsequently has been solely through the influence of Protestantism. Not one of these assumptions is true. In some respects civilization in what had been the Roman Empire was in the sixteenth century below what it was in the third, and perhaps is so even yet; but the fall was not owing to the Church, for Roman civilization actually advanced under her influence, as we may see by comparing the legislation of the Christian emperors with that of the pagan Republic. In the Imperial legislation there is embodied a sentiment of humanity, a respect for personal rights, and a tenderness for human life, of which you shall find no trace in the legislation of Republican Rome. The fall, as every body knows, was owing to the Barbarian invasion and conquests, which placed on the ruins of the empire a comparatively uncivilized people. The true starting-point

of modern Europe is, the date of the destruction of the Roman power by the Germanic conquerors, say at the beginning of the sixth century. Now if you take the sixth century for your starting-point, you will find that European society continued to advance, notwithstanding the Hunnic, Saracenic, and Norman invasions and devastations, not finally checked till the great wars of the crusades, and had at the opening of the sixteenth century attained on the whole, though not in every respect, to a better state than it could boast in the century before the irruption of the Barbarians began. No man who knows the history of that long period of a thousand years can doubt for a moment that the grand agent of the progress effected was the Catholic Church. I do not hold up those ages between the sixth and the sixteenth centuries as model ages ; I do not place them above the present ; I concede that they were often dark and barbarous ; but it was not the Church that made them so ; it was, on the contrary, the Church that gradually enlightened them, and rescued them, slowly if you will, from barbarism. Let this be remembered that Europe overrun by Barbarians in the fifth century, and reduced to a barbarous state, was by the Church rescued from that state, and under the paternal guidance of the Popes enabled to advance to the comparatively enlightened and civilized state in which the Reformers found it in the sixteenth century.

Now the Reformers, it must be borne in mind, took European society at the highest point it had reached after the fall of the Western Roman Empire. The chief labor had already been done. Catholic faith, Catholic zeal, Catholic piety, and Catholic charity had covered Europe all over with churches, colleges, hospitals, and foundations for the poor. The Church had diffused every where the Biblical spirit. She had to a great extent Christianized philosophy, science, art, literature, and even politics. Into these labors of society under her inspiration the Reformers entered, and Protestantism in the outset started with all the capital which Catholics had been patiently and laboriously accumulating for a thousand years. The venerable universities of Oxford and Cambridge were founded and endowed by Catholic zeal and charity, and the glorious old cathedrals which make the pride of England to-day, were

erected by our Catholic ancestors. Take these facts into consideration and you will see that society ought not only to have advanced, but to have advanced much more rapidly after the sixteenth century than it had done before, for there was the accumulated force of a thousand years to push it onwards. But has such been the fact? I will not say that there has been no progress since the Reformation, but I will say, and facts will bear me out in the assertion, that there has been far less than was to be expected, considering the vantage-ground already gained by European society. It is manifest to every one qualified by his genius and studies to form a judgment on such questions that there were causes in operation before the Reformation, which, if not counteracted or impeded, would have ensured a far greater progress than has been realized, and that what real progress has been effected has been in spite of the Reformation, rather than by it. Judging from what was done in any three hundred years during the thousand years prior to Luther, it is impossible to doubt, that if religious unity had not been broken, the Protestant heresy and schism had not been introduced, involving one hundred years of fearful and destructive civil wars, from the sad effects of which Europe has not yet recovered, and the Church had been permitted to continue to exert her directing power and her maternal influence in the whole of Europe, that the progress of the last three hundred years would have been far greater, and of a far higher order than it actually has been. In such case, moral and spiritual progress would have kept pace with material progress, and society would have reflected the lofty principles, the free spirit, and the sublime charity of our holy religion, instead of being as it is a pale reflex of Græco-Roman society.

*None case*

It is only common justice to bear these facts in mind. Under the thousand years that Catholicity was the predominant religion of Europe, society advanced from the barbarism of the sixth century to the comparatively high civilization of the sixteenth. This proves that the Church is not unfavorable to the progress of civilization, and that whatever defects there may have been in the civilization of the sixteenth century, she was not answerable for them. It was not the Church that had reduced a civilized people to a barbarous people; it was not the Church that

seated the Barbarians on the ruins of the ancient civilization ; it was not the Church that gave those Barbarians their barbarous manners, their cruel, or their lawless dispositions, their savage customs, their impatience of restraint, and their contempt of the arts and refinements of civilized life. They had them all before her, and brought them with them or borrowed them from Pagan Rome ; and it was precisely against them that she had for one thousand years to struggle ; and struggle she did with supernatural energy, and not without effect. Protestantism has had no such struggle. It has had no barbarous people to convert, at least it has converted and civilized none. It has taken no people from the depths of barbarism and brought them up even to a half-civilized state. It exterminates the savage or the barbarian when it comes in contact with him ; it never civilizes or Christianizes him. It has founded no state. The nations that are Protestant were old states, organized long before Luther, and as regularly organized as they are now. Protestantism commenced with powerful civilized states, and has, under the temporal order, had nothing to do, but to suffer them to continue the direction they had previously received, and develop the principles and institutions already established. Yet the result obtained, rating it as high as any Protestant can have the conscience to rate it, falls far short of what the previous progress had given us the right to expect. Protestantism has lent those principles and institutions no force, and has really proved an obstacle to their natural development and growth.

“From that day, Protestant Christianity has been the representative of freedom, freedom first in the domain of conscience, and then consequently in philosophy, art, science, church, and state.” Freedom of conscience in Protestant countries to reject the Pope and Councils, to form sects, and to persecute Catholics, conceded, but not in any other respect, for in no other respect do Protestants themselves, as a body, recognize freedom in the domain of conscience. “Freedom in philosophy.” There is just as much freedom since Luther as before, and that is all. Men in the domain of philosophy, as long as they confined themselves within that domain, were always free. St. Anselm, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventura, philosophized as freely

as Bacon or Leibnitz, Hobbes or Locke, Reid or Hegel, and far more profoundly and justly. Freedom in the "arts." We do not understand the claim put forth by the Reviewer. Art is not Protestant, and while we do not pretend that all the great artists of the modern world have been exemplary Catholics, we deny that a great Protestant artist in any department of art can be named. Moreover the impulse to both art and science was given prior to Luther, and we believe Leo X. did not deny to art any reasonable freedom. Freedom in the "church." In the Catholic Church, there is about the same degree of freedom and restraint that there was before the Reformation. In some respects, however, the abuses introduced and sustained by Protestantism, have led to the adoption of a more stringent discipline than was previously necessary. In the Protestant "church," the claim is absurd, for there was no Protestant church before, and there is none now. There are Protestant sects, establishments, conventicles, temples, but no Protestant church, except by courtesy. As for freedom in religion, we have seen what that is among Protestants; as for the internal discipline which the so-called Evangelical sects exercise over their members, it is far more stringent than any known amongst Catholics; and as for arbitrary authority exercised without responsibility or control, you will find it in its perfection in the Methodist bishops and conferences. It is carrying the joke a little too far for a Methodist to talk of freedom in the church. Whoever knows the *Book of Discipline*, or the constitution John Wesley gave to the sect he founded, will listen with impatience to a Methodist claiming freedom in religious matters. Of all the Protestant sects I am acquainted with,—and, if what is the stock charge against me be true, I must be acquainted with a large portion of them,—the Methodists have the least freedom, and are subjected to the most stringent discipline. They are more enslaved than even the Presbyterians. Freedom in the "state." There is not a Protestant state in the world that has introduced into its constitution a principle of freedom not contained in it before the Reformation. We in this country have done nothing but embody the great principles of natural right and justice, developed and defended by all the great Catholic doctors from St. Augustine down to the Spanish Jesuit,

Suarez. So all this fanfaronade about freedom proves to be—fanfaronade.

“It reared the throne of reason on the broken power of bigotry and intolerance, and supported it by order, justice, and truth.” Indeed! Where does that throne stand? Can you point me to its locality? “The ruins of bigotry and intolerance.” Why, my dear brother, do you really fancy that Protestants are free from bigotry and intolerance? Pray, what meaning do you attach to these cabalistic terms? A Methodist talking against bigotry and intolerance! That is capital. It proves, what we began by intimating, that he has come to the conclusion that Baal is God, and the Lord is not God, and consequently reverses the ordinary signification of words,—fulfilling thus the prophecy that the time would come when the churl should be called liberal, bitter sweet, evil good; the liberal a churl, sweet bitter, and good evil. The Reviewer’s whole article is written in defiance of reason and common sense, of truth and justice, and is an open display of narrow-minded bigotry and intolerance. What is the dark-lantern movement in this country, but an outrageous exhibition of bigotry and intolerance, seeking to obtain the strong arm of power? Because you are blind, do you fancy nobody can see? What strange hallucination has seized our Protestant friends that they imagine that they respect the authority of reason, and are liberal, free from bigotry and intolerance?

But think of a Methodist talking about erecting “the throne of reason.” The Methodist is a descendant of the old Montanists, and places his religion in feeling, in sentiment, in the operation of the spirit, with which reason has nothing to do. The Methodist “Elder” does not, at least did not in my boyhood, address the reason, the understanding, the judgment. He appealed only to the feelings, the sensitive soul, the animal passions, and labored to magnetize his hearers, and throw them into convulsions. Ask a pious Methodist woman, why she believes, she answers, “I know.” How do you know? “O I feel it here,” putting her hand over where her heart ought to be. Every body knows that Methodism is a species of wild fanaticism, without reason, method, or rule, in which mere animal feeling is dignified with the name of piety, religion. And yet



here is a Methodist talking in grandiloquent terms about the emancipation of the mind, rearing the throne of reason, and freedom in philosophy, arts, science, &c. Does he forget that the founder of his sect eschewed art as profane, and forbid all ornaments even of the temple of worship as savoring of pride and vanity? Does he forget that the male and female attire he prescribed was the reverse of artistic? Does he forget that Wesley forbids the erecting of steeples to the meeting-house, prohibits church bells, and instrumental music, except that through the nose? He required his people to eschew every thing partaking of the arts or graces, and intended them to be a simple and plain people. The meeting-house was to be, as a wag once expressed it in my hearing, "not the Lord's house, but the Lord's barn." He somewhere tells us that though he could vie with the great orators of antiquity, he did not dare to adopt the arts of human eloquence, that he allowed himself to use only plain, simple speech, and not the enticing words of human wisdom. The last thing the Methodists would have done in my boyhood, when I knew them well, and went often to hear their ministers hold forth in school-houses, in barns, and in groves, would have been to praise Methodism because it favored human learning and human science, art and philosophy, and reared the throne of reason on the ruins of bigotry and intolerance. The Methodist ministers I knew in my younger days were more remarkable for their lungs and cavernous voices than for their learning or love of art, and for their fat sleek horses than for their science or philosophy. They hardly knew the word reason; they spoke disparagingly of human science and learning, of art and culture, and depended solely on the gifts of the Spirit. It was a Methodist minister, I believe, who, when found not able to read, and being asked how he managed to preach, answered, "O, mother reads, and I 'spounds and 'splains." A change would seem to have come over the Methodists within the last twenty or thirty years, but if they are right now they were wrong then. I am willing to admit that they have latterly established three or four respectable academies and colleges, and in the older settled parts of the country are somewhat less uncivilized than they were, and shout, rant, and jump less, and split fewer pulpits. They have certainly made

considerable progress, for which we give them all due credit. They are growing respectable, and losing many of the peculiarities of primitive Methodism ; but they must not suppose that the Protestant world started in the sixteenth century from so low a point as they did in the eighteenth, or that the progress they have made since the last century is a fair measure of that made by the Protestant world. The man may know more than the child, and yet have little reason to boast of his progress. They are yet far below the level of the sixteenth century, and not quite up to the highest level reached by the more advanced Protestant sects.

In the statements which follow the Baalic character of the writer's views and assertions are so manifest, and the points raised have been so frequently and so recently discussed in these pages, that we must pass them over. In our last Review we reduced the boasted superiority of Protestant nations to its just dimensions, and showed that it lies in the natural order alone. We do not deny the material greatness of the British empire, but it is a greatness that requires only the natural virtues, and if it says nothing against, it says nothing for Christianity. With regard to this country we shall take an early occasion to compare the progress in civilization made here since the landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflower, with the progress effected by Catholicity in Spanish America. It must be borne in mind that the immense majority of the population of all Spanish America are the descendants of the Indians who possessed it before the European colonization. We shall institute the inquiry, not whether the population of Spanish America as a whole is on a level with the population of the United States, but whether the United States can show any work done for civilization, starting with the high civilization of our fathers, to compare with that of raising the Indian population from the point where Cortes and Pizarro found them, to that where they now are ? This inquiry, if we mistake not, will put a quietus upon our boasts of Anglo-Saxon civilization. At any rate it will present a contrast between Catholicity and Protestantism, on the very points on which the former is condemned, and the latter eulogized, that will be by no means flattering to our anti-Catholic declaimers. We have multiplied and

enlarged our borders, but it may be doubted whether in true civilization we have advanced on that of the original colonists ; indeed I fear facts will compel us to acknowledge that we have even *retrograded*. We are richer, more numerous, more luxurious, but we are, I fear, less highly civilized, less thoroughly trained, less moral, less energetic, less manly, than our ancestors. We have exterminated the Indians or driven them beyond the frontier settlements ; we have in no instance worth naming Christianized or civilized them, and adopted them as an integral portion of our population. We can show nothing that we have done for them in the way of civilization. But the Spaniards did not exterminate the Indian population. The Church by her missionaries went among them, Christianized them, infused into them the elements of civilization, and elevated them not to the level of the European, for she has not yet done that, but to their present condition, which is far above that in which she found them. Now here is a positive work done by Catholicity on this Continent ; we demand what Protestantism, working not with savages, but with highly civilized Europeans or their descendants, has to show as an offset to this ? We propose this question to our Methodist Reviewer, and leave him for the present to ponder on it. Perhaps, when we meet him again, he will deal less in rhodomontade.

“Where are schools ?” Schools are more numerous in France, Austria, and Rome, than in Great Britain, and also, we believe, in Turkey and China than in any Protestant country. The attention of Protestants has but recently been directed to education, only since the fright the Protestant governments got by the French Revolution, and education is as general among Catholics as it is among Protestants. Where are “Bibles ?” We answer, almost exclusively among Catholics. The book the Protestants call the Bible is not the true Bible. “An unfettered press ?” You will find it in England, the United States, and Belgium, one a Protestant country, one professing no religion, one a Catholic country, so far as the great majority of the people are concerned. You will find in France, which is not a Protestant country, a press free on all subjects, except the government. “The highest toned morality ?” Certainly not in Protestant states. “The purest

form of Christianity." That involves the question whether Catholicity or Protestantism is Christianity. If Catholicity is Christianity, as we hold, the purest form, and the only form of Christianity is to be found in all countries where the Church is, and nowhere else. If the writer had asked where are the foulest and impurest heresies to be found, we should answer at once, even taking him for judge,—in Protestant nations. "All these things,"—the reverse of what the Reviewer means,—“are so patent to observation and of a kind so calculated to catch the attention, that sophistry must be artful, and judgment perverse, if the mind fails to be convinced.” And yet we can hardly hope that the mind of the Methodist Reviewer will not remain unconvinced, though we have shown that his statements are untrue and his reasoning inconclusive.

So much in regard to Protestantism as the representative of the freedom, intelligence, and morality of the world, its philosophy, art, science, and progress in general. Turn we now from the bright picture of the Protestant system, which asserts Baal to be God, to the dark and gloomy picture of the Catholic world, which still persists in saying that the Lord is God, and as for me and my house we will serve him. “Opposed to this principle, is spiritual despotism in deadly hostility to Protestant freedom, and rallying for the most part under the standard of the Pope.” There is, then, some little spiritual despotism that does not rally “under the standard of the Pope.” That is some comfort. “Poorly disguised under the mask of Christianity the Roman Catholic hierarchy stands demonstrated by its history, its principles, and assumptions, to be a grand consolidated conspiracy against both religion and liberty.” The writer concedes it to be *grand*; there is a drop of comfort in that too, for it at least is not a mean and petty conspiracy against religion and liberty like the Methodist hierarchy, and its pet, the Know-Nothing party. “It is worldly ambition.” But you forget, my dear sir, that your standing charge against our Church is that she neglects the world, and that in the race for sensible goods she is far outstripped by Protestantism. “Ungodly ambition.” Supposing Baal to be God, agreed. “With the mere *skin* of piety.” In the Methodistic sense, agreed again. The Church does not confound piety with sensuality. “Defiant

of God,"—that is, of Baal, quite true. "The most deadly enemy of man." In the sense of being his best and only real friend, true, nothing more true. One only needs to take the contrary of what you say, to have the truth.

"In the name of Christ it has remorselessly grasped power which Christ refused." How does the Reviewer know that? "Claiming to be his vicerent on earth, it has proclaimed doctrines which Christ never taught." Whence did you learn that? You assert it; she denies it, and wherein is your assertion better than her denial? You have for your assertion at best only your private judgment, and she at worst has her private judgment against you, and her private judgment, on any ground you choose to put it, is equal to yours. You are of yesterday. My grandfather was the contemporary of the founder of your sect, nay, even my mother might have known him. You are only the illegitimate offspring of the Anglican Establishment, itself of illegitimate birth. Your sect is self-constituted, and nobody can be silly enough to suppose that either our Lord or his Apostles founded the so-called "Methodist Episcopal Church." Whatever may be said of the Catholic Church, it is certain that yours is a man-made church, and that you have no authority to decide what our Lord did or did not teach. You have no divine commission, and in the Church of God are simply nobody.

But see the admirable consistency of this man. He calls the Church a usurper because she claims authority to decide what Christ did and did not teach; yet, in the very sentence quoted, he claims for himself and undertakes to exercise this very same authority. When he says the Church has proclaimed doctrines Christ never taught, does he not assume the authority to decide what Christ did and did not teach? Who then is the usurper? If he says he has no authority, then his assertion is merely his opinion, and entitled to no consideration; if he says he has it, he must show us his commission. "Sanctioned enormities which drew forth his severest censures." Who made you a judge in the matter? Who authorized you to say what Christ did or did not censure? "Sanctioned enormities." In the eyes of a worshipper of Baal, be it so; in the eyes of the Christian, the worshipper of the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, that is for you to prove. "Imposed burdens

intolerable to be borne." Intolerable to those who say Baal is God, very likely ; but at worst she imposes no burdens so heavy as those imposed by your sect on its members. "Instead of peace it has brought the sword." The very thing our Lord said he had come to do. "Think not," said he, "I am come to bring peace on earth, yea, a sword rather." "Instead of consolation, wretchedness and despair." To the enemies of Christ and worshippers of Baal, be it so ; to others it is false. "And yet its pernicious errors are so interwoven with the truth, and the monstrous usurpations so covered with the sacred form of Christ, that the eyes of a large proportion of Christendom are still held that they see not its true character." How do you know, dear brother, that you yourself see its true character, and that what you call errors are not God's truths ? Are you infallible ? May it not be *your* eyes that "are held," and not ours ?

"The battle between these two contending systems has hitherto been waged at a distance from us. Confidence in our own safety, and belief in the impossibility of disturbing the strong foundations on which our religious liberties rest, have made us in a measure indifferent to the struggles of liberty abroad. We have forgotten, too, what our fathers suffered." Your fathers, sir, if they suffered persecution at all, suffered it from the hands of Protestants alone. Neither they nor you have received wrong at our hands. But to hear this man talk one would think that Protestants have been the firm champions of religious liberty, and the sweet, innocent sufferers in its cause. Why, he really has the effrontery to appeal to history. Does the poor man in his self-delusion suppose we cannot read history as well as he ? Does he suppose that we are ignorant of the persecutions and the inherent persecuting spirit of the party with which he identifies himself ? Does he imagine that he is proving Protestantism to be the friend of religious liberty, by invoking its spirit in a war of extermination against Catholics ? He is evidently aiming to arouse the Protestant feeling of this country against Catholics, and to deprive us of equal liberty with Protestants. Can he not understand that the religious liberty which he asserts is simply the liberty of Protestantism to trample on the Church ? Because we resist being trampled on by Protestants, does he accuse us of persecuting them ?

"So strong thus far has been the tide of Papal immigration from the old world, that Rome has already commenced the work of recasting our institutions to suit her schemes of ecclesiastical aggression." Does the writer really believe this, or does he say it merely for effect? If the former, let him talk no more of Protestant intelligence; if the latter, let him be silent as to Protestant morality. The whole statement is nonsense. What does Rome want to recast our institutions for? "Her ecclesiastical aggressions,"—on what? Her ecclesiastical system is fixed, the power of her bishops defined, and there is here no motive for aggression, and nothing on which to make ecclesiastical aggression. What is there in our institutions Rome would wish to change? Use the power of the Republic to put down Protestants, or to deprive them of their freedom to remain Protestants? Do you suppose she is so silly as to attempt any thing of that sort? Protestants have been here from the first settlement of the country, and have the full civil right to remain here as Protestants. It is not the principle or the practice of the Church to enter a country where another religion has had before her entrance a legal right to exist, to gain by intrigue, or in any other way, the government, and then use it to suppress the old religion. That is the Protestant, not the Catholic method of proceeding.

"Free schools, free presses, free Bibles, free speech, and free thought, are the natural supports of the great principle of Protestantism; and these, therefore, in some way must be subject to her regulation." p. 36. If Almighty God has given her the power and made it her duty to regulate them, what have you to object? If she does what you allege, you must prove that she has no authority from God to do it, before you can conclude any thing from it to her prejudice. "Free schools." Would you, a Methodist, send your children to a school taught by infidels, in which the books used were filled with slanders on Methodism, and in which your children would be trained up to despise the religion of their father and mother, to deny revelation, to deny God, and all moral distinctions? And what would you think of the man who should accuse you, because opposed to such schools, of being opposed to free schools, and to education? You would think of him

just what we think of you. Nay, would you send your children to Catholic schools, in which they would be likely to be trained up Catholics? Of course not. But you cannot hold Catholicity in greater horror than we hold your Methodism. It is not to free schools we object; it is not to education we object; but the sort of education you give in *your* free schools. You blame us for acting on the very principle on which you yourselves act. Why have the Methodists established schools, seminaries, colleges of their own, under the regulation of their own sect? Why do they not send their children to schools and colleges under the exclusive control of Episcopalians, Baptists, Presbyterians, Unitarians, Universalists, or Mormons?

"Free presses." Whether the Church likes or dislikes them, it is certain the Methodists are opposed to them. The Methodists, as a sect, have their own Book Concern, and superintend their own publications. It is understood that the members of the sect are to restrict their purchases of books to the works issued by their own Book Concern, and that they are not to purchase even books approved by the sect if issued by other publishers; at least this was the case some time since. As to journalism, the Methodists allow it no freedom; all the journals of the denomination are under the control of the denomination. The *Methodist Quarterly Review* belongs to the Book Concern, and the editor is designated by the authority of the sect, and is simply its agent. He has nothing of the freedom we have as the editor of a Catholic Review. The only restraint we are under is the restraint of conscience itself; but he must conform to the will of his employers or be dismissed. As to the press itself, there is a question whether the censorship shall be exercised before or after publication, not yet settled; but there is none as to the propriety of the censorship itself. Great Britain, the United States, France, Spain, Belgium, Sardinia, and one or two German States, recognize the liberty of the press, but punish or profess to punish the misuse of its liberty. Other states continue to exercise a previous censorship; which is the better system I am not called upon to decide.

The Reviewer is terribly scandalized at a recent publication of the Patriarch of Venice.



"If any one supposes that Rome is more tolerant of the press now than formerly, let him read the 'Circular of Pietro Amerilo Matti, by the mercy of God, Patriarch of Venice, to his beloved sons, the booksellers, publishers, and true believers, residing in the city and diocese,' issued so recently as December 31, 1855. This fulmination follows directly in the wake of the Concordat just granted to the pope by the 'most pious' Emperor of Austria, and is the first signal gun to warn all impracticable sons of the Church, as well as heretics, of what they are now to expect. We extract a couple of paragraphs.

"No one, be he priest or layman, will be allowed, without previously obtaining permission from our ecclesiastical "censure," to publish either as author, printer, or vender, any work either directly or indirectly touching on religion or morality, or specially treating of the Liturgy, or of *any other subject*. It is also forbidden to introduce *any book whatever* from other countries, without having applied for and obtained the approbation of the ecclesiastical "Censure Office," excepting in such cases where the book has been marked as being among the works which are permitted.

"Should *any person dare publicly or privately* to sell books, prints, or paintings, which are prohibited by the Church, or could be prejudicial to religion or morality, be it known unto him, that we will not only suppress such illicit sale ourselves, but will also *call in the arm of the civil power*, which the monarch has placed at the disposal of the Church to our assistance."

"What this arm of the 'civil power' means, the unhappy victims of priestly despotism in Austria understand full well.

"It is not the sudden overthrow among us of the rights and immunities of Protestant liberty, that we fear; open and direct assault would defeat its own aim. Rome understands too well the laws of human nature. She saps and mines by slow approaches. What cannot be accomplished in a year may yield perhaps to a generation or a century. The ages are hers. Like the painter Zeuxis, she works 'for eternity.'"—pp. 36, 37.

The words "*of any other subject*," understood in the universal sense, and as indicating the extent of the ecclesiastical prohibition, could not have been in the original, for they transcend the canons of the Church, and imply a power the canons do not confer on the Patriarch. The rest of the prohibitory sentence is no more than is claimed by every Evangelical sect. The canons of the Church prohibit, indeed, the publication of works touching faith, discipline, or worship, by a layman or simple priest, without the permission of the proper authority; but these canons are simply penal laws. I can publish what I please at my own risk. If what I publish contains nothing incompatible with faith, morals, discipline, or worship, I incur

no censure ; if I publish something against one or another of these I must submit to the penalty of having my publication placed on the Index and being excommunicated if I refuse to correct or retract the erroneous matter. The same rule obtains substantially amongst the so-called Evangelical sects. The Methodists would excommunicate from their communion the layman or "elder" who should publish any thing against the Methodist *Book of Discipline* and refuse to retract it. The Presbyterians would excommunicate the minister or layman who should do the same with regard to their Confession of Faith. The previous censorship is chiefly a protection to the author, for it enables him to throw the responsibility, in great measure, from himself on to his censors. Thus for years, for my own protection, I submitted all my theological articles to the revision of authority before their publication ; I do not do it now, because I choose to bear the responsibility myself alone.

The Patriarch of Venice, in his ecclesiastical capacity, could not prohibit the introduction of foreign books ; all he could do was to forbid Catholics within his jurisdiction to read them. The introduction or non-introduction is a matter that falls exclusively within the jurisdiction of the civil power. What that power prohibits or does not prohibit in Venice or any other Catholic state, is nothing to me ; for, as a Catholic, I am not bound to defend the legislation or administration of Catholic any more than of Protestant States. The principle involved in the Patriarch's circular is wise and just. The Church is bound to look after the faith and morals of her children, and if she allows her children to buy and sell and read without restraint, bad books, books prejudicial to religion and morals, our Protestant saints would set up a universal clamor against her for her alleged profligacy and disregard of religion and morals. There are classes of books, prints, and paintings, as the Reviewer well knows, which our laws forbid to be sold publicly or privately. Would the Reviewer think it wrong even for a Methodist Bishop to tell his people not to sell them, for he was determined to prosecute every man he found doing it ? Protestants, when it concerns what a Protestant may do in the bosom of his sect, exercise as rigid a supervision over the reading of their

members as the Church does. The Reviewer himself would not contend that all sorts of books, including irreligious, immoral, and infidel books, are proper even for Methodists. Would he recommend Methodists to read Tom Paine's *Age of Reason*, Volney's *Ruins*, Voltaire's *Philosophical Dictionary*, Jacques et son Maître, and *La Religieuse* of Diderot, Sterne's *Sentimental Journey*, or Moore's *Little's Poems*, to say nothing of the vile publications circulated secretly for the very purpose of corrupting the heart and inflaming the senses of our youth? Nay, would he not at least admonish them not to read even Catholic books, and to be on their guard against the seductions of Rome? Then what has he to complain of in the Patriarch of Venice?

One almost loses his patience with these Protestant declaimers against the Church. They cry out with all their force against the Church, accuse her of usurpation, of tyranny, of spiritual despotism, whenever she takes any step for the maintenance of the religion and morality of her children, or seeks to secure the peace and order of the state. Yet they know well enough that without discipline, without wholesome laws, restraining licentiousness and punishing vice and crime, society cannot exist. If the Church within her sphere, or a Catholic state within its sphere, attempts any thing of the sort, their love of liberty is outraged, and they call upon the whole Protestant world to come and put down these "Romanists." What is it they want? Of course, to prevent religion and morality from flourishing in Catholic states, to corrupt the morals of Catholics, to ripen the Catholic populations for sedition, rebellion, revolution, to render it impossible for Catholic governments to exercise their ordinary functions as governments, and to render the very existence of society in Catholic states impracticable. This is what English and American Protestantism is aiming at, and if it could only effect it, wouldn't it have a triumphant argument against the Church? The real significance of all these charges against the Church is that she pursues her own course without consulting the wishes or the interests of Protestantism, and has not the least disposition in the world to avoid doing her duty in order to give her enemies an advantage over her.

“What this arm of the civil power means, the unhappy victims of priestly despotism in Austria understand full well.” Is there any priestly despotism in calling upon the government to prevent the sale of books that strike at the foundation of religion and morals? Is it priestly despotism to call upon the civil power to punish gambling, adultery, theft, robbery, murder? Victims of *priestly* despotism in Austria! Who are they? Name them. But you cannot. Austria is of all Catholic states precisely the one in which the clergy have had the least power, and even the late Concordat does not secure to the Church in the Austrian empire the freedom and independence she has in these United States. Civil despotism there has been in Austria, and it has had its victims, but priestly despotism there has not been. The censorship has existed and exists still in Austria; yet its practical effect has been not to prevent the circulation of Protestant, infidel, or immoral publications, but the publication of Catholic works, and to discourage Catholic authors. Anti-Catholic books were connived at; Catholic books were prohibited, lest they should disturb the Protestant minority. Wherever the state has established a censorship Catholic thought and intelligence alone have suffered from it. What this wise and learned Methodist Reviewer lays to the charge of the Church belongs to the state. He is an unreasonable man, and blames the Church for the very despotism of which she is the first victim, and pretends that the despotism which the state exercises over her, is a despotism which she exercises over the state. We wonder not that he should say, “Baal is God, and I will serve him.”

“It is not the sudden overthrow of the rights and immunities of Protestant liberty, we fear.” To hear this man talk, one would suppose that he really imagines that Catholics are engaged in a dangerous conspiracy against the liberty of Protestants. Nero set Rome on fire, fiddled while it was burning, and charged the crime upon the Christians.

“Ecoute : c’est Néro qui met le feu dans Rome,  
Luimême ! Il nous fallait des coupables : c’est vous  
Qu’on a choisis : Fuyez, ou vous périrez tous.”

You are conspiring against the liberty of the country, and you would direct public vengeance against Catholics as Nero did. It is well ; it shows who were *your* ancestors, and who were *ours*.

"The ages are hers. Like Zeuxis, she works 'for eternity.'" The first truth we have found in the article. The ages *are* hers, and she will live and bring forth children to her heavenly Spouse, long after the very name of Methodism shall be forgotten. She works for eternity, like her Master, not for time. Would our Methodist saint have her work for the temporal instead of the eternal ? Like Baalam, the poor man opened his mouth to curse, but was forced by a higher Power to utter a blessing. What he intended for a cutting reproach proves to be the highest eulogy he could pronounce. The Church does work for eternity, and thus obeys Him who commands us to "labor not for the meat that perisheth, but for that which endureth unto everlasting life."

"If *such* a church were the *true* representative of Christ on earth, then would infidelity have whereon to stand. Infidelity to Christ would be duty to God. The infidelity of the eighteenth century was the insurrection of reason, not against truth ; not against Christianity ; but against that mockery of it, which had stolen its name, that huge hypocrisy which, in the livery of Heaven, blasphemed the Almighty, trampled on his servants, and practically nullified every virtue which the Almighty has taught. The jeers of Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopædists were a tribute to truth. The infinite scorn which in such terrible measure was heaped upon the pope and the whole papal system was a tribute to the truth. It sprang from a just conception of the holiness, wisdom, and justice of that God whose character was slandered and caricatured by the character and principles of the pretended successor of the chief of the apostles."—p. 41.

Another evidence that our Reviewer insists that Baal is God. The infidelity of the eighteenth century attacked the Bible as well as the Church ; it made war avowedly on Christ himself, and its war-cry was *Ecrasez l'Infame*. It denied all divine revelation, denied the whole supernatural order, the immortality of the soul, and moral accountability, and under the name of reason deified passion, fitly represented by a prostitute. "The jeers of Voltaire, Diderot, and the Encyclopædists were a tribute to

truth." Does the writer really know what he says? Is he aware that those jeers were directed against every thing which even he, if he calls himself a Christian, and believes that Jesus Christ was the Son of God, the Redeemer of mankind, holds sacred? If our Church be true, we grant infidelity has, as opposition to her, something to stand on; but if Protestantism, as this writer represents it, were true, it would have nothing to oppose and no motive to make war on Christianity, for in that case Christianity and infidelity would be one and the same thing. This converting Christianity to infidelity as the readiest way of converting infidels to Christianity, may do for a Methodist, but it will not do for a Catholic. The writer may persuade an intelligent unbeliever that Protestantism is infidelity, but he will never persuade him that it is Christianity. The common sense of the world has long since decided that Christianity and Catholicity are identical, and it is rare that a man who is really in earnest to be a Christian, if possessed of ordinary means of intelligence, finds a resting place outside of the Catholic Church. Protestantism under a purely religious point of view, has no hold on the world, and it is supported mainly as a political and social system, and under a religious name, perhaps as a compromise between heaven and earth, eternity and time, God and the devil. Many worthy people, no doubt, think it will answer the purposes of religion, and that by it they may provide for future contingencies without that renunciation of this world and of sensual gratifications demanded by Catholicity. But the man who has no religion, who has no Protestant connections, who is convinced of the necessity of religion for his soul's sake, not merely to whitewash a damaged reputation or to give him respectability in the eyes of the world, and knowing the difference between Protestantism and Catholicity, will never think of embracing Protestantism. He will regard it as too much or too little. Being in earnest he must have reality instead of a sham. Gentiles, Pagans, Jews, Mussulmans embrace Catholicity; very rarely Protestantism, and perhaps never except from a worldly motive. The notion of the writer that the unbeliever would be attracted by Protestantism rather than by Catholicity is true only on the supposition that the unbeliever wishes to gain the credit of being a

Christian without giving up his unbelief. If he wishes to become really a Christian and to believe and practise in all things according to the word of God, he will turn from Protestantism with loathing and disgust.

"True religious faith cannot co-exist with this tyranny." A living faith, a faith that works by love, cannot co-exist in the same breast with this or any other tyranny, we agree, and therefore we never look for true religious faith among Methodists. "The essential element of faith is freedom of opinion." Is the writer aware that in this assertion he writes in blessed ignorance of the meaning of the words he uses? The school in which he was educated must have been a free and easy school. Faith is impossible as an act without free will, but it has nothing to do with opinion free or unfree. The essential element of faith on its natural side is reason, on its supernatural side, it is divine grace, the gift of God. Its essential character is certainty, a firm persuasion of mind that excludes doubt. The essential character of opinion is uncertainty, doubtfulness. Opinion may or may not be true, but which, there is no authority to decide. To make freedom of opinion essential to faith is to make faith essentially freedom to be uncertain, to doubt, which is simple nonsense, since it is the essence of faith to exclude doubt and give certainty.

In matters of faith there is and can be no freedom to doubt, because no man is or can be free to doubt the word of God; in matters of opinion all men are free, and the Church asserts full freedom for all her children. Protestants do not very well understand this, for Protestantism can draw no intelligible distinction between faith and opinion. The only alternatives for them are spiritual despotism and spiritual license. If they demand assent to creeds and confessions they practise spiritual despotism; if they reject all creeds and confessions, really not merely in name, we mean,—they declare all doctrines indifferent, and assert spiritual license. They then place, as to faith, as to doctrine, the believer and the unbeliever, John Wesley and Thomas Paine, on the same footing. There is no help for them. They must do one or the other, although we are aware that they seek to do both, and both at once.

"In denying the rights of conscience, Rome arrays herself against the eternal principles of man's moral nature."

p. 44. But it is not yet proved that she denies the rights of conscience. We say she does not. She asserts them, and she alone asserts them. Her struggles with the temporal powers, which so scandalize our Protestant saints, have all been struggles on her part to maintain the freedom of conscience against the despotism of the state. Protestants rarely respect the rights of conscience in Catholics. The Reviewer would surrender his own freedom of conscience to the mob to obtain the power to oppress the consciences of Catholics.

But here is something which throws the Reviewer into an ecstasy of delight.

"If a test were wanted of the comparative truth of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism, perhaps no better one could be found than the standard of morals which prevails in countries long subject to the influence of these different systems. Let us seek an *experimentum crucis* in the statistics of crime as presented in the official and governmental reports of the different states of Europe. To go into this inquiry fully, would be impossible in a brief essay. But a table is at hand, found in Seymour's "Evenings with Romanists," which will be sufficient for our purpose. What is true of one grade of crime, and that the chief, will doubtless hold true of all, unless it can be shown—a thing which will not be pretended—that peculiar circumstances gave excessive development to that grade. The table is compiled from public reports of the crime of murder. The average annual per cent in Protestant England is compared with that of eleven Roman Catholic states, and is as follows:

Roman Catholic Ireland,	. . . . .	19	to the million.
" " Belgium,	. . . . .	18	" "
" " France,	. . . . .	31	" "
" " Austria,	. . . . .	36	" "
" " Bavaria,	. . . . .	68	" "
" " Sardinia,	. . . . .	26	" "
" " Lombardy,	. . . . .	45	" "
" " Tuscany,	. . . . .	56	" "
The Papal States,	. . . . .	113	" "
Roman Catholic Sicily,	. . . . .	90	" "
" " Naples,	. . . . .	174	" "
PROTESTANT ENGLAND,	. . . . .	4	" "

"Never were figures more eloquent or convincing. Nor are we surprised. The argument from experience sustains the deductions of reason. Under the keeping of such a system of falsehood, what but vice, moral stagnation, and intellectual imbecility, could be expected? The Bible is forbidden to send its searching light into the dark caverns of individual and social iniquity. Piety, rendered blind and impotent by false instruction, scarcely knows any other God



than the priest or the Virgin. Crime, though all besmeared with the tears and blood of its innocent victims, nevertheless, without repentance, purchases easy absolution by paying to the Church a few paltry shillings. The conscience is seared or misguided. And on every hand, where Christianity ought to be gathering its daily trophies in the salvation of souls, and art, science, and progress be heralding the elevation of humanity, there moral and intellectual stagnation prevails, and civilization, emasculated and infirm, seems scarcely able to withstand the waves of barbarism, which press around it on every hand, and threaten to return."—pp. 45, 46.

Mr. Seymour is no authority. The Reviewer might as well have cited Baron Munchausen. No English or American Protestant is any authority in questions of this nature, especially if he incline to Evangelicalism. The English are the least trustworthy statisticians going, and we make it a rule to interpret all statements of English and American Evangelicals, prejudicial to the Church or to Catholic countries, as old women do their dreams, by the rule of contraries. They are made up of ignorance, conceit, and prejudice, and are so warped by their Protestantism that they seem to be absolutely unable to speak the truth whenever there is a question touching the Catholic Church. They are mad against the Church, and their only defence is that set up recently in this city for a notorious forger, of "moral insanity." This "moral insanity" rages at present chiefly among English and American Evangelicals, and would seem to compel them irresistibly to forgery, in all its forms. It is a serious calamity, and may well excite the alarm of the Republic. The fact that our Reviewer gives these statistics, and on the authority of Mr. Seymour, is, as the lawyers say, *prima facie* evidence of their incorrectness, nay, of their absolute falseness.

The number of murders in a community is not a fair criterion of its morality or immorality. Every community has, so to speak, its pet crime, and in comparing nation with nation, no solid conclusion can be obtained by taking one crime alone. It is always necessary to compare the whole criminal list of one country with that of another. We have some statistics on the subject, and which warrant a conclusion the reverse of that presented by the Reviewer on his Munchausen authority. Moreover, the Reviewer gives us no data for an extended comparison. He does not en-

able us to determine whether the proportions he asserts are the results of a single year, or of a long series of years ; whether they are obtained from the reports of ordinary or extraordinary years, in relation to one or both terms of the comparison. The Catholic States of Europe have suffered, since 1789, more internal disturbance than the Protestant States, and Catholic governments have been more interfered with in the internal police of their States, than have the Protestant governments. The English government and press, as well as English travellers and agents, have had much to do in swelling the criminal lists of Naples and the Papal States. The American Evangelicals through their Protestant Alliance, and their efforts to destroy the Papacy by revolutionizing Italy, must also come in for their share. Anglo-Saxon Protestantism is in general a disturber of the peace, wherever it goes ; it is always intermeddling, always aggressive, and universally mischievous. No small portion of the actual crime in the Catholic States of Europe is due to the intrigues, and the secret or open efforts of Protestantism, more especially English and American Protestantism, to undermine Catholicity by embarrassing Catholic governments, and corrupting the morals of the Catholic populations.

In the list Ireland, we perceive, is set down as a Catholic country, but Ireland is a Protestant State, and none but a Protestant can wear its crown, or be its Chancellor and Lord-Lieutenant ; its nobility and landed proprietors are for the most part Protestants, and it is governed by a Protestant government, with a fixed purpose of maintaining the Protestant ascendancy. By what right then in regard to the statistics of crime, is Ireland reckoned as a Catholic country ? The crimes of Ireland should always be counted under the head of Great Britain, and set down to the credit of Protestant States. Yet the proportion of crime, of vice, and immorality, is far less than that of England and Scotland. In point of fact crime, which the law punishes, as well as immorality which the law does not punish, and which is more dangerous to a people than the crime, is well known to be far less in Catholic countries than in Protestant countries. Paris is less criminal and immoral than London, and Naples is paradise in comparison with New York or Boston. There is probably no coun-

try in Christendom in which murder is so frequent as in our own, and none where morality is more rapidly declining. Yet here is most of that liberty for which our Reviewer declaims, and he would maintain the most of the Protestantism he eulogizes.

But we must stop. It is no pleasure to be forced to combat ignorance, imbecility, prejudice, conceit, pomposity, and recklessness. We wish we could find now and then in the list of our opponents, a man, a well developed man, able and not afraid to reason, who would do something more than make unwarrantable assertions, and repeat old worn out calumnies a thousand times proved to be calumnies. Have our Evangelicals never a man among them? Has Protestantism really destroyed intellect, intelligence, and candor, among them? Can they give us no opponents that it is not a discredit to notice? Must we fight the battle only against children, weak women, and weaker men? Have you no champions of metal? Where are your Chillingworths, your Chemnitzes, your Bramhalls, and your Barrows? We are tired of the moral and intellectual troops you send against us, who appear in a plight worse than those whom the inimitable Falstaff so admirably describes, and with whom he was ashamed to walk through "Coventry." If you have any seriousness in you, do put forth some one, if you have him, who will discuss the great question between us seriously, and as a man who has confidence in his cause.

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ART. IV. *Ailey Moore. A Tale for the Times : showing how Evictions, Murders, and such like Pastimes are managed, and justice administered in Ireland, together with many stirring Incidents in other Lands.* By FATHER BAPTIST. New York: Dunigan & Brother. 1856. 2 vols.

FATHER BAPTIST has a lively fancy, a brilliant imagination, a warm gushing heart, genuine pathos, and a natural love of fun and frolic; he is a man of learning, of varied experience, and wide observation of men and things;

but he is not a practised novel-writer, and lacks some of the essential elements of the true literary artist. His sketches of Irish society and especially of Irish peasant life lack the delicacy and finish of the pictures given us by Banim, Carleton, and Gerald Griffin. He overdoes his good people, deals too much in the marvellous, and fails, as a priest should, in his love scenes. His work, also, lacks unity, and properly ends with Gerald Moore's acquittal of the charge of murder. The continental scenes belong to a separate work, and the portion relating to the obsession of Emma, is told in too gross and revolting a manner, and might have been advantageously omitted. These are not precisely times when young gentlemen like Frank Tyrrell are likely to be converted by witnessing exorcisms, because such things are looked upon either as mummary or superstition by our *liberal* Protestants. The author talks too much about the heart, which with him means feeling, and while justly praising the religious poor, seems to forget that the poor are not always religious. In Protestant countries they have very few of the sentiments or virtues he ascribes to them, and are not, under a religious point of view, much superior to the easy classes. In all Protestant countries, the poor, as a general thing, are irreligious, and seldom observe even the forms of worship. What he says is true of the mass of the Irish peasantry, but it must not be stated as true universally of the poor.

Nevertheless, *Ailey Moore* is an interesting tale, and contains materials for a dozen first-class novels. It is essentially an Irish story,—a story of Ireland's wrongs and sufferings, virtues and vices, presenting the lights and shadows of Irish life, with great truth and vividness. The author is a genuine Irishman, devoted alike to his religion and his country, and writes boldly, feelingly, and eloquently in defence of both. It is true, he tells us little that we had not been told before, but the story of Ireland's wrongs, and the sufferings of her warm-hearted peasantry for their religion and nationality, is one that will bear to be repeated, and that will always possess a harrowing interest for every unperverted heart, and especially for us Americans, since so large a portion of our population are of Irish birth or of Irish descent.

It is difficult, notwithstanding all that has been said

by both friends and enemies, to form a picture of the real state of things in Ireland. When we read the writings or listen to the conversations of Irish patriots we are apt to think there is some exaggeration in the case, and that too much of what is deplorable is charged to the English government. It is difficult to avoid suspecting that a portion of the evil is to be laid at the door of the Irish people themselves, and that they have failed to make the most they could of their situation bad as it unquestionably has been. The declamatory and passionate style in which the Irish patriots speak or write of their sufferings and the injustice of England, is not very well adapted to produce conviction in the minds of grave and unimpassioned Americans. But taking the best information we can get, and reasoning on it, coolly and impartially, we are forced to believe that it is impossible to exaggerate in the case, or to represent the wrongs which Ireland has received from the English government and the Anglo-Irish faction as greater than they actually have been. They have surpassed the power of any human language to express, especially since England became Protestant.

The English are not a bloodthirsty or a vindictive people, and though undemonstrative, they possess many noble and generous traits of character ; but taken as a body, they are proud, haughty, arrogant, conceited, narrow-minded, and bigoted. There are exceptions to this character, and exceptions much more numerous since the French Revolution than before. There are English gentlemen who have travelled and had the rough corners of their characters rubbed off, their minds liberalized, and their views expanded by intercourse with the Continentals, who are surpassed by no gentlemen in the world. But the genuine homebred Englishman is a bundle of conceit and prejudice, fully persuaded of his own excellence, and of the infinite inferiority of every person or thing not English. We do not believe the English people have ever intended to be unjust or oppressive to the Irish, and we doubt if it is in the power of mortal man to convince them that they ever have been. It is thoroughly English to believe that an Englishman can do no wrong, and that to complain of any thing done by Englishmen is base ingratitude,—is to take an entirely false view of one's own best

good, or to be carried away by faction or the blindness of party. The Englishman believes himself the noblest work of God, and that the Creator did his very best when he created him. His way of thinking and doing is the right way, and the only right way. Full of this conceit, he is unable to conceive it possible for any thing but gross ignorance or malice to dream of finding fault with any thing he says or does. He has rejected the Pope, because he is his own pope, denied the infallibility of the Church, because he could not admit her infallibility without denying his own. He thus strikes others, who do not hold him to be either infallible or impeccable, as arrogant and conceited, as intolerably self-sufficient, and it falls out that he is hated even when he confers benefits, and gives mortal offence even when he acts with noble and generous intentions. The English may be envied, may be feared, they may be admired for their energy, bravery, and success, but as a nation they are loved and respected by no foreign people.

It is now seven hundred years since Ireland became in some manner subject to the English crown, and yet England has not advanced a step in gaining the affections of the Irish nation. Every Irishman in whom a single spark of Irish national feeling remains unextinguished, hates the English domination, and curses the English connection. Not the slightest progress has been made towards reconciling the Irish people to the English government, or towards making them look upon themselves as an integral portion of the empire, or its glory as their glory. The hatred of the Celt for the Saxon has only been intensified and rendered ineradicable by seven hundred years of contact. This is a singular fact. The Romans were great conquerors, but after a comparatively brief time the conquered lost their hatred of their conquerors and became proud of the Roman name. Gaul was subjected by the Roman arms, and converted into Roman provinces, but it ceased to regard Rome as its conqueror, and was when the Barbarian invasions began as loyal to the Empire as Italy herself. The French have conquered Brittany and Lorraine, and annexed them to France, and yet their inhabitants though still speaking their national language and retaining many of their old national habits and customs,

regard France as their country, and are proud of calling themselves Frenchmen. Why this difference? It is not owing to difference of race, for the ancient Gauls, the modern Bas-Breton, and the Irish are generally regarded as belonging to the same family. This difference is owing to the different genius of the respective conquerors. The ancient Roman was proud, cruel, but he could understand and respect the national feeling and religion of the conquered, in his government of them after the conquest was effected. The same can be said of the French. The Romans left the Provincials their identity, and made them add to the power and strength of the empire; France, the principal heir of the Roman Empire as well as of the Roman civilization, leaves also to her conquered provinces their identity, and finds her conquests adding to her power. But England tolerates nothing un-English, and makes her conquests virtual exterminations, and her conquests are never completed so long as the extermination is incomplete. The English, and in this respect we include their descendants in America, consequently ourselves, proceed always on the assumption, express or implied, that what is not English ought not to exist, and that it is impossible for a people to be prosperous, wise, virtuous, or happy in any way but the English way, or as we say here, the American way. They make war to the knife on every thing that does not smack of Englishism.

There is something remarkable in this English race both in its European and American branches. It can never live in peace with a weaker neighbor. It is hard to say what would have been the fate of Europe, if it had been a continental power. It would either have grasped the whole continent, or it would itself have ceased to exist. It can endure no neighbors, no power beside its own, that it is able to crush. We see this in the British expansion in Asia. It has annexed nearly the whole of India, and is now annexing, or preparing the way to annex Persia on the West and China on the North. We see it also in our own expansion on this continent. We could never live in peace with the native Indians, and always contrived to pick quarrels with them, provoke them to acts of vengeance, and then make war on them, exterminate them, or drive them back, and take their lands

from them. We do not annex Canada, because we should, were we to attempt it, have to reckon with the Mother Country, and we are not quite prepared for that as yet ; but we are perpetually getting into disputes with our Southern neighbors ; we have already got Texas, California, and New Mexico, and we are working our way down to the Isthmus of Darien. The race seems to lack the sense of international law, and to have persuaded itself that might makes right, and that a people not able to defend its possessions has no right to hold them. The people too weak to maintain its independence has, it seems to believe, no right to exist as an independent people. How long would the little Republic of San Marino have retained its separate existence had it been situated in the British Isles, or within the geographical limits of the United States ?

Yet this so-called Anglo-Saxon race boasts itself the grand civilizing race of the modern world, and affects to despise all other races as inferior and semi-barbarous. But there is not a race or tribe in any part of the world that it has civilized by its arts, its arms, its missionaries, or its colonists, at least since the Norman Conquest. It has gained no conquests to civilization in the East. It has gained none in the West. Undoubtedly, the United States are a civilized state where three hundred years ago roamed only savage tribes. Yet it has become so not by civilizing those tribes, but by driving them out. The colonists brought their civilization with them and transmitted it more or less impaired to their descendants, but they have never extended it to the original inhabitants. They did not civilize the Indians, they exterminated them. Now a race which civilizes no savage or barbarous people, can by no allowable figure of speech or stretch of the imagination be called a civilizing race, for it civilizes nobody, although civilized itself. We acknowledge the race possesses noble and generous traits, that it is a strong and energetic, a bold and adventurous race, and England has retained its old constitution in greater integrity and vigor than any of the continental nations of Europe ; but we have never been able to detect, at least since it became Protestant, the least benefit resulting from its influence in foreign nations. Its embrace is fatal. No nation has been



benefited by its alliance or its protection. And its diplomatic influence in foreign states and empires has invariably been hostile to the progress of civilization. The only thing for which we are able to commend the external policy of Great Britain, is that, after having lost the monopoly of the slave trade, she abolished it, and exerted her influence to induce other nations also to abolish it. Yet the slave trade is still carried on.

Now this Anglo-Saxon race, to which probably we ourselves have the honor of belonging, is the worst race on earth to have the government of another and less energetic race; simply because of its undoubting belief in its own perfection, and its native inability to view any question from the stand-point of another race, or from any point of view save that of its own central life. It is philanthropic, I believe really more philanthropic than any other existing race, but its own intense egotism renders its philanthropy more fatal than the intense selfishness of others. It can conceive no possible way of serving any people but that of forcing upon them its own ideas, religion, and institutions. It lacks the sense of fitness, and does not conceive that the English is only one type among many, all equally types of excellence. Its injustice to Ireland, we do not believe has been consciously intended, but has resulted from its bigoted attachment to its own religion and nationality, and its honest belief that to force Englishism upon the Irish would be conferring on them the greatest possible benefit. Hence its determination to destroy both the Irish nationality and the Irish religion. It would make of the lively, mirth-loving, and devout Irishman, whose element is society, and whose life is faith, a cool, staid, sombre, unbelieving, undemonstrative, isolated English Protestant. With this thought England has, since the Reformation at least, governed, or misgoverned Ireland. In order to carry out this thought she has been obliged to deprive the Catholic and national party of all power, of all property, of all rights, and to bestow all her favors on the Anglo-Irish faction, to maintain the Protestant ascendancy, and to govern through it. She confiscated the land to the benefit of Protestant adventurers, or to base apostates from their religion and country, reduced the mass of the Catholic and national population

to the deepest poverty, and placed them in abject dependence on Protestant landlords for the very means of earning their bread by the sweat of their faces. They were rendered incapable of acquiring landed property, they were outlawed for their religion, and placed completely in the power of their bitterest and deadliest enemies. They were exposed to the caprice of the landlord, and what was still worse, to the upstart power and grasping avarice of the middleman. Their churches were taken from them, their clergy were outlawed, and hunted down by armed soldiers ; they were robbed of their schools, forbidden to go abroad for education, and forbidden to be taught even letters at home, unless in a Protestant school, and therefore obliged to grow up in ignorance or to give up their religion. They were poor and could not purchase justice, powerless and could not command it. They had no redress for wrongs, and were at every moment, and in almost every relation of life, exposed to the tender mercies of their most unrelenting enemies, who counted it a virtue to maltreat a Papist.

Taking these facts into consideration it is very clear to us that the Irish do not exaggerate the wrongs they have received at the hands of England, or attribute more than its share in their miserable condition to the British government. The severity of the penal laws are now indeed relaxed, and Catholics can now acquire, hold, and transmit property as well as Protestants, but the feelings and habits of three hundred years' growth are not changed in a moment, and the old hatred and contempt still remain. The government still seeks for the most part to maintain the old Protestant ascendancy, govern Ireland through the Anglo-Irish faction, and to exclude as far as possible Catholics from all real power to protect themselves. Catholics may be appointed, as with us they may be elected, to office, but they have little or no power to serve their Catholic friends, and to retain place and influence must often show themselves more severe against them than would a liberal-minded Protestant. With us a Catholic is well-nigh lost to Catholicity the moment he is clothed with official dignity. And it is, we suppose, pretty much the same in Great Britain and Ireland. Catholics are there as well as here the weaker party, and there as well as here, though

we are inclined to believe more so here than there, justice without power to back it need not expect to be listened to. The party without power, conscious of its weakness, is forced, in some measure, to supply by cunning its lack of strength. Its very existence depends on it.

These considerations sufficiently explain the state of things described in *Ailey Moore*, and make us look with a lenient eye on the short-comings of some of the Irish characters introduced. The virtues of the Irish are their own, their faults, and faults they have, are for the most part due to the unjust and blundering policy pursued by Protestant England for three hundred years towards them.

We cannot analyze the story of *Ailey Moore*, or give our readers any account of its plot or plots. We find in it a great variety of characters, the weak-minded, extravagant, and unprincipled landlord ; the miserly, grasping, oppressive, intriguing, cowardly, and black-hearted agent ; the Protestant Parson and his wife, the Catholic Priest, the angelic Ailey Moore, and her high-minded and accomplished brother Gerald, the pattern of a Christian and a gentleman ; their friends, Frank Tyrrell, and his sister Cicely, persons of condition, pure and noble-hearted, destined to be converted ; their uncle, the Baron, who though a Protestant, would seem to be as good as any Catholic ; soupers, villains, beggars ; evicted peasants starving, dying, or driven to exile or desperation ; the bold, fine-hearted, and energetic Ribbon man, who takes upon himself the character of "the whip of justice," and his confederates, soldiers, policemen, pimps, virgins, assassins, profligates, the devil, &c. The chief interest of the story turns on the attempt of the agent to get Gerald convicted of murder, and to wreak his vengeance on the Moores, who have rejected his proposal for a matrimonial alliance with "our own Ailey." The real hero of the story, however, is Shaun a Dherk, the Ribbon man, and Biddy Brown, or Gran', the beggar woman, is the heroine. Ailey is beautiful, highly accomplished, very pious, very charitable, and devoted to her old pastor, Father Quinlivan, but she is too ethereal for an earthly heroine, too unreal for flesh and blood. Gerald, though brave, and a great artist, does not effect much save to stop at great personal risk a runaway horse, rescue an innocent, beautiful Irish girl from a house of pros-

titution in London, whither she had been entrapped through the simplicity of her old servant, and paint his mistress as Judith, and idealize his sister into a *Mater Amabilis*. The dramatic power of the author shows itself to the best advantage in what he regards as his subordinate, and fails him in the higher and more ideal, characters. He tells us how great, good, noble they were, but he does not let us see it in their action. Their virtue appears to have been too sublime for representation.

A few extracts will prove the justice of our commendation of the author. The first we make is a scene with the Protestant parson and his wife at the well of St. Senanus. The peasantry have collected around the miraculous well, and are engaged in their devotions, when Mr. Salmer, the Protestant minister, with his wife drives up, and alights from his carriage.

"The Rev. gentleman ascended the steps towards the stone cross, manifesting all the way many internal workings of pity and contempt; his wife followed, held by his hand, and one or two steps behind him; they looked like a pair who held the fate of nations, and ascended the tribunal to deliver judgment. It was obvious that Mr. Salmer came to make an oration, and Mrs. Salmer, as became her, to hear and sanction the same.

"Having settled his feet and his wife to the satisfaction of both parties, or the three parties,—that is, his wife and his two feet,—he commenced by assuring them (the people) of his ardent and anxious love for them, which was answered by a universal '*gan dhoubth*,' which meant that his love was unquestionable. To be sure, 'twas said in a way which was not entirely demonstrative, but at all events they said '*gan dhoubth—go devin*'—indeed that's true. He proceeded to announce that their new landlord would soon come amongst them, and his arrival should be hailed by them with joy. He came to make his tenantry happy, and to diffuse among them the light of true religion (here there was some confusion). The late master of the property had not lived as a man of God (great murmurs, and a sod flying by Mr. Salmer's head). He hoped there was no man here (a voice, 'To eat pork on Friday—Eddy, tally high ho, fat po—'). Happy would it be for them if, abandoning the Pagan distinction between meats, which Paul declared should attain in the latter days, they would fling off the yoke—(a voice, 'Of the parsons')—the yoke of superstition, and obtain the freedom—(same voice, 'From tithes')—of the Gospel. The country was suffering deeply from (voices, 'From the tithes'). No; the tithes were the law of England; but the country was suffering deeply

from the reign of falsehood, the worship of stocks and stones (and now Mr. Salmer waxed into a warmth quite prophetic), woman-worship—the new-fangled doctrines of the Roman apostasy.

“Here there was an ominous hush, succeeded by a more ominous yet indescribable kind of noise. The parties behind were closing in, and those before were flushing and breathing strongly. At the words ‘woman-worship,’ there was a perfect heave forward of the whole mass, a woman’s voice crying ‘*Naove whuire banathe!*’—Blessed and Holy Virgin! The speaker was evidently drawing to a crisis. Several sods, some turf, a few black potatoes, had been flung, but an absolute hurricane of missiles, none of a dangerous description, however, were flying round him, immediately after the favorite expression of ‘Roman apostasy’ had been uttered.

“He stood his ground, and Mrs. Salmer looked out of her large eyes quite resigned, only she appeared to have attained some color.

“He was proceeding with even more energy, and exciting the crowd to a frightful degree of anger. In a short time he became quite inaudible from the groaning, and almost invisible from the pelting, but still the great arms swung, and the big lips moved, and the little dark eyes seemed running after one another, inside his head.

“Mrs. Salmer now felt a little nervous, and she clung to him.

“There was a rush; and shrieks, cries, and curses filled the little home where sanctity had so long rested. Mr. Salmer’s hour appeared to have come.

“The old man who was mentioned as having been seated on the first step of the ascent, had never stirred till now. He stood up majestically, and opening his old arms in front of the crowd, he waved them back. ‘Don’t touch him, boys—don’t touch him—don’t hurt the name of the ould spot where your gran’fathers knelt down to pray. Mr. Salmer,’ said he, turning to the parson, ‘you’re a stranger a’most in this place, but mind me, not near such a stranger as you think. Take the advice of gray hair, and go home wid your lady. Open the way there!’

“Salmer looked, but ’twas not thankfully. His eyes seemed to inquire; but he answered that he was engaged in the work of God, and would die a martyr.

“‘Much better for you, Mr. Salmer, to die a bishop—’deed it is. Hark’ee, sir; the sweat of that crowd put bread and butter on your table to-day, while *they* wur atin’ lumpers or India male themselves; an’ they gev’ you this for nothin’. Now don’t be unraysonable—id may satisfy your mind to abuse ’em; but you ought to be content wid ridin’ in a carriage out o’ their earnin’s.’

“‘I’m bound to save their immortal souls!’

“‘Oh, as fur that, don’t be foolish. If you wish to save souls—

you say you kem' from England—that wants sows to be saved very much. Thry your hand wid the colliers, that don't know the name o' God; thry your hand wid the fact'ries, that don't know the manin' o' virtue; thry your hand wid the counthry-people, an' tache 'em the Christian law o' marriage; or thry your hand wid the pious and larned clargymen of your own cloth, that's comin' over to th' ould church, as fast as hops. Now "charity begins at home," you know, Mr. Salmer: I show'd you your ground; but you'll get a bigger name from disturbin' the pace at Kinmacarra!"

"Joram, my dear, leave this wretched place," said Mrs. Salmer.

"Never," said Mr. Salmer; 'I'll not be put down by an agent of the priests!'

"Take your wife's advice," said many voices. 'Go home now, you've got enough.'

"Tally high ho, fat pork!—tally high ho, on Friday," roared Eddy.

"The priests—" said Mr. Salmer.

"Go home," roared the crowd.

"The priests, I say—"

"Hould your tongue," roared the crowd.

"I must and shall—"

"There was no resisting them any longer. They closed on the unfortunate gentleman. His shoulders and feet were seized; he was raised from the ground—borne out—followed by his wife, who was respectfully led after him. No one can say what the people, thus goaded, might have done, but a man appeared whose presence was a rule among his friends and foes.

Gerald Moore presented himself.

"A moment was sufficient to dash through the gathering. He stood by the side of Mr. Salmer.

"What, what," said Moore, 'will you disgrace yourselves? What, seize upon a single and unarmed man?'

"He has been abusing our religion!"

"Well, one was enough to be a fool; you should not forget charity, because he dishonored it. Let go this gentleman!"

"Young man," said Salmer, 'you have used expressions—'

"Mr. Salmer, I think you had better go home. Here's your carriage. You see it hasn't been disturbed. So, sir, that is much better. Mr. Salmer, will you enter, if you please. Now, reverend sir, I pray you not to disturb yourself; drive on, coachman. Farewell!"

"And the carriage drove off, amid the hisses, laughter, and groans of the multitude, for such it had now become."—Vol. i. pp. 39–44.

The next extract is a scene in the cave or hiding place of the Ribbon men.

"They now entered what might be called a cavern. The room was spacious, furnished with a blazing turf-fire and one table, at

which an intelligent young peasant was sitting reading some letters. Several others, ten or twelve, sat on fern, straw, or large unhewn stones, here and there in the apartment.

"All the persons present were young, athletic, interesting-looking men. They seemed in silent expectation of the arrival which had just taken place. They all rose to welcome Shaun a Dherk and his companion.

"'Fine night, boys,' said Shaun, after he had shaken hands with those next the door. 'Glad to see ye all to time. That's the way.'

"'An' yourself,' answered two or three, 'that never missed a minit or a man.'

"'Whoy, troth, I begged my way like a sojur; an', although carryin' so many *mouths* wid wan,' he said, pointing to his arms in his bosom, 'isn't favorable to the beggin' thrade. I got on purty well. I had a long talk wid the new landlord o' Kinmacarra, ye must know.'

"'Arrah,' cried the listeners.

"'Yis, faith, an' I did considherable toward pacifyin' the counthry with Justice Hangall; an' not to be exposin' the saycrets of the state, I must end my speech by makin' known to ye Mr. James Boran, a man very anxious to join ye, partiklarly if the bis'ness is dang'rous.'

"'Welcome,' answered all.

"'I have to say that the young master of Kinmacarra will make empty houses and broken hearts, boys,' added Shaun. 'He has a great notion intirely of savin' the sows o' the tinants by Parson Salmer's rule. Lases will be wrote out according to a man's Bible readin' an' desait, an' accordin' as he's pliable in sellin' the sows av his childher.'

"'O murther!' echoed the hearers.

"'Yis, faith, an' he'll have substantial men on the land, an' make the farms fine an' big, be my sowl, an' he'll throw down all the cabins an' give every mother's sowl a pound note that throws down the house himself an' goes.'

"'Where?' demanded the conclave.

"'Oh, to a mighty good place—to heaven, if they starve wid patience, to be sure; to the poorhouse if they like, or to cook landlords, or to the d—I.'

"'A sad day for Kinmacarra,' said all.

"'An' a sad day for the man that makes it so,' said Shaun, while his broad brow bent and his eye flashed the fire of his bitter feeling.

"'But the bis'ness of the night,' said the young man at the table; and he rose up as if even additional life had just then entered his frame.

"'He was a fine young fellow, too; some one or two and twenty

years he had seen. His eye and hair were light; but his arm was powerful, and his chest spread before him like a shield.

"'Yis,' answered Shaun, 'the bis'ness of the night—dark, black, cursed, ought to be the end of the man that killed the sowls an' bodies of the craythurs God put in his power. He may as well say his death prayer that won't sthrike home when sint upon this arrand,' and he took the finely-mounted pistol from his pocket. 'May the Maker of the land an' say sthrike me here an' hereafter; may the livin' spurn me an' spew upon me, an' the dead wither up the green grass in my way. Oh, curse on me!' he cried with dreadful energy, kissing at the same time the barrel of the instrument of death; 'curse on me if I would not kill him, at the foot of the cross of the Lord, the man that wud go back of his duty!'

"'Amen!' was the universal rejoinder.

"'Wasn't the widow to be here?' said one of the men, addressing the young person to whom we have referred, as introducing the last conversation.

"'She was, and she is,' answered the person appealed to.

"'Whereupon he left the room.

"'Poor Mick!' said Shaun a Dherk, 'twas a sorrowful day to you!'

"'Throe for you,' replied a man with an accent which marked him as having come from a distance. 'I know'd the colleen well, an' him. The sun never shone upon two more likely made to make one heart an' home. They looked in one another's faces as if their life 'ud mingle, an' their souls come out to kiss one another. An' then they hard the Sunday mornin's blessed, peaceful mass, and you saw 'em kneelin' side by side at the time they done the Christmas an' Aister duty! Well, God is good, an' Mick Dowlin' will have pace and the Ryans will have justice yet.'

"'Hush!' chimed the company, with the feeling so characteristic of the Irish peasant. 'They're comin'.'

"And just then there tottered across the threshold a woman not old in years, though her hair had whitened—it was said that within one month she had grown gray.

"Mick Dowling held her by the hand—indeed, almost supported her. The firmness of the preceding half-hour seemed a little shaken. His lip quivered slightly, and his eye was moist. Poor Mick Dowling was surrounded by sweet and bitter memories; the sweet ones softened his manhood. The tear of a good heart is not the message of weakness, but the pledge of a powerful soul.

"Not a word was spoken until they had passed to the middle of the floor. The woman was accommodated with the only chair possessed by the gathering, and Dowling stood behind her.

"She, the widow, was very poorly clad—was pale and emaciated. Her hair had escaped, and hung dishevelled on her face. Her head fell upon her breast, like one who had lost all memory. The young



man came closer. Every eye was bent upon the wreck of human hope and happiness. No word was spoken. The crackling of the turf on the hearth was almost painfully distinct, as if nothing should intercept the communings of the souls that spoke in their common feeling. Even Boran caught the contagion of sympathy, and tears streamed down his face.

"At length Shaun called the poor woman by her name—

"Mrs. Ryan!"

"She started, looked up, and around from face to face, but did not seem to recognize any one. Her head was falling back upon her breast, when Dowling presented himself. Him she examined curiously like one whom she should, but could not, call to mind. After some time her look of child-like wonder relaxed—her eyes began to fill with light. She started up, and seizing Dowling by the arms, she said, whisperingly:

"Where's Mary?"

"Sit down, Mrs. Ryan, sit down, you are wake and worn; sit down, and remember you're with your friends an' neighbors," said Shaun a Dherk.

"Dowling was unable to articulate a word.

"I'll tell you—Ah, Mick, Mick!—ah, Mick Dowlin'! Whisper—come here! Mary, Mary! Oh, shame on you—don't you remember how her thrue heart used to bound, and the red blood flash all over her handsome face, at the name of Mick Dowlin'? Och, shame! Go out of my sight! Mary Ryan isn't the girl for you! Whist! Whisper, Mick—shure Mary is dead. Dead! No; she's not dead! My curse on any one that says—Ah, God forgive me, why should I curse any one? I am a sinner."

"And she paused.

"Mick," she resumed, "I won't curse. Oh, no; maybe Mary is near me; an' oh, she could not bear a curse—you know my darlin', *our* darlin' Mary? But, Mick, she got so pale! the cowld went through her, Mick, and she hadn't a bit to ate. She sowld every thing, and used to putend she ate herself when she fed her little brother an' sisters—the brave little fellow you loved so, and the bright-eyed colleens. Mick, *acushla*, Mary fed 'em all, an' watched 'em in the fever. Cowld an' lonely—cowld an' lonely, an' hungry was the girl that loved you. They said you went to England for your hire. An' Mary was glad you didn't see her in her want. Mick, darlin', come here to me. I wronged you. I thought you wouldn't do for my heart's life. Gi' me pardon for the sake o' Mary."

"She looked around wildly.

"Och how she laid out the angels, an' she pale and wake herself! An' how she laid 'em in the green church-yard, when I warn't able to lave the lop o' straw! An' how pale she came back; an' h' vin' no fire, no light—nothin' only the cowld, cowld wather!"

Where was I? Mick, did Mary die, die of starvation? No, no: 'tis a lie! We owed no rent! 'Twas the other man—his name was in the lease. What! turn me out—turn me out—out o' the house my father built—where the father of my childher loved me first, an' last, an' died! Turn me out—out of the place that all the labor of the livin' an' the dead is growin'! Turn me an' Mary, an' all out to die in the ditch! Ochone, Mary—she lay down! Oh may the curse of the great God, and the vengeance of his Holy Mother—

"In a paroxysm of agony the widow Ryan fell upon the floor.

"Well, men,' calmly spoke Shaun a Dherk, 'who is the man to kill Skerin? Who puts the hand of justice upon the neck of the murderher?'

"He pointed to the woman, and looked around upon his companions. Simultaneously all called out,—

"I! I! I!'

"No, it must be the work of wan—no more. Listen, now—I know his road to-morrow. I know where he is to be to-morrow's midnight. I could dhrav his shadow upon the ground this moment. A man'll be there wid a gun that never desaved a man's hand. He can put the muzzle a'most to the villain's neck.'

"Hurra!' cried the excited outlaws.

"The graves of three innocent children, and a noble neighbor's child—the broken heart of the poor woman that's lyin' afore ye, will be in the man's mind!'

"Yis, yis, yis.'

"Fear, nor mercy, nor the dead, nor the livin', won't turn yez from your road?'

"No, no, no.'

"Kneel down around the mother o' the dead, an' join hands by the blood o' the murderher.'

"They did so.

"Now, may the red curse of the Lord brand the sowl of the coward that, sent to do this deed, pauses on the journey where justice raises up his arm.'

"Amen.'

"Pardon, Shaun,' said Mick Dowling, rising up. 'This ought to be my place. Skerin has killed my love, and broken my heart. I am for the road.'

"No,' replied Shaun.

"I ought,' said Dowling.

"It cannot be,' said Shaun. 'You are the first man to be suspected. You will live to do some good; here you would die almost for nothing.'

"But I don't care for life.'

"Your friends are the best judges, an'—you're sworn. Stay, boys, there's one who must do his work. My reason no man here will ax; 'tis a good wan. I never desaved you. Come here,

Mr. James Boran ; come, sir, you are the man to kill the Cromwellian Skerin.'

" 'Me!'

" 'You. An' look—your life is gone as Mary Ryan's, if the murderer be not executed before to-morrow's midnight. I'll point the place—an' among the dead—I'll be there to watch you.' "—Vol. i. pp. 53–61.

Mr. Skerin is shot, but not by James Boran, and his assassin gets possession of a bond which will give its holder power to ruin the Moores. It gets into the hands of the land agent, Mr. Justice Snapper, Ailey's rejected suitor. Shaun a Dherk is determined to get that bond, and to do justice to a family Mr. Snapper is about evicting. With this view he visits Mr. Snapper, whom he professes to assist in pacifying and quieting the country.

" Mr. Joyce Snapper welcomed Shaun a Dherk very patronizingly, of course ; and as he was in his 'best style,' he sat with the light full upon his face—upon his shirt-bosom, and upon his gray pantaloons and red slippers. Shaun a Dherk through humility, and because he wasn't in any style at all, would rather sit 'over near the windee,' if his honor 'pleased,' and as Mr. Snapper made no objection, this minor detail was arranged.

" 'Well, Shaun, how goes the world, as the saying is—eh ? Gone regularly through that affair, and so on ?' And Mr. Snapper smiled—a very meaning smile—and looked at least one hundred ways in one half-minute of time. He had an advantage in his eyes, the reader is aware.

" 'In troth, yer honor, I done a grate dale, an' I hope yer honor will considher me, fur I am a poor man, yer honor, you know.'

" 'What does Shanahan say ?'

" 'Och, by coorse, he made a poor mouth, an' he said his owldest boy was in the faver, God bless the hearers ! an' his owld father was sick, he said ; an' he hadn't the money, an' so he couldn't.'

" 'Couldn't, and all that, Shaun, eh ? 'Couldn't ?'

" 'Faith, yis—he couldn't. The place looked poor, sure enough—an' 'twasn't like the house o' the Shanahans a bit, an' tellin' the truth !'

" 'Well, Shaun, is that your news?—confound it !—and he couldn't—couldn't !—I know—then he'll march, as the saying is—the rogue's march. He'll march, if he was to carry his father's coffin in the cart, and his son sitting upon it—he'll march—march,' cried Mr. Joyce Snapper, indignantly.

" 'I hinted that, yer honor,' returned Shaun a Dherk. 'And I tould him that 'twas betther fur 'im to offur, bekase yer honor couldn't ax id—but he shuk his head, melancholy-like, an' he looked in sorrow.'

“Well?”

“So I said I was sorry for 'im; an' I was goin' away, when he called me back agin. “Shaun,” sis he, “wur you spakin' to the agint?” “Me?” <sup>sjs</sup> I, “spakin' to the agint? Di ye think his honor 'ud spake to the likes o' me?” “Well,” sis he, “Shaun, what'll I do—what'll I do?” an' his eyes was full o' tears like. “It'll take all my stock—every bit uv it—to pay all that money, Shaun; an' thin—och *one*!—not a dhrop o' milk to feed the owld or the young—  
—an' the poor owld man that never shut his dure agin any one, he'll be hungry—the father that rared me, Shaun.”

“Well, all that's very good, and so forth—we all know—well?”

“Arrah! yer honor, faith, I was near cryin' myself, so I was—case you know—Mich have the name of bein' a good son to th' owld people, an' I'm growin' owld now,” said Shaun, with a sigh. ‘But to make a long story short, yer honor, he looked round the owld house—he was born in the little room where's th' owld father yer honor—an' I saw he wouldn't fly from the nest. “My father's heart will brake,” he said, “if I'm turned out; an' he hasn't long to stay wid us now.” An' thin he paused, yer honor. “Yis,” sis he, “buy the renewal of the lase, and the son of owld Paddy Shanahan will have enough left to berry his father; an' thin he can go out wud his childher an' his wife to beg.” “Yis—yis,” he said, “my father shan't never know—never!” He'll be hare to-morrow, yer honor.’

“Shaun, you are “Solomon the Wise,” as the saying is; Shaun, there's a golden guinea for you!”

“Thank yer honor—yer honor desarnes all I'm doin', an' I'll do more, plase God.”

“The remains of that Hynes family—and so on—is a great bother; but the vagabond always pays up.”

“Och, sure, nothin' is asier than the way yer honor knows.”

“What way?” asked Mr. Snapper, with quite a complacent smile.

“Faith, thin, yer honor, 'tisn't I would be better than yer honor, I'm sure. But you know, yer honor, 'tis parties that way that disturbs the pace o' the counthry always. Little bits o' howldin's that can't stand; an' thin they want to get a change, somehow, an' all that; an' thin they join the “terries” an' the “boys,” you see: whin all the time, if the land wus together, the place 'ud be full o' respectable people, an' we'd have pace an' quietness.”

“Shaun, you speak like a man of sense.”

“Oh yis, yer honor; an' that's the *raison* you put the powdher in that beggar-woman's son's thatch, that he was transported fur.”

“Me?—eh?—what do you mean?—what do you mean, eh?”

“Och, yer honor,” Shaun replied, in a low, confidential tone. ‘Sure Grimes an' I wur hand-an'-gluv', an' I know'd all of it.’

“Mr. Joyce Snapper looked full at Shaun, and Shaun looked as

open and candid as the sky. Mr. Snapper was quite red this time, and he turned away from the candles a little,—a very prudent course.

“But Mr. Snapper said nothing,—he felt as if the beggar-man knew every thing and every one. He could kill Shaun, and he might attempt it—the thought struck him; but to dispute with him was impossible. Shaun knew too much, and he looked like adamant, Shaun did.

“‘An’ yer honor,’ Shaun continued, as if nothing at all had occurred, ‘I hard something about another that you know; faith, this house would look handsomer if a body I know was there! I hard something that brings home the foul murder o’ Mr. Skerin.’

“Mr. Joyce Snapper absolutely stood up. He looked like a man blackening for death. Shaun spoke in so solemn a tone—it looked like accusation.

“‘Di you want any thing, yer honor?’ said Shaun, very solicitously. ‘Can I do any thing fur yer honor?’ he asked.

“‘Nothing—nothing. Well, Shaun, you were saying something, and so on.’

“‘I was, sir—yis I was. Gerald Moore can—’

“Mr. Joyce Snapper’s heart beat like two horses racing.

“‘Gerald Moore can be convicted by evidence.’

“‘Eh!’ cried Snapper, entirely reassured. ‘Eh!—what’s that—tell me that again; Moore, the proud scholar—the—Moore—eh!’

“‘Yis.’

“‘How? Speak, man!’

“‘I know a man that saw *him* spakin’ to another; *that other* swore his book oath the same evening to murder Skerin, an’ appointed the place an’ the hour to do it; it was done at the place an’ the hour, an’ there is witnesses that can swear it.’

“‘Glory to Shaun a Dherk! you are better than a dozen police and justices of the peace, as the saying is. Where are the people who help you?’

“‘Och, sir, many a wan I have to help me, bekase I thavel the world wide, an’ I sees the world’s heart—the inside an’ the outside, you know, Mr. Snapper, an’ I know you’re loyal—a loyal man, you know,—an’ I’m doin’ my duty by a loyal man, in helping him to be a magistrate, an’ to keep the pace.’

“Mr. Snapper was flattered by this speech; but still Mr. Snapper did not feel perfectly easy.

“‘Any more, Shaun?’ demanded Mr. Joyce Snapper.

“‘Och, yis—a dale more, yer honor,’ answered the beggar-man. ‘I have, in a saycret place, something the dead man had about him that night, an’ I got id from Mr. Moore’s house.’

“‘You have?—the d—!—eh?’

“‘Throth, I have, thin—and I paid well for it, too.’

“‘What?’

" 'A bond.'

" 'A bond!—to whom?'

" 'To Skerin, from owld Moore.'

" 'For how much?'

" 'For one thousand pounds.'

" Mr. Joyce Snapper burst out laughing: he laughed very heartily. Never before or since had, nor has, Mr. Snapper laughed so loudly.

" Shaun looked very confounded.

" 'Is all your information like that, Shaun—as the saying is?' demanded Mr. Snapper.

" 'Why, yer honor?'

" 'Because that's not true.'

" 'Not throe?'

" 'Not true, Shaun.'

" And Mr. Joyce Snapper's heart dilated, and his chest stretched proudly forth, when he said to Shaun a Dherk—

" 'Shaun, be easy on that matter—you're wrong—I have that bond.'

" Shaun shook his head.

" 'I have, Shaun: I have that bond I say!'

" Shaun put out his hands and shook them.

" 'A mistake,' said Shaun—'a mistake. Ax the people. Shaun a Dherk is always right. You have a copy, may be.'

" 'No.'

" 'Yis.'

" Mr. Joyce Snapper, more proudly still—a little indignantly, in fact—rose from his chair, and rapidly went to a desk—an old-fashioned standing mahogany desk. There stood the venerable piece of furniture, with all its brass handles up the front, and its broad polished breast. It was against the wall beside the mantelpiece. The bell-pull hung just near it.

" Mr. Joyce Snapper slowly opened the desk; and having put in his hand, without any search, at once—but tenderly, ever so tenderly—he took out a piece of parchment. The parchment was nicely rolled and taped—taped with red tape. Solemnly rather, he undid the knot and unrolled the parchment. He brought it over to Shaun.

" 'Now?' said he.

" Shaun looked at the parchment, and then at Mr. Joyce Snapper.

" 'Well?' said Snapper.

" 'The copy,' said Shaun.

" 'Why, you omadhawn, as they say, I'm one of her Majesty's attorneys-at-law. Look at the names, and so on! Look at the names, Shaun! Look here!' And he spread the paper broadly over the table.

" Shaun a Dherk rose. He stood right between the candles and the window-blind, until his figure was perfectly defined upon it;

and he struck his stick on the floor as he made a step towards the table.

"As Shaun looked over the parchment, there was a shriek from the kitchen which startled Mr. Snapper, and apparently very much startled Shaun a Dherk.

"'What's that?' said Shaun. 'What's that?'

"Mr. Snapper, like a courageous man, rushed to the door; but, like a cautious man, he stood there. Shaun a Dherk, like a pious man, went on his knees to say his prayers. Having listened for a moment, and heard nothing below, Mr. Snapper was gaining courage, and really opened the door to go down stairs. But at the same moment the window of the drawing-room was raised as if by magic.

"Mr. Snapper's heart sank—he rushed towards the end of the room, and cried 'Thieves!'

"Shaun a Dherk roared 'Murder!'

"And the people below stairs were crying out any thing and every thing, but no one paid them any attention.

The barrel of a brass blunderbuss now made its appearance at the open window, and was soon followed by the owner or the bearer. Mr. Snapper's blood curdled in his heart—he thought his hour had come.

"The burglar was a powerful man—a fellow of light step and proud bearing. He wore a shirt over his clothes. On his head was a woman's beaver bonnet, and his face was covered with a crape mask.

"He laid down the window, walked right into the middle of the room, and summoned Snapper to his presence.

"'I'm only a poor man as looks for his bit, sir,' cried Shaun, 'an' have mercy on me this night! Och, sure you wouldn't,' continued Shaun, 'sure you wouldn't injure a poor ould creathur!'

"'Hould your tongue,' said the stranger peremptorily. 'Hould your tongue, you old spy. Your gray hair saved you many a day an' night, or your ould carcass would be feedin' the crows long ago.' The fellow spoke quite majestically.

"Again he summoned Snapper, and commanded him to go on his knees.

"The land-agent shiveringly obeyed, but cried for grace. Shaun a Dherk, in agony struck the table on which the bond lay, and cried 'Mercy!' The stranger placed the blunderbuss at Snapper's breast.

"'If you believe in God,' said the assassin, in a solemn tone; 'if you believe in God, pray.'

"'Oh, mercy! mercy!' cried Snapper.

"'Villain!' said the stranger; 'the graves an' the highways is full of the dead and the broken-hearted, that you tormented an' scourged, an' dhrove from home, an' happiness, an' hope. Oh, you dark, black devil, the curse o' the poor is upon you, day an' night: an' justice is come at last. Pray, if you have a prayer to say.'

“‘Och òne! och òne! och òne!’ cried the beggar-man.

“‘Spare me,’ said Snapper, ‘and I’ll swear—oh, I’ll make every amends, every amends, all amends. I’ll swear, I’ll swear. Oh, spare me!’

“The rebel deliberately, and fastly, too, tied Shaun and Snapper together, and just as deliberately tied them both to the grate. He then quietly—even slowly, it was so quietly—he quenched all the lights—the murderer seemed to have conceived some frightful thought. He would not shoot them perhaps—he would beat out their brains, or cut their throats, or—

“Snapper felt a knife at his neck!

“Humbly and fervently, though not loudly, he cried for ‘mercy.’

“‘Och òne! och òne!’ repeated Shaun a Dherk. ‘Silence! silence! like the grave of poor Brown,’ said the stranger. ‘Silence, like the empty cabins of the roadside,’ he continued, ‘or by the eternal — you shan’t get one minit longer.’

“Mr. Snapper shook from head to foot. He pushed closer to Shaun a Dherk, who still muttered his low ‘Och òne!’

“There was an awful silence. The heart of Mr. Joyce Snapper thumped so loudly at his breast, that it was audible through the whole room.

“Having engaged himself for some minute or two about the old desk, and muttered some other threats and curses, the assassin went down stairs. He was determined to be secure. The servants were first to die, or to be prevented from giving the alarm. What moments these were to Mr. Joyce Snapper and to Shaun a Dherk!

“However, five minutes passed, and no one was heard returning; ten minutes passed, no one came; a quarter of an hour, and steps were heard at a distance—a measured tread it was, and of more than one. Steadily, steadily, the steps approached the land-agent’s house.

“A gleam of hope—he knew not why—shot into the soul of Mr. Joyce Snapper.

“At length the steps were heard on the walk, approaching the door; and then at the door, and then in the hall, and then on the stairs. There was scrambling, and tumbling, and cursing, in the hurry; but Mr. Snapper recognized the voices of the police.

“‘Hurra!’ cried the land-agent. ‘Hurra!’ he cried again. ‘Here! here!’ he cried.

“‘God save the Queen!’ cried Shaun a Dherk.

“Caps knocked against the door-frame, and bayonet scabbards against the door, and guns made frightful noise as they were ‘grounded’ on the floor; and during all that time Mr. Joyce Snapper was laughing—laughing immoderately. He was almost beside himself with joy—a thing not very surprising, we should think, considering the time he has had.

“‘Why, Mr. Snapper,’ said the sergeant of police, ‘here is dread-



ful work indeed. Where are you? Johnston, will you strike a light? So! Thunders!' cried the sergeant, when he beheld the pair of captives. 'Thunders! but the rascals have left you in an awful pickle, sir.'

"There was no resisting the impulse to a simultaneous roar of laughter.

"'Desk rifled!' said the corporal.

"'Devil mend him!' said a private, in a side whisper to another, who answered, 'Amen!'

"Mean time Mr. Joyce Snapper was liberated, much to his comfort. He was so rejoiced, that for a moment he did not dream of his losses.

"Shaun a Dherk came beside him and gave him a nudge.

"'Let the polis folly him,' whispered Shaun.

"'A hundred pounds for his capture!' cried Snapper."—pp. 141–153.

We need not say that Shaun secures the bond, and that the money taken by the burglar, a confederate of Shaun, is carried to young Shanahan, who is thereby enabled to pay his rent, and save his old father from being turned out in the street to die. The whole scene is peculiarly Irish, and one can hardly help sympathizing with Shaun in his wild way of doing justice. We would gladly make several more extracts, but our limits will not permit. Father Baptist, as in duty bound by his profession, condemns Ribbonism, but it is very clear that his heart is with Shaun a Dherk, and his book will make a hundred Shaun a Dherks to one it will convert to law and order. Will the reverend author permit us to remark that the evident sympathy with which he describes the Ribbon man and his doings, detracts much from the effect of his condemnation of Ribbonism? We may in our writings depict truthfully what we hold to be wrong, and suggest all the palliatives or excuses possible for those whose conduct we must disapprove, but to depict it with evident sympathy, and to enlist the judgment or the passions of our readers on its side, is not allowable, and we make but poor amends for the countenance we thus give to what is wrong, by a formal and professional condemnation of it at the end. Father Baptist enlists our sympathies with Shaun a Dherk, and gives us admirable reasons for defending him. When the law ceases to afford protection, when it is made by its administrators only an instrument of oppression, it ceases to bind in conscience; civil society is dissolved; men are

thrown back under the law of nature, where every man becomes his own protector, and resumes the natural right of vindicating justice, and of doing whatever is not *malum in se*. On this principle alone can the Irish Ribbon men and our Vigilance Committees justify themselves. Now the question we ask Father Baptist, is, Is the state of things in Ireland such as to justify the appeal to this principle? If he says, yes, then why does he condemn Shaun a Dherk, and exclude him from the sacraments, solely because he resorts to it? If he says, no, does he do well to enlist his own and his readers' sympathies on his side? Is it wise to inflame our passions, work us up to a sort of madness, make us just ready to strike, and then come in with wise saws, and Gospel lectures, and tell us to forbear? Why work us up to a fit of mutiny, and then forbid us to mutiny, but exhort us to be patient and forgiving? Why bring the curse to our lips, and then tell us to bless? Is this treating us fairly? Either do not arouse our vindictive passions, or give them full swing. We do not say that the Reverend Father is wrong in condemning Shaun a Dherk, but he is wrong in our judgment, if he means to condemn him, in first justifying him, and enlisting all our human feelings in his support. It is not well to present nature and grace in opposition when we can help it, or to arm the passions against the authority of the priest. Authority should never create obstacles to itself, or enlist human nature unnecessarily against its commands.

There is here the great moral objection to a large portion, and that in general the better portion, of our popular literature. The author winds up usually with an admirable moral, but a moral in direct opposition to all the passions, feelings, and sympathies, his work during its perusal has excited. Now this moral tagged on to the end has seldom any power to counteract the mischief done before we reach it. *Ailey Moore* makes us curse the oppressors of Ireland, and we cannot read it without feeling that were we in Ireland, Shaun a Dherk should have in us a recruit, and one who would make war in every possible way to the death upon the base oppressors of Ireland's peasantry. We are maddened. We can hear nothing but one deep, concentrated cry of vengeance, and in vain while in this state will the author, priest as he is, seek to hold us back. If

he means to manage me, to make me obey him, and follow his peace counsels, he should not first madden me, deprive me of all self-control, except in accordance with the master passion he has inflamed.

However, we can easily conceive that such books should have in Ireland far less influence in arousing vindictive passions than might at first sight be supposed. The daily reality is worse than any picture can represent it. The book is comparatively tame and feeble to those who suffer the things we only read of. The reading, no doubt, to them operates as an anodyne, and allays more than it arouses passion; and after all the concessions the author makes to lacerated feelings and the weakness of human nature, may even prepare his readers for the moral he would enforce. The author knows his countrymen better than we do, knows far better through what avenues to reach their hearts, and their understandings, and to make them love the Gospel, and yield to its blessed spirit, and we cannot doubt the purity or charity of his intentions.

We conclude our brief notice by recommending *Ailey Moore* to the public, and adding our voice to that of so many others in its praise. The author is, if we are not mistaken in his identity, one of the most active and zealous priests in Ireland,—one who is devoting himself day and night to the means of saving our young men, and making them feel that they can not only do something for themselves, but also something for the honor and glory of God in the prosperity of religion.

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ART. V.—*The Slavery Question once more.*

WE have been told that our remarks on Slavery and the Incoming Administration in our Review for January last gave great offence to some of our readers, and we have found ourselves denounced in a Virginia Journal of note and influence as on the verge of Black Republicanism. We are not surprised at this, for partisans can rarely understand the position of one who holds himself independent of party, and who assumes the right to judge all parties.

Our views on slavery itself were given in *The Boston Quarterly Review*, for April, 1838, and were such as to secure us the friendship of the late John C. Calhoun, and of several of the more eminent statesmen of the slaveholding States. We are not aware of having changed our views on that subject since. We have never professed to admire slavery, or to wish its continuance; we have uniformly expressed ourselves as in opposition to it, wherever it is an open question, whether it shall exist or not. Thus we say to the South, January, 1841, "Slavery we cannot advocate, for we can see no affinity between slavery and Democracy. We shall undoubtedly speak out unquestioned, and unobstructed, in favor of universal freedom to universal man." "You must not think that we advocate slavery on principle, that we love the institution. There is not a Democrat north of Mason's and Dixon's line that does not loathe it, and believe it a crime against humanity. We refrain from meddling with it, simply because it is a matter which concerns States of which we are not citizens, because we can reach it by no constitutional action, and because we believe Liberty is more interested in preserving the Constitution, in maintaining State Rights, than in attempting the doubtful good of emancipating the slave without making any provision for him after his fetters are knocked off." \* Substantially the same views we have always expressed whenever we have alluded to the subject. We have maintained and still maintain that a man may hold slaves with a good conscience, in opposition to abolitionists who maintain that slavery is always and every where and under all circumstances a sin, but we have never approved it.

We have, ever since 1838, uniformly opposed,—no man more strenuously, whether efficiently or not,—the whole abolition movement, on legal, moral, economical, and political grounds. Touching the question of slavery the several States are, in relation to one another, independent sovereignties, and must be regarded as so many independent foreign nations. New York has the same right to take cognizance of slavery in South Carolina that she has to take cognizance of any domestic institution of France or Great Britain, and no more; that is to say, no right

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\* *Boston Quarterly Review*, 1841, pp. 91, 92.

at all. As a citizen of New York I am not responsible for the existence of slavery in any other State in the Union, and I cannot, further than the expression of my individual opinion, interfere with the relation existing between the master and his slave, without violating international law, striking at the mutual equality and independence of the States, and sapping the Constitution of the Union. The whole abolition movement of the non-slaveholding States as it has been carried on for now nearly thirty years we regard and for nearly the whole of that time have regarded as immoral, illegal, and its abettors as punishable by our laws.

We deny, and always have denied, the right of Congress to legislate on the subject. The Fugitive Slave Law is simply a law for executing a clause in the Constitution, which is in the nature of an extradition clause, in a treaty between independent sovereigns. We always regarded the so-called "Missouri Compromise" as unconstitutional. Slavery with us is purely a STATE institution, deriving from State sovereignty alone, and there is under our system no power to authorize or to abolish it, but the State itself, that is, the people in their State as distinguished from their Federal capacity. The State may or may not, as it chooses, authorize slavery, forbid it, or abolish it, without leave asked or obtained from the Union, or from her sister States. Congress has, then, no power to say to the States on one side of a given parallel of latitude you may, and on the other, you shall not, hold slaves. The Constitution gives it no such power either in respect of old States or new States. New York has been a slaveholding State since my recollection, and may become so again if she chooses. Congress has nothing to say on the subject, one way or the other. In the admission of new States, it has no right to say the State must come in with or without slaves. The State does not become a State by the act of admission, for it is admitted, and can be admitted, into the Union only as a State, and therefore must exist as a State before admission. When leave is given to a Territory to form a State Constitution for itself, and it has in accordance with the leave obtained formed its Constitution, and organized its State Government, it is a State, a free sovereign State, and till its admission, as independent of

the Union, as though it were a foreign nation. If Congress refuses to admit it, it does not fall back under the Territorial government, and become subject again to the Union, but remains a State outside of the Union, free and independent, with all the rights and capacities of a sovereign community. Congress then cannot dictate to the people of the Territory the provisions of the Constitution they adopt, and must treat them in relation to their Constitution, precisely as it must treat the States already in the Union. It has then nothing to say in the formation of their Constitution on the subject of slavery. When they have organized their State government, they have the right to apply for admission into the Union, and it is obligatory on Congress to admit them, if they have adopted a State government republican in its form. This settles the question as to the Missouri Compromise, and proves it to be unconstitutional.

The only case in which it can be pretended that Congress may interfere with the slave question is in the organization of Territorial governments; but it cannot even in this case interfere with it, because under our system slavery is purely a State question, and has no existence where there is no State. The Federal government is a government of express powers, and among its express powers there is none which gives it authority to introduce or abolish, to authorize or to prohibit slavery. Its powers in regard to Territories not yet erected into States are restricted to the necessities of the case, and must be exercised in accordance with the general principles of law. It may enforce the natural law, and is bound to protect all the rights which exist under the Common Law; but it can go no farther, except by special constitutional provision. It has no authority to create new rights or to derogate from existing rights. But as slavery exists neither by the Common Law nor by the natural law, Congress cannot introduce it in a Territory; and as slavery exists only by virtue of municipal law, it cannot enter legally into any Territory while a Territory. So in no case has Congress or the Union any power over the question of slavery, and hence both the Missouri Compromise and the Wilmot Proviso are unconstitutional, and ought never to have been adopted.

The South agree that Congress has no power to legis-

late slavery into a Territory, and the ground we took in our article is, that without the legislative action of Congress slavery cannot legally go into any Territory, while a Territory. We did not take this ground then for the first time. We took it on the passage of the Nebraska-Kansas Bill. Here is what we said.

"We are at a loss to understand the strong feeling against the Nebraska Bill. We think the bill inopportune and wholly uncalled for, but we see nothing in it, in so far as it bears on the question of slavery, worth getting excited about. It was, in our judgment, bad policy on the part of the friends of the administration to bring it forward at this time and under existing circumstances, but the principle of the bill, that of the non-intervention of the Federal government in the question of slavery, *if indeed such be its principle*, is unquestionably the only principle in accordance with the spirit of the Federal Constitution. When the Constitution was adopted, slavery existed in nearly all the States, and it was agreed that the recovery of slaves escaping from one State to another, to the States severally, and not be made a Federal question. Without this the Union could not have been formed. It was allowed to remain as a State question, and such it should continue to remain. The Federal Government is bound then to act on the principle of non-intervention. *Its non-intervention necessarily excludes slavery from the Territories till they become States*, because slavery according to a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, is a local institution, and can exist only by positive law, and no positive law can be enacted in a Territory but by the Federal government. If the Nebraska Bill is really framed on the principle of non-intervention, slavery cannot legally exist in Nebraska so long as it remains under a Territorial government, and the practical effect of the Bill must be to prevent it from ever becoming a Slave State.

"The pretence that the non-intervention of the Federal government leaves it to the people of the Territory to authorize slavery or not, as they see proper, is fallacious, because so long as it is a Territory and not a State, the people have no proper legislative authority, and their acts cannot, without the sanction of the Federal government, have the force of law. If a Territorial government passes an act authorizing slavery, and the Federal government expressly or tacitly approves it, or recognizes it as law, there is Federal intervention, a manifest violation of the principle of non-intervention. Therefore we say, the principle of non-intervention necessarily excludes slavery from every Territory till it becomes a State, that is, excludes it as legally authorized.—*Quarterly Review*, July, 1854, pp. 396, 397.

This ground we did not indeed take in 1847, in an ar-

ticle on *Slavery and the Mexican War*. We changed our ground in 1854, on being assured that the Supreme Court had decided that slavery is a local institution, existing only by virtue of positive law,—a fact of which I was not aware in 1847. I am told the decision of the Court does not go to the extent alleged. This may be so, but whether so or not is nothing to my present purpose. If the Court had not so decided, the opinion is incontrovertible, and although the alleged decision was the occasion of my adopting it, it is not the authority on which I defend it. Slavery is, whether the Supreme Court has so decided or not, a local institution, rightfully existing only by virtue of municipal law. Under the law of nature, there are no slaves, for all men are created equal, and one man has no *jus domini* over another. Hence all Americans maintain that power, in whose hands soever lodged, is a trust, and a trust to be exercised for the good of the governed, for whose benefit the trust is created. Neither the Civil Law nor the Common Law authorizes slavery, and every lawyer knows that all the presumptions of law are in favor of freedom. There remains then no possible legal sanction of slavery but that of municipal law, which has no force out of the municipality. It exists with us, if it legally exists at all, by virtue of the local law of the State, and that law has and can have no extra-territorial jurisdiction. How then is it possible for slavery to have a legal *status* in territory included within no State, and subject, aside from the laws of Congress, to no law but the law of nature?

We have been told that slavery exists in the Union by usage, and that the usage which obtained in all the colonies from the beginning authorizes it to go wherever it is not forbidden. But we deny that slavery exists in the Union by usage, for it does not exist in the Union at all. It exists in the States by usage, if you will, but not in the Union. Slavery is a State, not a Federal institution. It was, we believe, introduced into the colonies without any positive law, and it continues to exist, as a matter of fact, in all the States that have not by positive law abolished or prohibited it. But the usage was that of distinct, and in relation to one another, independent colonies. The usage of one colony had, *per se*, no force in another, and though in fact it obtained in them all, it was never the common usage



of the whole, but the particular usage of each. The usage in question may or may not legalize slavery in the States which have not abolished it, but as law it is confined to each State separately without extra-territorial force or vigor. It cannot legalize it in a Territory not yet erected into a State, because Territories have and can have no local usage. Usage itself, moreover, is not law, and is recognized by the Courts as law, only because its long existence warrants the presumption that it has received the express or tacit sanction of the law-making power ; and therefore no usage can have the force of law where there is no legislative authority competent to pass a law to the same effect. Give, therefore, to the usage or custom alleged all the force you can, since it is the usage or custom only of distinct colonies or distinct States, it can never authorize slavery, which does not exist by virtue of natural right or the *jus gentium*, out of the territorial jurisdiction of the particular State or colony. It is simply in its nature a municipal usage, and of no force save within the municipality.

We are told, again, that slaves are property, and the Union is bound to recognize and protect slave property as much as any other species of property. Very true, where slave property exists, but not where it does not exist. In the States where slaves are property, the Federal Courts are bound to treat them as property, and cannot discriminate between them and other species of property ; but not therefore does it follow that it must treat them as property in the Territories, where no local law makes them property.

The territory of the Union, not yet erected into States, belongs, we are further told, to all the States in common, and as all the States are equal, the citizens of Slaveholding States must have the same right to migrate to them and settle on them with their property, that the citizens of the other States have to migrate to them and settle on them with their property. Most certainly, with that which is property out of their own State or in the Territory. No discrimination can be made between the citizens of one State and those of another. The citizen of South Carolina must be as free to settle in Nebraska, for instance, as the citizen of New York, and to carry with him every species of property that his New York brother can carry. The citizen of New York cannot carry with him his real

estate, or as the French law terms it, his immovable property, though he may retain the title ; neither can the South Carolinian carry his real estate with him, and we believe negroes are counted by the laws of his State, real, not personal property. He may sell them, and carry with him the proceeds, which is all the New Yorker can do with his real or immovable property. The prohibition to the South Carolinian to hold his people in Nebraska as property only places him and the New Yorker on a footing of equality. But, if the South Carolinian asks to carry his people with him and to hold them as property in Nebraska, he asks more than he concedes to his New York brother, for as his people are property only by virtue of the laws of South Carolina, he asks simply that the municipal laws of his State shall, *pro tanto* at least, have extra-territorial force, and operate as law in Nebraska. What he really asks is, that the legislation of South Carolina shall extend by its own force over territory not within her jurisdiction, for by no other law than that of South Carolina are his people property. Why shall he have the right to extend over Nebraska the South Carolinian legislation which creates his slave property, any more than the New Yorker to extend over it the New York legislation which abolishes and prohibits such property ?

It is alleged again, that if debarred from migrating with their slaves to the new Territory, the citizens of the Slaveholding States are deprived of their equal right in the common property of all the States. But not any more than the citizens of the non-slaveholding States would be deprived of theirs, were the privilege conceded, for the existence of slavery is as repugnant to the latter as its non-existence is to the former. The existence of slavery has shut out emigration from the North to the rich lands of the South and South-west, as effectually as the prohibition of slavery has shut out emigration from the South to the rich and fertile lands of the North-west.

The mistake of so many of our own statesmen on this subject grows out of the assumption that the title to slave property rests on the same foundation as does any other species of property. We deny, and all along have denied, this assumption. The slaveholder's title to property in his people rests solely on municipal law, not on natural right.

We dispute not its validity within the jurisdiction of the State enacting that law ; but we deny it in toto out of that jurisdiction. The right of property is, indeed, anterior to civil society, and is a natural and divine right, but the right to property in human beings is only a municipal right. God gave the earth to the children of men ; he made man the lord of the lower creation, and gave him dominion over the beasts of the field, the fowls of the air, and the fishes of the sea, for they were created for man. In them man has a natural right of property, which civil society may indeed define and regulate, but which it does not create, and which it is bound to recognize and protect. But God, as Pope Gregory VII. has declared, never gave to man dominion over man, nor to one man the right to lord it over another. He has never created some men to be kings and others to be subjects, some to be masters and others to be slaves ; but he has created all men equal, and therefore Alexander III. asserts, that by nature all men are free. This is the teaching of Catholic doctors, and of all Christian expounders of the law of nature. It flows naturally and necessarily from the Christian doctrine of the unity of the race. Man has naturally, by the law of nature, no right of property in man, and one man has the right to the services of another only in consideration of benefits conferred, or a debt voluntarily contracted. Here then is a broad distinction between slave property and other species of property. Man has a natural right to property in his lands, his house, his sheep and cattle, and the products of his own skill and industry, and in the absence of municipal prohibition, and in so far as movable, he may carry them with him wherever he goes. But the case with slave property is different. Slaves being property only by virtue of municipal law, they cease to be property when transported out of the jurisdiction of the State which creates him a property in them.

Certainly, if the South Carolinian claims the right to transport his people to Nebraska, and to hold them there as property, he must claim to do it by virtue of some law. We ask him, by virtue of what law ? The law of nature ? No, for under that law all men are equal, and one man has no property in another. By virtue of the Civil Law, the "written reason" of Continental Europe and parts of

America? No, for that law proceeds on the principle that every man is born free, and holds every man to be a free man till the contrary is proved. By virtue of the Common Law, the *Lex non scripta* of England and of most of the States of the Union? No, because in this respect the Common Law and the Civil Law are coincident. By virtue of the laws of South Carolina? No, for the laws of South Carolina have no force beyond the territorial limits of South Carolina herself. By virtue of the Territorial laws of Nebraska? No, for Nebraska, while a Territory, has no original legislative power, and none at all, except what is conferred by Congress, and therefore, of course, none which exceeds the legislative power of Congress itself. But Congress, the South Carolinian himself maintains, has no power to legislate on the subject. Will he tell us then, how in the absence of Congressional legislation directly, or indirectly through the Territorial legislation, authorizing slavery in Nebraska, he can claim to hold his people in that Territory as property? Of course he cannot do it, and therefore we maintain that the non-intervention of Congress in the slavery question necessarily excludes slavery from the Territories so long as they remain under Territorial governments, not indeed by depriving the citizens of the Slaveholding States of rights which they possess, but by not creating for them rights where they never possessed them.

We take, it will be seen, in the whole course of our argument the Southern doctrine of State Rights, and of the powers of Congress. We defend the Southern doctrine of non-intervention, in opposition to the Abolitionists and so-called Republicans. We are faithful to the principles we learned from Mr. Calhoun and the State Rights party, which has always been our party, so far as party we have had; but we arrive, we grant, at a different conclusion from that insisted on by our masters. They held and hold that slavery may go wherever it is not forbidden by municipal law; we, that it can go only where authorized by municipal law, or municipal usage having the force of law. We are right, and they wrong, if, as we maintain, under the law of nature all men are free, and man has by natural law no *jus domini* over man, as all Catholic morality teaches, as was declared by the American Congress of 1776, and as is implied in our whole system of jurispru-

dence, and assumed as unquestioned by nearly the whole modern world. The negro is a man, and has all the natural rights and freedom of any other man. I cannot, as a Catholic, deny this, and am obliged to assert it as a man. The negro is free unless deprived of his freedom by municipal law, or by his own misuse of his freedom. That a man can forfeit his freedom by his offences nobody doubts; that the State may place some men in the ward of others, and give them a valid title to their bodily services, we do not question; but where neither of these conditions is present, we do and can recognize no slave property. How far the laws of Spain and France authorized slavery in the territory acquired from those two powers before it was erected into States, we shall not undertake to decide, but we do say, and this is our doctrine, that under our system, slavery can have no legal existence in any free territory, while that territory remains under a Territorial government. Texas was annexed as a State, and slavery was legal in it by virtue of its own laws prior to its admission, and therefore, though a Slave State, was legally admitted. There is very little territory now belonging to the Union likely to be affected one way or the other by our doctrine, and its only practical importance is, as it regards territory which may hereafter be acquired on our Southern border.


It will be seen that we have thus far been discussing the constitutional and legal rights of slavery. Slavery is under our system purely a State institution, and strictly a State institution we wish to keep it. As a State institution, whatever may be our private opinion of it, we are bound to recognize, respect, and, when the occasion calls, defend it, as we are any other legitimate State institution. We oppose the so-called Republicans, not because they are opposed to the extension of the area of slavery, but because they claim for Congress the power to prevent it by legislation. The power to legislate against implies the power to legislate for its extension, and the Republicans in reality claim for Congress full jurisdiction of the slavery question in the Territories. This we deny. We say Congress has no jurisdiction in the case. Slavery is not a Federal question. If as the South contend, and as several of our statesmen have admitted, slavery is free to go where no municipal law prohibits it, we cannot deny that it is free to go into any

territory of the Union not yet erected into a State. Congress has no authority to forbid it, and we ought to submit to its extension, as a less evil than the exercise of an unconstitutional power by the Federal Legislature. Whether slavery can or cannot legally exist in the Territories, is a question for the Federal Courts, and if these courts decide against the ground we have taken, we shall submit. Meanwhile we must be permitted for the reasons we have alleged to believe that they will not and cannot so decide.

We have scouted so-called "squatter sovereignty," but we have not the least scruple in maintaining that the people of the Territory in forming, by permission of Congress, a State constitution, have the right, and that they only have the right, to say whether they will or will not authorize slavery. The people of a Territory in meeting in convention and forming a State constitution, have all the powers of a free, independent sovereign people, and are competent to decide whether involuntary servitude shall or shall not be permitted, and we know under our American system no other power competent to decide that question. To them we wish to leave it, and to them the people of the Union should leave it. The Northern Democrats, at the head of whom stands our new Secretary of State, are wrong in their assertion of "squatter sovereignty," which is the extreme of Radicalism, and, in principle, incompatible with the assertion of any legitimate government; the South are wrong, in our judgment, in asserting that slavery is free where no municipal law prohibits it. But we regard the Abolitionists and Free Soilers as still more dangerously wrong than either; for the doctrine of Federal sovereignty and consolidation underlies all their proceedings. Their tendency is to centralize all power in the Federal Government, and make the States derive from the Union instead of the Union from the States. We know the tendency of the modern world is to centralize power, and to render the sovereign, whether monarchical, aristocratical, or democratical, absolute; but we are old foggy enough to oppose all absolute governments, and to contend for the old doctrine of a limitation of the sovereign power, whatever its form. Democracy, as popularly understood and defined, is as fatal to freedom as autocracy, and perhaps practically even more so. There is no limitation of power where the limitation and

the power have one and the same basis. If the States derive from the Union, they are no limit to the power of the Union, for they depend on it, and have no independent basis of their own. Were the Union dissolved, we should not, under the State Rights doctrine, be thrown into a state of complete anarchy, because each State would still exist, at least theoretically, as a complete political community, with all the rights and capacities of a free, independent, and sovereign State. But on the Abolitionist and Free-Soil doctrine, the dissolution of the Union would carry with it the dissolution of all government, and we should be thrown into anarchy even in the bosom of the States as well as of the Federation. It is the consolidation tendencies of the so-called Republican party rather than their anti-slavery doctrine that renders it impossible for us to go with them. The evil that would result from their triumph would be greater than any evil likely to result from any probable extension of slavery, unless that extension be effected by the action of the Federal Government.

Our remarks in our Review for January were addressed mainly to the party, whether at the South or at the North, seeking either to extend slavery within the Union, or to build up a great Southern slaveholding republic, and had, as was evident on their face, for their purpose to warn the Incoming Administration against throwing itself into the hands of that party, for should it do so it would be impossible for it to gain the support of the Union. Such is the temper of the people of the non-slaveholding States, that their suffrages cannot be obtained for a pro-slavery administration, or an administration controlled by the slave interest. We ventured to do this, because we had been so long identified with the opposition to Abolitionism and Free-Soilism, that we did not suppose any one would be likely to misconstrue our motives or views. We say of the whole anti-slavery movement to-day, what we said nineteen years ago, when we first discussed the question in its political bearings. We suffer a little humiliation, we admit, when we find that twenty years of steady devotion to the rights of the States, and of opposition on State Rights principles to the consolidation tendencies of the anti-slavery party, can have no weight in saving us from the suspicion of being a Black Republican. Certainly we are no "Nigger dri-



ver," but we are just as little of a "Nigger worshipper." We are no advocates of slavery, but we are at the same time no abolitionists: we do not assent to the Southern doctrine insisted upon in late years, that slavery is an excellent institution, but we acknowledge the right of every State in the Union to maintain or establish it, if such be its choice, and we will defend that right to the death against any interference with it by the Union. But we will go just as far against any extension or positive support of slavery by the action of the Federal Government. While we sustain in favor of slavery all the rights it has by virtue of positive law, we shall maintain with equal earnestness all the presumptions of the natural law in favor of freedom. This is our position, and if it displeases our friends at the North or our friends at the South, we cannot help it, and shall regard the fault as theirs, not as ours.

We take the liberty of laying before our readers an extract of some length from an article we wrote in the *Boston Quarterly Review*, for April, 1838, when the consolidation or centralizing tendency of the Anti-slavery movement had hardly been alluded to. The extract shows the ground on which we then placed our opposition to the movement, and from that ground we have not deviated to our knowledge since.

"The real question at issue between the Abolitionists and the South is not whether slavery be good, bad, or indifferent, but whether one State has the right to avow the design of changing the institutions of another State, and of adopting a series of measures directed expressly to that end? This is the question. In all that concerns them as States, these United States are as independent on one another as are England and France. France has as much right to interfere in the internal police of England, as Massachusetts has in the internal police of South Carolina. Slavery is unquestionably a matter which falls within the powers of the States, as independent, sovereign States. In relation to this question, then, all the States stand to one another precisely as foreign nations. The question then comes up in this shape: Have we the right to avow the design, and to adopt measures to control the internal legislation of a foreign nation? The question needs no answer. Every body knows that we have not, at least so long as we acknowledge the independence of that nation.

"Nor does it alter the nature of the question, that the actual interference is by individual citizens and not by the state. What the state is prohibited from doing, it can never be lawful for the citizens



to do. Interference in the affairs of foreigners is as unlawful on the part of individual citizens as of states. Who will pretend that La Fayette had any more right to interfere in the quarrel between this country and England, than France herself had? And who will pretend to justify La Fayette's interference by international law? France was at peace with England, and La Fayette, as a subject of France, was bound to keep that peace. We adduce not this case to censure La Fayette, whose chivalrous aid to the cause of American Independence we appreciate as highly as do any of our countrymen, but simply to show that the obligations of the state bind the citizen. Our Canadian neighbors are now in a quarrel. Has this nation a right to interfere in that quarrel? Certainly not under its existing treaty obligations to England. It may side with the Canadians, but not without involving itself in a war with England. Its duty, if it would preserve its peace relations with England, is to remain neutral. Is not the duty of the citizens the same? Can an American citizen take up for the Canadians, without losing his character of American citizen, and forfeiting the protection of American laws?

"If the individual citizens may do in relation to an independent state, what the state may not do, the consequences are not difficult to be foreseen. If the citizens of this state may associate to do what the state itself may not do, all that is requisite to enlist the whole force of the state in that which it is unlawful for the state to do, is to waive the state, and band all the citizens together in what shall be called a voluntary association. If half a dozen citizens may unite in an Abolition Society, pledged to emancipate the slaves, all the citizens of the state may do it. And when all the citizens of the state have thus formed themselves into an association, what is that association but the state under a different name? The interference of such an association would be as efficient, to say the least, as that of the state itself. And if the citizens of a state may thus lawfully associate for changing the institutions of foreign nations, we ask, what security can one foreign nation ever have in relation to another? It is of the greatest importance to the peace and safety of nations, that citizens or subjects observe with scrupulous fidelity the engagements of their respective governments. The Abolitionists themselves were of this opinion in relation to the interference of our citizens in the affairs of Texas.

"Nor again, will it do to say that slavery is an institution of so peculiar a character, that we may claim the right of interfering with it, without claiming the right to interfere with the whole internal police of foreign nations. In the first place, it is not an institution peculiar in its kind. Something similar to it is found in every State, in which the law makes any discrimination between individual citizens. The principle which legitimates Southern slavery may be found incorporated, if we are not much mistaken, into the constitution and laws of every State in the Union. In every State in which

restrictions are placed on eligibility, as in this State, or in which the law presumes to say who may and who may not exercise the right of suffrage, or in which there are monopolies or exclusive privileges recognized by law, there is the seminal principle of slavery. But waive this, as not essential to our argument. In the next place, we say we have no right to make any inquiry concerning the institutions of foreign nations, for the purpose of ascertaining which of them we have or have not the right of undertaking to abolish. We cannot do this without denying the independence of the nation in question. Do we acknowledge South Carolina, for instance, to be a free and independent State? Do we acknowledge her sovereignty to be absolute, so far as not limited by the Constitution of the United States? Then what right have we to take the revision of her doings? Can we do this without virtually denying her sovereignty? Can we deny her sovereignty without giving her just cause of offence? And when we admit her sovereignty, do we not acknowledge her right to establish such institutions as she pleases? If then she pleases to establish slavery, is it not her affair, and one of which we have debarred ourselves, by the acknowledgment of her sovereignty, from taking any cognizance?

"But it may be said, that slavery is unjust, that no State has the right to establish an unjust institution; therefore, South Carolina has no right to establish slavery. Grant it. What then? Who has the right to determine the question, as to the justice or injustice of the institution, South Carolina or we? If she be an independent State, she has the right to be her own judge as to the rectitude of her decisions. She is not accountable to us, and we have no right to arraign her before our tribunal. If we believe her decision unjust, we may undoubtedly tell her so; but so long as we admit her independence, we must speak to her as an equal, not as a culprit. We must concede her right to judge for herself; we must disavow the right, and the intention, of dictating to her; and we must confine ourselves to the simple statement of our reasons, as one man may state to another man his reasons for not agreeing with him in opinion. If, however, instead of doing this, we begin by formally declaring her in the wrong, by denouncing her as awfully wicked, by stirring up wrath and indignation against her, by solemnly pledging ourselves not to cease our exertions till we have compelled her to reverse her decision, and by adopting all the measures in our power which we believe conducive to that end, do we not then fail to treat her as an independent state, refuse to acknowledge her right to judge for herself, and are we not, to all intents and purposes, waging war against her?

"It will be seen from what we have said, that we do not question the proceedings of the Abolitionists on Constitutional grounds. We do not believe that we of the North have made a compact with the South, by which we are debarred from interfering with slavery. We

find in the Constitution of the United States no such compact. None such in fact was needed. Slavery exists in the States by virtue of no Constitutional guaranty, but solely by virtue of State sovereignty. The question in relation to it stands precisely as it did before the formation of the Federal government, and we have precisely the same rights, and only the same rights, of interference with it, that we should have had, had no Federal government ever been formed. The States are older than the Union, and they retain in their own hands all the rights of sovereignty not, in so many words, conceded to the Union. Now as the disposition of slavery is not conceded to the Union, it belongs as a matter of course to the States. By belonging to them it stands precisely as it did before the Union was consummated. As the States before the Union were so many independent nations, the question of slavery in them is to be treated solely as a question between foreign nations. Interference with it in one State by the citizens of another State is to be regulated by international, and not by constitutional law. Had the Union not been effected, every body knows that efforts by the citizens of Massachusetts to free the slaves in South Carolina, efforts begun and carried on with express reference to that end, would have been a violation of international law, especially if accompanied with perpetual denunciation of South Carolina, and by their very character threatening to disturb her internal peace and tranquillity. Now this, which would have been true without the Union, we contend, is true under it. The South, we think, must therefore place her defence on the ground of State sovereignty. It is as striking against State sovereignty, as denying the independence of the several States, as claiming for the citizens of one State jurisdiction over the legislation of another, that we view the proceedings of Abolition Societies with suspicion and alarm. To say the least, they assert the justice of a species of propagandism, which, if admitted, must strike at all national independency, and which will not fail to disturb the peaceful intercourse of nations, embroil them in war, and deluge the earth in blood. He who comes forth as the champion of liberty, must bear in mind, that he is under no less obligation to defend the rights of communities, than he is the rights of individuals. He who loves America, and would live and die for American liberty, should look well before he adopts a course which may embroil the several States in a civil war, or in the end change the relations which now subsist between the Federal government and that of the several States. Liberty is as much interested in maintaining inviolate the rights of the Federal government, on the one hand, and especially of the several States which compose the Union, on the other hand, as she is in freeing the slave. In the measures the Abolitionists adopt, there is a deeper question involved than that of Negro slavery. All who are accustomed to look below the surface of things, may see that it is a question of no less magnitude than that of changing the whole

structure of the government of this country, and possibly that of destroying the liberty of the whole American people. When hundreds and thousands of our citizens are banded together to trample on the rights of independent communities in the holy name of Freedom herself, we confess we are not a little alarmed for the rights of the individual. One barrier leaped, another may be; and when communities can no longer make their rights respected, what can the individual do?

"But we shall be told that all our fears are idle, all our reasonings groundless, for Abolitionists do not propose to do any thing more than we have conceded them the right to do; that is, to express freely their honest convictions on the question of slavery. We deny this. The Abolition Societies, as every body knows, are not formed for the discussion of slavery, but for its abolition. Their members are pledged to the 'immediate emancipation of the slaves without expatriation.' Lawyers may have been consulted, and the wording of their constitutions may be technically within the letter of the law, but we know, and every body knows, that the real end, the avowed end, of their formation is not merely to give utterance to certain opinions on the question of slavery, but to effect its abolition. They are not formed for deliberation, for discussion, but for action, and action, too, within the limits of States of which the Abolitionists are not citizens.

"But we shall be told again, that, admitting the Abolition Societies are formed for the abolition and not the discussion of slavery, they do not contravene international law, because they adopt for the purpose of carrying their end only legal and constitutional means, such means as the laws of nations permit them to adopt. This undoubtedly is the real ground on which the Abolitionists rest their defence. We object to it, because we are not yet able to perceive that the legitimacy of the means, in themselves, can legitimate an unlawful end. It is admitted that the Abolitionists have no legal right to emancipate the slaves. Yet the emancipation of the slaves is what they propose to do. They propose to do what the laws of nations prohibit them from doing. Are any means directed to that end lawful to be used?

"The Abolitionists, it will be said, do not propose to emancipate the slaves, except as the effect of the expression of their opinions and feelings on the subject of slavery. We question this statement; but admit it for a moment. The Abolitionists, unless they choose to break with the slaveholding States, to refuse to sustain the relation of friends to them, and to come into open war with them, are bound by the laws of nations to refrain from all words and deeds which will disturb their peace and tranquillity, stir up insurrection in them, sully their reputation, or excite public indignation against them. Now we may undoubtedly discuss the question of slavery, but not so as to produce any of these results. Free discussion is it-

self subjected to this restriction. So long as we wish to be at peace and amity with foreign nations, we are bound to treat all their institutions, as their institutions, with respect. We have no more right to denounce them, to slander them, to speak to their prejudice, or to injure them in any way, because their institutions differ from ours, or from what we believe just, than we have an individual whose creed we happen to disbelieve. We may reason against such a man's creed, but we are bound to see that our reasoning against it do not result in any injury to him. If we should represent him as one with whom his neighbors should hold no intercourse, brand him as a sinner of the deepest dye, hire editors of papers to publish him to the world as such, and hold public meetings and pass public resolves to the effect that, if he do not change his creed instantly, he shall be placed out of the pale of Humanity, we should most assuredly transcend our rights in regard to him, and give him just cause of complaint against us. Now the Abolitionists pursue a course like this towards the slaveholding communities, and they do this for the express purpose of freeing the slave. They may in all this be only giving utterance to their honest convictions and feelings, but have they, under plea of free discussion, a right to utter themselves in this manner? Can they do this and be in a state of peace with those communities?

"The Abolitionists say they use only moral and rational means, merely arguments addressed to the reason and the conscience. Is it so? To what kind of a reason or a conscience is denunciation addressed? Is it so? What mean then these fifteen hundred affiliated Societies, spread over the non-slaveholding States, pledged to the immediate emancipation of the slaves? Are these Societies' arguments addressed to the individual reason and conscience of the slaveholder? What is the rationale of this argument? What is its legitimacy? Many hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children, all solemnly pledged to effect the immediate emancipation of the slaves, are banded together in some fifteen hundred Societies; therefore slavery is a sin; therefore no slaveholder is a Christian; and therefore every slaveholder must immediately emancipate his slaves! We confess this is a species of logic that passes our comprehension. That these Societies, by banding together the majority of our population, may so concentrate public opinion, and bring it to bear with such force on the institution of slavery, that the slaveholder shall feel himself unable to withstand it, and therefore compelled to free his slaves, is what we can understand very well; but this is neither a rational nor a moral argument for the abolition of slavery. A man finds a loaded pistol presented at his breast, and to save his life gives up his purse; and the slaveholder finds the community pointing the finger of scorn at him, and to save his reputation, which he holds dearer than life, emancipates his slaves; which is the more moral and rational argument of the two? An

army, organized and marching upon the South to free the slaves at the point of the bayonet, would, in principle, be an argument to the individual reason and conscience of the slaveholder, equally as forcible, appropriate, and convincing, as an associated multitude pointing the finger of scorn, or shouting denunciation, and threatening the vengeance of Heaven.

"Nor is it true that our Abolitionists contemplate no action on the subject, but the action of truth and moral suasion. They do contemplate political action. They let pass no possible opportunity of bringing the subject of slavery before the State legislatures; and they are constantly at work to get it discussed on the floor of Congress. What, we ask, is all this agitation for? Why is Abolitionism organizing a political party in the States and the Nation? Why does it want Abolition members in our State Legislatures? Why does it interrogate candidates for office as to their views of slavery? Is there no political action intended? Give it a majority in Congress, and will it not legislate on the subject? It will at once abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and in the Territories. Will it stop there? Who so simple as to believe it? It will usurp, or alter the United States Constitution so as not to need to usurp, the power to abolish it in the States. What are paper constitutions in the way of a body of men, women, and children, inflamed, drunken with a great Idea, and so much the more drunken because the Idea with which they are filled is a holy one,—what are paper constitutions in their way, when they have in their hands the actual power to advance? He knows nothing of the power of an enthusiastic multitude, who thinks such feeble barriers would arrest their progress. Their leaders might rush before them, the wise and prudent might beg them to pause; but leaders, and the wise and prudent are as chaff before the wind, and on will the multitude press, sweeping them away, or trampling them under their feet, to the realization of the idea which inspires them. Here is the danger. Let the Abolitionists get the majority banded together in or under the control of their affiliated Societies, pledged to the immediate emancipation of the slaves, and they will throw into Congress the power to do it; that is, power to regulate the internal institutions of the States; gone then is the independency of the States; and then goes individual freedom; and then all power is in the central government; Greece or Rome is reproduced; the absolutism of the state is established, which merely preludes the absolutism of the Emperor. God grant, that in the honest and earnest defence of Liberty we dig not her grave!

"We speak on this subject strongly, but we have no fears of being misunderstood. There is not a man or woman living that can accuse us of defending slavery. This whole number of our Review is devoted to the defence of the rights of Man, not to the rights of one man, of a few men, but of every man. We can legitimate

our own right to freedom, only by arguments which prove also the Negro's right to be free. We have all our life long sympathized with the poor and the oppressed, and we yield to no Abolitionist in the amount of the sacrifices we have made, wisely or unwisely, needlessly or not, in the cause of human freedom. It is not to-day, nor this year, that we have pledged ourselves, for life or for death, to the holy cause of universal liberty. But every thing, we say, in its time. First, we must settle the bases of individual freedom, settle the principle that man measures man the world over, and establish our government upon it, and secure the action of the government in accordance with it, and then we may proceed to make all details harmonize with it.

"To explain ourselves; the work to be done in this country to-day is to place the government in the hands of the people, not only in principle, but in fact. Hitherto the government, in point of fact, has been in the hands of the business men, who have shaped legislation to their especial interests. We are struggling now to get it out of their hands,—not to the disadvantage of the business men,—but to hinder them from having an exclusive control over it. The business men form a part of the people, a large part, and a respectable part, and we must not wish to turn the government in any respect against them; but we must seek so to arrange matters, that they shall share only an equal protection with all the other sections of the community. The object is to effect such changes, that there shall henceforth, in all governmental relations and actions, be no classes, but simply the People. This done, we shall have established the principle of universal liberty, and opened the door for every man to enter into the possession of entire freedom, under the dominion of equal laws. We shall then have all the individual freedom of the savage state with all the order and social harmony of the highest degree of civilization. . . . .

"Now, our danger is not from an excess of individuality, but from centralization. The danger to be apprehended is from the strength, not the weakness of the government. Nearly the whole North has a strong tendency to merge the individual in the state. The North is enterprising, fond of undertaking great things, which are to be accomplished only by concentrating the power of masses, to be wielded by a few directing minds. This tendency is good, and springs from noble qualities; nevertheless, it may, in its eagerness to reach its end, so centralize its power, that the individual from an integer may become a mere fraction of the body politic. It therefore needs a check, a counterbalancing power, at least until the bases of legislation and social action become so fixed, that there shall henceforth be no danger that the state shall swallow up the individual.

"This check is found in the strong individuality of the South, arising from the individual importance which each man there possesses, in consequence of being himself a petty sovereign. The

Southern planter keeps alive here the very element of individual freedom, represented by the feudal baron in Europe. The South, therefore, becomes the defender of individual freedom, as the North is the great advocate of social freedom. One represents the individual element, as the other does the social element of human nature. Hence the North demands a strong government, and the South a strong people. The North have been Federalists, the South Democrats. Now, if we weaken the Southern individuality before the Northern centralization be fixed by laws, which leave the individual in possession of all his natural rights, we destroy the equilibrium between the individual and the state, and endanger the freedom of both. This is one reason why we regret the present agitation of the slave question, and why we see danger not to the Union merely, but to liberty herself in the Abolition movements.

"This strong individuality of the South is the effect of the institution of slavery. The South without slaves would have had the same tendency to centralization that we have at the North. The cause of it here is the fact that no individual here feels himself of much importance by the side of the state. Individually he can do but little, and feels himself small. Hence his strong desire to lean on the state, his uncommon fondness for associations, corporations, partnerships, whatever concentrates power and adds to individual strength. Then again our commercial and manufacturing pursuits also tend to make us desire somewhere the social power, we can call in to supply our individual deficiency in strength, capital, or skill. The Southern planter is a sort of prince. Living in the centre of the plantation, of his own principality, absolute lord and proprietor of a number of human beings, he feels that he, individually, is a man; that his rights as a man are of too much consequence to be swallowed up in the rights of the state. It is true, he ought to reflect that his Negroes have the same rights by nature, as himself, and so he will one day; but first he must secure his own rights. After he has secured his own rights as a man, and finds them no longer in danger from the Northern tendency to centralization, he will perceive that he has, in defending them, been defending those of his Negroes; and then he will take up in earnest the matter of freeing them. To free them before were of no use, because before he has secured his own rights, there can be no security for theirs.

"Here is the aid which slavery itself, through the providence of God, is made to contribute to liberty. Good always comes out of evil; and Southern statesmen are nearer the truth than we commonly think them when they say, that "Southern slavery is the support of Northern liberty." We confess, that as things were, we see no way in which freedom could have been established in this country, without the strong sense of individual freedom which slavery tends to produce in the planter. When the world has become Christianized, we shall support individual freedom on the maxim, that "you



are as good as I ;" but in an earlier stage of social and individual progress, we must do it by means of this other maxim, "I am as good as you." Now this feeling of personal importance, of egotism, if you please, was in no way, that we can see, to be introduced but by slavery, and without this, our Republic would not have had the checks and balances needed. The time will come, when this will not be needed, and then slavery will cease. Before, it will not.

"Another means of saving individual freedom is in the sovereignty of the individual States. Destroy the States as sovereignties and make them only provinces of one consolidated state, and centralization swallows up every thing. The individual finds the government so far from him, and his own share in it comparatively so insignificant, that he soon comes to feel himself individually of little or no importance, and when he so feels, he ceases from all manly defence of his rights, and loses himself in the mass. Now the South, in consequence of having peculiar State institutions to defend, has been the foremost in defence of State Rights, the Sovereignty of the States in its plenitude, so far at least as all their internal affairs are concerned. It is because they have had slaves, not to be retained without the supreme control of all State institutions, that they have been so earnest in defence of State sovereignty. There is some analogy between the relation a State holds to the Union, and that held by the individual to the State. The arguments which defend the rights of the individual defend those of the State, and those which defend the rights of the State defend those of the individual. The South may have sometimes carried her doctrine of State Rights too far, but her repeated assertion of it has done not a little to save American liberty.

"Now, until we have settled the controversy about state rights and individual rights, and obtained the amplest security for both, it is as unwise as it is useless to touch the question of slavery. As yet there is no security given, or capable of being given, that the slave will be a freeman, even if declared free by the laws. Let this security be obtained before you attempt to emancipate him. He is now, paradoxical as it may seem, aiding in laying the foundation of universal liberty to universal man, and when the superstructure is reared, and the multitude throng its courts, he shall appear in the temple a free and equal worshipper.

"Hard undoubtedly is it, that liberty should be purchased at the slave's expense, and we confess we have no fondness for the idea ; but less injustice is done the slave than we commonly imagine. The Negro on a Southern plantation is unquestionably a superior being to the Negro in his native Africa. By being enslaved, he has been elevated, not degraded. Degraded he no doubt is in comparison with his master, but his captivity shall redeem his race. The years of his bondage shall not be so long, his labors, sufferings, and sacrifices, in becoming a civilized man shall be far less, than ours have

been. So far as we may judge from the past, it is the settled order of God's providence that man shall be saved only by crucified redeemers. Man is never to receive freedom and civilization as a boon ; he can obtain them only by toil and struggle and blood. Why it should be so, is one of the mysteries of Providence, for which we might, perhaps, assign some good reasons, but which we do not undertake to solve. The world is full of mysteries, and this is no more dark and perplexing than a thousand others. Time will clear it up."—pp. 246-260.

There may be some incidental opinions in this extract which we should not now accept without some important modifications, for we are not now a Protestant, as we were when we wrote it, and we recognize now, as we did not then, a power distinct from both the state and the individual competent to decide for the state and the individual, the morality of acts and institutions. But the substance, and all that has any bearing on the question before us, we accept. The reader will also see that the ground on which we oppose the abolition societies and the anti-slavery agitation, is a ground which compels us to oppose equally all our recent filibustering tendencies and movements. We recognize the right of religious propaganda by divinely commissioned missionaries, but we deny all propaganda on mere human authority against the wishes of the political sovereign. All human powers, however constituted, are in relation to one another independent and equal, and the law which binds the sovereign against intervention binds the citizen or subject,—a fact which our Anglo-Saxon race, through all stages of its historical existence, seems never to have duly considered. It may be called the filibustering race. The South as well as the North have favored the filibustering expeditions against Cuba, Mexico, and Central America, and in so doing have given countenance to the very principle on which the abolition societies defend their intermeddling with slavery in the Southern States. It was filibustering coupled with pro-slavery tendencies, that we more especially condemned in our article on the Incoming Administration. If you accept the filibustering clauses of the Cincinnati Platform, we cannot defend your opposition to the anti-slavery party, for you accept the very principle which justifies that party. The anti-slavery movement and the filibuster movement originate in the same ten-

dency, and proceed from the same principle. If we are to defend slavery against the Abolitionists on the principles of international law and State sovereignty, you must not embarrass us by defending the filibustering movement, which denies international law, and the independence of States. There is nothing less justifiable in the formation at the North of a party to abolish slavery at the South, than in the expeditions which have sailed from our ports against Cuba and Central America. If you encourage the latter, how can we in your favor oppose the former? If the South encourages the Filibusters with a view to the acquisition of new slave States, what can we say against movements at the North for the abolition of slavery? If the South expects the North to respect international law in her favor, she must respect international law herself.

Thus far we had written before the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case was rendered. We have read an abstract of that decision as given us in the columns of the *New York Herald*, with great satisfaction in some respects and great surprise in others. It sustains us on all points except one, and the dissenting opinion of Judge McLean sustains us even on that; but the opinion of the majority, as given by Chief Justice Taney, on several incidental points, we cannot regard as worthy of the high source whence it emanates, and we are sure it will be very far from acceptable to a very large class of American citizens who are free from the slightest taint of Abolitionism.

As to the precise question before the Court the decision is final, and we have no disposition to criticize it, even if it were becoming in us to do so. We suppose the Court is the judge of its own powers, and was competent to dismiss the case as not coming within its jurisdiction. We cannot understand on what ground it could claim jurisdiction in the case, since, if we understand it, it was purely a question for the State Courts of Missouri, and surely these Courts were competent to decide whether Dred Scott was or was not a slave under the laws of Missouri. Scott was a slave before he left the State, and we can understand no reason why his temporary residence at the United States military posts in Illinois or other free States, should have operated his freedom, so that on his return to Missouri he

could not be legally held as a slave under her laws. His being employed at the United States military posts makes in our judgment some difference in the case, for while residing at them he was still constructively in Missouri. Had he chosen when in Illinois to leave his master, a question, however, might arise, whether he could have been recovered as a fugitive slave. But he having remained with his master and returned with him to Missouri, we think the Court was quite right in still regarding him as a slave.

We are disposed to agree with the Court, that a slave brought by his master into a free State with a view merely of a temporal sojourn there does not recover his freedom, so that if he returns to the State in which he was a slave he becomes there a free man. He is free only in the sense that so long as he resides in a Free State he cannot be recovered under the Fugitive Slave law. We do not think that New York can endow a person held as a slave in South Carolina with any rights of citizenship which will make him a free citizen everywhere in the Union. If this is the opinion of the Court we do not see that it can be objected to. But the doctrine that persons of the negro race are not included in our political community and cannot be citizens of the United States, we are not yet prepared to accept. Negroes are men, and may be freemen, and the essential character of a citizen is that he is a freeman. Every freeman born within the jurisdiction of the United States, of parents not citizens or subjects of a foreign state, is a citizen in every State of the Union, whatever was the condition of his ancestors or the race from which he sprang. This is necessarily so because our institutions recognize among freemen no distinction of rank or race. There were free negroes in several, perhaps in all the States at the time of forming the Union, and they were an integral portion of that people of the States who formed the Union and for whom it was formed.

The negro being a man, a human soul, endowed by the law of nature with all the rights of a white man, he must in all things be held the equal of white men, except where the municipal law makes a distinction to his prejudice. Is there any clause in the Constitution which excludes negroes from our political community, or that restricts that

community to the white race? The Court will not pretend it. Is there any clause which recognizes negroes as such as slaves, and declares them incapable of being free-men? Certainly not. How then can the Court pretend that negroes born in the country and born free or freed by their masters or by the operation of law are not citizens? They may be, we need not tell the Court, citizens, entitled to the protection of the Union, and capable of holding and transmitting real estate, and of suing and being sued in the Courts, State and Federal, without being electors.

New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, confer on negroes the right of suffrage, and make no political or legal distinction between them and white citizens. Suppose one of these negroes, whose ancestors were indeed imported from Africa as slaves, but have never themselves been slaves in other States, should emigrate to Kansas and seek to become a landholder there, could he not do it? Will the Court say that he would be incapable of owning and transmitting landed estate, or maintaining actions in the Federal Courts of the Territory? What rights has a white man in that Territory that he would not have? How then say that negroes are not citizens of the United States? Mr. Chief Justice Taney rests the opinion of the Court on the estimation in which the negro race was held at the time the Union was formed. They were regarded as no fit associates socially or politically for white men, as having no rights which white men were bound to respect, while nobody denied that they might be bought and sold as an ordinary article of merchandise. Suppose such was the fact, what has that to do with the question? Is it any where incorporated into the Constitution of the Union, or recognized by the laws of the United States? Of course not. Then it cannot be cited against the rights of free negroes under the Federal Government.

But we dispute the fact. There can be no reasonable doubt that Mr. Jefferson and many others when they declared all men created equal intended the principle they asserted after Pope Alexander III. should apply in its fullest extent. Mr. Chief Justice Taney is a Catholic, and knows that from 1482 the Popes have condemned, on pain of excommunication, the reduction of African negroes to slavery, and he knows that Mr. Jefferson, in his draft of

the Declaration of Independence, enumerated among the things which justified the Colonies in severing the tie which bound them to Great Britain and in casting off their allegiance to the British Crown, the fact that the Crown had refused its assent to laws prohibiting the importation of negroes from Africa to be held as slaves. There was too at the adoption of the Federal Constitution already rising throughout the civilized world a strong opinion against the justice of negro slavery. The right to buy and sell negroes, already slaves, as an ordinary article of merchandise, was very generally held, I grant, but the right to buy and sell free negroes, or to reduce free negroes to slavery, was denied by the Catholic Church, and was, I would faintly believe, held by very few. There were then free negroes as well as now; if every body regarded it lawful to reduce negroes as such to slavery, or looked upon them as having no rights which white men were bound to respect, what was the difference between a free negro and a negro slave? How can a man who has no rights which all others are bound to respect be said to be free?

Mr. Chief Justice Taney seems to us to proceed on the assumption that negroes are politically and legally a degraded race in the Union; but such is not the fact. They may be so in some of the States, but they are not so in the Union, nor indeed in all the States. We regret that in giving the opinion of the Court the learned Judge did not recollect what he is taught by his religion, namely, the unity of the race, that all men by the natural law are equal, and that negroes are men, and therefore as to their rights must be regarded as standing on the same footing with white men, where there is no positive or municipal law that degrades them. Here is what we dare maintain is the error of the Court. We admit that negroes, but not negroes any more than white men, may be reduced by positive law to slavery, but planting ourselves on the Constitution, and natural right as expounded by the Church and the Common Law, we maintain, and will maintain in face of all Civil Courts, that where no such law reduces the negro to slavery, he is a free man, and in the absence of all municipal regulations to the contrary has equal rights with the white man. Neither race nor complexion disables a man under our Federal system. That negroes may be

citizens and possess equal rights with white men is proved by the fact that we have made them so in the territories acquired from France, Spain and Mexico, by the very treaties by which we acquired those territories. The opinion of the Court belongs to an epoch prior to the introduction of Christianity, and is more in accordance with the teaching of Aristotle than with that of the Gospel. We have no more disposition to interfere with slavery where it legally exists than have our Southern friends, but we do protest against an opinion which places negroes as such not only out of the pale of our Republic, but out of the pale of humanity. If opinion once went that length, it was the business of the Court to brand it with its disapprobation, and not to recognize it as law. The Court should lean to the side of the weak, and set its face against oppression. The negro race is, no doubt, inferior to the white race, but is that a reason why they should be enslaved, or why the Court should join the stronger against the weaker?

The opinion of the Court which allows the slaveholder to sojourn temporarily with his slaves in a free State, or to hold them *in transitu* through a free State, we think is just; but the opinion incidentally expressed, that a slaveholder may settle with his people and hold them as slaves in any territory of the United States, we cannot accept, for reasons assigned in the earlier part of this article. We have anticipated, and we think we have refuted, the reasoning of the Court on this point. If we have not done it, Judge McLean has, and effectually.

These are some of the exceptions we have felt bound to take to the opinion of the Court, as it has been reported to us. Of course, we are aware there is no appeal from the Supreme Court, and its opinion must stand as law till it is set aside. Though we take exceptions to it, and believe it in several respects erroneous, we trust we shall not forget our duty as a loyal citizen. For ourselves personally, we believe liberty is more interested in the preservation of the Union than even in preventing the extension of slave territory, since, if the slave trade be not revived, the extension of slave territory involves no real extension of slavery. But we regret the decision, for we foresee that it will be impossible to prevent the Anti-slavery agitation from being pushed on with new vigor, and with more danger

than ever. The decision will be regarded as an extreme Southern opinion, and the dissent from the majority by the ablest judges from the Free States will deprive it of all moral force out of the Slave States. We almost fear for the safety of the Union. Yet we believe Almighty God has great designs with regard to the American people, and we will trust in his good providence to carry us safely through the present crisis, the most dangerous that has as yet occurred in our history.

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ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *The Psalms, Books of Wisdom, and Canticle of Canticles.* Translated from the Latin Vulgate, and diligently compared with the Hebrew and Greek, being a revised and corrected Edition of the Douay Version, with Notes Critical and Explanatory, by Francis Patrick Kenrick, Archbishop of Baltimore. Baltimore: Lucas, Brothers. 1857. 8vo. pp. 584.

THE American Catholic public can hardly be sufficiently grateful to the Archbishop of Baltimore for his numerous and invaluable contributions to our Biblical and Theological Literature. Besides smaller works, all bearing marks of industry and solid learning, we have from him a complete course, in Latin, of Dogmatic and Moral Theology, in seven volumes octavo, a Vindication of the Primacy of the Apostolic See, which has passed through five editions, and which may be said to exhaust the learning on the subject, a Vindication of the Church against the Protestant *Episcopal* Bishop of Vermont, a work of equal learning and spirit, a Revised and Corrected Translation of the whole New Testament, with Notes, Critical and Explanatory. And now we have a goodly volume containing a revised and corrected edition of the Douay Version of the Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, the Canticle of Canticles, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus, illustrated with Critical and Explanatory Notes of great value and rare erudition.

The Douay Bible so called, made from the Latin Vulgate, is in general use among English-speaking Catholics, and is upon the whole, no doubt, a passable version. It, however, cannot be cited as authority in controversies, and the approbation it has received from our American Prelates does not interfere with the liberty of scholars and students in laboring for a more correct or a more elegant version. "The first Council of Baltimore," says the learned Prelate, in his Introduction to the work before us, "framed a decree for retaining the Douay Version, as having been approved by the Holy See, which assertion the Sacred Congregation of Cardinals desired to be expunged, no record of such approval having been found. The decree itself as resting on the constant usage of the Churches in which the English language prevails, was sanctioned with the addition made by the Prelates that a most accurate edition should be published. From the many changes made in the various editions, it has been found impracticable to point



to a standard that might be in all things followed; so that although since the Council, which was held in 1829, not less, perhaps, than ten large editions have been issued with permission and approval, it has not been possible to secure their entire accuracy." Although, then, the Douay version is in a general way approved, it would seem that we have no fully authorized edition of it.

Moreover, all our modern editions depart more or less from the original edition of the Douay Version, the language of which has become in many respects antiquated, and in need of revision to be intelligible to the mass of readers at the present day. The original Douay version is no doubt, upon the whole, a very excellent version, and worthy to form the basis of any new version that may be attempted in our language; but the worthy men who have modernized it at various times have been in general more praiseworthy for their intentions than for their literary taste and skill. The true genius of our Anglo-Saxon tongue is not always seized, and the rendering of the original Latin is often feeble, though faithful, and sometimes the version is as unintelligible to the mere English reader as the original itself. In style and language our version is too often inferior to that of King James' translators, and if the Protestant version had been made from a correct text, and its authors had been faithful in their rendering, it would be superior to ours. There is no reason why this should be so, and we ought to have an English version that should even in the accessories of taste and elegance equal that generally used by Protestants. The preference, we give to the Protestant version of the Bible, is purely in a literary point of view; in all other respects we allow no comparison between the two versions.

In a new version of the Holy Scriptures into English, the Douay version undoubtedly should be taken as the basis, and followed wherever there is no urgent reason for departing from it, so that old associations may be as little disturbed as possible. This seems to be the principle on which Dr. Kenrick has proceeded in his translations. Perhaps, were we to find any fault with him, it would be that he has followed the old version too closely, and that too when both considerations of taste and intelligibility authorized a departure. Why retain the word *pestilence* in the first verse of the first Psalm? "Blessed is the man who walketh not in the course of the ungodly, nor standeth in the way of sinners, nor sitteth in the chair of *pestilence*." The word *pestilence* comes in abruptly, and suspends the sense. It is not till we have reflected a long time, and obtained a very unusual sense of the word, that we are able to carry on to its close the thought of the inspired author. The word cannot mean *pestilence* in its literal physical sense, and are we so bound by the Vulgate that we cannot use the word which the Hebrew authorizes, and which the sense evidently demands? Is it not lawful in translating to translate idioms, and when the sense requires to translate instead of transferring the original word? In some instances we own we should wish a greater liberty than the author has allowed himself; but we think upon the whole his revised and corrected version is far superior to the ordinary editions of the Douay Bible—superior in taste and elegance, and in intelligibility. His labors deserve as we trust they will receive the gratitude of every Biblical student, and have a powerful tendency to encourage Biblical studies in this country.

2. *Science vs. Modern Spiritualism. A Treatise on Turning Tables, the Supernatural in general, and Spirits.* Translated from the French of Count AGENOR DE GASPARIN, by E.W. ROBERT, with an Introduction by Rev. ROBERT BAIRD, D.D. New York: Kiggins & Kellogg. 1857. 2 vols. 12mo.

THE fact that these volumes are ushered in by an Introduction from Dr. Baird is presumptive proof that they are of no great value. They are volumes of great promise and little performance. The author is a French Protestant, a fanatic, and has written this work mainly for the purpose of getting a chance to vent his spleen against Catholicity. He probably is very far from understanding himself, or appreciating the spirit or tendency of his own work. His book is written in the interest of the lowest form of rationalism, and its principles and methods of reasoning tell as strongly against the divine supernatural as against the demoniacal, and if admitted would render all arguments from miracles in favor of divine revelation inappropriate and inconclusive. He in reality denies the supernatural, and he may explain the miracles of our Lord on scientific principles as well as the facts of Modern Spiritualism which he concedes.

Count Gasparin is a man of much passion, little science, and feeble intellect. He concedes up to a certain point the phenomena alleged by our modern Spiritualists, or Spiritists, as we prefer to say, and attempts to explain them on scientific principles, by mesmerism and the odalic force asserted by Baron Reichenberg. He does this by first contracting mesmerism to a natural force, and then expanding it so as to embrace any extraordinary phenomenon he has to explain. He takes also the liberty of cutting his garment to his cloth. One time he stretches his mesmeric force so as to take in the phenomena; another time he pares down the phenomena so as to bring them within the *cadre* of his mesmerism. The poor man has not attained to the first inkling of genuine science, and gives in his own person a striking proof of being under Satanic influence.

In brief we may say, we have read his work with no satisfaction or instruction. He has told us nothing that we did not already know, and offered us no explanation with which we were not already acquainted, or which we have not in our Spirit Rapper, published in 1854, proved to be insufficient. We do not accept all the theories of the Marquis de Mireville, but we believe that Satan has a hand in modern Spiritism, and that there are phenomena well attested that cannot be explained without the supposition of Satanic intervention. We are glad to learn that modern Spiritism, under the name of mesmerism, has been declared unlawful by the Holy See.

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3. *Lizzie Maitland.* Edited by O. A. BROWNSON. New York: Duni-gan & Brother. 1857. 16mo. pp. 840.

THIS is a work by a highly accomplished lady, a convert from Episcopalianism, and is, we think, a work of a high degree of merit. We have given our opinion both of it and the class of works to which it belongs in the Introduction, and need here only commend it to the suffrages of the reading public.

4. '98 and '48. *The Modern Revolutionary History and Literature of Ireland*. By JOHN SAVAGE. New York: Redfield. 1856. pp. 384.

WE have as many quarrels on our hands already as we can well manage at one and the same time. We cannot be expected to approve all the sentiments of this book, redolent of Young Ireland, and we have said as much on former occasions against its doctrines as we consider necessary. We are too old, and too much of an old Fogie to sympathize with the author in all his views, but then we admit he writes with spirit and eloquence, and if we were of his "parish," we suppose his pages would powerfully affect us. We cannot bring him to our way of thinking, and as we see no great harm he is likely to do, we simply thank him for his attention in sending us his volume, and express our hope that it is meeting all the success it deserves.

5. *A Vindication of Italy and the Papal States*. From the *Dublin Review* for October, 1856. Cincinnati: J. P. Walsh. 1856. 24mo. pp. 115.

WE are glad to see this able article reprinted from the *Dublin Review*. It is "an able vindication of Catholic Italy, and a dignified but withering rebuke of the injustice of British Protestant Letter Writers and Journals." It is no part of our vocation to defend every thing we find in the temporal governments of Catholic States, but we know no Catholic people who even as to the temporal order need blush before any Protestant State.

By the way, we should be pleased to see reprinted and widely circulated the article in the last *Dublin Review*, on the *Irish in England*, which is as appropriate here as in Great Britain. The last number of the *Dublin* is one of the very best numbers of that very able periodical we have seen for a long time. The article on the *Present Dangers of Catholicism*, we especially like. We did not like the *Rambler's* sneering remark in regard to the "remnant of English Catholics." The *Rambler* mistook the nature of our complaint, and we are sure the Catholic mind in England is prepared for as broad and comprehensive views as any we wish to see put forth. It is not for us who have come in at the eleventh hour to complain of those who have borne the burden and heat of the day. Catholics, inside of dogma, should be free and tolerant, but Catholic Journalists should beware of hobbies, and we converts must be on our guard against bringing with us peculiar crotchets of our own. We may know more of error than old Catholics, but they are likely, other things being equal, to know a great deal more of Catholic tradition.

\* \* The call for the January number of our *Review* being greater than we anticipated, we find ourselves under the necessity of printing a second edition, which will soon appear, so that new Subscribers may rely on being supplied from the commencement of the volume.

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

JULY, 1857.

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ART. I.—*The Catholic. Letters addressed by a Jurist to a Young Kinsman proposing to join the Church of Rome.* By E. H. DERBY. Boston : Jewett & Co. 1856. 12mo. pp. 293.

WE have in fact dissected in our three articles already published, only a small portion of Mr. Derby's volume ; but we have commented on nearly every point of much importance it raises. The bulk of the volume only repeats, with variations and farther developments, the objections to Catholicity contained in the first five or six letters, and in continuing our review we can do little else than go over ground we have already travelled. Yet we suppose the learned Jurist will pretend that we have failed to give his book the thorough dissection we promised, if we fail to repeat our refutation as often as he repeats his objection. We shall therefore continue our remarks for some time to come, and we pray those of our friends who are disposed to blame us for expending so much powder on an author comparatively so obscure, to bear in mind that in replying to him we are replying to the whole mass of popular objections to our religion urged by the "No Popery" ranters and declaimers of the day. We have said enough to show the futility of the author's attempt to disprove the Primacy of Peter and his successors in the See of Rome. We will therefore pass to another of his objections.

"Let us now glance at some of the abuses which the usurper has sanctioned in his path to power. Let us consider the worship of the Virgin Mary, of saints, images, relics, and shrines.

"St. Paul, in Holy Writ, gives the assurance that 'Neither have we any other Mediator and Intercessor by whom we may have access to God the Father, but only Jesus Christ: in whose name only all things are obtained at his Father's hands.' \*

"But the Church of Rome worships the Virgin Mary, and allows such *adoration* to be offered to her as follows:—

" 'Holy Mother of God, who hast worthily merited to conceive him whom the whole world could not comprehend, by thy *pious intervention*, wash away our sins, that so being *redeemed by thee* we may be able to ascend to the seat of everlasting glory, where thou abidest with thy son for ever.' †

"And again a similar worship and prayer:—

" 'Let our voice *first* celebrate Mary, through whom the rewards of life are given unto us. O *queen*, thou who art a mother and yet a chaste virgin, *pardon* our sins through thy son.' ‡ Even Cardinal Bembus, the Pope's secretary, in an official letter to Charles VI., the great Emperor of Spain and Germany, § calls the virgin 'our lady and goddess.' And the seaman when he commenced his voyage, the palmer when he began his pilgrimage, and the knight when he went forth to fight the Saracen, were sent to pay their orisons at her shrine, and to bow before her image.

"Again, the churches have been filled with her pictures and statues, and with images of saints. A patron saint has been found for nearly every Roman Catholic village, and saints have been recognized for various diseases, to whom sufferers are encouraged to address *prayers*, and to make votive offerings if relief be obtained. The images of the virgin, and saints with their shrines, like the statues of the heathen divinities, and like the shrine of the chaste goddess Diana at Ephesus, against which St. Paul bore witness, have been fashioned from precious metals, and decorated with gold, silver, and jewels.

"Statues and images are borne in solemn procession through churches and streets, with pomp, ceremony, and display. Waxen candles have been burned before them, while salt, oil, legends, and relics, real or pretended, have been, and are still used with imposing ceremonies, to impress the ignorant and superstitious.

"Now let me ask you, because the Holy Virgin is said in Holy Writ to be blessed among women, and is called blessed in our prayer book and in the writings of St. Augustine, does it follow, as a necessary consequence, that she is to be made the *queen of heaven*, created a *deity* and a *goddess*, endowed with the power of pardoning sins, and that the follower of Christ must bow his knee before her image and shrine, enriched with gold and jewels, like those of the

\* See 1 Timothy 2: 5. Rom. 8: 34. Eph. 2: 18. 3: 12.

† See Collect in Hor. Paris, Fol. 4.

‡ Ibid. Fol. 80.

§ Bembus, in Epist. ad Carol. V.

Virgin Diana of the Ephesians, and is he to present his gifts at her altar, and offer up his adoration to her image, or herself?

"If this homage was sanctioned by our Saviour or his apostles, or authorized by the councils of the Catholic church during the first two centuries, refer me to the authorities. As respects the use of images in churches, not only is it against the language of Scripture, but the Council convened at Grenada, Spain, about A. D. 300, and still held in high respect, condemn the practice. The blessed Augustine, Tertullian, Lactantius, with Theodorus, bishop of Ancyra, join in the condemnation of such a usage; and Epiphanius, bishop of Salamis, in Cyprus, where St. Paul planted a church, who died about the age of seventy, A. D. 403, on his return from Constantinople, writes as follows: 'My children, be mindful that ye bring no images into the churches, and that ye erect none in the cemeteries of the saints, but evermore carry God in your hearts. Nay, suffer not images to be; no not in your private houses, for it is not lawful to lead a Christian man by his eyes, but rather by the study and exercise of his mind.' " \*—pp. 44—47.

The author began his Letters by assuring us that he had gone to the "fountain heads," and had cited only such authors as the Church approves. Yet the fountain head here, by his own confession, is the Protestant bishop Jewel. We have shown that the Jurist is so uniformly untrustworthy in his citations and translations of Catholic authorities, that we must be excused from the unnecessary labor of continuing to point out his inaccuracies. The fact that he alleges an authority apparently against some Catholic doctrine or practice, is *prima facie* evidence that it is substantially a forgery, at best a total misapplication of it. In this extract, it will be seen that the author calls the Pope a usurper; but he has no right to call him so, till he has proved that the Pope claims and exercises an authority not conferred on him by our Lord. Our Lord had all power in Heaven and in earth as invisible Head of the Church, and could confer on his Vicar as much power as he pleased. The Jurist must prove that our Lord did not confer on him the power he claims and exercises, before he can call him a usurper for claiming and exercising it. He is not at liberty to make a charge and then conclude from it as a fact. Between making an accusation and sustaining it, a jurist ought to know there is a distance.

The author alleges that the Church of Rome authorizes

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\* Epiphanius, cited in Jewel's Apology, page 150.

the worship of the Virgin Mary, of saints, images, relics, and shrines, and thence concludes against her. His conclusion is valid only on the condition that the worship of this sort which she authorizes, is wrong in itself or forbidden by the positive law of God,—a thing for him to prove. We agree that idolatry is forbidden both by the natural law and the revealed law, and is a sin of the deepest dye. But what is idolatry? It is offering the worship due to God alone to that which is not God, or failing to render due worship to God, and rendering an undue worship to creatures, whether living or dead, whether real or imaginary. He who renders due worship to God, and no undue worship to creatures, is free from the sin of idolatry. In the worship of Mary, the veneration and invocation of saints, and respect for images, relics, and shrines, do we withhold from God what is his due, and do we offer them any thing more than their due, they being what they are? If not, we are not idolators; and the fact that the Church authorizes it, is an argument in her favor, not an argument against her; for the eternal law of justice bids us give to every one his due, that is to say, to render unto every one his own.

Mr. Derby's pretence is, that the worship we render to Our Lady and to the saints is taken from the worship due to God alone. But this he does not prove. He is so habitually inaccurate that he cannot even quote the Scriptures correctly. St. Paul says, indeed, that there is one *Mediator* between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; but he nowhere says that he is our only *intercessor* with the Father. "There is but one mediator." Who denies it? "Christ maketh intercession for us." Who denies it? We do not regard the saints as mediators in the theological sense of the term between God and us, but we do call upon them, in virtue of the merits of Jesus Christ, to intercede for us, and this we may do, as every one must conclude who believes it proper for one man to pray for another. When a priest or a minister prays for his congregation, he makes intercession for them, but he can lawfully do it only in the name of Christ, through whose merits alone the intercession can be efficacious. So with the saints. They intercede for us by their prayers, on the same principle on which we pray for one another in the Church on earth. And why should the prayers and inter-

cessions of the saints in Heaven rob Christ of his mediatorial glory any more than the prayers and intercessions of Christians for one another in this life? The objection of the learned Jurist, if admitted, would condemn all prayers and intercessions of the Church for kings and magistrates, for persons in authority, for the faithful, for the sick, the poor, and the afflicted; for the conversion of unbelievers, and for peace and concord throughout the earth.

We worship the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, we concede, with an inferior worship; but the Jurist must not suppose us stupid enough to worship her as a goddess, or to offer her that worship which is due to God alone. Even Protestants, we presume, are in most cases able to distinguish between the creature and the Creator, between God and the work of his hands; and if they can, then, *a fortiori*, Catholics. *To worship* means literally to recognize and honor worth, and worth has the right to be recognized and honored wherever it is. The supreme worth is in God alone, but all creatures in their several degrees participate in the divine worth, inasmuch as they have their being in him, and it is in him, and by him, that they live and move. Worship, then, in some sense, is due to the universal creation of God, to creatures as well as to the Creator; and hence St. Paul, speaking by the Holy Ghost, bids us "Honor,—that is, *worship*,—all men." The only thing to be guarded against is giving an undue honor or worship to creatures, or that honor or worship which is due only to God, and giving them honor or worship for their own sake alone, regarded as independently existing beings, and not as the creatures of God, as did the heathen to their inferior deities. The heathen never lost entirely the conception of one Supreme God, or denied the obligation to worship him; nor did they deny that the supreme worship was due to him alone, or assert that more than an inferior worship was due to their inferior gods, or demigods. Their hero-worship contained a reminiscence of the truth, but became idolatrous and sinful, because it was given to the hero, the demigod, or inferior god, for his supposed independent worth or divinity; not to him as a creature owing in the last analysis all his worth to the Supreme God, and entitled to worship on his own account only as dependent for his worth on the worth or excellence of the Creator. The



creature is nothing in himself alone, and has no separate or independent worth ; but as the creature of God, and partaking, in his degree, of the Divine Being and excellence, he can have worth, and be entitled to worship. Of the creatures of God the saints are the most worthy, for they participate not only in the Divine worth in the natural order as manifested by creation, but also in the supernatural order as manifested by grace. To offer a special worship to saints, is to recognize and honor God in his works of creation, redemption, and sanctification, and to refuse to do it is to offer an indignity to him both as author of nature and grace. What greater indignity can you offer to the workman than to refuse to honor his work ? If you honor not the saints for what they are, you cannot honor God as the author either of nature or grace, and therefore do not give him the worship that is his due. You might as well pretend to love God while you hated your brother. How can you love him who begat, if you love not him who is begotten ?

The worship we render to the saints is honoring in them the worth they possess, first, as creatures of God, and second, as his friends and servants in the order of grace. They really have such worth ; and worth, wherever exhibited, is entitled to recognition and honor. It is impossible for us to pay it more honor than it deserves so long as we regard it not as an independent or self-subsistent worth in the creature, but as derived from the supreme worth of God, and subsisting only by union with him. The special worship we pay to the saint, as distinguished from that which we pay to all creatures, is the honor we pay to the worth created in them by the operations of Divine grace and their concurrence therewith. Grace was purchased for us by our Lord, and we are indebted for it solely to his merits. So this special worship of the saints is a recognition and worship of the Word made flesh, through whom the grace which has sanctified the saint comes. If the Jurist can understand this, he will see that not only is this worship not idolatry, but that it is a worship really due to our Lord in his saints, and that we cannot duly honor him without honoring them. So far from tending to make us forget Christ as our sole Mediator, it necessarily compels us to recognize and honor him in that relation, by being in itself a recognition and worship of

what in that relation he has effected. This much of the *cultus sanctorum* in general.


Mr. Derby is, of course, wrong in asserting that the Church ascribes our redemption to Mary, and in pretending that we worship her as a goddess. We have never met with such a prayer addressed by the Church to Mary as the one he pretends to cite, and he will find, if he goes to the "fountain head," that the prayer in question, if not a forgery, is addressed, not to Mary, but to God, and that the petition is, O God, through the pious intercession of her who has worthily merited to conceive him whom the whole world could not comprehend, wash away our sins, so that *redeemed by thee*, that is, the Word made flesh, &c. As it stands it certainly is not genuine, and we have been able to find nothing like it in the *Missale Romanum*, or in any of the liturgical books of the Church we are acquainted with ; we have not examined the work the author refers to in his foot note, for we do not understand his reference, or what work he means. Mary has not redeemed us herself, but she is intimately connected with our redemption, inasmuch as she is the Mother of Him, who, through the flesh taken from her chaste womb, has redeemed us.

Mary is entitled to worship as a saint, on the same principle that the saints are entitled to worship. But she has another and higher claim founded on her relation to the Word made flesh, and the very ground of this claim is such as to preclude the possibility of our falling into the gross error of regarding her as a goddess, or other than a creature. Cardinal Bembo, on some occasion, used in speaking of her the term *dea*, for which he was severely rebuked, but the Church never approved or adopted the term, and the poor Cardinal, we suppose, adopted it, not for the purpose of representing Our Lady as other than a creature, but for the purpose of writing what he took to be classical Latin. He was governed by philological not theological reasons, as he was when he used in a despatch to the Venetian court, the expression, *per deos immortales*, or as those are who apply the term *Divus* instead of *Sanctus* to a saint canonized by the Church. The special worship we pay to Mary is founded on her connection with the Incarnation, through which alone we hope for salvation ; and the least as well as the best instructed Catholic knows enough

to know that it would be a denial of the Incarnation itself, of the reality of the flesh assumed by the Word, to deny that Mary is a creature, or to regard her as a Divinity, as we should do, if we offered her divine honors, or paid her the supreme worship due to God alone. All the special honor we pay her, all the lofty epithets we apply to her, have reference to the Incarnation, and her relation to the Incarnate Word. We are redeemed, sanctified, finally saved, by the Word made flesh, and this flesh the Word, with her free consent, assumed in her womb. She redeems us only in the sense of consenting to be the mother of Him who redeems us. It was from her flesh the Word took the redeeming flesh, and from that flesh she can never be separated; and it is her connection with it that forms the ground of the worship we render her. It is clear, then, that the worship we render her, presupposes her to be a creature, and therefore cannot be in principle, or in fact, the supreme worship due only to God. We honor her as the Mother of the Incarnate Word, and if not flesh, and therefore a creature, she could not have been that mother.

Mr. Derby errs grievously when he asserts that we pray to Mary to pardon our sins. We do no such thing; we simply ask her to obtain our pardon by her intercession with her Divine Son, who hath power to pardon, and with whom her prayers and intercessions, since they are always in accordance with his will, must be all-powerful. Mr. Derby ought to recollect that though Protestantism is incoherent and self-contradictory, Catholicity is not. Whether true or false, Catholicity, so to speak, hangs together, is always logical, always coherent, and always consistent with itself. You will never find it at one time asserting a principle which at another it denies.

The author and Protestants generally find grave difficulties in understanding and appreciating the worship Catholics pay to Our Lady, because they have ceased to believe in the Incarnation, and have lost the sense of the mystery of the Word made flesh. They do not understand that it is God made man, and therefore God in his human nature, that redeems and saves us. They see no necessary connection between the Incarnation and the final beatitude of man; they see not that the whole of redemption and all the rewards in heaven depend on our Lord in his human



nature, not on him regarded solely in his distinctively Divine nature. They are, almost without exception, Nestorians or Eutychians, and either give to the flesh assumed a human subsistence or personality distinct from the Divine, which is virtual Unitarianism, or they deny to the Divine Personality two for ever distinct natures, the one Divine, the other human, and thus adopt the Monophysite theory. They fail utterly to recognize the indissoluble union of two for ever distinct natures in one Divine person. Hence, while they are willing enough to say that Mary is the Mother of Christ, they shrink from saying that she is the Mother of God. They cannot bring themselves to say that God was born of woman, or that he had or has a mother. Thus they dissolve Christ, deny virtually that the Word was made flesh, and that since the Incarnation, human nature is truly, and as substantially, the nature of God as the Divine nature itself. The Word, since the Incarnation or hypostatic union, has a twofold nature, the one human and the other Divine, and the one therefore is as much and as truly his nature as the other. Hence the term God applies to him as properly in his human as in his Divine nature, in which he is one with the Father and the Holy Ghost. This is the meaning of the assertion that the Word was made flesh,—*Verbum caro factum est*.

God in his divine nature, as the Divinity, was not, indeed, born of Mary, any more than he died on the cross, for in that nature he is eternal and immortal,—can neither be born nor die; but God in his human nature was born of Mary, and therefore what was born of her was not simple humanity, that is, a man, adopted and united by the Word to himself, but God himself in his humanity or human nature. Therefore, as by the Incarnation human nature becomes really and substantially the nature of God, Mary was as truly the mother of God as any mother is or can be the mother of her own son. The relation of mother and son, by virtue of the hypostatic union, really and truly subsists between God and Mary, and must for ever exist. We must say this or deny the Incarnation.

This granted, Mary necessarily holds to God a peculiar relation, a superior and more intimate relation than is or can be held by any other woman or by any other creature. It is not possible to assign her in creation a rank above her

real rank. She holds and always will hold the relation of Mother of God, and, as her Son is universal King, of universal Queen-Mother. She is by the very fact of that relation placed above every other creature, above all the sons and daughters of men, above all the choirs, thrones, dominions, angels, and archangels of heaven, and can be below none but God himself. This is no exaggeration, but sober reason and literal truth, when once it is conceded that the "Word was made flesh." Weak men and sciolists, wicked men and devils, may rage or cavil at it, but so it is, and so it cannot *not* be. Exclaim as you will against it, nothing can alter it; nothing can prevent it from being true that eternal justice imposes upon us the duty of recognizing that relation, of acknowledging her exalted rank, and of rendering her the honor, the love, and veneration due to it. Fine Christians we should be, if we refused her the honor that is her due, and great honor and respect should we show to Him who has given her that exalted rank above every creature in heaven, on earth, and under the earth! It is not Catholics worshipping Mary as the Mother of God and Queen of heaven, who need to defend themselves, but Protestants who refuse her the honor that is her due, and will not conform to the real relations which God himself has established between Mary and her Son,—Protestants, who think they maintain truth by rejecting it, and that they show their respect for the Son by refusing to honor his Mother for what she is, and He by being born of her has made her. Let them defend themselves, if they can, but forbear to accuse us.

Protestants for the most part, at the present day at least, fail to recognize the office of the Sacred Flesh in our redemption and salvation. In losing the sense of the Mystery of the Incarnation they have lost the sense of salvation by an Incarnate God. The redemption in which as Christians we believe is not merely satisfaction made by the Incarnate God for our sins, original or actual, and the purification of the soul or spirit, but also a redemption and sanctification of the flesh. The Word was made flesh, *Verbum caro factum est*, and it was not merely the spirit, the soul, or immaterial part of man that God assumed to be his nature, but also the flesh, the body no less than the soul of man. It was our nature, and our whole nature,—

“perfect man”—that he assumed, and made his nature ; and the flesh as well as the soul is elevated to union with God, in the Incarnation, deified, or made the nature of God. Here opens a view we all too seldom appreciate. The heathen believed in the immortality of the soul, and the return of the spirit to God who gave it, but they had no conception of the resurrection or future life of the flesh. The distinctive doctrine preached by the Apostles was not the immortality of the soul, as some sectarians contend, but the *resurrection* of the dead, therefore, the resurrection of the flesh, for only the flesh dies. Yet we apprehend that the Protestant world has virtually lost or is rapidly losing all belief in the resurrection of the flesh—*carnis resurrectionem*—and confound belief in the natural immortality of the soul, with belief in the resurrection of the body. Hence, placing no belief in the resurrection, or attaching no importance to the resurrection of the flesh, they fail to perceive the significance of the mystery of the Word made flesh.

But whoever reflects a moment will see that the redemption of the flesh and its elevation to union with God, could by no possibility be effected, save by the Incarnation of the Word ; and as its redemption and elevation were in the design of God from all eternity, theologians of no mean repute maintain that the Word would have been incarnated, even if man had not sinned. But be this as it may, certain it is, that where sin abounded, grace superabounded, and that the Word was made flesh, not merely to repair the damage done by sin, as Protestantism would fain have us believe, but over and above repairing that damage, to elevate us to a union by nature with God himself, and therefore of making man in both soul and body one with God. Hence the reason why the Word assumed our nature. Had he assumed the nature of animals he would not have redeemed us or elevated us, for we are above them ; had he assumed the nature of angels he would not have redeemed or elevated the flesh, since that enters not into the nature of angels ; or if he had assumed our nature only in its angelic or spiritual part. But by assuming flesh, and becoming perfect man as he was perfect God, he elevated our whole nature to himself, and made it his nature. As the human nature he assumed was complete human nature, soul and

body,—for man is not soul alone, or body alone, but the union of the two,—and identical with our nature, he elevates us by nature, soul and body, to the nature of God. Our nature, if we may use the expression of St. Leo, is by the Incarnation deified, made as truly the nature of God as the Divine nature itself. As this includes the flesh as well as the soul, it is evident that the Catholic doctrine of fasts, mortifications, and chastisements of the flesh, has its foundation in the Mystery of the Incarnation. They are not merely lacerations of the flesh for the good of the soul, but are chastisements of the flesh for its own good, to fit it to be the temple of the Holy Ghost. The flesh itself is to live for ever, and its discipline is as necessary to prepare it for practical union with God hereafter as the discipline of the soul. In the redemption and elevation of man, soul and body, the whole lower creation is also redeemed and elevated, for man is, as the ancients said, a microcosm, and contains in himself the several natures of all the orders below him, and in fact, in his intelligent part, the elements of the angelic nature, which is above him.

Now when we take this view of the redemption and elevation of created nature through the Incarnation, we can easily perceive that the rank of Mary must be the highest under God. That rank is determined by her relation to the Sacred Flesh of our Lord, through which and which alone he effects this universal redemption and elevation. The Sacred Flesh was taken in her womb, and was flesh of her flesh; her relation to it must necessarily be more intimate than that of any other creature, and as it was not taken by violence, but by her free consent, she necessarily participates in its glory, in a sense in which no other creature does or can participate. As mother of that Sacred Flesh born of her, she is the Mother of God, and as it is only through it we are redeemed and sanctified in our flesh, she is the mother of our redemption and sanctification. As we by redemption and sanctification become united in our flesh to the Sacred Flesh of Christ, she is, in the order of redemption and sanctification, literally our mother, and as truly the mother of redeemed and glorified humanity, as Eve was the mother of natural humanity, or the human race in the natural order. These considerations, to those who are capable of understanding them, will show that what

Protestants should object to in us, is our belief in the Incarnation and the resurrection and future glory of the flesh, not the worship we pay to Our Lady ; for if the Word was made flesh, the strongest language the Church has ever authorized, and the warmest affection, the tenderest love, and the deepest devotion of Catholics to the Mother of God, are fully warranted. The whole *cultus* of Mary flows from the profound mystery of the Incarnation, and the belief in that mystery ; and what Protestants so injuriously call our "Mariolatry," do and must stand or fall together. It may be that popular Catholic writers, writing for Catholics alone, and even some popular controversialists, who have more piety than thought, and more erudition than philosophy, have not taken sufficient pains to show the connection between the Incarnation and the worship of Mary, and the future resurrection and glorification of the body, but that connection exists, and it is impossible on any rational grounds to deny the consequences which flow from it. If we look into history, we shall find those who believe the most firmly and vividly in the Incarnation are the most devout worshippers of Mary ; and we seldom find our worship offending any except those who lack faith in the mystery of the Word made flesh, and who resolve Christianity into pure materialism, or a pure spiritualism, which regards man as all soul, and denies the resurrection of the flesh.

The Jurist affects to be scandalized at what he calls our worship of images. We have images of Our Lady, and of the saints in our churches, and carry them in processions, &c. But what if we do ? Is it a fault ? Wherefore ? He knows, or ought to know, that not simply the making, keeping, or worship of images, but the making, keeping, or worship of images as idols or gods, is what is forbidden in the first commandment of the Decalogue, otherwise painting and sculpture would be forbidden, indeed all the imitative arts, and no man could lawfully keep and respect a picture of his mother, or a statue of his father. Puritan Massachusetts would, in such case, be bound to remove the carved image of a codfish, which is now suspended in the Representatives Hall of her State House. I have while writing an image of Our Lady before me, and I kneel before it when I say my prayers, but I do not pray to it. I pray to God before the image of his Mother,



or I pray to his Mother herself, to intercede for me with him, and obtain for me the graces and benefits I most stand in need of. What harm can you detect in that? And yet here is all the worship of images Catholics practise. Here is no idolatry. I honor the image for the sake of the original, but I am not quite so stupid as to suppose it is a god. I should suppose even the most stupid Protestant could distinguish between praying before an image of Our Lady and praying to it, and between the worship we pay to Our Lady herself and that which the Ephesians paid to their goddess Diana; but it seems that Mr. Derby cannot, and that he imagines his young kinsman cannot. Surely, the power of discrimination in our Protestant friends must, if they do not slander themselves, be exceedingly weak and dull.

It seems that we keep and treat with respect the relics of saints, and such is really the fact. There is no denying it. My good Protestant mother showed me one day the writing-book of my long-departed father, which she had affectionately preserved; she also showed me a pattern of the last dress she had seen her own mother wear, and even a lock of my own and my twin sister's hair, taken from our heads when we were little children, and which nothing could induce her to part with. The lover preserves with pious care the picture of his mistress, or any thing he possesses that was hers, which she had looked upon, which she had touched, or which she had loved. These things are dear to us, not for their own sake, but for the sake of those we love and who are absent from us. So is it with Catholics in regard to the relics of the saints; we keep them, we venerate them, we cherish them for the sake of the saint whose relics they are.

But there is a higher and a holier reason for the veneration of the relics of saints. Protestants have the feelings of heathens towards dead bodies and dead men's bones. These things are repulsive to them, disgusting, and they hasten to burn them, or to bury them from their sight, because they have never fairly grasped the meaning or any portion of the meaning of the Incarnation, because they have never believed or understood the redemption of the body, and the sanctification of matter. The Catholic looks upon the relics of the body of the saint, as redeemed and ennobled

by the Word made flesh. The sanctity of the saint was not confined to the soul alone, but overflowed and permeated more or less his body, his fleshly tabernacle. When the Catholic touches the relics of a saint, he feels that he touches what is holy, and he looks forward to the resurrection, when this blood, this flesh, and these bones, will be reunited to the soul, and be fashioned anew after Christ's glorious body, and enter into glory. The flesh of the saint is redeemed, and is of the same nature with the flesh assumed by the Word. It is, therefore, a sacred thing, and as such we treat it. Catholics are not Gnostics or Manichæans. They do not regard matter any more than spirit as intrinsically evil. As the work of God it is good, as redeemed by Christ it is sacred, and as pertaining to one who loved God, who conformed to the Divine will, and is now enjoying the beatific vision, who was pleasant in life, beautiful in death, and now glorious in immortality, it is precious. It is precious, too, because it has been chastened by divine grace, and nourished with the Blessed Sacrament, the precious body and blood of our Lord himself, and made the very temple and dwelling-place of the Holy Ghost. Here are reasons enough to prove the propriety of our worship of relics and shrines. There is a deep philosophy, a lofty morality, and a tender piety in this worship, which they who are not Catholics lack, and cannot have, for with them this worship, so pure, so true, so elevating, and so consoling with us, were they to attempt it, would degenerate into a gross idolatry, or a debasing superstition. Yet the honor we pay to relics is not to them as mere flesh and bones, but to the saint whose they were, and through the saint to the Word made flesh, whence all redemption and sanctity, whether of soul or body, have their source. We cherish them as sacred through the holiness of the saint, and the redemption of the flesh by its assumption by the Word ; but we do not pray to them, or reverence them as living things. We love them for what they are, not for what they are not, and to regard them as they are and to honor them for what they are is a simple duty. We must tell the learned Jurist, then, that his flippancy is in bad taste. There is in these Catholic practices a beauty he does not see, a fitness he is unable with his cold, sneering temper to appreciate, a deeper significance, as in all Catholic things, than he

has dreamed of. His objections betray his ignorance, not his science,—his shallowness, not his depth,—his coldness, not his warmth,—his indifference, not his love to the Word made flesh. Let him lay aside his self-conceit, his false assumption that he knows something of the Gospel, open his heart to the inspirations of grace, as the sun-flower opens her bosom to the rays of the sun ; let him sit down at the feet of God's minister, as Mary Magdalen sat at the feet of Jesus, and be content, before criticising, to learn with the docility of the child, and our word for it, he will soon love what he now hates, and see a truth, a beauty, an excellence, in what he now fancies is mere craft, imposture, falsehood, and superstition. Let him meditate seriously, and with open heart, on that mystery of mysteries, the Incarnation, which even his church professes to believe, and he will see Catholics are alone in giving it significance, in regarding it as a living truth, and in making it the basis of their religious life and practices.

But we have dwelt too long for our space on this topic, and must hurry on to another.

"I pass to the next important topic, the celibacy of the Roman Catholic clergy. We have the authority of Holy Writ for the fact that St. Peter, the alleged founder and *first prelate* of the Church of Rome, was himself a *married man*, for we find\* that when Jesus was come unto Peter's house, 'He saw his *wife's* mother laid and sick of a fever, and he touched her hand and the fever left her, and she arose and ministered unto them.' He mentions also his *son* Marcus.† This, however, may have been Mark, the apostle. St. Peter, also,‡ speaks of the marriage state as honorable, for he names, among the holy women of old who trusted in the Lord, Sarah, who obeyed her husband Abraham, God's chosen prophet and minister. He directs wives to be chaste and gentle, to obey their husbands and thus win them to the truth, and to seek the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit, a priceless jewel in the sight of God, preferable to plaiting the hair, or wearing of gold or apparel. He counsels husbands to *honor and dwell* with their wives as common heirs of the grace of life, so that their prayers be not hindered, and § counsels all he addresses 'to be ready to give an answer to every one that asketh them for the hope that is in them.' And St. Paul, addressing Timothy in one of the Eastern churches, whose observances the Greek Church now follows, writes, 'A bishop then must

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\* Matthew 8 : 14.

† Ibid. 3 : 1-6.

‡ 1 Peter 5 : 13.

§ Ibid. 3 : 16.

be blameless, the husband of one wife.\* The early historians of the Church, Sozomen and Theophylactus, commend the marriage of the clergy, and two of the earliest provincial councils held at Ancyra and Gangra in Paphlagonia, the latter A. D. 360; and some of the earliest canons of the Eastern churches authorize the marriage of men in holy orders. Some learned doctors among the Roman Catholics admit that the marriage of the clergy was lawful until the era of Pope Siricius, bishop of Rome, A. D. 385.

"The blessed Chrysostom, who lived twenty years after this period, expressly says, that 'It is an honest and lawful thing for a man living in matrimony, to take upon him therewith the dignity of a bishop.' Chrysostom was himself a presbyter of Antioch, one of the most ancient seats of Christianity, and subsequently bishop of Constantinople, the seat of empire.

"I find by reference to the standard work of McCulloch, that in Russia, which A. D. 1838 contained fifty-nine millions of people, more than fifty millions were of the Greek church, and the residue either Lutherans, Mahometans, or Pagans, with some Catholics, principally in the provinces last conquered. I find it there stated, under the head of religion, that the uniform practice in the Greek church, is for those taking holy orders to marry. Indeed, the canon law is so imperative, that no priest or bishop is allowed to officiate until he enters the holy state of marriage; and upon the death of his wife, is suspended until he marries again. The church is guided by a patriarch, whose predecessor removed to Russia from Constantinople upon the fall of the Greek empire. And it is well understood that the female members of the Greek church stand higher with respect to chastity than females in Roman Catholic countries. If, then, the theory of the Romish church should be assumed to be true, that our Saviour selected Peter to be the future ruler of his church, and intrusted to him the gates of heaven, he selected for the first prelate a married man, one who approved of marriage in the clergy, for he refers to Abraham, God's chosen prophet and minister, who was ready to sacrifice his son Isaac upon the altar, and refers also to Sarah, his holy wife, and bids the husbands to 'honor and dwell with their wives the coheirs of salvation.'

"Does not Peter, by his example, his *citation*, and his *precepts*, clearly show that bishops and priests may marry; and are his successors holier than their alleged first bishop, the first and oldest apostle of our Saviour, or more deserving of respect than the holy fathers who lived before the inroads of barbarism, and were accustomed to visit the churches planted by the apostles?

"Again, let us recur to the fact, that Greek and Romish churches were governed by the same councils and rules, until they separated upon the mere question of Easter-day. In the words of the blessed

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\* 1 Timothy 3: 2.

Jerome, 'Gaul and Britain and Africa, the East, and India, and all the barbarous nations, adored *one Christ*, and observed *one rule* of truth in the early ages of Christianity,' and you observe he includes 'the British almost severed from the world.'\* In the Greek church the marriage of the clergy is not only authorized, but absolutely required. Now, if we find that the marriage of the clergy has been found conducive to virtue, and a check to profligacy; if we see a precedent for it in the party alleged to be the first primate of Rome, and in the precepts of St. Peter; if we find, further, that the bishops of the Greek churches, the modern representative of the Eastern, uniformly adhere to the ancient usage, have we not an accumulation of evidence that the Romish church has departed from the truth?

"And whether you ascribe it to the ascetic rules of monks, who aspired to unusual sanctity in the dark ages, to a desire to sink all worldly and carnal thoughts in a devotion to God, or, what may well be argued from established facts, to a deep design on the part of the Roman pontiffs to secure a devotion to the advancement of their power, the constrained celibacy of the clergy has no sanction in the early church. Indeed, such departures from the truth are predicted by the great Apostle to the Gentiles, inspired by a heavenly vision, who foretells † 'That in the latter days some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, forbidding to marry, and commanding to abstain from meats, which God has created to be received with thanksgiving of them which believe and know the truth.'"—pp. 48-52.

We pass over the author's citations of authorities, taken from untrustworthy Anglican Anti-popery writers,—authorities in every instance miscited, misapprehended, misapplied, or irrelevant. The Church of Rome does not dishonor marriage; she treats it as a sacrament, declares it to be always a sacred thing, and gives it her benediction. If she insists on the celibacy of the clergy, it is not because she regards marriage as dishonorable, or unclean, but for other reasons, which will readily occur to those who properly understand the office and duties of the Catholic priesthood. Mr. Derby argues that the celibacy of the clergy is not an Apostolic institution, because Peter was a married man; but that Peter had a wife living and that he lived with her as a married man, after he was called to be an Apostle, the only thing to be proved to his purpose, he does not, and

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\* "Et penitus toto divisis orbe Britannia."

† 1 Timothy 4: 1, 2.


cannot prove. There have been several Popes, and innumerable bishops and priests in the Roman Church, who have been married men ; and one of the most distinguished and worthy priests of this diocese was a widower, and had a family of children, when he received Holy Orders. Proof, therefore, that a Pope, a bishop, a priest in early times, or even an Apostle, had been married, is no proof that the celibacy of the clergy was not the discipline of the Church.

We are not particularly informed as to the discipline of the Russian Schismatic Church in respect to the marriage of the clergy, but in the Schismatic, as in the United Greek Church, no one in Holy Orders is allowed to marry, but those who were married before receiving Holy Orders are allowed to retain their wives, though no married priest can be consecrated a bishop, and hence bishops are taken generally from the monastic orders. This is what we have always understood to be the discipline of the Greek Church, and we suppose it to be also that of the Russian. We place no reliance on Mr. Derby's statement to the contrary, for he evidently has no exact information on the subject, since he says the Russian Church is guided by a Patriarch, which is notoriously untrue, for it is guided by a Synod with a lay president, the patriarchate having been suppressed, if I recollect aright, by Peter the Great. That the Russian clergy generally marry before receiving Holy Orders, we believe is the fact, but that a priest or bishop is suspended from his functions when his wife dies till he gets a new wife, is pure fiction. Whether the morality of the women stands higher in countries under the Greek Church than it does in those under the Roman Catholic Church, is a question we shall not discuss ; but he who can believe it, is, in our opinion, prepared, as Clemens Alexandrinus said of the Greeks of his day, to believe any thing, except the truth. However this may be, we advise him to institute no comparison in respect of purity of life and manners between *Protestant countries* and Catholic countries—a comparison which would be much more to the purpose.

The Jurist alleges that St. John Chrysostom says that "it is an honest and lawful thing for a man living in matrimony to take upon him therewith the dignity of a bishop," but he fails to tell us where St. John Chrysostom says this, and surely he cannot expect us to read through

thirteen huge folio volumes in order to determine whether he says it or not. I recollect no such passage in the writings of this holy Doctor of the Church. He certainly defends the Catholic doctrine of marriage, against the Manichæans and others who forbid people to marry, on the ground that it is impure, and incompatible with the sanctity of life,—a notion founded on the false doctrine of the essential impurity or intrinsic evil of matter ; but I do not find that he defends the marriage of bishops. In the East the discipline that was established from the earliest times in the West, never universally obtained ; there the clergy of the second order were allowed to have wives ; this discipline obtains now in all the Oriental rites, alike among those in communion with the Holy See, and those in schism. Yet the laws of the Church alike in the East and the West, and still adhered to by the Schismatic Greeks, forbid marriage contracted after the reception of Holy Orders, that is, bishops, presbyters, deacons, and subdeacons, have never been allowed to marry. Even to-day the clergy of the United Greeks, that is, Christians of the Greek rite in communion with the Apostolic See, if married before ordination, may retain, and do retain, their wives after ordination, though they rarely hear confessions.

To contend that a Church which makes marriage a sacrament, which declares it honorable, holy even, and gives it her benediction, falls into the category of those the Apostle speaks of, who declare marriage in itself impure, and therefore forbid to marry, because she forbids those whom she ordains to minister at her altars to marry, is to reason about as wisely as honest Fluellin, who likened the Prince of Wales to Alexander the Great, because there was a river in Wales, and also a river in Macedon. If the learned Jurist will pay a little attention to what we have said of the redemption and sanctification of matter by the assumption of flesh by the Word, he will see that it is absolutely impossible for the Church with her own fundamental doctrines to fall into the errors censured by the Apostle in the text cited at the close of the extract we have made. The Jurist judges without understanding either the law or the facts of the case, and on the hypothesis that the Church has as little understanding of what she does as he has of the matters on which he writes. There is no doubt that



the chastity the Church requires of her clergy is above nature, and can be preserved only by supernatural grace ; but this is no more than is to be said of the chastity or continence demanded of the spouses in Christian marriage, as the experience of our non-Catholic world is at this moment proclaiming in tones not to be mistaken ; and we know no reason why the grace needed may not be given in the one case as well as in the other ; yet all experience proves that even naturally continence is more easily maintained by the celibate than by the married, as total abstinence is less difficult than temperance. Whoever will consult the records of our criminal courts will find that in proportion to their numbers the Protestant clergy furnish more instances of conjugal infidelity than any other class of society. At least so tells us a Protestant lawyer who is well qualified to judge. Almost all the instances that come to light in which Protestant ministers have fallen, the minister has been a married man, with an interesting wife and children. We are not surprised at this. When we consider the temptations, even seductions, to which a popular and fascinating Protestant minister is exposed on every hand, and the fact that he lacks the grace of the sacrament of marriage to sustain him, we rather marvel that comparatively so few, not that so many fall. We touch here a subject of great delicacy, and which some day must be thoroughly discussed. Christian marriage, or the morality of the Gospel in relation to marriage, is above the strength of nature alone. Our Lord knew it, and therefore raised marriage under the New Law to the dignity of a sacrament, and assigned it a special grace, which those who enter into marriage with proper motives and dispositions receive, and may, if they will, always preserve. But we must say that the Protestant experiment of trying to maintain Christian marriage, without the sacramental grace, has proved, and is every day proving, a failure. It would not be amiss for worldly-minded and indifferent Catholics themselves to pay some attention to this fact, lest even they fail to escape the general corruption of manners with which our land bids fair to be deluged. But we leave this topic, and follow our author in his givings out on another.

“ I acknowledge our several letters of February 14th, 19th, and 24th, to which I propose to reply *seriatim*, after disposing of all that



remains of your letter of the 4th current, in which you advance the following bold propositions, namely, that the Church of Rome is

- " 1. The only universal or Catholic church.
- " 2. The only apostolic or primitive church.
- " 3. The only church which has preserved its unity.
- " 4. That no dissenters from the authority of the pope existed before the time of Luther.
- " 5. That the Catholic church has not varied one iota in the faith from the time of the apostles.
- " 6. That if you can be shown one place (where men have any idea of the Christian religion) where Roman Catholicism does not exist, you will be a Protestant.
- " 7. That the Episcopal church has neither unity, catholicity, nor apostolicity, and is of course heretical.
- " 8. You ask where is he to whom the keys of heaven and hell are given, and the church to which God has promised the gates of hell shall not prevail against it, and without doubt refer to St. Peter and the Church of Rome."—p. 53.

The questions here raised were disposed of in our first article on Mr. Derby's book, inserted in our Review for last October. Points 4 and 6 assumed by Mr. Derby's son, are untenable, and he betrayed his ignorance in assuming them. We have known some ignorant or unreflecting Catholics rashly assert in their arguments with Protestants that there were no separatists from the Church prior to Luther. Such assertions are inexcusable, and do harm. They are easily refuted, and our opponents are ready to swear that, if they have refuted some unimportant statement made in the heat of argument by an individual Catholic, they have refuted the claims of the Church herself. There were heretics even in the Apostolic age, and we know no age since in which the Church has not been afflicted with heresies. The Middle Ages bristled with heresies, and we have never been able to find that Luther originated any new heresy. The Popes, from the division of the Roman Empire into the Empire of the West and the Empire of the East, had had as bitter enemies as Luther to contend with, and the defection in the East prior to Luther was greater than any defection there ever has been in the West. These are facts, and it is a short-sighted policy that seeks to conceal them. If the claims of the Church are irreconcilable with the facts of history, they cannot be sustained, for facts are not rendered no-

facts by being concealed or denied. There have always been heretics and schismatics, and no doubt there always will be to the end of the world ; but this is a fact which proves rather than disproves the Church, for if there were no Church, one and Catholic, there could be no schismatics or heretics, as there could be no counterfeit, if there were no genuine coin. Mr. Derby, however, does not understand this.

“ Let me now recur to the points you have advanced. First. I have shown that the Church of Rome does not pervade the world. I have shown the Greek church engrosses a large part of Russia, Turkey, Greece, and Germany, while the Protestant faith is gradually overspreading the globe. I will concede to you, that at the close of the third century the true church of Christ was established and pervaded the world, but it does not follow therefrom that the Church of Rome is the same at this moment, or has the same universality.

“ Christianity made rapid progress under the teaching of the apostles. It had to encounter in the Roman Empire, which then embraced the civilized world, a state religion, venerable for its antiquity, its mythology, and its association with both poetry and history. It had its oracles and temples, its sacred fountains and groves, its statues of gods, goddesses, and deified heroes. Its votaries from childhood bowed down to them, and offered worship and sacrifices, and when their religion was assailed, exclaimed, Great is Jupiter, great is Apollo, great is Diana of the Ephesians. Even St. Pauls, in London, occupies the site of the temple of the Virgin Diana.

“ This religion was sustained by the love of people and princes, by *antiquity*, *universality*, and general *consent*, but in less than four centuries it yielded to the apostles of the Gentiles.

“ At the close of the second century, Irenæus speaks of the prevalence of the gospel among ‘ the Germans and Celts, the Egyptians, Libyans, and Orientals.’

“ The eloquent Tertullian, A. D. 198, recites : ‘ We are but of yesterday, yet we have filled your empire, your cities, your islands, your castles, your corporate towns, your assemblies, your very camps, your tribes, your companies ; your palaces and your temples alone are left to you.’ And again, ‘ The Parthians, Medes, Persians, the inhabitants of Mesopotamia, Armenia, Phrygia, Cappadocia, Pontus, Egypt, and parts beyond Cyrène, the Romans, tribes of the Getuli, many in the extreme parts of Mauritania and Spain, many nations in Gaul and places in Britain inaccessible to the Roman arms, have been subdued to Christ. The Sarmatians, Dacians, Germans, Scythians, and many other nations, provinces, and islands to us unknown, are subject to Christ’s dominion,’ and this was at least a century before the accession of the first Christian emperor, and

during the reign of Severus. After the victory of Constantine, A. D. 306, under the luminous cross, with its inscription, 'conquer by this,' Christianity still advanced, and before the middle of the fifth century, about the time of St. Augustine, attained its greatest power under Valentinian and Theodosius. Bishop Hopkins \* proves by various authors, that at this early period, long before the Roman prelate had claimed the supremacy, or wore the title of universal bishop, and when he certainly was not ruler of the world, that the Christian world contained two thousand bishoprics. Records are now remaining of at least

566	dioceses in Africa,	estimated to contain 55,000,000 souls.
50	" " Persia, Asia,	" " " 2,500,000 "
48	" " in the patriarchate of Jerusalem, Asia,	5,000,000 "
164	" " " " Antioch,	" 33,000,000 "
400	" " " " Constantinople,	" 80,000,000 "
200	" " " " Europe,	40,000,000 "
300	" " Italy "	
117	" " France,	
38	" " Ireland,	
50	" " Britain, Germany, and other places, estimated	25,250,000 "

"Some of the bishoprics were very large and populous. That of Carthage contained five hundred presbyters. That of Cyrus consisted of eight hundred parishes and sixty thousand farms. The diocese of Cæsarea, over which St. Basil presided, covered an area of ten thousand square miles, and he had under him fifty assistant bishops. The aggregate of each district gives us more than two hundred and forty millions of Christians, more Christians than the entire world now contains. But little more than a century after this, the bishop of Rome usurped the powers of the church, and claimed supremacy. The Greek church seceded. In the year A. D. 622, the baneful crescent rose in the East. Mahomet, with his false faith, invaded a divided empire, and swept before him the churches, people, and civilization of Asia. Africa, and Eastern Europe. The ages of ignorance and superstition followed, and when the Church of Rome insists to-day that she has been since the time of the apostles, universal, catholic, and apostolic, may we not ask, What has she done with those vast and fertile regions, the garden of the world, the seats of arts, commerce, and literature, in which the church was first planted? Where are the five hundred and sixty-six dioceses of Africa, the six hundred and sixty-two dioceses of Asia, and the two hundred bishoprics of Eastern Europe, and the two hundred millions of Christians they contained? Has she not severed herself from them by her ambition? Did she not leave them to perish? Have they not been trodden down by the infidel, and what remains of

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\* In his treatise on the Primitive Church, p. 402.

them but a remnant of Greeks, Maronites, and Nestorians? If the Church of Rome has any existence in these regions, or in the Northern and Eastern provinces of Norway, Sweden, and Russia, it must be in the shape of some feeble missionary or wandering friar. I will not pretend to prove a negative to the claim that a Roman Catholic there exists, but must ask you to prove that he does exist there, and if he does, that he preaches to any purpose.

"And in this connection let me ask, in what part of our own State, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Connecticut, did the Church of Rome exist for the first century after her forefathers landed, for I find no records of its existence.

"If your theory is, that a solitary priest, perhaps travelling in disguise, is proof that a religion exists in a country, and is sufficient to prove it universal, then glance at the missions which the Protestants of England, Germany, and the United States have planted throughout the world. Her morning gun and her banner salute the sun as he rises in every portion of the globe, and the chant of the Episcopal church, or the prayer of the Protestant missionary, ascend from nearly every point touched by the commerce, or reached by the energy of the Anglo-Saxon. Upon your theory, the faith of the Protestant is more diffused and more universal than that of the Church of Rome."—pp. 54–58.

No Catholic pretends that all the world is converted to the Catholic Church, and that there is no spot on the globe where she is not physically present. I am aware, indeed, of no nation, in which the Christian religion is professed, where there are no Catholics; but there are tribes which so far as we know no Catholic missionary has visited, and large tracts of country where there is no Catholic church or Catholic priest. But to argue from this against the Catholicity of the Church, would be to argue against the Catholicity of Christianity itself, for not half of the human race now on the globe are even so much as nominal Christians. It would also be to deny that the Church of the Apostles was Catholic, when it went forth from Jerusalem to convert the world, and thus deny to the Christian Church, whichever it be, the note of Catholicity, a thing Mr. Derby himself cannot do, since he undertakes to prove the Unity, Catholicity, and Apostolicity of Anglicanism. The Church is Catholic because she teaches all ages, all nations, and all truth. She is Catholic as opposed to particular or national churches, Catholic in that she subsists without interruption from the Apostles, in opposition to sects of later origin, and because she teaches the whole

truth, in opposition to the sects, who mutilate it, and teach only some fragments of it. The work of conversion is a work of time, and goes on successively, and the Catholicity of the Church does not therefore depend on her actually teaching all nations at once from the first moment of her existence and through every instant of succeeding time. It is enough that she is constituted alike for all, and in proportion as she effects their conversion unites all in the same faith, in the participation of the same sacraments, under the same regimen, with one and the same visible head.

That there were more Christians in the world in the fourth century than there are now, we are disposed to doubt, since it is asserted on the authority of Bishop Hopkins. The Roman Empire, beyond which the Gospel had not penetrated far, was even in the fifth century far from being wholly Christian, and the pagans were still numerous enough to treat Christians with contempt, and to entertain strong hopes of being able by the help of the unconverted Barbarians to restore the old gods to their temples and niches. But be this as it may, certain it is that the Christians in the fifth century, with the exception of acknowledged heretics and schismatics, were in communion with the Apostolic See, and were therefore Roman Catholics. The argument of Mr. Derby is therefore a *Derbyish* argument, that is, an argument which, as far as it goes, proves the reverse of what was intended. The attempt to make a distinction between the Church in the primitive ages and the Church in later times, is idle ; and moreover, if successful, would be as fatal to Mr. Derby's cause as to ours ; for he as well as we asserts the Catholicity of the Church of Christ, and the Church to be Catholic must be so in time as well as space, and therefore must exist without interruption or alteration as one and the same identical body from the time of the Apostles down to the end of the world.

That there have been defections by heresy and schism, as well as accessions by conversions, in every age from the Apostles down, is undoubtedly true ; but whence follows it that the exclusion from the communion of the Church of heretics and schismatics, who by their heresy and schism separate themselves from it, impairs her Catholicity ? The Apostles themselves cut off persons from the communion of

the Church ; did the Church by that cease to be Catholic ? If excommunication does not in itself impair Catholicity, the number, whether greater or less, excommunicated cannot do it. The defections alleged no more impaired the integrity of the Church than the defection of Judas impaired the integrity of the Apostolic College. Mr. Derby forgets that heresy and schism are deadly sins, and that they who commit them are condemned by their own judgment. The losses he speaks of were due to heresy and schism on the part of those lost, and the responsibility rests on them, not on the Church, or the Pope. It is nothing to the author's purpose to prove that there have been heresies and schisms, or that whole nations or quarters of the globe have lapsed into them. What he needs to prove, in order to make out his case against the Catholicity of the Church, is that the See of Rome has herself fallen into heresy or schism, or given to one or the other her sanction.

Mr. Derby pretends that the losses he speaks of were occasioned by the usurpation in the sixth century by the Pope of the powers of the Church. The Oriental and African Christians were cut off and abandoned because they would not submit to the usurpation. But he, as we have seen, fails to prove that the Pope ever usurped any powers, or has ever claimed or exercised any powers not given by our Lord to Peter and his successors. It is possible, and till the contrary is proved, the legal presumption is, that they were cut off, because they refused the obedience they owed to the Vicar of Christ. Rebels are not always in the right, and resistance to the Pope is not *ipso facto* obedience to God. The wrong may have been on the side of those who resisted the Pope, and they may have become powerless and their fertile regions become a prey to the Barbarians and the seat of barbarism, because they cut themselves off from the centre and source of the Christian life.

The Greek schism in the seventh century was only temporary. It was not fully effected till the eleventh century, and was abjured by the Greeks themselves in the Council of Florence, under Eugenius IV. in the fifteenth. The foundation of that schism was laid not in the claim of any new or extraordinary powers by the Roman Pontiff,

but in the division of the Roman Empire into the Empire of the East, and the Empire of the West, under the sons of Theodosius the Great, and the subsequent conquest of the Western Empire by the Barbarians, which gave the immense superiority in arts, science, learning, civilization, to the Eastern. Greek pride revolted at the idea of submitting to the Pontiff whose See was no longer the seat of the first Empire of the world. The Pope was not responsible for the schism, but I will not say that no responsibility attaches to the Western secular powers, especially the Frank and German Emperors. They did not always treat the Greek Emperors with justice, and in the religious crisis, they took care to arouse the national pride, and to embitter the national feeling of the more highly-civilized, but less vigorous East. I have no doubt that the East had legitimate causes of complaint against the West, not against the See of Rome, but against those who claimed to be the Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire, and who did to a certain extent defend the Holy See in her Western relations.

But we must proceed to other matters.

“ You urge that the Church of Rome is the only apostolic and primitive church. In my previous letters I have pointed out to you its numerous departures from the divine word, the rules of the apostles, and ancient usages. Let me draw your attention to a few others. The pope of Rome claims to unite spiritual and temporal power, but St. Paul in his directions to Timothy, an early bishop, expressly charges him to be the soldier of Christ, and not to entangle himself with the affairs of this life.\* The apostolic canons, which contain the rules by which the church was governed in the second and third centuries, expressly provide, ‘ Let not a bishop, or a priest, or a deacon, undertake temporal offices, but if any should, let him be expelled.’ How can you reconcile with this rule, the triple crown worn by the bishop of Rome, when he assumes the office of a temporal prince at his coronation? How can you reconcile the various and discordant practices of the monks and the monastic life, with the teaching of our Saviour or his apostles, or the earliest usages of the primitive church? Where do you find in Holy Writ directions to found monasteries, or directions to one class of monks or friars to eat fish, and to another to eat herbs on certain days, or imperative orders to some to use sandals, to others to go barefoot, to

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\* 2 Timothy 2 : 3, 4.

some to wear woollen, to others to dress in linen, to one set to put on white and another black apparel, or prescribing a broad tonsure to some, and a narrow tonsure to others. I am well aware there were enthusiasts and devotees in the first three centuries, that even devout and pious men sought retirement, and even St. John, in his old age, (and he lived nearly a century,) fled from persecution to the Isle of Patmos, where he had heavenly visions, but I can find no early authority for monasteries and monastic rules. On the contrary, St. Augustine expressly condemns the idle monks who made their appearance in his day, and lived upon others. 'We cannot tell (he observes) whether they became monks to serve God, or being weary of a life of poverty and want, were desirous to be fed and clothed in indolence.' Again he remarks, 'they serve not God, but their own low appetites,' and calls the alms they obtain, 'the gains of a lucrative poverty, the reward of a *pretended holiness*.\*' And Theodoret, A. D. 420, speaks of *monasteries* as dens of thieves, and commends bishop Letois because he had 'chased the wolves from the fold,' when he overthrew and burned the Thessalian monasteries. And again, Cardinal Pole, reporting to Pope Paul III., pope of Rome, A. D. 1534, under a commission to view the disorders and deformities of the church, remarks, 'Another abuse there is to be reformed in the orders of monks and friars, for many of them are so vile that they are a shame unto the seculars, and with their example do much ill; as for conventual orders we think it good they should be *all abolished*.' Remember, this is the *official testimony* of an eminent Roman Catholic to the pope, of the vices and impurity of hosts of monks and friars. The church you consider *apostolic*, then overflowed with such *pretended holiness*."—pp. 59–61.

We have already shown that Mr. Derby has proved nothing of what he here alleges. The canons he cites, bating his accustomed inaccuracy of transcription and translation, are in force now in the Roman Catholic Church. Yet those canons were never understood as prohibiting bishops from looking after the temporalities of the Church. The States governed by the Pope in their temporalities are the States of the Church, the patrimony of St. Peter, and as such naturally and legitimately fall under the government of the visible head of the Church, the successor of Peter. To object to this is to object to the Church having any temporalities, any revenues, an objection which, we suspect, the author's dear friends, the Anglican bishops, will reluctantly sustain. The government of the temporalities of

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\* Augustine de opere, Monach. c. 12, 22, 28.



the Church belongs to the ecclesiastical authority, and the Church in Apostolic times administered her own goods, and for this purpose appointed proper officers of her own.

The Jurist is a queer reasoner. Some monks wear a white habit, some black, some gray, some woollen, and some linen, therefore the Church of Rome is neither primitive nor apostolic. There is no refuting such a reasoner. He says he cannot find any early authority for monastic rules, therefore he concludes the Church of Rome has departed from the word of God, is condemned by Holy Writ, and is not the primitive or Apostolic Church. "St. Augustine condemned idle monks." Very likely, and yet St. Augustine lived according to a monastic rule, and founded a monastic order which still subsists. Suppose Cardinal Pole did recommend the abolition of all the monastic orders; he was not Pope, and the Pope does not appear to have approved his recommendation. Because there were idle or vicious monks, therefore the Church of Rome is not apostolic. Because Judas Iscariot betrayed our Lord, therefore our Lord was not the Son of God and the true Messiah, is an argument equally conclusive. Have there been no unholy bishops or ministers in the Anglican establishment? The Church is responsible for those only who obey her laws and follow her precepts.

"But let us glance for a moment at auricular confession. I do not mean to argue that our Saviour and his apostles did not direct us to confess our sins, but where do you find in the gospels, acts, and letters of the apostles, or apostolic canons, a rule for females to confess in private to the priest, their sins, in thought, word, or deed? And permit me to ask, whether, down to A. D. 1560, it was not a question in the Church of Rome, on what authority rested auricular confession, the *canonists* saying it was appointed 'by the positive law of man,' and the *schoolmen* urging it was appointed by the law of God. Has not the practice been shamefully abused by dissolute priests and friars, and when we find the doctors of the Church of Rome disagree as to the sanction for such a practice, and gross abuses attendant, are we not safe in its rejection?"—p. 61.

We do not accept Mr. Derby as the expounder of the rules and canons of the Church. It seems he does not like auricular confession. He is not alone in that. Even many Catholics have a very great repugnance to it, so strong a repugnance that we are sure that if it had not been estab-

lished by Divine authority, it never could have been established at all. The author is very much disturbed at the idea of females confessing in private to a priest. We did not know that they did confess in private, and certain we are that there is no canon requiring them to do so. The confession is private of course, but not therefore must they be in private when they make it. Private confession has been abused, says the author, and we know few good things that have not been or may not be abused. But how does he explain a well-known fact that those Catholic mothers who frequent the confessional themselves, and are the most anxious to preserve the purity of their daughters, are precisely those who are the most anxious to send their daughters to confession? There is, no doubt, corruption in many Catholics, but it is precisely the greatest among those Catholics who the most neglect confession. There is, however, little propriety in a New England Protestant jurist talking about the corrupting influence of the confessional. Within the memory of persons now living, grown-up men and women wishing to join the Congregational churches were required to walk up the broad aisle, and make a public confession before the whole congregation, of the sins of impurity they had committed, and their confession was entered upon the Church records, and preserved in its archives. These old Church Records of New England tell some queer tales, and prove, with regard to our Puritan ancestors, that all is not gold that glisters, and that nature revenged herself not unfrequently for the outrages she received. The Gospel morality is impracticable without the grace of the sacraments.

“Did our Saviour or his Apostles or their successors, the earliest bishops, or the canons of the primitive Church, for centuries, require the applicant for baptism, as a condition precedent, to swear obedience to a temporal prince?”—(p. 61.) Most likely not, for nothing of the sort is required of an applicant for baptism now. “Or to the bishops of Rome?” No oath of the sort is exacted now, except in the case of adults who have grown up in heresy or unbelief; yet we suppose in the earliest ages as now the candidate for baptism, either personally or through his sponsors, was required to profess the Catholic faith, to renounce the devil, and promise to keep the commandments of God; and obedience

to the Pope, as visible head of the Church, is included in those commandments he promises to keep. If no special promise of obedience to the successor of Peter was exacted of adults, it was because no one in those early ages doubted the Primacy of Peter, or questioned the authority of his successor. But did the early Church impose on the Christian the oath of supremacy imposed now in England upon Anglicans? What is there more improper in taking an oath to obey in spiritual matters the spiritual head of the Church, than in taking the oath which Mr. Derby himself as a lawyer has taken of fidelity to the Constitution of the United States and to that of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts?

"With these prefatory remarks, cited from standard Catholic authorities, I recur to your two positions: that the Church of Rome has always preserved her unity, and that there were no dissenters from her authority before the time of Luther.

"If the church claims a derivation from the primitive church, was not that unity broken, by her abandonment of her Eastern churches, with at least two-thirds of all the bishops, churches, presbyters, and Christians, to which I have already referred? Is there any unity between the Greek and Roman churches at the present moment? Is there any unity between the Church of Rome and the Maronites, Nestorians, Armenians, or Abyssinian churches, which have existed for more than ten centuries. I would refer you also to Gibbon,\* where he shows the prevalence of the Arian doctrines in the churches of the Roman Empire at the accession of Theodosius, 'who claimed the merit of subduing the Arian heresy, and was in fact the first emperor baptized in the faith of the trinity.' When he ascended the throne, A. D. 379, just after the death of Athanasius, the Arians, encouraged by the Emperor Valens, himself an Arian, held all the churches of Constantinople, more than one hundred in number."—pp. 63, 64.

That there were dissenters from the Catholic Church before Luther, we have conceded, and we have very little patience with those silly Catholics who now and then assert the contrary. There are, no doubt, even Catholics who have a zeal for the Church, which is not according to knowledge, and our task of defending the Church would have been much lighter, if all who have undertaken that defence had been even moderately qualified to do it. Her-

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\* *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. V. pp. 18-23.

esies there have been from the very times of the Apostles, and we know no age which has been free from them. Luther was not the first to deny the authority of the Pope as supreme governor and ruler of the Church. So we let pass what the author says on that point,—a point no intelligent Catholic assumes. The other point, that the Church of Rome has preserved her unity, stands firm, notwithstanding all the learned Jurist alleges. That the Church of Rome has not maintained unity among all who have called themselves Christians, we of course concede, for otherwise we should be obliged to maintain that there have been and are no heresies and schisms in the nominally Christian world. But heretics and schismatics do not break the unity of the Church, save in respect to themselves. They cease from the moment of becoming schismatics and heretics, to be members of the Church, or of Christ's body, and they go out from the Apostles as not of them. There were Arians in the empire, but not Arians in the Church, as we have already shown in a former article. There is unity between the Church of Rome and the Maronites, for the Maronites are Catholics in communion with the Apostolic See. There is unity between Rome and a large portion of the Chaldean Christians, commonly called Nestorians, but none between her and those who adhere to the heresy of Nestorius, for they are not in her communion. The Armenians are in part Catholics and in part schismatics. A large portion of the nation is in communion with the See of Rome, and all acknowledge the Primacy of Peter, and his successor, the Bishop of Rome; but the schismatic portion allege that the Pope gave the plenary authority for their government to Gregory the Illuminator, and therefore that they are not now dependent on Rome. There is no unity of course between Rome and the schismatic Armenians, and none between her and the greater part of the Abyssinian Churches. But what has this to do with the unity of the Church of Rome? Her unity is preserved in the unity of the Apostolic doctrine and Apostolic authority, which she has maintained intact from the first. The Emperor Valens had no authority in the Church, and she is not responsible for his acts.

Mr. Derby, in his tenth Letter, returns to his theory of an independent British Church, founded by St. Paul, and

continued by the present Anglican Establishment. We cite his argument at length :—

“ We derive this church from the English, which traces its bishops in direct succession from the apostles, and it will be my effort to prove that the Church of England was planted in Britain in the first century by St. Paul, or his immediate converts, and was for centuries entirely independent of Rome, governed by its own bishops and archbishops ; that it has through every age struggled to preserve its independence, and in a greater or less degree opposed the errors of Rome, and now, purged of its errors, claims to be the true apostolic and Catholic Church. But before I trace the history and succession of this Church, let me briefly advert to its articles of faith and form of government. Its faith is founded on Holy Writ, the apostolic canons, and in part on the decisions of the earliest councils, including the great Council of Nice. If it has deviated materially from this primitive standard, point out the discrepancy. As respects the form of government, it is overlooked and guided by bishops, who trace their succession from the apostles. During feudal times, some of these were lords temporal in England. But no American bishop wields any temporal power, he bears here only the spiritual sword. As respects the office of bishop, the apostles at first appointed presbyters and deacons to direct the church under their guidance. This was in the infancy of the church. As the disciples increased, and the apostles pursued their mission in different regions, the more distinguished presbyters were selected as ‘ angeli or episcopi,’ legates or bishops. James, supposed to be the brother of our Lord,\* presided at the first council at Jerusalem, and pronounced the decree ‘ I judge,’ &c., which was confirmed by his associates ; and during the lifetime of St. John, in apostolic days, numerous bishops were appointed, for he addresses his Revelation from Patmos to the seven angels or bishops of the churches of Asia, namely, Ephesus, Smyrna, Pergamos, Thyatira, Sardis, Philadelphia, and Laodicea. The English bishops claim a succession from St. John, through Polycarp his disciple, bishop of Smyrna, and the great historian Eusebius, who had access to the early church records, has preserved the succession of the bishops of Jerusalem, Rome, Alexandria, and Antioch, from the apostolic period down to A. D. 305, fifteen years before the Council of Nice, when he wrote his history. In his list, Linus, a friend of St. Paul, a *married man*, a prince of Britain, appears as *first* bishop of Rome, Amianus as *first* of Alexandria, James, presumed to be the brother of our Lord, as *first* of Jerusalem, and Evodius as *first* of Antioch ; and by the same authority, Linus, bishop of Rome, presided over the church of that city from A. D. 67 to A. D. 79, when he was succeeded by Anacletus, and

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\* Acts 15 : 12, 28.

on his death, A. D. 91, by Clement. The liturgy of the Episcopal Church corresponds closely with that early used in the Church of Ephesus, ascribed by early history to St. John, and is traced from Britain to Lyons, and thence through Bishop Paulinus, a disciple of Polycarp, the pupil of St. John, to Smyrna and Ephesus, the seat of the favored apostle of our Lord.

"Let me invite your attention to the historical evidence that St. Paul first planted the Church in Britain. From those valuable documents, the Triads, preserved in the Welsh monasteries, it appears that about A. D. 52, Caradoc, a British prince, his son Brennus, and grandson Linus, were carried to Rome, and detained seven years in bondage. While in Rome they became converts to Christianity. At the end of seven years Brennus returned to Britain with Aristobulus, whose household St. Paul salutes in his Epistle to the Romans.

"This account is supported by Gildas, a British historian, A. D. 560, who affirms in the evidence of ancient records, that Christianity was introduced into Britain about the time of the revolt and overthrow of Boadicea, A. D. 61. Linus, the son of Brennus, of Britain, was probably ordained by St. Paul, first Bishop of Rome,\* and appears to have been his convert and particular friend, for he refers to him in his second Epistle to Timothy.† Clement, another disciple of St. Paul, and *third bishop of Rome*, commended by that apostle in his Epistle to the Corinthians, A. D. 87, states, that St. Paul, in preaching the Gospel, 'went to the utmost bounds of the West,' which not only includes Britain, but is the very expression by which Britain was then described. Eusebius, A. D. 305, says, 'one of the apostles visited the British isles,' and Theodoret, A. D. 415, mentions the Britons and Cimbrians as nations who had received laws from the apostles; and we are not to forget that St. Paul himself proposed to make a visit to Spain, a point still more remote.

"Were further confirmation wanting, the old writer Dorotheus mentions the fact that Aristobulus, the friend of St. Paul, was one of the first bishops of the British church, made many converts, ordained priests and deacons and bishops, and died in Britain. Aristobulus being a Greek, would of course carry with him the Eastern ritual, and this may explain the agreement between the Greek and British ritual, and the variance from the Roman. We may then safely infer, from the evidence of history, that St. Paul planted the Church in Britain between A. D. 60 and A. D. 67, when he was beheaded at Rome, under the Emperor Nero. The Triads further prove that Lucius, a *grandson of Linus*, the first bishop of Rome, was permitted by the Romans to reign over part of Britain, and exerted himself to promote Christianity in Britain.‡ The venerable Bede, the

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\* Apos. Cons. VII. 46.

† 2 Tim. 4: 21.

‡ See Monos. Angli. Vol. III. p. 188; Hopkins, P. C., 364.

favorite author of King Alfred, records a severe persecution (A. D. 803) of the Christians in Britain, and the names of the first martyrs, Verolamus, Aaron, and Julius, the last of Legion, or Cair Leon, in Wales."—pp. 70–74.

The learned Jurist appears to have two theories, which do not precisely harmonize. The one theory is, that the British Church was founded by St. Paul, who it will be recollected our Jurist maintains was the principal, if not sole, founder of the Church of Rome; the other is, that it derived from St. John through the Church of Ephesus in Asia. We hope in the second edition of his Letters, he will decide which of these two theories he will abide by, for we shall not allow him to hold both. With regard to the important historical documents he speaks of, all we have to say is, that the Welsh Triads have about as much historical authority as the romances of Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table, or of Charlemagne and his Twelve Paladins. There is not the slightest historical authority for supposing St. Paul ever visited Great Britain, and certain it is the British Church was never reckoned among the churches founded by an Apostle. The pretence that the Church in Britain was derived from the Apostle St. John, through the Church of Ephesus, has no foundation, except that there was, down to the time of Pope St. Victor, a difference as to the time of keeping Easter between certain churches of Asia Minor and the Church of Rome, and there was also a difference in the sixth century on the same subject, between Rome and the British churches. But though there was a difference, it was not the same difference. The British Christians differed as much from Ephesus as they did from Rome. St. Linus was an Etruscan, the son of Herculanius, not a Welshman, and grandson of Caradoc,—at least such is the best historical account of him extant. Whether St. Linus was a married man or not, does not disturb us, unless it be proved that he had a wife and lived with her as his wife while he was Pope.

The controversy the learned Jurist opens as to the original establishment of the Church in Great Britain has a certain antiquarian interest, but it is not of the slightest importance in the question before us. St. Paul could not have founded in Britain a Church not one with the Church Mr. Derby contends he founded in Rome. The Church is

a polity, a kingdom, and therefore must be, wherever it is, under one and the same regimen. It is only on this ground that there can be such a sin as schism. The supposition that the Church in Britain was an independent Church, complete in itself, would imply that it was different from the Church in other countries, and therefore deny the unity of the Church. But even suppose the British Churches were independent of the Apostolic See, that would not help the present Anglican Establishment, for this Establishment derives no Apostolic succession from them, since they had, at the time it was founded, no Apostolic succession, as they had no Apostolic character, except what they had derived from communion with the See of Rome. If they had ever existed as distinct and independent Churches, they had for ages ceased to exist as such. The Welsh prelates had, to say the least, for nearly a thousand years, maintained their Apostolic succession only through the See of Peter, and any other channel through which it could be derived, if other channel there was, had long since ceased to exist for them. Even if the present Anglican Establishment, which is not the fact, derived from them, as both they and it rejected the succession through Rome, it would not and could not have contained the original British Churches, and through them have reached the Apostles, and maintained an unbroken succession. The supposed or alleged British succession had been abandoned or lost, if it ever existed, by the connection with Rome and recognized dependence on the Papal See. Independence of the Papal See did not revive that succession, which had not merely been in abeyance, but had wholly lapsed. Supposing, then, the original British Church was founded by St. Paul, and was independent of Rome, the Anglican Establishment did not enter into the rights of that Church with which it had never been connected, and from which it was separated by a distance of a thousand years. This fact alone would be fatal to the Church claims of the Establishment. During the period of its union with the See of Peter, it was Catholic, or it was not. If it was, it is not now, because it has separated from that See; if it was not, it also is not now, because during all that period it wanted the Apostolic succession, and as it was united with no other See, that by another channel connects with the Apostles, it is not Catholic, for



the Church must be Catholic in time as well as space, and it can be Catholic in time only by means of an unbroken Apostolic succession.

Mr. Derby proceeds on the false assumption, that bishops, if validly consecrated, can transmit the Apostolic succession, thus resolving the Apostolic succession into simple Episcopal succession. There is no doubt that the Episcopal succession, although it has not been in the so-called Church of England, may be kept in heresy or schism. Heretical or schismatical bishops may be validly consecrated, and may confer valid orders, and if orders were what is meant by Apostolic succession, that succession might be claimed by heretics and schismatics. Indeed, no one validly ordained could be regarded as a schismatic or a heretic,—certainly not as a schismatic. But the succession essential to the Church is not simply the *Episcopal* succession, but also the *Apostolic* succession, and this is not simply a succession of orders, but also a succession of authority. Orders carry with them a character, and an indelible character, but they do not carry with them jurisdiction, or the authority to exercise Episcopal functions. The Church of Christ is Apostolic, not simply Episcopal, and bishops are successors of the Apostles only in the respect that the Apostles were Bishops, and can transmit only the Episcopal, not the Apostolic succession. Take the case of the British Bishops, as Mr. Derby presents it ; they could have transmitted only the Episcopal succession, for that was all they had ; but the Episcopal succession is simply a succession of orders, not of authority or jurisdiction. This would have given to the Establishment no Apostolic character, and no participation in the Apostolate which our Lord established. The Apostolate is above the Episcopate, and is under God the origin and source of all authority in the Church. Our Lord placed, as St. Paul tells us, Apostles first, that is, made the Apostolic authority the supreme authority in His Church. Bishops, by the simple fact that they are bishops, do not participate in this authority, for if they did no bishop could be deprived, even for schism or heresy, since the Episcopal as the sacerdotal character is indelible. The Episcopal character of itself carries with it no jurisdiction, no authority whatever, and the bishop can licitly perform no Episcopal function till authorized or assigned his jurisdic-

tion by the Apostolic authority. The Greek schismatic bishops have orders, and are real bishops, but they have no rightful jurisdiction, have no authority to govern the faithful, and no voice in defining the faith, simply because they have not the Apostolic succession, or have interrupted it, by breaking away from the Apostolic See. The Church must be Apostolic as well as Episcopal, as even Anglicans themselves virtually concede in asserting, though falsely, for themselves the Apostolic succession.

That orders do not of themselves carry with them Apostolic authority, or jurisdiction, even Anglicans must and do admit. Their bishops receive the Episcopal character from their brother bishops, but not their jurisdiction, or authority to exercise their Episcopal functions. That they receive from the crown or civil power, which, though it preserves for them a civil, can hardly be said to preserve for them the Apostolic succession. Anglicans were more consequent than are our American Episcopalians. They saw clearly enough that Episcopacy was not in itself a governing authority, and having resolved to reject all ecclesiastical authority above bishops, they transferred the governing authority, hitherto exercised in the Church, from the Papacy to the crown, and as they were aware that with bishops alone they could not retain the Church, they merged it in the state, and made the bishops simply civil functionaries. The Archbishop of Canterbury may be a prelate, but he is a civil not an ecclesiastical prelate. The Episcopalians with us, having no civil power to govern them, no king or queen to be their head and governor, are acephalous, and without authority of any kind. They have bishops in name, but no authority to assign them a diocese, and authorize them to exercise their Episcopal functions. Their convention is a self-constituted body, and is a ridiculous attempt to extract something from nothing. The bishops distributively have no power to confer jurisdiction, how can they then collectively? Can the whole be more than the sum of the parts?

But passing over this; it is clear that what Mr. Derby calls the Church of England has and can have neither Catholicity nor Apostolicity, both of which even he concedes to be essential marks of the true Church. It is not Catholic, for it is national, and there is a period of nearly a thousand years when it had no existence; and it is not

Apostolic, because, in the first place, it neither, in itself alone, nor by any other communion with which it is united, extends back to the time of the Apostles, and because, in the second place, it has no Apostolic succession, without which it is idle to pretend to Apostolicity. The Apostolic succession is not simply the succession of orders and doctrine, neither of which, by the way, has the Church of England, but also, and chiefly, the succession of the Apostolic authority. If any thing is certain, it is that our Lord established the Apostolate in His Church as well as the Episcopate, and that, if the Apostolate, as distinguished from the Episcopate, survives at all, it survives in the See of Peter, the Roman See, or, as we Catholics say, the Apostolic See. No other see can pretend to it, and in point of fact no other one does pretend to it. Whether it survives in that See or not, we do not at present inquire; we only say that it survives there or nowhere, and no church not in communion with it can be Apostolic, or any thing more than Episcopal. But the Anglican Church has no communion with the Roman See, and, therefore, is certainly not Apostolic, and in fact it does not in reality profess to be Apostolic, at least in this country, for here, it calls itself the Protestant *Episcopal* Church. The attempt of the author to prove it Catholic and Apostolic, is as miserable a failure as his attempt to prove the Papacy a usurpation.

The author makes, as he proceeds, various historical statements, which prove him as indifferent a historian as he is a theologian or a jurist. He is in general not better versed in history than he is in patrology, and cites historians almost as inaccurately as he does the Fathers. We cannot take up and correct all his misstatements, for to do so would compel us to cite nearly his whole volume, and that is more than we dare inflict on our readers; we must however make one extract more, *apropos* of the Church of England.

“Between the visit of Austin, A. D. 603, and the Norman conquest, A. D. 1066, various councils of bishops were held in England, and repeated efforts made to establish the power of the pope, but there was not at any one of them a recognition of his authority, although he was permitted to introduce monks and monasteries. Both the British and Saxon churches remained independent until the invasion of the Duke of Normandy, when they were merged in

one, entirely independent of papal authority. Under the Norman kings the pope of Rome resumed his efforts for supremacy in Britain, and sent a legate to that country. William II. made Anselm Archbishop of Canterbury, and he acknowledged the authority of Pope Urban, and for this the whole body of bishops at Rockingham *renounced* their allegiance to Anselm, and after this he was not permitted to convene councils or fill up vacant dioceses.\*

"Henry I. allowed no appeals to the pope without license from the king, and required the bishops to attend the councils of the nation. He maintained his ground against all opposition. Under the degenerate Stephen, papal encroachments were made, but his successor, Henry II., called a council at *Clarendon*, A. D. 1164, composed of archbishops, bishops, abbots, lords, and barons, which enacted sixteen canons that gave a most effectual check to the influence of the pope for several centuries. These canons provided among other things that the clergy should be amenable to the secular power, should not leave the realm without the king's consent, and have no right to appeal to the pope; that the election of bishops should be invalid until confirmed by the king, and that no freeholder should be laid under interdict without the consent of the king or his chief justice. These canons were condemned and revoked by Pope Alexander, but notwithstanding this, were confirmed by kings, lords, and clergy, at a council held at Northampton, A. D. 1176, in the presence of the pope's legate, were long enforced, and for centuries formed the bulwark of the Church of England. During the reign of Richard I., who died A. D. 1199, these canons were strictly observed, but under the pusillanimous John, renewed efforts were made by the pope to subject England to his sway, and that imbecile monarch swore fealty to him, and allowed Peter pence to be collected. His successor, Henry III., acquiesced in silence, but the opposition of the clergy was aroused, they complained to the king, and appealed from the pope to a general council for redress.†

"The three Edwards, who reigned from the death of Henry III., A. D. 1272 to 1377, held the reins with a firmer hand than the two weak kings who preceded them, and during their reigns the pretensions of the pope were successfully resisted. By a series of statutes the king was empowered to reverse sentences of excommunication, the donation of John to the pope declared invalid, the remittance of funds to Rome strictly prohibited, parties appealing to Rome declared traitors and outlaws, taxes were levied on the clergy, and when Boniface VIII., by his bull, A. D. 1296, forbid the clergy to pay such taxes, and excommunicated those who laid them, the king, by a decree of *outlawry*, sanctioned by the lay peers, enforced submission.‡

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\* See Lingard, the Catholic Historian, Hist. Eng. Vol. II. p. 23.

† See Lingard, III., pp. 32-89.

‡ See Lingard, Stowe, and Hopkins, P. C. p. 378.

"From the death of Edward III., A. D. 1377, until A. D. 1422, under Henry IV. and V., other restrictive statutes were passed, forbidding the sale of indulgences, and prohibiting aliens from holding benefices in England, except priors, who were required to find sureties for their compliance with the laws of the realm, for which see the statutes of England."—pp. 75-77.

It is not true, that, from the time of St. Austin to the Norman Conquest, both the British and Saxon Churches were independent of Rome. The British prelates may have, during a part of that period, objected to the authority of the Anglo-Saxon Metropolitans, but they acknowledged the authority of the Papal See. The Anglo-Saxon Church was founded by missionaries sent by Pope St. Gregory the First, and was of all the national Churches in the world the most devoted to the Apostolic See, and in which the successor of Peter found the least resistance to his authority. It was precisely during this period that England was called by the Pope, *Insula Sanctorum*. The Papal legate was received, and in general his authority was recognized by the government. Even the outlines of the English Constitution were transmitted by Pope Adrian I. through his legate to England, and adopted on his presentation by the bishops, the prince, and the nobility; and it was precisely after the Danish invasions, and at the period of the Norman Conquest, that systematic resistance, on the part of the king and his courtiers, lay and cleric, to the Pope began. Almost the reverse of what Mr. Derby pretends in the case. To be satisfied of this one needs but read the letters of St. Gregory VII. to William the Conqueror.

"Under the Norman kings the Pope of Rome resumed his efforts for supremacy in Britain, and sent a legate to that country." Just as if he never sent a legate to that country before. The Pope resumed no efforts for supremacy in Britain, which the Church in England had always acknowledged. His efforts were to make the Norman kings respect what had been always the rights of the Church. The bishops did not renounce St. Anselm, because he acknowledged the Papal authority, for the question did not turn on the authority of the Pope; but ostensibly because he acknowledged Urban II. to be the legitimate Pope, in a case of disputed succession, before the Church in England had done so; yet really because he had fallen under

the displeasure of that monster William Rufus. It was not the bishops that originated the difficulties that St. Anselm had to encounter, but the king who wished to enslave the Church, and secure to himself her revenues. Lingard, in the place cited by Mr. Derby, as was to be suspected, does not sustain the author's statement.

"Henry I. allowed no appeals to the Pope without license from the king." What then? Does Mr. Derby expect us to take the oppressive acts of a civil tyrant as ecclesiastical authority? We know very well that the Norman kings undertook to destroy the Papal authority in the English church, and with but too much success. A movement was commenced against the Papacy by William the Conqueror, which on the part of the civil power was continued down to Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Elizabeth. As far as the kings and courtiers could render the Church in England independent of the Pope, they did it, and in doing it, were too often aided by unworthy bishops; but kings, though they may oppress the Church, have no authority in the Church, and it is a little too bad to hold her responsible for the acts of which she is the victim. What should we think of a writer who should argue that the Catholic Hierarchy in England now, at the head of which is his Eminence, Cardinal Wiseman, is independent of Rome, because the English government passed against it The Ecclesiastical Titles Act? Yet he would only argue as does our learned Jurist. The acts against Appeals to Rome, the Clarendon Constitutions, the law of Præmunire, and all others which show that the sovereign wished to trammel the exercise of the Papal power in England, cited by Mr. Derby, prove, if you will, that the kings were anti-Papal, and oppressed the Church, but they do not prove that the Church did not recognize her dependence on the Papal See. They prove, so far as they prove any thing, that she did, and that the civil tyrants wished to break that dependence, and render her solely dependent on themselves, so as to be able to despoil her and tyrannize, more at their ease.

Mr. Derby is a degenerate Puritan, and forgets the principle on which his ancestors separated from the Anglican Establishment. They denied, in their stern way, the authority of the State in spirituals, and asserted, in principle, the Independence of the Church. They erred in

doctrine, they erred as to the Constitution of the Church, but they would have been hung, drawn, and quartered, sooner than have admitted the civil power had any authority in the Church. Mr. Derby, as a true Anglican, knows no distinction between Church and State, and takes the action of the State in a given country as the exponent of the faith, and discipline of the Church in that country. The Roman emperors at one time favored Arianism, exiled Catholic bishops, and intruded Arians into their Sees, and hence he concludes that the Church then was Arian. In England, he finds on the part of the king and parliament, a long series of acts hostile to the spiritual supremacy of the Holy See, and hence concludes that the Church in England was independent of the Apostolic See, anti-Papal, and that the Papal authority, opposed by the civil power, was illegitimate, a usurpation. The civil power with him is always right, and the ecclesiastical always wrong; kings are infallible and impeccable, but the Popes are always fallible and peccable. Kings are never ambitious or grasping when they war against the Popes; Popes are always insolent, grasping, ambitious, tyrannical, when they oppose kings and defend the rights of religion. The man really does not seem to know that he talks like a simpleton or a madman. For our part we believe that God is King of kings, and Lord of lords, that the Pope is his vicegerent on earth, and that when Pope and Cæsar are in conflict, Cæsar is in the wrong. Religion is the supreme law, and its representative is to be obeyed in preference to Cæsar, who represents only the state. We give to Cæsar what belongs to him, but we do not make him the arbiter of our faith, or the keeper of our conscience. We acknowledge in him no spiritual competency.

The Jurist, no doubt, wishes us as well as others to regard him as an intelligent and fair-minded man, and we suppose he would feel insulted were we to call him a pettifogger; but, although he is only a fair sample of anti-popery writers, we can conceive nothing more unjust or unfair than his whole line of argument from beginning to end. Our readers know that we make it a point of honor and of conscience to represent the views and arguments of our opponents fairly, and to reply to them in the same manner. Many a man may find in our pages his objections to our



views put in a clearer and stronger light than he had himself put them. We make it a rule to meet an opponent in his strength, not in his weakness, and answer his objections in their real meaning, without any chicanery, or the substitution of any false or collateral issue. We write never to win a victory, but always to elicit, defend, or recommend the truth, and we cannot understand how a Christian or even a man who respects himself can do otherwise, and yet we have rarely met a man who, in arguing against Catholicity, consents to meet the question on its merits. There is less both of candor and clear sharp intelligence in popular writers, and even writers of reputation, than is commonly supposed. Some of the criticisms of our own religious friends, as well as enemies, confirm us in this. There are few men who can write without prejudice, fewer still, perhaps, who can go at once to the heart of a question, and seize vividly and firmly the principle on which it hinges.

Mr. Derby is not a great man, is not really a learned man, but he is, as the world goes, a man of more than average abilities and attainments; yet his line of argument against Catholicity proves that he writes without conviction, and without reflection. It is clear from his pages that he has never inquired what is the truth in the case, but simply asked what he can say against the Church that may appear plausible to those who know nothing of the subject, or that will require time and labor on the part of Catholics to refute. Thus, wishing to disprove the unity of the Church of Rome, he proves that there have been in all ages heretics and schismatics, or persons who have denied her doctrines and her authority. He alleges what nobody denies, and which has nothing to do with the question. What he proves would be to his purpose, only on condition that instead of anathematizing the heresies he enumerates, she had adopted them, and had herself authorized the schisms alleged. He wishes to deny the Church's claim to Catholicity, and alleges to sustain his denial that there are sects, and nations even, that reject her, forgetting that his objection could have been urged with far greater force against Christianity itself in the days of the Apostles than it can be against the Church now. Why does he not argue that our Lord did not die for all men, because there are



millions who do not own him, and will never accept his offers of pardon, and salvation. He wishes to prove that the Papal power is a usurpation, and that the Pope has no right to govern the Church, and he quotes the acts of kings, parliaments, courtiers, and worldly churchmen, resisting the Papal authority as his proof, just as if these acts were the acts of the Church herself, or as if kings, parliaments, courtiers, juriconsults and false-hearted prelates, who side with power in order to save their heads or their revenues, were the authoritative expounders of God's law. Has the Jurist ever studied a single Treatise on Evidence, or attained to any comprehension of what is or is not pertinent evidence in a case? We fear not; if he has, he certainly has profited little by it. Yet, in reading what he has alleged in his effort to prove the Church in England was always independent of Rome, we cannot help feeling that much of the heresy and schism which now afflict the world, is owing to a grave neglect in the Middle Ages on the part of pastors to instruct sufficiently the mass of the faithful in the true Papal character of the Church. There were not sufficient pains taken to make the people understand that the Church is built by our Lord on Peter, and that where Peter is, there is the Church. The Papal supremacy was never palatable to the human nature which even bishops to some extent retain, and was always offensive to Cæsar. Hence in every nation there was and is a strong temptation to diminish rather than enlarge the Papal prerogatives, and to make as little depend on the Papacy as possible. Millions of Catholics in the Middle Ages lived and died without any explicit understanding of the real office and significance of the Papacy. Hence, Cæsar was able to command the support even of good Catholics against the Sovereign Pontiff. Godfrey of Bouillon fought in the army of Henry, King of the Germans, after that monster had been excommunicated and deposed by Pope St. Gregory VII.

Happily in our times a better spirit prevails, and Catholics generally turn with affection, devotion, and reverence to the See of Peter. They very generally regard the Church now as essentially Papal, not merely Episcopal as Cæsar would have them regard her. Cæsar has lost the greater part of his influence in spirituals, and there probably

has never, since the downfall of the Western Roman Empire, been a more cordial submission of the prelates, and the great body of the faithful, to the successor of Peter than now. The palmy days of Anglicanism, Gallicanism, and Josephinism are past, as the unanimity and joy with which the whole Catholic world has received the Papal definition, declaring the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady to be of faith, has been received, abundantly proves. The Papal triumph is complete, and a glorious future opens before the Church.

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ART. II.—*A Response to O. A. Brownson.* Universalist Quarterly and General Review. Boston: Tompkins. April, 1857.

OUR Universalist friend, in his issue for April, offers a rejoinder to the Reply in this Review for January last to his criticisms on our Article on *The Church and the Republic*, published the previous July. We have nothing to object to the tone or temper of what he calls his Response. It is respectful, in better taste even than his first article, and, we doubt not, intended to be perfectly fair and candid, although it is less full and less vigorous than we were prepared to meet.

The author thinks we made too much of his concessions, but we can assure him that we understood them precisely as he does himself.

“ Before attempting to comply with Mr. Brownson’s invitation to respond to his last article, we must ask him not to make too much of the concession we have made relative to the logical advantage which the Catholic has over the Calvinist. We write from the standpoint of a Universalist interpretation of Christianity; and we say, what we presume most of our Universalist brethren are also ready to say, that Calvinism concedes the premises out of which the necessity of an infallible interpreter is deduced. But such a statement, coming from a Universalist, is no concession. We have not said, nor do we think, that Universalism gives the Catholic any such ground of deduction. We have only said, that Calvinism does this; but as the Calvinist will not permit us to speak for him, our statement cannot be viewed in the light of a concession.”—p. 156.

We cited his concessions not as indications of his Catholic tendencies, nor as the concessions of one who would be recognized as authority by Calvinists, but as the concessions of an intelligent Protestant, who has as good a right to the name of Protestant as any one of those who pretend to believe more than he does, that there is no middle ground between Catholicity and Rationalism ; and as a testimony confirmatory of what we so often assert, that intelligent Protestants very generally regard so-called Orthodox Protestantism as an exploded humbug, and are very well satisfied that if Christianity is any thing more than a republication of the law of nature, if it be in fact a supernatural and authoritative religion, it is identically the Roman Catholic religion.

In our Article on *The Church and the Republic*, we maintained that religion is necessary as a mediating power between the individual and the state, to save us, on the one hand, from anarchy, and the other, from despotism ; and we further maintained, that to answer this purpose it must be religion organized as an organism, indeed, as the Church, because otherwise it is not a power, but simply an idea. The Reviewer accused us of taking the vital point, the only point in the argument which Protestants want proved for granted, and leaving it without even a show of proof. We replied, and showed, as we thought, that the charge was unfounded. Our reply, it seems, has not satisfied him, and he reiterates and insists on his objection in his response. He says :—

“ It is possible that our author, in the words here quoted from him, shows that he did not assume, that he really attempted to prove what we have termed the vital point in his argument. Possibly there is something in his words that we do not see. Candor, however, compels us to say, that we see in the extract nothing but an assumption of that ‘ vital point ! ’ What does he give as argument, that religion to be authoritative in society, must be organized, must be an organism ? Why must religion be an organization, a church ? The answer is, ‘ because religion without the church, without an organization, is not a *power*, is only an idea, a simple opinion, and therefore nothing but individualism. ’ Now it may seem an act of presumption to call in question Mr. Brownson’s logic—the province, of all other, wherein he is deemed a master. But truly, the words which we have just quoted from him, look very much like what Whately calls a *petitio principii* ; in common

words, a begging of the question. The real question is, can religion be a power without being an organization, a church? The *conclusion* for Mr. Brownson to establish is, that religion is not a power, except as it is an organism. And one of the *premises* by which he seeks to establish this conclusion is the affirmation that religion without a church is not a power! This conclusion, so far from being educed from his premise, seems to us simply a re-statement of the very premise! He affirms that religion to be a power, must be an organism. We ask for proof. He replies: religion unorganized is not a power. We leave it with our intelligent readers to decide, whether there is any difference between his proposition and his proof. The only difference that we can see, is that the one is stated in the affirmative form, and the other in the negative form.

"If, however, Mr. Brownson can show that the two propositions which we have deemed equivalents, have nevertheless a logical distinction of premise and conclusion,—and very likely he can show this,—we must still repeat our complaint, that he has assumed the turning point in the argument. If he can show that he has not done this in his conclusion, he will certainly admit that he has done so in his premise. Whether his proposition, that 'religion without the church, without an organization, is not a power,' be a re-statement, in different form, of the point which needs proof, or whether it may be considered as a prior and distinct proposition, authenticating that point, the proposition itself is an assumption. And the question arises, have we therefore a right to complain?

"Now with reference to this matter of assumption, we desire not to be irrational. We need not be told, that in all argument something must be assumed. Fundamental propositions are always to be taken for granted. No first truth can be proved. And so when two persons consent to argue, they go on the presumption that there are propositions to be assumed by both parties. Certainly, we shall not complain of Mr. Brownson for doing what we have done, what every body who reasons must do,—we shall not complain that he has assumed a proposition. If he has assumed that which is self-evident, which admits of no dispute, we have no right to demur. Our charge is not, that he has assumed a proposition, but that he has assumed the wrong one, one which is not self-evident, one which calls for proof, and which, if true, admits of proof. Every thing in our author's argument rests upon the proposition, that 'religion, without the church, without an organization, is not a power,'—always meaning by the term church, or organization, a body of men existing, in certain organic relations, as the depositaries and authentic exponents of religion. And will our author claim that this is a self-evident proposition? He has a right to start with an assumption—this he must do; but will he affirm that this is the proposition to start with—to be assumed? We ask particular attention to the point now under notice, for the whole issue of the present

"The church is not religion without a  
 body, and this very church a body  
 without power, we cannot conceive. At a point can be  
 reached, at this point can be  
 reached. *If it be true,*  
*that the church is a society,—and we*  
*are a part of it,—then we*  
*are a part of a society must*  
*be a part of it.* We are reminded, that  
 the church is that  
 of a certain con-  
 sideration than our author  
 the power which  
 the church has  
 without premedi-  
 tation and considerable  
 advantage which  
 the concession  
 virtually, makes  
 the Calvinist  
 power. Hav-  
 ing to grapple with  
 an admission is

did not develop the second Article. But we did offer it. Our argument is based on the fact that we must have a mediator to mediate between the two parties. To restrain one party is the case. To restrain on its own and the in-terest. This much we must concede.

we proceed to say, then it must be religion organized, as an organism, as the Church. Why so? Because religion not as an organism, as organized, as the Church, is not a power. Why not a power? Because it is then merely an idea, and ideas are not powers. There is no proposition not conceded left without proof, except that an idea is not a power, which we proved at length in our second Article on the subject. The Reviewer has fallen into the mistake of supposing that we leave the point, that the religion needed must be the Church, unproved, by confounding two propositions, which in our argument are given as distinct, and the one as the proof of the other. This is evident from the following extract:—

“ In our former article we must have been unfortunate in the choice of words, for it seems that Mr. Brownson regards us admitting his fundamental proposition! And here we must quote from his article:

“ ‘ Here is in substance our argument, and it is a conclusive, an unanswerable argument, if, as we allege, it be true, that religion unorganized, religion without the Church, is only an idea, and religion as an idea is not a power. That religion without the Church, religion unorganized, is only AN IDEA, our Universalist friend does not deny, nay concedes, as he must, if he speaks not merely of natural religion, or the law of nature, for it is impossible to conceive it to be any thing else.’—pp. 9, 10.

“ Mr. Brownson’s ‘ Universalist friend does not deny ’ that religion in order *to be a power* must be a church? Indeed, he does deny, and this most emphatically, every thing of the kind! What we are supposed not to deny, we in fact look upon as a most fruitful source of religious error. We have no faith whatever in the common idea of a church. It does very well for the Catholic to laud the church, and to attribute to it supernatural gifts, for in doing this he is consistent with the necessities of his faith. But we cannot conceive that the Protestant has any right to imitate his example in this respect; and when he does this, he puts himself hopelessly in the power of his Catholic opponent.”—p. 161.

Now it is clear from the words cited from us, that we do no such thing. What we say our Universalist friend does not deny, nay, concedes, is, that religion unorganized or without the Church, is only an idea. We did not represent him as not denying or conceding that it is not a power, for that was precisely what he did deny. From his not denying or conceding that it is only an idea, we labored in our Reply to force him by an argument *ex concessis*,

to concede that it is not a power, because ideas are not powers. We can explain his mistake only by supposing that he regarded the two propositions used by us as formally identical, and overlooked the fact, that religion without the Church is only an idea, was adduced as proof that religion without the Church is not a power.

We understand him now to concede that ideas are not powers, and to deny that religion without the Church, or unorganized, is only an idea. "If it be true," he says, in a passage already cited, "that religion without a Church be necessarily only an idea—and we think we apprehend Mr. Brownson's use of the term idea—then we must admit that the third and authoritative element in society must be an organization, a Church," and "we are prepared in view of certain considerations not now under discussion, to go further than our author asks us to go, and admit the Catholic Church to be the power that may rightfully adjudicate upon the claims in dispute between the state and the individual." The author knows that we used the word *organization* in our Article only in the sense of *organism*. His concession is, then, we take it, if religion without the Church is only an idea, if to answer the purpose it must be an organism, it must be religion as the Catholic Church. This concedes all we contend for, except a single point, and leaves no dispute as to which is the organism or Church, if any, is necessary. This point is, that religion without the Church is only an idea. In proof that it is only an idea, we allege the fact, that whatever in God's universe exists at all, exists as an organism, and cannot otherwise be conceived of as a real existence. This is conceded as to vegetables, animals, and human beings, and physicists have proved it to be true of minerals, and thus exploded the old notion of brute matter as well as the *materia prima* of the Peripatetics. What we call matter does not consist of brute atoms as the old Atomists contended, but of active elements, which Aristotle named *entelecheia*, and which Leibnitz calls *monads*. Every thing in it that actually exists, exists as an active force, or *vis activa*, and has in itself its own centre and principle of action. Whatever lacks this internal principle, which, as we ascend in the scale of creation, is called life or the principle of vitality, or is incapable of acting from within outwards, is no real, no substantive existence, and is at

best only an idea. Every real existence then exists as an organism, for an organism is characterized by the fact that it has in itself a principle of life or activity, and lives or acts from its own centre.

Now the question whether Christianity be an organism or not, is simply the question whether it really exists or not, that is, whether it is actual or only ideal existence. If not an organism, it is not an actual existence, and if not an actual existence, it can in the nature of the case, by the force of the terms themselves, be only an idea, or an idea existence. Now here is a question which the Reviewer has not duly considered. The question is this, Is Christianity or is it not an actually existing order of life, a real creation, as real a creation in the supernatural order as the natural creation is in the natural order? If not, it has no distinct existence, and is identical either with God or with nature. There is then no distinctively Christian religion, no Christian *vis activa*; and what we call the Christian religion is either a human conviction or an idea in the Divine mind, at least, if it be not a pure fiction. It is at best only a possible, not an actual religion. Precisely what we said when we said it was only an idea. Possible or ideal things may, but do not exist. To exist they must be concentered, for nothing exists in the abstract, or as an abstraction, and to be concrete or to be concentered, is to be an organism. There is no escape from this conclusion. Either Christianity is no actual existence, or it is an organism; and if an organism, then, as the Reviewer concedes, the Catholic Church, that sublime and mysterious existence, that life of unity in variety, which we presented to the meditation of our Universalist friend in our former reply.

The Reviewer unconsciously proves this even in trying to escape it.

"In rejecting, as we do, in whole and in every part, the theory of a church so brilliantly stated in this extract—in denying the existence of any vital union between religion and a church, as an organization—in affirming that religion may have, does have, an existence and a power, apart from organization—in repeating our former statement, that a church in itself, as an organization, has no mystery, no power, no sanctity; but that it derives all mystery, all power, all sanctity, from the religion which its several members bring into it—bring into it, too, as individuals—in affirming all these things,



Mr. Brownson will say, and say justly, that we are obligated to furnish something as having authority—a something which is not the individual, which is not the State, which is not an idea—a something that can speak to the individual, and to the State, and fearing neither, control both—a something, too, which can speak without liability to mistake, whose commands shall be irrevocable, and whose power cannot be resisted. Yes, we are obliged to furnish a power possessed of all these attributes. And are we asked, what is this power? We answer, reverently—God! We are of the number who believe that God not only was, but that he is—that he rules among the inhabitants of the earth—that he is ever present, actively present, and all-sufficient to mediate between the claims of the individual and the State. Mr. Brownson, himself, believes all this. The difference of conviction between him and us, relates only to the *medium* through which God, ruling among men, would restrain the licentiousness of the individual and the despotism of the State. He will say that God speaks through that mysterious body, so vividly portrayed in the extract, last quoted from him. We say, that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual man.”—pp. 164, 165.

This is a plain and unequivocal rejection of Christianity as an actual religion. The power needed, the Reviewer concedes, as we have seen, is the Christian religion. He now says it is God himself. “Are we asked, what is this power? We answer, reverently—God.” This settles the question, and denies Christianity as an actually existing provision made or instituted by our Heavenly Father for our wants, since it asserts, and permits us to assert, only God and nature. We proved, and the Reviewer concedes, that the power needed is the Christian religion, and therefore he must concede that the Christian religion is a power, something really existing, and capable of acting from its own central activity or life. But in the passage before us declaring the power to be God, he denies Christianity to be itself a power, and makes it merely the direct and immediate power of God, which, of course, he must do by denying Christianity as the Church, but which he is not at liberty to do after his concessions. He has to maintain against us that the Christian religion, without the Church, unorganized, as not an organism, is a power resting on its own basis, and capable of mediating between two other powers, or social elements. But here he shows that he cannot do it, for outside of the Church the only Christian religion he can assert is the Divine Being himself; that is,

Christianity without the Church, as we told him, has no actual existence, and is only an idea either in the Divine mind or in the human mind ; for the Christian religion as an actually existing religion, though like all creation inseparable, must be distinguishable from God, as the creature from the Creator, the work from the workman.

The author here proves what we told him in our former reply, that he does not conceive of Christianity as the new creation or supernatural order lying above the natural order. "He believes in no order of existence above nature, save God himself ; God and nature are for him all that is or exists. He has no conception of Christianity as a substantive existence or second cause." The passage we have last cited proves it. The question is not whether God is a power without the Church, for such a question would be absurd ; but is the Christian religion without the Christian Church or Christian organism a power, a substantive existence, with an internal principle of activity, or its own central life, as in the case of every other actual existence or living thing. This is what we denied, and what the Reviewer undertakes to prove, but what he does not succeed in proving.

We tell him again that there is a deeper significance in the Catholic view of the Christian religion objectively considered than he has suspected. He says all the difference between him and us is, that we hold that God speaks through that mysterious body we call the Church, while he holds that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual ; but he is quite out in his supposition that this is all or even the chief difference between us. We hold as firmly, and perhaps even more firmly than he does, that God speaks through the reason, the conscience, the soul of the individual. We hold in this respect all he holds, and we regard with even more reverence and docility the inspirations of the Almighty into the soul of each more than he does. Our religion requires us to do so. The Catholic cherishes with the profoundest love and joy this internal communion with God, and seeks always, when faithful to his religion, the internal light and guidance of the Holy Ghost. Why else his prayer and meditation ? Let the Reviewer read the life of any Catholic Saint, or any Catholic work designed for spiritual instruction and edification, and he will find that in this respect we believe all he

believes, and even much more than he has ever dreamed of. He differs from us here, in that he falls short of us, not in that he goes beyond us.

On this point Protestants generally mistake Catholic teaching. Because we assert an external authority, they conclude, very rashly and illogically, that we deny spiritual communion with God ; because we assert an external objective revelation deposited with the Church, and authoritatively expounded by her, that we deny all interior illumination of the individual soul ; because we assert the necessity of communion with the Church, in order to render us acceptable to God, that we deny all individuality and all inward piety and devotion. Nothing is, or can be, more untrue, more unjust to the teachings of our religion, and the practices of Catholic Saints. It is possible that our polemical writers have not always been careful in their controversial works to bring out this point, and that they have, by confining their defence to the external, had some influence in confirming the impression that we recognize only the external, and deny the proper internal relations of the pious soul to God. Protestants have not erred in asserting the interior operations of the Spirit ; their error has been in asserting them to the exclusion of the external authority and communion of the Church. One extreme begets another. The external being the point denied, the Catholic has had that to defend, and in confining himself almost exclusively to its defence, he has had the appearance of not esteeming, or rather, of not admitting the internal. But Protestants may be assured that we maintain with equal earnestness both the internal and the external, and both as concurrent, not as antagonistic elements or authorities. Protestants have less than we ; in no case have they more, or indeed so much.

The difference is not where or what our Universalist friend supposes. Certainly, we hold that God speaks through the Church, but that is only a little of what we hold. Certainly, we believe that God has deposited the revelation he has made with the Church, appointed her its guardian, teacher, and interpreter ; but all this, though much, does not begin to exhaust our idea of the Church. Nothing thus far does more than introduce us into her vestibule, nay, any more than bring us to her door. Our

radical conception of Christianity is that of a new creation or the regeneration, the special work of the Word made flesh,—an order of life which indeed presupposes our natural life, but lying above it, and bearing to the Word made flesh a relation analogous to that borne by natural creation to the unincarnate Divinity. There is by the Incarnation of the Word introduced into the universe not only a new fact, but a new order of existence, which we call the new creation, the regeneration, or the supernatural order. Our Lord assumed flesh not merely to make expiation or satisfaction for our sins, not merely to deliver us from the power of Satan, and repair the damage caused by transgression, but also to elevate man above the natural order, to be the second Adam or Father of a regenerated humanity, appointed to a supernatural destiny, or a destiny far above that to which man in the natural order is able to aspire. This supernatural order, this regenerated humanity, deriving from the Word made flesh, is in its most general expression what the Catholic means by the Church. The Church in this sense is the grand central fact of the universe, to which all the providences of God converge, for which all historical events are ordered, and in which the whole natural order finds its significance and its explication. The Church is not merely the Church on earth or Church militant, but it is the Church suffering, including the souls suffering in Purgatory, and the Church triumphant, the Church of the Blest in heaven. In all three states it is one and the same living and immortal body, one and the same holy communion, one and the same regenerated human race united to God through sameness of nature with the human nature assumed by the Word. By natural generation or birth no man enters into the Church, becomes a member of regenerated humanity, is introduced into this supernatural order of life, or is placed on the plane of the supernatural beatitude promised to those who enter it and persevere to the end. The assertion of the Church in this sense does not conflict with that natural communion with God which the Reviewer contends for, and the value of which we should be sorry to under-rate, but it offers a higher, a supernatural communion with God, even a closer communion by faith here, as well as by the light of glory hereafter.

The Reviewer will see that the office we assign to the Church, or the position she holds in our faith, is far higher, broader, and more intimate and comprehensive than he supposes. She is not merely a congregation of individuals holding certain relations to one another, but is to Christians what the natural human race is to natural men, and has the relation to them that the race or humanity has to individuals, and they live by its life as individual men and women in the natural order live by the life of humanity. You may know and assent to all Catholic doctrine, you may comprehend all mysteries, and in your life keep the whole law of nature, or practise with the most scrupulous fidelity all the natural virtues, and yet have no lot or part in the regeneration. You are a natural man, worthy of all respect in the natural order ; but he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than you. You must be born into the kingdom, into the regeneration, into the new or supernaturalized humanity, or you cannot live its life. Hence our Lord says, "Except a man be born again, he cannot enter into the kingdom of heaven." Hence the reason of the dogma, *extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, or, out of the communion of the Church, no one can ever be saved, that is, no one can ever attain the supernatural destiny or beatitude of regenerated humanity. To maintain the contrary, would be as absurd as to pretend that a creature, never a man in the natural order, can share the natural beatitude of a human being. As to the punishment of those who die out of the communion of the Church, it will be meted out according to their deserts, and will be neither greater nor less than in strict justice they by their deliberate acts have merited ; but common sense repugns the idea of their sharing the rewards of a humanity of which they have never been members, and whose life they have never lived.

We cannot undertake to explain the whole mystery of the regeneration, for it involves the whole mystery of the Incarnation,—a mystery which is the mystery of mysteries, and into which the angels desire to look in vain. God alone can adequately comprehend it, for its explication is in his own invisible and ineffable essence. But this much we know, its internal principle, its central life is Divine grace, flowing from the Word made flesh, and binding it to him as his mystic body, in a living organism. It is not

easy to grasp the conception of unity in variety, but we are obliged to concede it in natural as well as in regenerated humanity,—in the human race in the natural order, as well as in the Church, or supernaturalized humanity. St. Paul says we are many members, but all members of Christ's body, and members one of another, so that when one of the members suffers all the members suffer. There is one Spirit, and this one spirit unites all in one spiritual body, and is its informing principle, the centre and source of its life. The fact is certain, and if the mystery is great, it is not greater than that of the life of the human body itself, which is one, and remains one and identical, although one in variety of molecules, each one of which has distinct existence, and acts from its own central principle of activity.

Now Christianity in this sense, as the supernatural order, is what we assert as the Church of God. Whether there be or be not the supernatural order in this sense, is not now the question ; but between the assertion of this order, and simply saying God speaks to us through it, we maintain there is a difference, and therefore that the difference between the Reviewer and us is far greater and even of another kind than he supposes. We hold the Church to be a new creation, the institution by the Word made flesh of a new, regenerated, or supernaturalized humanity, a humanity propagated by election as natural humanity is by generation, not merely the organ through which God speaks or declares his law, or his pleasure. Christianity is not simply a law, or simply a doctrine, it is a life, the life of Christ, the Word made flesh, lived by men. Faith is good and is the foundation and root of every Christian virtue, and without it we cannot enter into the Christian order, and be assimilated to regenerated humanity, but it alone does not suffice. Faith alone cannot save us, and is never in the New Testament given as the characteristic mark of discipleship. "A new commandment," says our Lord, "I give unto you, that ye love one another." "By this shall all men know that ye are my disciples, if ye love one another." The characteristic badge of the disciple of Jesus Christ is love, or charity, not the simple natural sentiment of benevolence, though that is good in its own order, but the supernatural affection of the supernaturalized heart, the spontaneous sentiment of the heart elevated by grace

to the supernatural order, the natural expression of regenerated humanity, the principle by which the regenerated commune with one another and with the Word made flesh, their Head, and the Fountain of their life. Now the Church is needed not simply to teach us what we are to believe, or what we are to do, but she is needed as the condition of our rebirth and of our living the supernatural Christian life. Man lives a natural life only by communion with his like and with his Maker as author of nature; he can live his supernatural life only by communion with those who live that life and with the Word made flesh, its Author and Source. The end is the regenerated life, and as this life is not out of the regenerated humanity or the Church, it cannot be lived out of the Church.

There are over and above what the Reviewer supposes we ask of the Church, the Sacraments, by which our supernatural life is generated or begotten, recovered, sustained, strengthened, propagated. There is Baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, by which we are born into the supernatural order, or enter into the Church, and are made members of regenerated humanity, the mystical body of Christ. There is the sacrament of Penance, by which we recover the supernatural life, when by mortal sin we have lost it, and the Blessed Eucharist, by which our new life is fed, sustained, and invigorated. Now what is sometimes called the sacramental system is, after all, the great thing in the Church, and that which renders her so indispensable to the Christian. Could we even know without the Church with infallible certainty what we ought to believe and what we ought to do, we should still need the Church, and be as unable to live the Christian life without her as we are now. Cut off a man in the natural order from communion with his kind, and he dies. Sects separated from the Church become in relation to Christian humanity what savages are to natural humanity. They lose all power of progress, become stationary as to Christian life, or rather retrograde till they lose all traces of their supernatural life communicated in baptism, and fall back on the natural order alone, living only the natural life of humanity, as savages lose all traces of civilized life, lose the arts and sciences, fail to manifest the higher elements of human nature, and almost degenerate into mere animals, only a grade above the

ourang-outang or monkey. All history proves it. To live the Christian life you must live in the Christian order, and on the food appropriate to the sustentation of that order of life. The Christian belongs at once to two humanities, the natural and the supernatural, (for grace does not annihilate nature, but presupposes it,) and he can no more live the life of regenerated humanity without communion with that humanity, than he can his natural life without communion with natural humanity. We beg the Reviewer, when attempting to point out what we demand of the Church, to bear these important considerations in mind.

But we pass on. The Reviewer says :—

"The only objection which Mr. Brownson has offered to our view of the subject under discussion, is that it does not give religion the means of becoming a *power*. It must have an existence and an authority distinct from the individual and from the State. It must not be a part of either of these, for in this case, it will be what the individual or the State makes it, and so may be altered at the will of the party that proclaims it. We can conceive of no objection more fallacious. Because God speaks to the guilty wretch through his own conscience—because the word torturing and distressing him is thus spoken—is the word of rebuke a part of that wretch, just what *he* makes it, to be altered at *his* will, to be silenced at *his* nod? We confess, it occasions us no little surprise to find our author representing every thing, spoken through the individual, as a part of the individual, and so subject to him. Certainly, there is no necessity for such a representation. God *can* speak the words of truth, warning, censure, despair, hope, through the individual soul. To affirm that he does so speak, is to involve no contradiction. The things so affirmed, are at all events possibilities. And if they are possibilities, the argument, so far as the present issue is concerned, is with us. Mr. Brownson has argued the necessity of the Church, on the ground that any other authoritative element in society is an impossibility. We may not have shown that there actually is an authoritative power other than the Church. We are not called upon to do this. Our sole obligation is to show that there may be such an element of power. This we are confident we have done. And so long as it is in the power of God to speak to man *through* man—to speak through this medium words which no human will can modify, no human cunning evade, and which no human strength can resist—we find no necessity for that more cumbrous and complex instrumentality, which is usually commended to us as the infallible Church. This organization has been offered to us on the sole ground that it is a necessity. We have seen that no such necessity exists; and until forced to accept it on other and more conci



grounds, we feel compelled to trust in the individual soul as the medium of communication between God and his subject man."—pp. 165, 166.

That God could, if he had chosen, have made provision for the wants of natural society by other means than the supernatural order we call the Church, we have not denied, but expressly asserted. What we have asserted and claimed to have proved, is that some graciously sustained provision in addition to the law of nature in its natural organism is needed, because that has never been found to suffice. This much the Reviewer has in reality conceded, in conceding that the mediating power is the Christian religion. In his explications of Christianity he may, and no doubt does reduce Christianity to the natural law, but it is idle for him to pretend that, in conceding the Christian religion to be the power we had proved to be necessary, and which we had shown must be a power that the ancient heathen world had not, he did not understand, and mean that his readers should understand by it something more than simply the natural law incorporated into the very nature of man. Nay, we cannot let him off even there. He has conceded that, if Christianity without the Church is only an idea, or not a power, the third element needed is the Catholic Church as held by us, for he has conceded that if the Christian religion is an organism or a Church at all, or must be in order to be a power, it is that Catholic Church as set forth by us in our former reply. What we have to show on our side is what we have already shown : that Christianity without the Church is only an idea, or not a power. What he has to show on his side is, not that there may be a power without the Church adequate to the purpose, for that is not denied ; but that there is, and that this power is the Christian religion. He is bound by his concessions to find this power in the Christian religion, without the Church, and he is not at liberty to seek or to assert it elsewhere. But, while we have shown that the Christian religion without the Church is not a power, being only an idea, he shows neither that it is nor that it can be a power, for he simply casts it aside. He shows, if you will, that God can mediate without the Church between the state and the individual, a fact which nobody disputes ; but this is nothing to his purpose, for God is not the Christian religion, though as

the Word made Flesh, he is its Author and Finisher. We beg the Reviewer's special attention to this point in his next response.

The Reviewer passing over the Christian religion, and forgetting that he had conceded that it was the power needed, asserts the power to be God speaking to and through individual reason and conscience, and contends that in his so speaking there is something not individual, or under the control of the individual, something which the individual can neither make nor unmake. He says this, in opposition to our remark that, if we leave religion to be determined by the individual, we make it, practically considered, as was obviously our meaning, dependent on the individual, who would determine it to suit himself. We have no doubt that God can inspire men as he did the Prophets and Apostles, and accompany his inspirations with sufficient evidence that it is he who inspires them or speaks to them ; but the Reviewer neither believes nor intends to assert that God so inspires all men. But were he so to speak to and through individual reason and conscience, he would thus only strengthen the individual in face of the state, not the state in face of the individual, and therefore, whatever power he gave to the individual, it would be only one half of the power needed. But though God may speak to the reason and conscience of the individual, there being on the Reviewer's hypothesis no objective or external authority to which reason and conscience are bound to conform, or to which an appeal from them can be made, it would depend on the individual to determine that the voice he hears is the voice of God, and also the sense of what he hears, in both of which respects he may err, and mistake for the Divine word his own ignorance, interest, passion, inclination, or hallucination, as the Reviewer will be as ready as we to maintain against Calvinists or the various classes of Evangelicals.

No doubt a man's conscience often tortures him with remorse, and just as little doubt that a man has no absolute control over his convictions. But conscience is the judgment which a man passes on his own acts, performed or proposed, and is sound or unsound according to his intelligence or his ignorance. Conscience is never indeed to be violated, but it is never infallible. A man sins who

deliberately acts against his conscience, but he may have a false conscience, and feel he must do what he ought not to do, and suffer the tortures of remorse for doing what in itself is not wrong. Certain it is that God does not speak immediately to conscience so as sufficiently to enlighten it, or to save the individual, without instruction from other sources, from false judgments as to what is or is not his duty. Here is the difficulty. The individual, mistaking darkness for light, falsehood for truth, forms to himself a false conscience, and really believes that he has the right and is in duty bound to pursue a course of conduct, at war with the legitimate authority of the state. What, in such a case, is to be done? Remind him that God speaks to and through his reason and conscience? But that is only to aggravate the evil. Attempt to enlighten his reason and conscience? But does not God speak to his reason and conscience,—does not he himself enlighten them? Have you more light than God to impart? Is your human voice to be held paramount to the voice of God himself? Will you allow the state to disregard the individual's reason and conscience, and repress his destructive conduct? What, allow the state to trample on individual reason and conscience? That is tyranny, that is the grossest and most terrible despotism conceivable. If there is any thing sacred in the individual, it is his conscience, his intimate reason, for in that consists the elemental principle of all individual freedom. Over that the state has and can have no control; with it society has no right to intermeddle, for conscience is accountable to God alone.

Let us take a practical case, one which is not unlikely to create no little trouble yet, that of the Mormons. The Mormon reason and conscience are incompatible with the maintenance of the American state. Mormonism teaches that the dominion of the World belongs to the Saints, and that the Saints are the Mormons. The Mormons acknowledge, as we were instructed by two of their twelve apostles, no legitimate authority but that instituted by Joseph Smith amongst themselves, and hold that all the property of the Gentiles is given to them for their inheritance, and that they have a divine right to take and appropriate it to their use when and where they please; and if they do not as yet do it, it is because they are restrained

by prudential considerations, because they are not strong enough to make it prudent for them to attempt it. They hold also that they have a perfect right to slay and exterminate, in the name of the Lord, all who refuse to join their communion and submit to their authority. "You must exterminate us," said a Mormon elder to the writer, "or we, as we become strong enough, shall exterminate you," that is, the non-Mormon portion of the American people. Moreover, they hold to polygamy, and permit each man to have an unlimited number of wives. Here is the Mormon reason and conscience. Here is what Mormons hold God says to them. What will you do with them? Suffer them to go on and live and act according to their individual reason and conscience? But that is incompatible with the safety of the state, the peace of society, and the morals of the community. Suppress them by the strong arm of power? But who gave the state authority to decide questions of conscience? What right has the state to trample on the Mormon conscience any more than it has on the Catholic conscience, the Presbyterian, the Episcopalian, the Baptist, the Methodist, or the Universalist conscience? The foundation of all civil liberty is religious liberty, and religious liberty denies the competency of the state, or of any human authority whatever, in matters of conscience? For the state to trample on conscience in the case of Mormons, is in principle as much a violation of religious liberty as to trample on it in the case of any other class of persons.

Or, leaving the Mormons, let us take the Abolitionists. The abolitionist proper believes that he is bound in conscience to labor for the abolition of slavery, and in doing it to trample on all constitutions, all laws, all vested rights that are in his way. Here is individual reason and conscience opposed to the state. What will you do? Let the abolitionist go on, and trust to his individual reason and conscience to correct and restrain him? But his individual reason and conscience, supposing him sincere, are precisely what is in fault. To trust to them, would be like trusting the murderer to try, convict, sentence, and hang himself, or to recognize and execute the law which he has shown by the murder he despises. To let abolitionists proceed is anarchy. But to repress them by the state on its own authority alone is despotism, and the worst species of despot-

ism, for it is the assumption, by the state, of power to determine questions of reason and conscience. How with only God speaking through individual reason and conscience are you to get over this difficulty? Do you say that the reason and conscience of the abolitionist is the voice of God? How do you know, and how will you prove it? Do you deny it? By what right do you step in between the abolitionist and his God? Here it is evident, whether we speak of the Mormons or of the Abolitionists, the state cannot intervene in its own name, and by its own authority, without the denial of individual liberty, which is civil despotism. And yet, if the state does not intervene, legitimate civil authority is subverted, and anarchy inevitably follows.

God speaking to the reason and conscience of the individual is practically only individual reason and conscience, and the Reviewer in reality means no more by them. What he means is, that the reason and conscience of the individual are the voice of God in the soul, or God speaking in the nature of man, or as perhaps, he would prefer to say, in and through our spiritual nature. There is no need of any words about it, this is without any doubt his meaning. What he really means is, that God lives in us and manifests himself in our reason and conscience. His doctrine is, that the Divine power manifested in the reason and conscience or soul of every individual man is the power that mediates between the individual and the state. Reason and conscience are a law unto the individual; they are not the individual, they are not subject to his will, but are imposed upon him by his ever present and active Creator. Practically, then, the mediating power asserted is the reason and conscience of the individual. But does not the Reviewer see that these are all on the side of the individual, constitutive of the individual, and therefore are not and cannot be a mediating power between the individual and the state? What power can they give the state to repress them when they resist its authority? or what power do they add to the individual to resist the state when it would encroach on individual liberty? Does not the Reviewer see, that whatever may be the power of God, and whatever God might do, if he saw proper, practically he asserts nothing at all but what is included in the state and in the individual, and therefore leaves society without the third element proved

by us and conceded by him to be necessary? What he wants is an external and objective authority, to which both the state and the individual are amenable, which decides when the individual reason and conscience are really the voice of God, or in harmony with the law of God, and when not, and therefore when the state has the right to use force against them, and when not. A false conscience is not inviolable, when once decided by competent authority to be a false conscience. Let a competent authority condemn Mormonism or Abolitionism, and the state may, as far as practicable, suppress either. But neither the state nor the individual is competent to decide what is or is not a false conscience, or to declare Mormonism or Abolitionism against the law of God. If the state decides, it is civil despotism; if the individual, it is anarchy. Moreover, the case demands not only a simple judicial power, competent to declare the divine law in the case, but an executive power capable of executing by spiritual pains and penalties, not always without temporal consequences, the sentence pronounced by the court, or of giving efficacy to the judgment rendered, for both the state and the individual may, and often do act, the one tyrannically, the other rebelliously, against their sense of right and clear convictions of duty.

This power must be superior in dignity and authority to both the individual and the state. It must be a Divine authority, not a human authority, otherwise it would be no higher than the state, would have no more right than the state to decide questions of conscience, and in asserting it, we should only change the despot, not the despotism. All sects, religious corporations, or religious establishments, that have no Divine commission to teach and govern men in spirituals, are usurpations, and the worst of all possible despotisms, for they enslave the soul as well as the body. The Church, if a human corporation, if instituted by men even acting from the purest and best of motives, and sustained by all the world, would have no spiritual authority whatever, and to compel individual reason and conscience or even the state to conform to its rulings would be the grossest tyranny. The state is the highest conceivable human authority, and its constitutional acts are laws, and binding on all its subjects, unless they conflict with the laws of God, and conscience is amenable to no human tribunal. But as both

the state and the individual are amenable to the law of God, the "higher law," there is no encroachment on the prerogatives of the state or on the rights of conscience, by holding both subject to a tribunal expressly instituted and commissioned by God himself, and rendered infallible by his supernatural presence and assistance, to declare and administer his law for both.

The objection to Senator Seward's doctrine, concerning the "higher law," is not that he asserted that there is a higher law than the Constitution of the United States, but that while holding his seat by virtue of the Constitution he should assume the right to disregard it ; and, furthermore, that he made the individual reason and conscience the court to declare the higher law. There is a law above the state, and above the individual reason and conscience, and authority as distinguished from despotism, and liberty as distinguished from license depend on the strict observance of that law ; but as that law is the law of God, no court not above the state and the individual, or not expressly instituted, commissioned, and assisted by God himself can be competent to declare, or enforce its observance. Evidently, then, God simply speaking through the individual reason and conscience is not the power needed, for if it were there never would have been either despotism or anarchy. The Reviewer, then, has not shown what he acknowledges he was bound to show. He has not shown us the Christian religion is or can be a power without the Church, far less a power adequate to our wants. We have on the contrary shown that Christianity without the Church is not a power, because without the Church it is no actual or concrete existence, and can exist only as an idea, either in the Divine mind or in the human mind. The Reviewer himself virtually proves this, also, in failing to recognize any Christian religion without the Church distinguishable on the one hand from the Divine, and on the other from human nature.

ART. III.—*Present Catholic Dangers.* The Dublin Review.  
London : Richardson & Son. January, 1857.

It would not become us to mingle as a partisan in the controversy, if controversy it can be called, between *The Rambler* and *The Dublin Review*, the two leading Catholic periodicals in the English speaking world ; but as we were ourselves the occasion of its breaking out, we cannot in justice to either side pass it by in total silence. A year ago we took occasion from an outcry raised against *The Rambler* for some theological articles which were very far from pleasing us, to commend the general character of the periodical, and to offer it some words of sympathy and encouragement. We spoke of it as a periodical very much after our own heart, and expressed our admiration of its fresh and vigorous thought, its free, bold, and manly utterance. But lest our admiration should raise it up new enemies among those who look upon every departure from routine as threatening a departure from the communion of the Church, we intimated that, though it took the right direction, it did not go far enough for us, and in some respects lacked breadth and comprehensiveness. Understanding, or not understanding, our motive, the editors replied with great frankness, admitting the alleged defect, and excusing it, not on the ground of want of conviction, but of the necessities of their position, which prevented them from seeing their way clearly to follow the course we recommended. We cite their reply :—

“ Whatever is the fault of our published views, their lack of ‘breadth and comprehension’ is rather a consequence of our want of ability to say what we mean in a masterly manner, and of the necessity that encompasses us to observe silence on many things, than of our want of perfect and intimate conviction of the truth which Dr. Brownson so well unfolds. England, and especially the little remnant of Catholic England, lives very much on tradition—lives by the past. We cannot criticise the past without breaking with that on which our editorial existence depends. We have to write for those who consider that a periodical appearing three times in the quarter, has no business to enter into serious questions, which must be reserved for the more measured roll of the Quarterly. Our part, it seems, is to provide milk and water, and sugar, insipid ‘amusement and instruction,’ from which all that might suggest and excite



real thoughts has been carefully weeded. These are the conditions sometimes proposed to us, as those on which our publication will be encouraged. We may, indeed, be as severe as we like in showing that there is not a jot or scrap of truth in any of the enemies of Catholics; that all who oppose us, or contend with us, are both morally reprobate and intellectually impotent. We have perfect liberty to make out, by a selection of garbled quotations, how all the sciences of the nineteenth century are ministering to their divine queen; how geologists and physical philosophers are proving the order of creation as related by Moses; physiologists the descent of mankind from one couple; philologists the original unity and subsequent disruption in human language; ethnographers in their progress are testifying more and more to that primeval division of mankind into three great races, as recorded by Moses; while any serious investigation of these sciences, made independently of the unauthoritative interpretations of Scripture, by which they have hitherto been controlled and confined in the Catholic schools, would be discouraged as tending to infuse doubts into the minds of innocent Catholics, and to suggest speculation where faith now reigns. People, forsooth, to whom the pages of the *Times*, the *Athenæum*, and the *Weekly Dispatch*, with all their masterly infidelity, lie open, will be exposed to the danger of losing their faith if a Catholic speculates a little on questions of moral, intellectual, social, or physical philosophy,—if he directs his mind to any thing above writing nice stories, in illustration of the pleasantness and peace of the Catholic religion, and the naughty and disagreeable ends to which all non-Catholics arrive in this world and the next,—to any thing more honest than defending through thick and thin the governments of all tyrants that profess our religion, and proving by ‘geometric scale,’ that the interior of a Neapolitan prison is rather preferable to that of an English gaol. We only wish we saw our way clearly to be safe in speaking out in a manner still more after Dr. Brownson’s heart.”—*Rambler*, Oct., p. 316.

There can be no doubt that this reply is keenly sarcastic, and in some measure contains its own refutation. We are not, however, surprised that it should have given offence to those, if such there were, against whom it was pointed. The editors did not intend their remarks to apply, and they could not justly apply, to the great body of Catholics in the United Kingdom; but we presume, there as well as here, there are some to whom they are not inapplicable,—very good people too in their way, very devout, and much more likely to save their souls than we are ours, who suppose that all the traditions of Catholics are traditions of faith, or at least no less sacred, and that to introduce any

novelty in our modes or methods of presenting or defending Catholic doctrine is to introduce novelty in doctrine itself. In the view of these good people to question the traditional replies to popular objections, or the historical, scientific, or philosophical statements of popular apologists, is to betray a proud, arrogant, innovating, and indeed an heretical spirit and tendency. These must have been deeply wounded by the sarcasms of the *The Rambler*. *The Dublin Review*, not usually on the side of those who are unduly wedded to the past, seems to have been stung by some of *The Rambler's* remarks, and seizing upon the unlucky allusion to "the little remnant of Catholic England," and coupling it with the fact that the editors of the offending periodical are converts of not many years' standing, takes occasion to retort sarcasm for sarcasm, and to read them and converts in general, a severe, and even if a merited, certainly not a very palatable lesson. It rebukes them for their arrogance, exhorts them to humility, and reminds them of their very great inferiority in Catholic things to those who have sucked in Catholicity with their mother's milk. It accuses them of drawing a line between old Catholics and new converts, of disparaging the worth and services of those who have toiled from early morning and "borne the burden and heat of the day," and of seeking to form a convert party. It even goes farther, and accuses the editors of *The Rambler* and their friends of standing aloof from the Catholic body, of refusing to throw themselves into the great current of Catholic action, and of conducting themselves as critics or speculators instead of hearty, loyal, and self-forgetting co-operators. All this is done with rare polish, unction, and suavity of manner ; but we are forced to add that, however polished or unctuous, it has given pain to not a few old Catholics, and awakened a feeling of wrong in the bosom of more than one convert.

Our readers know that we ourselves have taken great liberties with converts who have attempted to fly before they were fledged, and that we have gone as far as the extreme limits of truth and justice in our efforts to avoid exciting the slightest jealousy or distrust in the minds of those who have been Catholics from their infancy ; but with all respect for the writer in *The Dublin Review*, with whom in much he says we cordially sympathize, we must be per-

mitted to say, in all sincerity and loyalty, that he has in our poor judgment borne too hard upon a class of men who have the right to meet with encouragement rather than discouragement from those of their brethren who have never wandered into "a far country," and who have the happiness of owing their Catholicity, under God, to the faith and piety of their parents. We converts were indeed born and brought up in heresy and schism, but through the grace of God we have abjured heresy and schism, and followed our convictions into the Church, who has received us to her bosom as a true mother, and deigned to own us as her children. We see not wherein our merit is less than that of those who have had only to persevere in the way they were trained to go, or what greater right they have to boast over us than we have to boast over them. Neither of us, indeed, have any right to boast ; for in both cases the glory is due solely to Him who became man and died on the cross, that he might redeem us, purify us, and elevate us to union with God. We do not believe that it ever occurs to converts to place themselves in their own estimation above old Catholics. We look upon ourselves rather as the prodigal who has returned to his father's house, and has been unexpectedly and undeservedly received as a son. We are aware of the superiority of those who have welcomed us among them, and readily acknowledge it, in all that which can come only from long training and familiar habit. They are, as it were, native born citizens ; we are only aliens recently naturalized, and we are far more likely to feel our inferiority, than to claim superiority, in Catholic things, to those who are to "the manner born."

It is but natural that converts should be inferior in that nice Catholic tact, and that quick and instinctive appreciation of Catholic things, which belong to those who have been reared in the Church, but, perhaps, they have, after all, some compensating advantages. They have a more intimate knowledge of the inner life of non-Catholics, and in general are better able to appreciate the obstacles which they find in the way of accepting the Church and submitting to her authority. Coming to Catholicity free from all the old secular traditions, habits, and associations of Catholics, they can more easily discriminate between what is of religion and what pertains only to the social life, nationality,

or secular habits, customs, and usages of Catholics. In the concrete life of Catholics in all ages and nations there is much inherited from their ancestors, which, if not anti-Catholic, yet is no part of Catholicity, but which they do not always distinguish from their religion itself, and sometimes half confound with it. The Catholics of Great Britain and the United States are hardly more widely separated from their non-Catholic countrymen by their faith and worship, than they are by their associations, habits, customs, affections, and modes of thought and action, which are no necessary part of their religion, and are only accidentally connected with it. The convert, trained in a different world, is not wedded to these forms of secular life, and is able to distinguish them without effort from Catholicity. He can embrace Catholicity, so far as regards these, with less admixture of foreign elements, and attach himself more easily to it in its essential and universal character, free from the local habits, manners, and usages of an old Catholic population. This is some compensation, and places converts more nearly on a level with old Catholics than is sometimes supposed, though it, no doubt, leaves them still far inferior.

The convert, on being admitted into the Church and beginning to associate with his Catholic brethren, does not always find them in all respects what he in his fervor and inexperience had expected. He finds the Church altogether more than he promised himself, or had conceived it possible for her to be, but he finds, also, that, though in all which is strictly of religion, his sympathy with his Catholic brethren is full and entire, in other matters it is far from being perfect,—through his fault it may be as well as through theirs. He finds that they are wedded to many things to which he is a stranger, and must remain a stranger; that, in all save religion, he and they belong to different worlds, and have different habits, associations, and sympathies. Outside of religion he belongs to the modern world, speaks its language, thinks and reasons as a man of the nineteenth century, while they appear to live in what is to him a past age, have recollections, traditions, associations, which, though dear to them, have and can have no hold on him. If he allows himself to dwell on these, he is apt to form an undue estimate of the real sentiment and worth of the body into

which he has been admitted. There is, with equal faith and piety on both sides, in matters not of religion, a real divergence between them, which not unfrequently leads to much misunderstanding and distrust on both sides. Each is more or less tenacious of his own world, each clings to his old habits, associations, traditions. The old Catholic feels that there is a difference, though he may not be able, in all cases, to explain its cause or its exact nature, and is disposed to think that something is lacking in the convert's faith or piety. To satisfy him, the convert must sympathize with him in what he has that is not of Catholicity, as well as in what is, fall back with him into that old world inherited from his Catholic ancestors, and thus become separated in all things in which he is separated from the actual world of to-day. He naturally wishes the convert to embrace not only the Catholic religion, but all the traditions of Catholics, and defend the civilization of Catholic ages and nations, and the conduct of Catholics in relation to religion and secular politics, with as much zeal and resoluteness as he defends Catholicity itself, although, in point of fact, to do so would require him to defend much that the Church has never approved, and much that she has never ceased to struggle against. The convert, if a full-grown man, cannot do this. He cheerfully takes the old faith, submits unreservedly to the old Church, but in what is not repugnant to faith or morals he sees not why he should change, or cease to be a man of his own times or of his own country. He is, unless of a very philosophic turn of mind, even offended by the old Catholic's unnecessary and in his view unreasonable attachment to the past, which was no better than the present, if indeed so good, to old methods, to old usages, no longer in harmony with the living thought of the age or country, and feels a vocation to emancipate his Catholic brethren from a bondage the Church does not impose, and which seems to him to crush out their manhood, and deprive them of all ability to serve effectively their Church in the presence of non-Catholics.

Certainly, there is here much misapprehension and exaggeration on both sides, and neither side is strictly just to the other. All old Catholics do not cling to the past : many of them are fully up with the times, and are men of their own age and nation ; and converts are not always defi-

cient in sympathy with mediævalism ; indeed, some of them are too much attached to it, and far more than old Catholics hold that what is mediæval is Catholic, and what is not mediæval is not Catholic. Still, the principle that underlies the convert's thought is sound. It is the principle on which the Church herself always acts in dealing with the world. Herself unalterable and immovable, she takes the world as she finds it, and deals with it as it is. She found the world in the beginning Imperial ; she accepted Imperialism, and labored to Christianize it. At a later epoch she found the world Barbarian ; and she took the Barbarians as they were and Christianized and civilized them. At a still later period she found it feudal. She never introduced or approved Feudalism itself, yet she conformed her secular relations to it, and addressed feudal society in language it could understand and profit by. In the same way she deals with our proud, self-reliant, republican Anglo-Saxon world. She concedes it frankly in the outset whatever it is or has that is not repugnant to the essential nature and prerogatives of our religion, and labors to aid its progress. She leaves it its own habits, manners, customs, institutions, laws, associations, in so far as they do not repugn eternal truth and justice, speaks to it in its own tongue, to its own understanding, in such forms of speech and such modes of address as are best fitted to convince its reason and win its love, and that too without casting a single longing, lingering look to the past she leaves behind.

But all Catholics are not up to the level of the Church, and not a few of them never study her history, investigate the principles on which she acts, or catch even a glimpse of her sublime wisdom or her celestial prudence. Many of them are merely men of routine, creatures of the traditions and associations inherited from their ancestors, and which they seldom even dream of distinguishing from their religion itself. These cannot sympathize with the convert who comes among them, bringing with him the active and fearless, not to say reckless, spirit of the nineteenth century. He is a phenomenon they do not fully understand, and they find him both strange and offensive. He breaks their rest, rouses them from their sleep, disturbs their fondly-cherished prejudices, even forces them to think, to reason, to seek to know something of the world passing

around them, to take broader and more comprehensive views of men and things ; in a word, to come out from the cloister and be active, living, energetic men in their own day and generation ; and they not unreasonably look upon him as a rash innovator, a restless spirit, a disturber of the peace and repose of the Church, because the things he wars against are regarded, by those who cherish them, not as hindrances, but as helps to religion. Indeed, they are at a loss to conceive what it is he wants or is driving at, and they suspect that he is really seeking to Protestantize, secularize, or, at least, modernize the Church, and they conclude that they may justly resist him, and inculcate doubts as to the reality of his conversion, or, at least, as to his perseverance in the faith. This is natural, and is to be expected by every one, convert or no convert, who attempts to effect a reform in any department of human activity.

The convert again, on his side, convinced of the soundness of the principle on which he proceeds, and the justice and purity of his aims, and not in all cases meeting that clear understanding among Catholics of principle or that firm and uniform adhesion to it he had expected, feels, at first, a sad disappointment, and though he abates nothing in his faith or his devotion to the Church, is tempted to form too low an estimate of the spirit, understanding, and energy of the mass of his new brethren, and to take what is really true of a small number only, as characteristic of the whole body. He thus not unfrequently does great injustice to men who, in those very qualities he most admires, are far his superiors. He forgets, too, for the moment, though he is freer than old Catholics from one order of old habits and associations, that he is less free from another, that as pure and as complete as he may regard his Catholic faith, it is nevertheless possible that he retains some of the old Protestant leaven, and unconsciously cherishes a spirit and tendency that the delicate Catholic instinct repels. It is possible that we who are converts have in us a slight touch of Puritanism, and forget that not all who are *in* the Church are *of* the Church ; that we make too much depend on human wisdom, virtue, and sagacity. God's ways are not our ways, and it is very possible that brought up as we have been in Protestantism, and accustomed to rely almost solely on human agencies,

and to feel that it is we who sustain the Church, not the Church that sustains us, we may be urging in our zeal and enthusiasm, or in our impatience, methods of proceeding which God cannot bless, because they would rob him of his glory and transfer it to man. In dealing with principles no compromise is admissible, but in their practical application compromises are allowable, are almost always necessary, and we often endanger success as much by going too far ahead of those with whom we must act, as by lagging too far behind them ; we must deal with men as we find them, not only with men outside of the Church, but also with men inside of the Church. What we want may be just and desirable, and yet it may be our duty not to urge it, or not to insist on it, because, in the actual state of things, the Catholic body is not prepared to receive it, or to co-operate with us in obtaining it. There is never wisdom in urging what is impracticable. Never are we able to do all the good we would ; we must content ourselves with doing all that we can, and preparing the way for our successors to do more. Catholics must work with the Catholic body, and none of us must suppose that we are the only ones in that body who have right views, true zeal, and effective courage. To some extent the writer in *The Dublin Review* may have only administered us a well-merited rebuke, for it may well be that we have not rightly judged this old Catholic body into which we have been incorporated, and that we have formed too low an estimate of the *active* virtues of its members.

Nevertheless, we agree this far with *The Rambler*, with many of our fellow-converts, and a much larger number not converts, but Catholics from infancy, that the English speaking Catholic world, to say nothing of Catholics who speak other tongues, are too timid and servile in their spirit, too narrow and hidebound in their views, too tame and feeble in asserting the truth, beauty, and majesty of their Church ; that a freer, more manly, and energetic spirit is demanded by the temper and wants of our times ; and that to act favorably on the modern world we should take more pains to place ourselves in closer relation with its intellect, and accept with more frankness and cordiality its historical, scientific, and philosophical labors in so far as they have obtained solid and durable results. In matters



of religion we are and must be exclusive, for truth cannot tolerate so much as the semblance of error ; but dogma saved, we must not manifest intolerance towards either Catholics or non-Catholics, or feel that we have nothing to do or say in the great intellectual movements going on around us. It will not do for us to stand aloof from these movements, or to deny that any thing true has been discovered, or any thing valuable has been obtained by men out of our communion. Out of the Church as well as in the Church men have nature and natural reason, and in what pertains to the natural order may make valuable discoveries and important acquisitions. We can, in the times in which we live, be neither just to them nor to our Church herself, if we remain ignorant of their labors, or refuse to acknowledge what of real merit they have. The whole non-Catholic world is not anti-Catholic. The Church found much in Græco-Roman civilization to retain, and the influence of the Roman jurists may be detected even in our works of casuistry. The modern non-Catholic world is not further removed from Catholicity than was the ancient Gentile world. The civilization which obtains now in non-Catholic civilized nations is less repugnant in principle and in spirit to our holy religion than was the old Græco-Roman civilization. As compared with that it is Christian. There is more in the labors of modern non-Catholic scholars, physicists, historians, poets, philosophers, that we can advantageously appropriate, than the Fathers found in the labors of the great men of classic antiquity ; for in the order of civilization the Church has never ceased to exert an influence on men even outside of her communion. Undoubtedly, we can save our own souls without any knowledge of the learning and science cultivated by non-Catholics ; undoubtedly the intrinsic value of their learning and science is far less than they imagine ; but we have in our age to seek the salvation of our neighbor as well as of ourselves, and to cultivate not merely our own personal piety, but those active and disinterested virtues which render us instrumental in saving others ; and to do this we must know thoroughly this non-Catholic world, master it on its own ground, and prove ourselves its superior in every department of thought and life.

We are not disposed to deny or to disguise our defects.

We frankly concede them ; but they are easily explained and excused by the circumstances in which we have hitherto been placed. It is true, we do to some extent lack spirit, independence, energy, and courage ; we do not assert and maintain our rightful position ; we do not lead, as we should, the intellect of the age ; and not a few of the finest minds, the ripest scholars, and most brilliant geniuses of the modern world are not in our communion, are indifferent or hostile to the Church. But how long have we had our freedom ? For three hundred years English speaking Catholics have been an oppressed, down-trodden, and persecuted class. England boasts of her free constitution, and we admit that the English have always been the freest people in Europe. But till quite recently, Catholic Englishmen, with one or two brief intervals, have, since the Reformation, had no share in English freedom. They have been regarded as outside of the constitution, deprived of the native-born rights of Englishmen. Protestant England despoiled our Catholic ancestors of their rights, confiscated their goods, robbed them of their churches, schools, colleges, and universities, and did all that power aided by Satanic malice could do to force them into apostasy, or, failing in that, to reduce them to the most abject poverty and ignorance, and to crush out their manhood. They were able to hold fast their faith only at the sacrifice of all else, only in bonds, confiscations, fines, imprisonments, exile, and death. All England and all Ireland have been drenched with the blood of Catholic martyrs, and made hallowed ground. The Catholic religion was proscribed by law, and the most terrible penalties annexed to its practice, and no Catholic could, for ages, in free England, practise it save by stealth. The clergy were proscribed and forbidden to enter the kingdom, and if they did enter it, and were convicted of performing any sacerdotal function, they were hung, drawn, and quartered as traitors ; they were obliged to resort to all manner of disguises, to live in secret, to conceal their character, and take all possible precautions against capture, as criminals hiding from the officers of justice, in order to minister for a short time to the spiritual wants of the faithful. With all their precautions they were caught and executed by hundreds. The history of Catholics in England during the reign of Elizabeth Tudor,

and to some extent under James I., repeats that of the early Christians of the martyr ages. How were the Catholics, despoiled, persecuted, oppressed, surrounded by spies, treated as outlaws, and every day dragged to slaughter, to retain the bold, energetic, independent bearing of a ruling class? How should they not, when they had to resort to every expedient, make every shift, not forbidden by Catholic faith and morals, in order to save their lives, become in manner tame, feeble, suspicious, and evasive? They needed all their firmness and heroism when called before the magistrate, when subjected to torture, or led to execution, and on those occasions their firmness and heroism rarely failed them. How, when stripped of their goods, deprived of their schools, excluded from the universities, and resisted at every point by authority alike vigilant and ferocious, were they to keep up their scholastic tradition, and to preserve the lead of literature and science?

During these centuries of persecution, Catholics could be expected to do no more than study to practise their religion in as quiet and as inoffensive a way as possible. They were thrown upon the defensive, and naturally adopted an apologetic tone. However firm they might be in the faith, or courageous to suffer for it, their position in the state, or rather out of the state, the disguise, the secrecy, the evasion they were obliged to study in order not unnecessarily to compromise themselves or their friends, the perpetual danger in which they lived of having their goods confiscated or their throats cut, naturally told on their characters, and made them in the world, amongst their enemies, cautious in their language and timid in their conduct; nor is it to be thought strange if, at times, the iron entered into their souls, if they felt that they were, in a worldly point of view, an inferior class, and lost the hope of seeing better days. Assailed on all sides, their religion every where misrepresented, grossly belied, and calumniated, what more natural or more excusable than that they should study, as far as possible, to apologize for it, to divest it of its more offensive features, that they should pass lightly over those passages of history or science apparently against them, and to the explanation of which they could not expect their enemies to listen, or that they should seek and dwell only on such things as would tell most in their favor?

We see in the ages of persecution, in the oppression to which Catholics were subjected, in England and Ireland from the accession of Elizabeth, and in Scotland, from the accession of James VI. down to the passing of the Catholic Relief Bill in 1829, enough to account for all the defects to be detected in the great body of English-speaking Catholics at the present time, and that, too, without casting the slightest blame on our Catholic ancestors.

We think it undeniable that Protestants in the United Kingdom and in the United States, have a more thorough, a more comprehensive, and a more finished education than Catholics generally have in the same countries. In England, the Protestants not only deprived Catholics of their schools, colleges, and universities, but took them and their ample endowments, derived from Catholic sources, for themselves. They enriched themselves with our spoils, as was the case wherever the government became Protestant, a fact never to be forgotten when speaking of the greatness, power, or civilization of the Protestant nations of Europe. The Protestants entered into the possessions of their Catholic ancestors, and took as their outfit the accumulations of ages of Catholic faith, zeal, liberality, and labor. Despoiled of the provisions they had made for education, forbidden both by their poverty and by law to make new provisions, Catholics had, for a long time, no resource but that of sending their children abroad to be educated in some Continental school, which few of them could do, and which the government prevented all from doing as far as it was able. Catholics were excluded from the public schools and universities which their own Catholic ancestors had founded and endowed, and in Ireland at least, the Catholic father was prohibited by law, under severe penalties, from teaching his own child even letters, from sending him out of the kingdom to be educated, as well as from transmitting to him money to pay his expenses. Under these spoliations, these terrible penal laws, and with all the wealth, power, and patronage of the state against them, without means, without civil protection, proscribed and treated as outlaws, how were Catholics without a miracle to compete successfully with their Protestant enemies in the several branches of a finished liberal education? History tells us of the consternation with which the early Christians received the cowardly edict

of Julian the Apostate, closing to them the schools of the Empire, and yet the schools he closed to them had been founded, not by them or their Christian ancestors, but by non-Christian emperors, and they were supported from the Imperial treasury. The British government under Protestant influence carried its injustice, its cruelty, its cunning, and its cowardice to an extent which Julian, astute and malignant as he was towards Christians, appears never to have dreamed of. He closed to the Christians the public schools of the Empire, and forbid them the study of heathen literature, but he did not forbid them to found schools of their own, or to teach in them their own religion, philosophy, literature, and science. What should astonish us, therefore, is not that there is a disparity in education, in literary and scientific culture, between English-speaking Catholics and English-speaking Protestants, but that the actual disparity is no greater.

Nevertheless, we must not conclude because our ancestors did well, did nobly under their circumstances, that we are to be content, under the far more favorable circumstances in which we are placed, with doing no more than they did ; we must do for our epoch as well, as nobly as they did for theirs. We are now in the English-speaking world comparatively free and untrammelled in our action, and we must learn to use our freedom,—without misusing it, of course,—and do our best to obliterate from our hearts, and from our manners, all traces of our former servitude. We must feel that we are free men, and refuse for a moment to regard ourselves as an inferior or as an oppressed class. We must study not to appeal to men's pity, but study to command their respect and admiration. To effect what we should aim at, and to acquire the commanding position in the modern world which is our right, we must undoubtedly adapt our system of education, our schools, colleges, and seminaries, more to the wants of the times and the country, and seek more carefully to prepare our youth for the work they have to perform in our new and altered circumstances. Our university must be founded on a larger and more liberal plan, embrace a larger circle of studies, and aim more at intellectual development, at encouraging free, vigorous, and original thought, and at rearing up a class of scholars, well versed not only in our own doctrines and traditions,

but like Moses in "all the learning of Egypt," who will be able to compete successfully with the non-Catholic scholars of the age, in their own peculiar province. When the world was Catholic, when the civil authority guarded, or professed to guard, the flock against the wolves from without, and the work of education was simply to promote the personal virtues, and to keep things quiet and as they were, it was, perhaps, not unwise to bring up children in ignorance of error, and to exclude them from all intercourse or acquaintance with its adherents. There was little call in the case of the many for secular learning and science, and the chief thing needed was moral and ascetic discipline. But in our times and country, we English-speaking Catholics are placed in a non-Catholic world, and the faithful should understand that to keep our children out of harm's way, by keeping them in ignorance of the world around them, is impracticable. We cannot do it, except to a very feeble extent, if we would. Neither parental nor sacerdotal authority will suffice for that. We cannot fly danger, and as we cannot fly it, our only safety is in boldly confronting it. We must arm our children against it, not by ignorance, but by knowledge, by permitting them to learn under our own guidance and direction all that the non-Catholic philosophy, literature, and science are likely to teach them. The graduate of a Catholic college must be not merely an acute and subtil scholastic disputant, not merely an humble, pious, and devout Christian, but he must be also a man, a learned, an intellectually-cultivated man, master, as far as at his years can be expected, of all the learning and science of the age, whom no man out of the Church can take by surprise, on any subject. We think, therefore, while our schools, colleges, and universities abate nothing in their ascetic discipline, or their religious training, that they should pay more attention to the secular learning and science of the day. To this end the circle of studies must be enlarged, and the university course prolonged. More attention should be devoted to the development, to the encouragement of free, bold, vigorous thought, and to individuality, and even originality of character. We must give full scope to the reason of the scholar, and not be afraid now and then of a little intellectual eccentricity. Better in our age sometimes to err, providing it is not from an heretical spirit or inclination,

than never to think. Nothing is worse for the mind than mere routine, nothing more fatal to all true greatness and intellectual progress than to attempt to mould all minds after one and the same model, and to maintain a certain dead level of intelligence. There is nothing in our religion itself that demands it. Catholicity does not fear, nay, she challenges free thought, and gives to reason full and entire freedom, all the freedom it can have without ceasing to be reason. In the world in which we live it is no less important that our young men should feel their freedom, and be encouraged to use it, than it is that they should feel and discharge their obligations to authority. To suffer them to grow up with the impression that they are as Catholics in mental bondage, that what are to them the most inviting fields of literature and science are prohibited, and that they are doomed to forego the nobler part, so to speak, of their natural manhood, is the worst policy possible, and tends only to drive from our ranks a large proportion of those who by their natural talents are the best fitted to extend and adorn Catholic literature and science.

In these remarks we are not aware that we do more than repeat the convictions of the good Fathers who have the principal charge of our higher schools and colleges, nay, what we are urging seems to us to be only the application to our age and country of the very principle on which the system of education adopted by the Society of Jesus was originally founded. That Society arose at a time when the old scholastic system was losing, or had lost its hold on the age, and had found a powerful rival, if not a conqueror, in the Humanism of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ; and in organizing its schools its aim was, while it retained all that was good and applicable to the age in scholasticism, to surpass the Humanists in their own peculiar line. The Society did it, rolled back the tide of heresy, gave new life and energy to Catholic learning, and took and kept the lead of European education and of European thought for nearly a century and a half. Since then a new Humanism has been developed, and we ask for to-day, only what the Society of Jesus did in the sixteenth century, and what we believe it is doing or preparing to do now as fast as its means and circumstances will permit.\* But this subject of education

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\* It is not our intention in these remarks to cast any reflection on

will be discussed more at length in a following article in our number, and perhaps in future numbers of our Review.

Closely connected with this subject is another defect of Catholics in this country, less easy to explain and excuse than those we have referred to. *The Rambler* seems to think that a portion of the Catholics in the United Kingdom are less disposed to tolerate free thought and free speech in open questions than they are in the United States, at least this is the construction that *The Dublin Review* puts upon its language; but we are inclined to think the reverse is the fact. In matters of faith or orthodoxy the Catholics in this country are by no means too rigid or too exacting, and saving certain Jansenistic tendencies now and then encountered, we are far enough from being too intolerant; we are liberal enough towards heresy, and none too strenuous in our maintenance of the form of sound words; but in the sphere of opinion, within the sphere where we are all free to hold the opinion we prefer, and to follow our own private judgment, we seem hardly to understand what toleration means; we practise very little of that mutual forbearance, that wise liberality, and that mutual respect and good will which our religion enjoins. Let an honest, upright, sincere Catholic, whose piety and whose orthodoxy are above suspicion, defend in open questions, an allowable opinion not in accordance with the opinion of a portion of his brethren, and they open upon him with a hundred mouths, denounce him, misrepresent his opinion

the learning, science, views, or ability of those who have charge of what after the French we may call Secondary Education. The defective education of our youth is not precisely their fault. It is far more, if not altogether the fault of Catholic parents, who are too insensible, with a few honorable exceptions, to the necessity of that higher education we contend for. The college faculties have to a great extent to educate the children of uneducated parents, and these parents will not leave their sons long enough in the college for them to become scholars in any worthy sense of the word. Boys leave college at an average age of eighteen, at the age they should enter the university, and commence a new course of four or six years. Till parents become more aware of the importance of giving, when they have the means, a more thorough and a more liberal education to their sons, and cease to think they must close their studies at sixteen, eighteen, or even twenty, no modifications of our systems of education, or of the educational staff, will give us the educated and highly-cultivated body of young men the interests of our religion and of our Catholic population demand.



or his arguments, appeal to popular prejudice against him, and do their best to ruin him in the estimation of the Catholic public. We suffer ourselves now and then in this respect to run even to shameful lengths ; we need specify no instances, for several will readily occur to our readers. Many of us seem not to be aware that we are bound to respect in others that freedom of thought and utterance which we claim for ourselves, or that freedom of opinion is as sacred in them as it is in us. There is nothing more uncatholic than to tyrannize over others in matters of opinion. So long as a man saves orthodoxy, says nothing to weaken dogma, or against morals and discipline, so long as he is within the limits of free discussion allowed by authority, and manifests no heretical spirit or inclination, his honest opinions, honestly uttered as opinions, not as dogmas, are free, and no man has the right to censure him for them, let them be what they may, to denounce them, to seek to render them odious, or to bring popular opinion in any respect to bear against them. They may be controverted, disproved, shown to be unsound, or even dangerous, if they can be, but only by fair discussion on their merits, and by legitimate argument.

Unhappily, this rule is far from being always observed. Judging from what we have seen and experienced since we became a Catholic, this rule is reserved only for special occasions, and in the discussion of matters in which we take no interest. If we have to deal with a strong man, who is to be presumed to understand himself, and to have some skill in fence, not a few of us make it a rule never to discuss the real question or never to discuss it on its merits. We make up a collateral issue, evade the real point in question, give our readers a false and mutilated view of the opinion advanced, detach a few sentences from their context, and give them a sense wholly unintended and wholly unwarranted, attack a conclusion without hinting at the principle from which it is obtained, and then proceed to refute the opinion we do not like, and which we have shaped in our own way, by arguments addressed not to the reason, but to the ignorance, the prejudice, or the passion of our readers. It would seem that the study is, through the unfair mode of treating the opinion, to damage in the estimation of the public we address the author, and

then, through the author, the opinion. We hardly recollect in the nearly thirteen years of our Catholic life an instance in which an able and intelligent Catholic writer has been met by his Catholic opponents with fairness and candor, or his opinion discussed on its merits with courtesy or common civility. Our domestic controversies speak but ill for our civilization, our liberality, and our conscientiousness. Our so-called Catholic press, in regard to our disputes among ourselves, where differences are allowable, stands far below that of any other country, and indicates a lower moral tone, and an inferior intellectual culture. For the honor of American Catholic journalism, and, we must add, for the honor of American converts, several of whom are editors, and those who display the most intolerance, and the least fairness and candor towards their opponents,—we must labor to elevate the character of our journals, demand of them a higher and a more dignified tone, and insist that their conductors devote more time and thought to their preparation, take larger and more comprehensive views of men and things, exhibit more mental cultivation, more liberality of thought and feeling, and give some evidence of the ability of Catholics to lead and advance the civilization of the country. We want the men who conduct our Catholic press to be living men, highly-cultivated men, up to the highest level of their age,—men who are filled with the spirit of our holy religion, and will take their rule from the morality, gentleness, courtesy, and chivalry of the Gospel, not from their petty passions, envyings and jealousies, or from a low and corrupt secular press, that disregards principle, mocks at conscience, seeks only success, and counts success lawful by whatever means obtained.

Our readers will not misunderstand us. We are advocating no tame, weak, or sickly style of Catholic journalism. We ourselves like plain dealing, if honest, and severity even, if it is the severity of reason, not the severity of passion. We respect an honest, downright, earnest style, which tells clearly, energetically, its author's meaning without circumlocution or reticence. We have writers who in their language observe sufficiently the outward forms of politeness, and as far as mere words go are not discourteous, but who yet are highly reprehensible for their intellectual unfairness, for their want of candor and strict honesty in

reproducing the doctrine, the real thought, and the arguments of their opponents, and replying to them as they stand in the mind of the author. No smoothness of language, no polish of style, can atone for substantial unfairness of representation or mutilation of an opponent's meaning or argument. The mere manner is a small matter ; the substance is the thing to be considered. The American people do not need to be addressed in baby tones ; they are not, taken in mass, a refined people, but they are an earnest people, and like plain dealing, and demand of those who would gain their hearts, or their ears, sincerity, truthfulness, honesty, and courage. They cannot endure persiflage, or what they regard as unfairness, evasion, or cowardice on the part of a Catholic writer. Be manly, be true, be brave, be open, be just, and then be as strong, as cogent in your reasoning as you can. We complain of nothing of that sort ; but we do complain of the uncandid, unfair, and intolerant manner in which the views and arguments, and even persons of respectable and highly-deserving Catholics, are treated by those of their own brethren who are placed in a position to have more or less influence on the public opinion of the Catholic community.

The intolerance which we complain of, and which seeks to crush an opponent by bringing extrinsic forces to bear against him, and which refuses to discuss the points in dispute on their merits, is the greatest discouragement and hinderance to free, original, and manly thought that can be conceived. It introduces a false standard of judgment, and subjects the thinker or the writer to a test which neither the Church nor the State imposes. It tends to make authors and journalists the slaves of popular opinion, to erect popular opinion, which may be only popular ignorance, prejudice, or caprice, into a Papacy, or to substitute it for the Pope and councils, for the Church and her pastors and teachers. It dwarfs the intellect ; it freezes up the well-springs of thought ; it prevents one from ever rising above commonplace, and renders him tame and feeble. Every man should always be free to ask, What is true ? what is just ? what needs to be said ? not forced to ask in self-defence, What will be popular ? what will people say ? or what will gain me a momentary reputation ? Great practical questions every day come up which deeply concern the

State, and even religion, and in the discussion of which the Catholic publicist must take part if he is to be a man of his age and country, a living man and not a fossil. He must be free to take part and adhere to principle, without any fear of the popular opinion of the North or the South, of the East or the West, of this party or of that. Truth knows no geographical boundaries, and is not determined by sectional lines, nor is it to be subordinated to the petty passions and interests of office-holders or office-seekers.

We have the right to expect Catholics to have a conscience, to be wedded to principle, and prepared to stand by it to the death. When they understand themselves and appreciate the liberty of thought and expression their religion allows, they are never intolerant ; and never seek to excite public opinion or bring the force of popular or party prejudice to bear against an honest and intelligent writer, who happens to advance, within the limits of free opinion, something not in accordance with their own convictions. They feel and know that it is their duty to stand by the Catholic publicist, who boldly defends the cause of truth and justice, of religion and humanity, in a straightforward, earnest manner, although he may incidentally suggest thoughts or opinions which they are not as yet prepared to receive. They feel and know that it is theirs to sustain him in the exercise of his lawful freedom, and to shield his reputation from the attacks of ignorance or malice. They may frankly controvert his opinions, if they deem them unsound, but they will do it with argument, with fairness, and candor, without seeking to lessen him in the public estimation, or detract any from his merits as a man and as an author. They must do so, or we shall have few men appear in our ranks with sufficient force of character and strength of mind to serve us in our hour of need, to meet on equal terms the enemies of our cause ; or to give a free and healthy development to Catholic literature and science. We must place in our publicists, who prove themselves true men, a generous confidence, and treat them with justice and liberality.

*The Rambler* has very justly remarked in one of its numbers that in the English-speaking world there is a very general, deep-seated impression that we Catholics, when our religion is in question, lack frankness and courage, and

that we are indeed disingenuous, untruthful, and cowardly. That such is the impression is undeniable. We are never supposed to be open and frank ; and it is believed that we trim, evade, use mental reservation, in a word practise what they express by the word Jesuitry, whenever our religion is in question. No doubt, to some extent, this impression was originated by the cautions and shifts, disguises and reserve to which our ancestors were obliged to resort in the time of persecution in order to escape the terrible penal laws enacted by the Protestant government ; but however that may be, or whatever may have been the origin of the impression, it certainly exists, and operates more than any one thing else, to our disadvantage. It prevents us from obtaining a hearing, or if we obtain a hearing, it prevents our expositions and defences of our religion from being received with respect. We are regarded as impeached witnesses, as unworthy of the slightest credit when we speak of our religion. Nothing is more important to us than to remove this damaging impression. We cannot remove it by exclaiming against it, by denying its justice, and asserting by words our own truthfulness and courage. Our words are precisely what is not believed. We can remove it only by deeds, only in showing by our acts that we are frank and truthful, open and courageous ; that we shrink from the frank avowal and defence of nothing really pertaining to our religion, or from recognizing and meeting no historical or scientific difficulties alleged against the claims of our Church ; that there is nothing in history or science, in Catholic ages, nations, or practices, that we would conceal, or are not prepared openly to avow, and so far as Catholic, boldly defend.

Now, we think it cannot be denied that we have not taken, in general, sufficient pains to do this and to clear ourselves of this damning accusation. We have naturally thought that our indignant denial of it should suffice, that we have the right to throw ourselves on the maxim, "Every man is to be accounted innocent till proved guilty." This may do very well for us, but we cannot expect it to satisfy our enemies, who think they have proved us guilty. It must be admitted that there are appearances against us, and that some of us have occasionally indulged in what *The Rambler* terms "literary cookery." Some of our

writers have notoriously trimmed, like the late Charles Butler, and pared off the features of our religion supposed to be the most offensive to Protestants ; that we have in our popular controversies from ignorance or policy passed over historical passages difficult to explain, and by carefully-selected extracts from scientific writers made the scientific tendencies or the results of the scientific investigations of the age, appear more in our favor than they really are. Our popular apologists have, when they could, evaded, or when they could not evade, have met unfairly, and not frankly, the facts in the delicate questions of religious liberty, the Inquisition, burning heretics, and the Papal supremacy. No doubt our popular writers have been governed by considerations of prudence, but they forget at times, at least it seems so to us, that what at one time may be truly prudent, at another may be grossly imprudent. In the beginning, the Church adopted and for some centuries preserved more or less strictly the *Disciplina Arcani*, but in our days the discipline of the secret, whether desirable or not, is impracticable. The Church has been too long in the world and played too conspicuous a part on its theatre for that. She is a public body, and her history is as open to her enemies as it is to us, and they can read history as well as we. There is no historical fact that can by any effort of ingenuity or malice be twisted to her discredit that is not already known to them, and made the most of against her. When we consider this fact in connection with the impression so widely and damagingly prevalent, that, when we speak of our religion, we are no better than tricksters, liars, and cowards, it seems to us that the only prudent course is that of entire openness, and frankness, which conceals and attempts to conceal nothing. No special pleading we can resort to, no historical cookery possible, no subtil distinctions, and ingenious explanations conceivable, will ever convince the non-Catholic English-speaking world that Gallicanism truly represents the Catholic doctrine as to the power of the Pope and the relations between the spiritual and the temporal orders ; that the Church does not teach, and Catholics are not required to believe, that out of the Church there is no salvation ; or that the modern doctrine of religious liberty professed by the non-Catholic world, and which is tantamount to religious indifferentism,

is Catholic doctrine, or that it has not been condemned by Popes and councils and the practice of the Church in all ages. All efforts to this end are so much labor lost, nay, worse than lost ; for they tend only to confirm the impression already so strong of our cowardice and unscrupulousness in explaining or defending our religion and its history. The rebukes we received a few years since for our alleged imprudence in publishing our essays on the Papacy has persuaded nobody out of the Church that we were unorthodox, and has had the effect only of confirming the non-Catholic world in their belief in the lack of frankness, honesty, and courage on the part of Catholics. Mr. Chandler's famous Speech in Congress on the temporal power of the Pope, may have seemed to Catholics an admirable reply to the charges brought by the Know-Nothings against us, but to the non-Catholic world it has seemed only an ingenious perversion of evident historical truth, and a transparent evasion of the real difficulty. The non-Catholic world believe us, not him, for they know that we are truer to the common sense view of history than he is.

We agree precisely with our friends as to the duty of observing prudence, but we differ with some of them as to what in our age and country is prudence. We believe that a bold, fearless, manly and truthful avowal and defence of our religion in its offensive as well as inoffensive features, is the only legitimate prudence in the world we have to deal with. We believe the only prudent course is to throw ourselves upon the truth, and leave the truth to sustain us. If the facts of history or of science are really against us, we cannot maintain the claims of our Church, if we would ; and if, though not really against us, they present difficulties that in the present stage of historical and scientific progress we are unable satisfactorily to explain, we lose nothing by frankly avowing the fact. In history we know no such difficulties. In science, in philology, ethnology, and geology, we do find difficulties that we are not ourselves able to explain, on any principles we are acquainted with so that they shall harmonize with Catholic dogmas. These difficulties, however, do not disturb our faith, for it would be extremely illogical to argue against the Church from our own ignorance. But they exist in the present state of science, and we gain nothing but a new

confirmation of the damaging impression against us by refusing to acknowledge them. We here and every where shall do best to be open and courageous, to confide in truth, and to have no fear but the God of truth will sustain us, and give success to his own cause.

The old nursing and safeguard system has ceased to be practicable. We cannot keep from the faithful a knowledge of these difficulties and what our enemies allege against us, if we would. We disguise not from ourselves or from others the dangers to which our children and youth are exposed in this proud, self-reliant, and conceited Anglo-Saxon world. But we must face the danger with brave hearts and manly confidence. The Church is comparatively free, and is no longer crippled by having the temporal power for her dry nurse ; but she is left without any external support from the state. She is forced, from the nature of the case, to fall back on her own resources as a spiritual kingdom, and make her appeal to reason and will. She can subsist or make progress in this Anglo-Saxon world only as she can convince the reason and win the heart. The only obedience she can count on is a free, intelligent, voluntary obedience, yielded from conviction and love. Such is undeniably the fact, and we should none of us by our reminiscences of a different past be prevented from frankly and loyally accepting it. Our sole reliance under God is in the ability of our Church to meet all the demands of intelligence, and to command by her intrinsic excellence the intellect of the age. This being the case we must give to intellect its free development, and treat it with respect even in its aberrations, though not the aberrations themselves when incompatible with faith or sound doctrine.

We have acknowledged and commented on certain defects which converts, like ourselves, seem to detect in the Catholic population of Great Britain and the United States. And yet these are, after all, not defects that can be predicated of any considerable portion of that population, at least at the present moment. They are defects, moreover, shared by many converts, to as great a degree as by our old Catholics, if not even in a greater degree. They are, however, every day disappearing, and with freedom and the opportunity to give full scope to their Catholic



life, the great majority of our Catholic population are assuming that high, manly tone, that open, frank, ingenuous manner, that sense of equality, which becomes them in the presence of their enemies. We would not be understood as having written in a querulous tone, or in a censorious spirit. We have merely wished to give our views on several questions which have been raised in England, with the desire not of finding fault with the past, or of denying that a great improvement has taken place, but of vindicating for Catholic publicists their rightful position, and of stimulating our brethren to greater improvement hereafter. We have defended converts from what we have regarded as unjust insinuations, and intended to rebuke the taunts to which they are sometimes subjected ; but it has not entered into our thought to place them above old Catholics, or to favor in the remotest degree here or elsewhere a convert party. For ourselves personally, it is only by an effort that we can bring home to our own mind that we spent upwards of forty years outside of the Catholic communion. We think, feel, and act, according to our knowledge and virtue, as a Catholic, and as nothing else. We find it difficult to draw a line between ourselves and those who have been Catholics from their infancy. Our interests, our affections, and our lot in life are all bound up with this old Catholic body into which through the grace of God we have been admitted as one born out of due season. Their faith is our faith, their hopes are our hopes, their God is our God. Whither they go, thither we go with them ; where they dwell, there will we dwell. We will recognize no schism between them and us, and it is on them under God we place our reliance for the future of our religion in the English-speaking world. In our own country our hopes rest mainly on the young Catholic generation growing up. We find much in them to deplore, but in every city and considerable town throughout the Union, we find a noble band of Catholic young men, some born here, some born abroad, who seem to us filled with the right spirit, who love their religion, who are not ashamed of it, who are willing to live it, and live for it, and who are able to recommend it to the non-Catholic world, by their high-toned virtues, their simple, unaffected piety, their intelligence, their high sense of honor, and their manly bearing and conduct. May God bless them.

ART. IV.—*Catholic Almanac*. Baltimore, 1856.—*Catalogue of Mount St. Mary's College*.—*Catalogue of Georgetown College*.—*St. Mary's College, Baltimore*.

FROM the constant reference made to the first of these brochures, as an exponent of the general condition of the Church in this country, and from the prominence it gives to the academical inducements held out to the youth of the land, whose means are ample enough to enable them to enter life with the advantages of a collegiate education, we are led to give it a place in some remarks we propose to offer on the subject of Public Instruction.

Leaving the question how far the respective merits of these centres of education tally with the published statement of their condition, to be canvassed and solved by those immediately concerned, we can, in an article of very general scope and bearing, consider even such of them as have the prestige of age and established reputation, from no nearer point of view than that which may best afford evidence of the adaptation of their course of instruction to the interval between the elementary preparation of the grammar school and the reception by the student of his first degree.

We approach the consideration of this subject, freed at least from the acerbities, political and otherwise, that sometimes surround and obscure the discussion of the good and bad qualities of what is recognized as common school education. The defects to be remedied, if they exist at all, are too plain, the benefit to result from their correction too salutary, and the question presents itself too distinctly to the interests, rather than to the passions of men, to provoke a renewal of the education fray.

The comparatively recent period at which a large majority of the institutions, commemorated in the *Almanac*, received a "local habitation and a name;" and the traces of affiliation that exist in a course of study, in many respects common to all, enables us to give a reasonably clear notion of the precise nature of the classical and scientific instruction now offered to the predilections of the Catholic community, whilst the prominent position occupied by the time-honored halls to which we refer, in the open field of public favor, will preclude good-humored criti-

cism from being hastily construed into broad caricature, much less into unlooked-for and ungenerous attack.

In an age when the skilful development and practical application of the resources of nature and of art are completing the revolution in the pursuits of men which their discovery initiated, and have transferred from the collective force of the many to the intelligence of the individual the power of attaining results of eminent value in social life, classical education ceases to arrest the gaze of illiterate admiration, and academic honors, simply as such, find their most lasting appreciation in the social circle of partial connections and sympathizing friends. The production of the diploma of a university is no longer a prerequisite for a strictly professional career, and in the enlarged sphere of intellectual energy, once comprised by the bar, the pulpit, and the practice of medicine, pre-eminence is not uncommonly attained by the unaided force of natural parts and genius; nevertheless, the intrinsic value of a university course is as apparent, and the vantage ground it affords to its possessor is as highly prized, as when its claims were potent enough to arrest the uplifted arm of judicial action in vindicating the supremacy of the law.

The never-ending change and modification to which the forces of the physical world are subjected, in the successful endeavor to multiply and diffuse the means of increasing the material and social well-being of man, have caused a corresponding movement in the domain of mental cultivation; and the wide-spread necessity for exact scientific knowledge has been promptly met by enlarging the facilities for high scientific acquirements. Hence it is that learning, in ceasing to be the privilege of the few, has become the blessing of the many; that its haunts are thronged by a rapid succession of eager votaries; and that there attaches to those who serve in her temple a social consideration second to that of no other profession in the wide range of intelligent and useful activity. The ancillary and provisional employments of the schoolmaster and tutor are lost to view, and are replaced by the delegated trust and duties of the professor, in the discharge and performance of which he finds "room and verge enough," not only to fill the measure of well-directed conscientious labor, but to gratify

the inclinations of a praiseworthy ambition by the attainment of an enduring fame.

Proficiency in divine and human knowledge is so constantly found united in the same individual, that an intimate relation has ever subsisted between the office of religious and of scientific instructor ; and in our day the van of educational progress and its most important posts, are occupied by men already eminent as religious guides and teachers. Indeed, when the way for readily imparting knowledge is to be made straight by conciliating and attaching the affections, encouraging the faint and reproving the wayward, there seems to be a peculiar fitness in committing the delicate task to those, whose sacred calling endows them with a spirit of tenderness and sympathy for all, who are so practically conversant with the processes of the human heart, and who enter into the various feelings by which it is tried. But this salutary alliance, instead of being regarded as the means, and as such subject to all the conditions and qualifications that attach in the discharge of an office simply vicarious, has been confounded in some minds with a guaranty of a finished education.

Calculations based on a fatuity so gross would be sufficiently illusory at any time ; but are alarming in an age when an outvying emulation is fast supplanting the spirit of disinterestedness and of magnanimity ; when the testimonies and virtues, the learning and dogmatism of the closet are not fairly arrayed, in the arena of life, against astuteness, dexterity, practised skill and manly self-reliance, and when, in fine, the course of studies that is to fit a well-taught boy to become an intelligent man, is more than ever valuable, only so far as the principle of efficiency gives life and vigor to the whole.

That there are claims which humanity makes on the Christian scholar, whose discharge is daily attested in the practice of instructors in whom this twofold office appears, no one who has given himself the trouble to think at all on the subject can fail to admit ; but these are by no means the only or most peremptory claims advanced by country, society, or religion, and are, besides, so entirely dependent on the acquirement of that knowledge which is power, that we must first be shown those crowds of Catholic alumni who, on the great theatre of affairs, are not only eminent,

each in his particular sphere, but who outrival their religious instructors in a field peculiarly their own, before we can acquiesce in the prominence so complacently given to this feature of Public Instruction.

The oppressive demand that is universally felt in the Catholic community for a public instruction that, in its organization, working, and material results, shall come up to that bestowed in colleges, endowed and supported by other confessions, is a matter grave enough to interest every man of education, and it is very desirable, if possible, to acquire some clear perception of the features in our own system that distinguish it from others, and cause the unfavorable contrast. If, on examination, we recognize at every turn traces of a great radical defect, that must ever prevent it from attaining the desired efficiency, the discovery should lead, at least, to some effort for its correction. There is a manifest ambiguity in the indiscriminate use of the artificial distinction of *College*, when applied to the various institutions that go by that time-honored name; for whilst some of them possess not a few of the characteristics of a university, there are others, as seen through the olympic dust of exhibition day, that remind us only of a high school. A college is a public institution of learning, favored by the law, with express functions in the economy of science, and possessing within itself all the powers requisite for discharging them. Not unfrequently the religious sentiments of a single denomination are alone enlisted, and its public spirit displayed in a liberal endowment, whilst its prominent social position is marked by the presence in its communion of men of character and respectability, capable of distributing the bounty, guarding the privileges, and perpetuating the blessings of the institution. Within its halls, lectures are publicly given by a learned faculty of professors, students matriculated and engaged in a common pursuit, a course of studies and the terms within which it is regularly given prescribed, the acquirements of freshmen, just from school, and the qualifications of seniors about to receive their degree, ascertained by examination; regulations that leave little, to the discretion, or, rather, despotic fancy of the administration established. The discipline and the destinies of the whole are presided over by rare and attractive merit, a merit so conspicuous, that, as illustrated in the paternal

rule of Dwight, of Kirkland, of McCaffrey, and of Wayland, has made the name of President, in its relation to Public Instruction, a household word.

If such an institution is to exist for any valuable end, it must exist in its integrity. The bare mention of some of its most obvious characteristics excludes the possibility of confounding it with that of an institution for any of the special professions. Having methods, principles, and truths of its own, its peculiar discipline and course of study can no more be adapted to comprise those of a military academy, or of a college of physicians, than it can those of a theological seminary, or of a preparatory school.

It is idle to suppose that public opinion will move spontaneously in this matter, or that its equilibrium is not to be disturbed lest the attempt to direct it in this particular channel may fail. The voluntary endowment of colleges by individuals, is as traditional as their existence ; as a charity, its precedents are historical ; and in the present estimation of learning, their proper equipment challenges public favor in so eminent a degree, that it needs but to impress upon an intelligent community, how intimately the subject is connected with their onward progress, to win for it a favorable consideration. That the cause of education finds a hearty response from Catholics as well as from the community at large, if not so judiciously expressed, is clearly shown by the recent contribution, raised from one end of the country to the other, for the purpose of founding a university in one part of Europe, and by the substantial proffers elicited by the bare suggestion of establishing a seminary in another.

We do not know that there exists an institution of note, under the supervision of Catholics, the sole object of whose erection was to impart a collegiate education, in its strict sense, to youth who would naturally seek it at such a source ; on the contrary, their origin, their name, the wants present and prospective which it was hoped they would supply, the auspicious direction to which they owed an unchallenged access to public favor, all savor of the theological seminary.

In this department of science, our colleges take rank gracefully and fitly with their sister institutions of separated confessions. And if the almost universal success of alumni can be fairly attributed to the meritorious deserts of Alma

Mater, they outrival more fortunate competitors. Not only are natural parts of high excellence trained in the theological department of our colleges, to become brilliant and shining lights in the Church, but, what is specially noteworthy, such is the prestige of our seminaries, that the most unpromising subjects of mental and intellectual discipline, enter them, fulfil the required course, and, as if they had taken a bond of fate, confidently and acceptably enter at once on a career of high usefulness in the great field of missionary labor.

The Society of Jesus, whose connection with the congenial soil of Maryland is coeval with its earliest settlement, in harmony with its historical precedents, planted a seat of learning, afterwards widely known as Georgetown College ; here, such of its members as displayed an aptitude for scientific instruction dispensed their stores of learning to the youth, not only of the immediate field of their missionary labors, but of distant states and climes. A pioneer in Catholic education, this institution still maintains a chief place among its peers, in the sphere of liberal studies. Its professors are members of the Society, and its students are under the superintendency of candidates for its labors and its rewards.

At a time too, near enough to the success of this institution to be called coincident, a new star in the firmament of Catholic education was making its appearance. As both sprang up under the footsteps of religious zeal, the origin of the latter was volcanic, and the luxuriance of whatever grew in its soil may perhaps be attributed to so unusual a cause.

Whatever havoc the political explosion in France, at the close of the last century, entailed on the kingdom whose throne it overturned, it was beneficial, in a degree, to the infant condition of the Church in the Union. The great abilities which first awoke on this side of the Atlantic, to a sense of the change which this event made in their personal career, were not slow in assimilating their ideas to those which already obtained, in order to fulfil under other circumstances their high mission. The names of Cheverus, Dubourg, Dubois, Bruté, Nagot, and of other no less worthy, if less conspicuous, victims of this catastrophe, are inseparably linked with the history of the Church in this

country, and their labors have impressed upon it a character, that will not soon be effaced by future progress.

The Abbé Dubois selected as the centre of a missionary activity extending over a vast district, a place possessing the peculiar advantages of a friendly neighborhood and of Catholic traditions. Reasoning from the analogies of his own early experience, he erroneously supposed, that there needed only the planting of a seminary for the instruction of youth, to convert the rustic and apt material existing so abundantly around him into valuable auxiliaries and worthy successors. Filled with this hope, he concentrated all the energies of a practical and untiring mind to the realization of his project. The labors of the good Abbé in the cause of learning have added a bright page to Catholic annals, but the great object nearest his heart was attained only so far as exceptional instances testify to the attractive sway which transcendent virtue exercises over the hearts of those within the sphere of its immediate influence. The Catholic inhabitants of the neighboring districts and of distant states, are grateful for the boon of educational training for their children to more than one generation; and the paternal solicitude which he manifested for all within the comprehensive folds of his experiment, guaranteed an impartial distribution of the bounteous stream, which, like the fabled Arethusa, sought refuge and reappeared in that distant and kindred scene: but the auxiliaries and successors of the good Abbé, in the vineyard, were spirits, who, like their beneficent patron, found an opening for that meritorious employment of their talents, in a new country which was to some extent denied in their own, and who repaid the fraternal welcome,

*Non ignara mali miseris succurrere disco,*

of the illustrious Refugee, by triumphantly carrying out a scheme which in no other sense has succeeded.

The early age at which youth are emancipated from parental control, the liberty accorded them in following the bent of natural inclination in adopting callings in life, and the untowardness evinced by them for the holy ministry as the field of future labor, could not be foreseen by the zealous strangers of whose services in the cause of religion these institutions are perhaps the least enduring monu-



ments. And now that it has been ascertained and established beyond peradventure, the education of youth in quasi-seminaries, under the hope that some may be more readily inclined by that means to the holy ministry, is worse than a fraud on all concerned : it is an iteration of the folly, in the well-known story of the hen and its eggs ; and, but that the subject is a grave one, we might pursue the parallel, for the result of the experiment, in both cases, is identical.

The patent objection to which the older institutions are obnoxious, and it is a radical one, is the combination of independent and widely-divergent courses of study, merely, it would appear, because piety and humanities happen to be incident to all. We refer to the preparatory, collegiate, and theological departments of education. Whatever may be the advantages presented by the adoption of this arrangement, they cannot be claimed for the collegiate course of instruction, and with the interests of that alone have we to do in this connection. It is not a legitimate development, but a complete subversion of its essential qualities. A college, in the academical sense, is, and always has been, an Alma Mater, from whose bosom youth are to draw literary refinement, classical culture, and mental training ; as such, it has historical precedents, usages, discipline, and privileges ; as such, it has distinct claims on the community for generous assistance and hearty support ; except as such, its precedents have no application, its discipline has no efficiency ; the nurture which it gives to youth is so distinguishing a characteristic, that it makes it what it is. When it ceases to be Alma Mater it ceases to be college ; and what is true of the new arrangement ceases to be true of collegiate instruction. If men can see no difference between public instruction and private instruction, and can recognize no vicious duplicity in the incorporation of two or more courses of scientific study into one ; if they really cannot comprehend, that one science may be more important, and yet alien and apart from the healthy development of a distinct order of ideas, we have no means of reaching their minds.

Besides, the time of professors is engrossed in teaching the rudiments of learning to pupils, who, having come up without any definite object, and for the most part without any preparatory training, will leave when their anomalous

position gives them a distaste for study. The proportion of those who persevere to obtain a degree, is out of all comparison to the number in the catalogue ; youths just on the eve of manhood are subjected to a disciplinary surveillance that would be excessive in any country, and is perfectly intolerable in this ; an undue prestige and superiority attaches to the course, which includes the "queen of sciences," and the education which is intended to fit youth for intelligent advancement in the sober walks of secular life becomes a matter of secondary and subordinate consideration.

The significant consequence has been that, whilst almost every theological student has, by the confidence acquired in previous training, attained an honorable place in the American Church, in its broadest and widest sense, it is rare to find an individual, eminent in the many walks of intellectual occupation, which net-like diversifies social life, who rejoices to trace back the position to which he may have attained, to the fostering care of Alma Mater. Nor is this a matter to excite surprise. The student who entered college with no better defined object than that of mental cultivation, to be promoted by familiar association and collision with spirits obviously assembled for a kindred purpose, finds, at the commencement of a new career, that however much a distinct class of his late associates may have had their inexperience enlightened, their uncouthness reduced to rule, and their unfitness qualified, he has indeed acquired learning from the mass of which he has the task of selecting the useful, and the pain of abandoning the useless.

The bond of religious fellowship and connection is strong enough to sway the feelings and incline the judgment, to induce people to overlook the manifest deficiency of a system, presided over by officers of conspicuous merit and of known experience in the arduous, self-sacrificing labors of instruction ; but when deficiency becomes positive defect, and confusion ends in darkness, what consideration can induce the placing in jeopardy of interests of the last importance, and in the guardianship of which men are held to a stricter accountability than to their own ? A wide-spread and clearly-defined consciousness of the existence of this anomaly, and a clear perception of its consequences, will, if uncorrected, estrange, if it does not

wholly alienate the strong partiality of those who are charged with the high trust of ushering the rashness and inexperience of youth on the great theatre of affairs, under circumstances that may realize a well-founded hope of success.

It is plain that the burden of an interest whose advantages are shared by the state, the community, and the Church, is borne by the last. From the theoretical parity of denominations before the law, the state cannot support institutions as Catholic institutions, even when their object is to educate men of courage and ability to stand as defenders of the commonwealth. It is the community that are vitally interested, with an interest that is inheritable. To them it is no trifling matter that their children return from college with well-formed habits, passions subordinated, and with minds well developed ; their children are entitled to receive in their fatherland that mental culture and discipline which no craft can bewilder, no flattery blind, and which intuitively detects the intentions of interested, selfish men.

The prevailing ideas that determine the course of events, the different shapes which they assume, the changes they undergo, and the incidents attending them, vary with the ever-varying circumstances of times, institutions, and people ; their orderly succession, however, goes to make up a nation's annals, and the laudable aim of a citizen, next to performing modestly and well his peculiar part, is to provide that his children may advantageously fulfil the duties that appropriately devolve upon them, by learning principles, cultivating the powers of acquiring knowledge, and by an education fraught with an insight into things. The learning that has been educed in support of the various theories as to the most eligible mode of attaining this result, belongs to some other aspect of the subject than to that which presents itself to us. The pertinency of classical studies has been questioned, and the claims of literature in the mother tongue have been prominently advanced. An influence, beneficial and the reverse, has been ascribed to the study of mathematics, and the pretensions of university education have been assailed and sifted ; the mental acquirements requisite for mechanical invention have been contrasted with the results of liberal study, and an occasion, marked

enough in the world of letters, to gather together a class most deeply interested in educational progress, draws from the great chieftains their continued adhesion, each to his peculiar view.

Whatever may be the leading idea at the basis of a scheme of professional or general education, it cannot ignore the great, living current of actual life, and must recognize at more than one point of contact its form and pressure; the material which it manipulates comes up from, and, in due course, returns to that current, and whether a youth is to be prepared for a professional career, or is to be fitted to perform justly, skilfully, and magnanimously all offices, public and private, the scheme of education that professes to effect this should display, to the eye of an expert in the business of instruction, evidence of practical design in the groundwork, intelligent arrangement in the distribution of its parts, and desert, ability, and wisdom in the successive stages that mark the carriage of the whole.

The concourse of a multitude, their discipline, the collision of mind with mind, the general high attainments of professors, the virtues, correctness, and decent propriety of attendants, can be presented in schemes of education under every possible variety of condition and circumstance. It is, however, a special, exclusive, entire adaptation to the present need and actual requirements of the community, the age, the ideas, and the institutions, of which it is so advanced a part, and which it often moulds and shapes, that makes it eminently effective, rather than a capacity to impart knowledge, relatively of importance, and good in its way as is all knowledge, but which might have been almost equally valuable a century since as it is now. As members of a political community, of which self-government is the cherished principle, it is obvious that a discipline, into which sentiments of true honor, self-reliance, intelligent subordination and self-control largely enter, is better adapted to the early training of those who are to illustrate its advantages, than one which is not unfrequently carried out, in insolent disregard of the existence of any such sentiments in the breasts of youth, by some hot-headed, overbearing attendant, who makes up for the lack of administrative capacity and ability to cultivate a moral influence, by considering the voluntary relations formed by students with

an institution, as formed by force, and the conduct of which he has, for the nonce, the arbitrary and irresponsible direction ; moreover, when youth are the exclusive beneficiaries of a provision made by natural affection and solicitude, whose proper distribution is committed to those who temporarily occupy the place of parents, on grounds of personal attraction, favor, or desert, there needs the application of discriminating wisdom, by the latter, in the selection of attendants, to preclude a perversion that would make youth instead, the recipients of an eleemosynary gratuity, doled out at the hands of those, who, not comprehending their own position, do not readily enter into the feelings, sympathize with the wants, or bear with the idiosyncrasies that constantly manifest themselves, and have to be dealt with when the mutual relations of instructor and pupil are formed.

Admitting that the zeal and good feeling of all interested in the actual establishment of public instruction, yielded a hearty acquiescence to the impromptu and provisional mode that marked its first essays, and that the pressure exercised by the same motives obtained results, on the whole, of a gratifying nature, he must have slumbered indeed, who cannot perceive that circumstances are widely different in our day from what they were in that of our fathers, and that what was true of the beginning of the century, is by no means so after it is more than half elapsed. That our fathers found a work to do, and did it with all their strength, will not help us, if with folded arms we make no appreciable progress, when all is progress around us. The very temerity and hardihood, the self-sacrifice and personal risk which it cost to demonstrate the absolute feasibility of a public instruction peculiarly Catholic, will be our condemnation, if deaf to the promptings of industrious effort and the counsels of good sense we fail to secure it on a firm basis.

The sympathy that was elicited from the breasts of a young and generous nation in behalf of the victims of a social catastrophe, spent its force when it enabled them to volunteer instruction, for which they sought no recompense but the consciousness of having discharged a function of their sacred calling, and for the practical value of which they were accountable no further than for the blamelessness

of the medium through which it flowed. It can no more be drawn into a precedent, than was the brilliant result of their labors a warrant for their perpetuity.

Claims addressed to the understanding for its approval of an arrangement on the ground of superiority, provoke inquiry and challenge comparison. If the efficiency of an institution consists in the charter which authorizes it to confer degrees, and a respectable number of professors; then indeed the Catholic community may indulge in a pardonable exaltation at the flourishing condition of their educational establishments; but if the number and character of the students determine the rank of the college, an examination of the condition of any one of them, as far as it is displayed, fails to disclose any appreciable improvement in the irregular partisan mode of instruction adopted in the outset of their career. There appear a number of students, between which and the number of graduates it is impossible to institute a proportion, and yet preserve the idea of a collegiate course; a discipline, the copy of no prototype and the example of no imitation; an ever-present spirit of emulation, kept alive by an artificial scheme of rewards, that, culminating in the solemn trifling of exhibition-day, prematurely develop mental vigor, and the student, at the close of a protracted course, receives his degree under the delusion that he has reached the *ne plus ultra* of education. The claims of religious guidance and teaching are made paramount to those of collegiate instruction, and in the latter manifest defects are obnoxious to no public censure, and undeniable excellence elicits no general praise; the principle of permanence, so much contended for in the relation of professors with the institution, is eliminated, and, finally, a flourishing condition of the institution itself is no assurance of its perpetuity. The halls of old St. Mary's are closed alike on the returning steps of alumni, whose diplomas have borne fruits worthy the fame of its learned faculty, and on the aspirations of youth who seek to draw from the bosom of Alma Mater literary refinement and classical culture.

We have touched but lightly on a few of the defects in our own present system of public instruction. The wants of the Church were, undoubtedly, the first to be provided for, and it was perfectly natural that in the beginning our

schools should have principally in view the supplying subjects for the priesthood, though it must be admitted that even in that respect they have not fulfilled the hopes of their founders. But the time has come when the wants of secular education are beginning to be widely and deeply felt, and when it seems to us that our Catholic community is in a condition to make a respectable provision for meeting them. The necessity of a numerous and well-educated clergy no Catholic doubts or can doubt, but the clergy cannot, in a country like ours, meet all the wants of secular society. We need also a class, and a large class of educated seculars, who can be auxiliaries of the clergy, and give tone and respectability, a position and moral weight, to our body in this non-Catholic world. For this we need colleges devoted primarily to secular studies, to the rearing and training of a generation of scholars that can more than match, in all the branches of a liberal education, the best scholars educated in the country. That our colleges now fail in this, few, we apprehend, are prepared to deny, and we have contended that one great reason of this failure is owing to the continuation, in the same institution, under nearly the same regimen and discipline, of the college, the preparatory school, and the theological seminary. As preparatory schools, many of our colleges are admirable, and leave little or nothing to be desired, and some of them are equally admirable as seminaries; but none of them come up to the proper conception of a college, and give that liberal training, that manly development, and that profound and various learning which the wants of our Catholic community require.

What changes we would propose, what results we would obtain, and what means, at the disposal of Catholics, we would suggest for obtaining them, will form the subject of a future article. Meantime, we entreat our friends to direct their attention to the subject, and examine it with reverence indeed, but thoughtfully and dispassionately, for it is of vital importance to the future of Catholicity in the United States.

F. G.

ART. V.—*Des Appels comme d'Abus et des Articles Organiques du Concordat.* Par le COMTE DE MONTALEMBERT. Paris, Le Correspondant, April, 1857.

IN criticising M. Montalembert's essay on *The Political Future of England*, in this Review for April, 1856, we suffered ourselves to be betrayed into some remarks which were understood in a sense unfavorable to M. Montalembert and his friends, and favorable to the Emperor and the present Imperial government of France. Several of the Imperialist journals, among which we notice the *Revue Contemporain* and *Le Constitutionnel*, seized with avidity upon our remarks and used them with some effect against the author of the Essay and the friends of constitutional government. We owe it to ourselves and to our friends in France to say that our remarks were never intended to have the application, or rather, misapplication that has been made of them. We wrote with the impression that our distrust of the Emperor of the French, and our devotion to free institutions, had been so often expressed and were so well known, that we were in no danger of having our meaning or our purpose misapprehended. But in view of the misapplication and perversion which has been made of our remarks by the Imperialists, we assure M. Montalembert and his friends, whose organ is the *Correspondant*, that we regret that they were not differently worded or at least more guarded, for nothing was farther from our intention than to embarrass the defenders of constitutional freedom or to please the Imperialists.

Accustomed in our own country to a free press, free discussion, and full publicity, it did not, when we were writing, occur to us that publicity is restricted in France, that the French press enjoys only a one-sided freedom, a freedom of the Jansenistic sort, and therefore that our friends would not be at liberty to correct publicly any errors of fact or opinion into which we might fall to their prejudice, or any misapplication or perversion of our remarks that might be made by the Imperialist press. Our forgetfulness on this point was not unnatural indeed, but it was hardly excusable, and we sincerely and deeply regret it. We wrote, moreover, with a partial misapprehension of the



chief design of M. Montalembert's Essay. We, as well as many others, supposed that the chief design of the illustrious author was to induce his countrymen to make an effort to obtain for France a political constitution modelled after that of England, which, in the present state of French society, we look upon both as undesirable and impracticable ; but we are now satisfied that whatever his admiration of the British constitution, or his desire to obtain for his own countrymen the liberty it secures to Englishmen, his chief design was to warn Catholics in those states which still retain a greater or less degree of constitutional or parliamentary liberty, to be on their guard against the prestige of the Imperial *régime*, to deepen their love of political freedom, and to induce them to resist manfully, with all the power and influence they possess, the farther extension of the new-fangled Caesarism which seems to have succeeded in Europe, since 1852, to the Red Republicanism of 1848. He wished, no doubt, to counteract in Switzerland, Prussia, Holland, Belgium, Great Britain, and the United States, the influence of that portion of the French Catholic press, which, not content with yielding the new government in France, a firm, dignified, and loyal support, has deemed it proper to rehabilitate in its favor theoretic despotism, and to decry as anti-Christian parliamentary government and its defenders. To this design we at least have nothing to object.

We never wished the overthrow of the Monarchy of July, or the Republic of February, 1848. But when that Republic had been once inaugurated, our readers know that we wished it to have a fair trial, and that we believed it susceptible of such modifications and developments as would secure social order, and the freedom, independence, and prosperity of France. We were opposed to the efforts of the monarchists, whatever their dynastic preferences, to subvert it, and re-establish monarchy. But when it had been subverted, and the Empire revived in Napoleon III., although we distrusted the Emperor, especially in relation to the freedom of the Church, we believed it better to give him a loyal support, than to expose France to the horrors of a new revolution, or of a civil war. It was with this view, which we still entertain, that we wrote our strictures on M. Montalembert's Essay, and urged him and his friends

not to stand aloof from the government, not to assume an attitude of opposition or *quasi*-opposition to the new power, but to accept the Emperor as a "fixed fact," to unite with him, and seek the true interests of their noble country under the Imperial *drapeau*. But we committed the usual mistake of those who are giving advice in relation to matters they only half understand. Our advice was good, our policy admirable, only it happened to be wholly impracticable. What we urged was what our friends were perfectly willing and even anxious to do, but precisely what the Emperor will not permit them to do.

As a Catholic, we have always looked upon the Imperial government chiefly from the Catholic point of view, and, though not liking it, we have always felt that if it permitted the free, untrammelled expression of Catholic thought and aspirations, it would be enduring and compatible with the best part of liberty. We distrusted from the first the personal dispositions of the Emperor towards religious liberty, and we could find nothing in his words or his acts to give us any assurance that he either understood or desired the true freedom and interests of the Church. We yet trusted that Catholicity had so revived in France, the old-fashioned Gallicanism had been so generally repudiated by the bishops and clergy as well as by a very considerable number of the Catholic nobility, and the devotion to the Holy See had become so wide and so deep, that the Catholic public opinion of the Empire would be strong enough to prevent any gross encroachments on the rights of the Church by the state, and to maintain, in practice at least, full liberty to defend publicly through the press an un mutilated, an unemasculated Catholicity,—liberty, in practice at least, for the Catholic champions to maintain publicly the inherent rights of the Church, and the incompetency of the state in spirituals. We felt confident, if this were so, our friends could erect a barrier to the encroachments of the civil power on the ecclesiastical, practically secure the freedom of conscience, and thus prevent Imperialism from growing into absolute Cæsarism. But we reckoned without our host. It now appears that this liberty is precisely what is most strenuously denied them, and what the Imperial police is on the alert to detect and suppress. Hardly had our criticism on M. Montalembert

issued from the press, before we learned that the *Correspondant* had received an *avertissement* or warning from the police *à propos* of an able and spirited Essay by the Prince de Broglie on the present state of religious controversy in France ; we learn from the *Univers* of the 3d of May last, that it has received a second warning on account of the paper cited at the head of this article by Count Montalembert, written, indeed, with great force and ability, but in a temperate and loyal spirit. One more warning, and the police, as the law now stands, may suppress the publication of the *Correspondant* entirely, and thus silence the only organ of Catholic independence in France.

We have read both articles, and find it difficult to discover any thing in them at which the government could take exception. The civil power that can fear them must have a vivid consciousness of its own weakness, or the usual sensitiveness of the *parvenu*. Power that cannot suffer such criticisms as these articles to pass without censure, lest its own stability should be shaken, seems to us to be greatly misplaced in a nation so intelligent and so highly civilized as France, and to be hardly worth defending. We had supposed the Imperial government too strong, and too deeply seated in the heart of France, to fear such criticisms, and we had also supposed that the Emperor himself was too noble, too high-minded, and too generous in his feelings, too keen-sighted as well as too broad and comprehensive in his views, and too much wedded to the interests and dignity of French literature, to which he has made so many and so valuable contributions, to be offended at them, or to suffer his police to interfere to suppress them. Not in France in the nineteenth century, can an Emperor secure a glorious reign and establish his dynasty, by outraging free thought and free speech, and offering an indignity to men of letters, or to loyal though manly intelligence. Intelligence, in the long run, is sure to carry it over brute force, and men of letters will succeed where men of the sword must succumb. He wages an unequal war, who opposes bayonets to the subtil essence of intellect, or attempts to trample out free thought by a charge of his cavalry. Still more unequal war does he wage, who wars against the Catholic conscience and the inherent rights of God's Church. The uncle of the present Emperor, with an army

and a military genius never surpassed, tried both, failed, and went to fret out the remainder of his life, a caged prisoner, on a barren isle of the ocean. Let the nephew take warning by the fate of his uncle. Let him provoke no war of opinion, or imagine that he can by his police extinguish free, manly thought in French breasts, or reduce to silence French lips. Let his police exert their utmost vigilance, let them be, as it were, ubiquitous, yet, through a thousand avenues they cannot guard, the outraged thought will reach the hearts of his subjects, rekindle in them the old Gallic fire, the old Gallic love of freedom, and the old Gallic scorn of chains and slavery. Not yet are Frenchmen prepared to sink into the passive obedience that marks the subjects of Oriental despots.

The article by M. Montalembert, which we have cited, was called forth by a recent declaration of the Council of State, condemning the venerable Bishop of Moulins for an act of ecclesiastical discipline towards one of his priests, an act within his Episcopal competency, and for which he was responsible only to his ecclesiastical superiors. When the First Consul published in 1802 the Concordat conceded to France by the Holy Father in 1801, he annexed to it of his own accord, without consultation with the Holy Father, certain organic articles, among which was one authorizing an appeal from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil, termed *Appel comme d'Abus*. The Pope on their first appearance protested against these organic articles, and they have never been accepted or submitted to by the Church. To concede the right of appeal from the ecclesiastical courts to the civil, that is, from the Church to the state, would be to surrender to the state the independence of the Church in her own sphere, to subvert her essential constitution, to render it impossible for her to enforce her discipline in the spiritual order on her own subjects, and in principle, to bring the spiritual power into complete subjection to the temporal. Hence the canons of the Church have always prohibited ecclesiastics from appealing from ecclesiastical censures to the state courts for redress. By the canons of the Church in France such an appeal by a priest incurs excommunication. The Abbé Martinet, a priest of the diocese of Moulins, having refused to conform to these canons, his Bishop suspended him from his clerical

functions. From this act of the Bishop an appeal in behalf of the priest was taken to the Council of State, which entertained it, and declared the Bishop guilty of an abuse. The Council of State thus declares the organic articles of the first Empire, which were no part of the Concordat conceded to the First Consul by the Holy Father, and which had become obsolete, to be in full force in the second Empire. The Council ground their declaration against the Bishop on the decree of Napoleon I., February 5, 1810, reviving the edict of Louis XIV. proclaiming the Four Articles of the French clergy in 1682, and declaring that edict the general law of France. By the declaration of the Council of State in the case of the Bishop of Moulins, reviving that decree, the edict of Louis XIV. is declared to be in force in 1857; and by that edict the Four Articles are ordered to be enregistered by all the courts of parliament, and all the subjects of the king are forbidden to teach in their houses, colleges, or seminaries, or to write any thing contrary to the doctrine contained in them. It is, furthermore, ordered that all who shall thenceforth be charged to teach theology in the several colleges and universities, shall subscribe to those articles, and no one shall be licensed as a bachelor in theology or canon law, or receive the degree of Doctor, until after having maintained in one of his theses the doctrine they contain. This edict, rendered in 1682, against which the Popes have uniformly protested, and which it is said Louis XIV. revoked, is, according to the Council of State, the present law of France, and consequently every Catholic teaching any thing contrary to those infamous Four Articles is liable to a legal prosecution under the paternal government of Napoleon the Third.

The case of the Bishop of Moulins, M. Montalembert contends, and justly, transcends all former precedents. In all the cases that have heretofore been carried by appeal from the ecclesiastical courts to the Council of State, the dispute has been between the Church and the state, or virtually a case of conflicting jurisdiction; but in this case the original dispute was not between the Bishop and the civil magistrate, but between the Bishop and one of his own ecclesiastics, touching a matter of purely ecclesiastical discipline. The assumption of appellate jurisdiction in such a case by the Council of State is, in principle, the assumption

by the Emperor of the highest and essential prerogatives of the Papacy; by it he is virtually declared the supreme teacher and governor of the Church in his empire,—in principle all that was claimed by Henry VIII. of England. Catholicity, according to the Declaration of the French clergy, involving, as we have shown on more occasions than one, the supremacy of the State in spirituals, or political Atheism, is the only Catholicity legally tolerated in France. Frenchmen may be Catholics, according to the Four Articles drawn up by order of the monarch and imposed by the civil power, but they are legally forbidden to be Catholics, as the Pope is a Catholic. The French Catholic must teach and believe, at least teach, that the Council is above the Pope, and that the judgments of the Pope are reformable, till they have received the assent of the Church.

What renders this restriction on Catholicity so much the more reprehensible, is the well-known fact mentioned by M. Montalembert, that there is no law in France that requires a man to believe even in God, or that prohibits him from assailing the Divinity of our Blessed Lord. All religions, all except the Catholic religion, are free in France; Protestants, Jews, Infidels, are free to profess and defend their peculiar beliefs or unbeliefs. The irreligious press in France is perfectly free to attack the Church on every side, in her authority, her dogmas, her morals, her ritual, her usages, her discipline; and the most widely-circulated journals in the Empire are doing it daily, without one word of warning from the police. But the Catholic press, the moment it ventures to offer a manly, temperate, and perfectly loyal defence of the rights and independence of the Church in her own order, is visited by an "Avertissement" from the Imperial police. All this, too, under a nominally, and, as his admirers at home and abroad pretend, a practically Catholic sovereign; eulogized by men who draw on their imagination for their facts as the protector and defender of Catholic interests throughout the world. Here is a refutation of those silly anecdotes circulating amongst Catholics in and out of France, as proofs of the Emperor's devotion to Catholic interests, and which have so often been repeated against us, as a full reply to our expressions of distrust of

his Imperial Majesty, in relation to the freedom of the Church.

It is well known that we have been almost alone among Catholics in Great Britain and the United States, in our uniform distrust, from the first, of the Emperor's disposition in regard to the freedom and independence of the Church in his Empire. We have obtained no echo to our expression of this distrust among English-speaking Catholics; they have seemed in their horror of socialism to have hailed the Emperor as a deliverer, and to be half prepared to identify the Catholic cause with that of French Imperialism. It has almost been regarded in certain quarters as a want of the true Catholic spirit to doubt the Imperial *Parvenu*, or to intimate that after all he might prove but a broken reed for Catholics to lean upon. Nothing but a panic fear of the threatened socialist or red republican revolution can account for their blindness or obliviousness. The traditions of the French monarchy from Louis XIV., the traditions of the first Empire, the antecedents of the nephew of his uncle, his affiliation with the insurgents against Gregory XVI., his letter, when president, to Colonel Edgar Ney, stating his policy with regard to the restoration of the Holy Father and the government of the Pontifical States, all were well calculated, one would suppose, to awaken distrust, and to force upon the most confiding the conviction that he would be disposed to serve the Catholic cause no further than he could make it subservient to his own purposes. What Catholic could confide in the loyal intentions towards the Church of the Emperor, who projected, as a reward of honor to his brave soldiers fighting in the Crimea, a medal with the device of three hearts united in one, intended to symbolize the union of Catholicity, Protestantism, and Mahometanism?

It is but simple justice, however, to the Emperor, to say that he has never professed to be the friend of the freedom and independence of the Church. No word have we heard from his lips that implied that he either understood or desired that freedom and independence. We have heard of no authentic act of his that indicated any disposition on his part to be the defender or protector of Catholic interests, or to depart from the policy towards the Church pursued by his uncle; and we are aware of no act of his towards reli-

gion that has shown any other regard for it than that dictated by state policy. Religious interests have suffered terribly in France since the re-establishment of the Empire, and the Church does not occupy, by any means, so free, so commanding, or so secure a position under the Imperial *régime* as she did under the republican *régime* of 1848. The Emperor has granted some pecuniary aid to particular churches, has given seats in his senate to certain ecclesiastical dignitaries, has assigned to bishops and priests an honorable place in his fêtes, and in processions on gala days, and permitted his almoners and chaplains to make a grand parade of certain harmless devotions calculated to charm the idle, please the sentimental, and captivate the *dévôtes*; but he has taken good care to give to the Church no substantial freedom, no positive security for the future, and to keep all effective power, whether in Church or State, in his own hands. So far as the civil law can do it, he has confined the Church within the narrowest limits possible without absolute schism, and made her free action and development in the Empire dependent on his own will and pleasure. And yet there are Catholics even in our own country, that look upon him as entitled to the confidence and gratitude of the Catholic world.

In this country Catholics have been misled by the conduct of a portion of the French bishops and clergy. A certain number of French prelates, long held in reverence as the champions of religious freedom and independence, lavished in the summer and autumn of 1852 praises on the Prince-President, which are rarely deserved by mortal man, and Catholics have very naturally concluded that they knew what they were about, and, therefore, that they must have received assurances that were not vouchsafed to the world at large. The policy pursued by the *Univers*, very generally supported by the French clergy, of denouncing the old parliamentary champions of Catholic interests, also contributed not a little to the same conclusion. The *Univers*, indeed, has little direct influence in this country, but through the so-called Catholic organs of Great Britain, Ireland, and the United States, and prominent individuals who read and admire it, it has had a very commanding influence, and we doubt if there had been such a burst of indignation against us, if we had questioned the infallibility



of the Pope, as there was a few years since for questioning that of M. Louis Veuillot. It is with no pleasure that we speak disparagingly of the *Univers*. We go heart and hand with it in the repudiation of Gallicanism, and the assertion of the plenary authority of the Holy See. But, unhappily, it has seen proper to couple its championship of the Papal supremacy with the defence of modern Cæsarism, and true Voltairian sneers at parliamentary government and its defenders. Its chief editor sent us a few months since his reply to Count de Fallaux on the *Parti Catholique*, accompanied by a kind and respectful note, evidently conceived in a conciliatory spirit. We have never been able to repel any overtures, even of a bitter enemy, to peace. We therefore read M. Louis Veuillot's reply with softened feelings, and with every wish to find the estimate we had formed of him unjust. But we have been disappointed. His reply does not satisfy us. It is in great part irrelevant, violent, and unjust, and its perusal has left upon our mind the painful impression that justice and candor towards opponents are virtues that he has yet to acquire. He manifests the temper and breeding of a fanatic, and seems to act on the principle that whoever differs on any important point in history, politics, or philosophy, from himself, must needs be a bad Catholic, or no Catholic at all. We question not his sincerity, we question not his personal piety; but we do question his qualification to be a Catholic leader. His mind is too narrow and one-sided for that, and his leadership, with the best intentions on his part, is fitted only to bring about the very results he most deprecates. Notwithstanding his hostility to those who regret the loss of parliamentary freedom, and his devotion to Imperialism, he has not been able to save his journal from an *avertissement*; and it would seem that, after having aided in erecting an absolute Government for his country, and in breaking down all the safeguards established by constitutionalism to freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and public discussion, the police have had the cruelty to take him at his word, and give him a taste of the despotism he has been willing to fasten upon others.

No one supposes that either the *Univers* or the French prelates we have spoken of intended to sacrifice the liberties of the Church. We do not doubt their good faith. They pro-

bably hoped to be able, by their zeal and devotion, to gain the Emperor on their side, and to prevent him from following old-fashioned Gallican counsels. But they mistook their man, and he was able to penetrate at a glance their motives. Gallicanism was originated in the courts of princes, and is the traditional doctrine of the temporal authority. No sovereign will accept the high Papal doctrines of the *Univers* and the Catholic prelates, if he can help it. We complain not that these prelates consented to the revival of the Empire, or that when revived they gave the Emperor a loyal support ; what we do complain of is, that through a panic fear of socialism they threw themselves at the feet of the new sovereign, and made an ignoble surrender to him of their personal dignity, and that freedom for which the Catholic party in France had for twenty years so nobly and so bravely struggled. They should have maintained their erect attitude, as free men and princes of the Church, and made the new Emperor feel that they neither courted his favor nor feared his displeasure ; that so long as he respected the rights and dignity of the Church of God he could count on them as his loyal supporters, but that the moment he attempted to assume spiritual functions, and to encroach on the ecclesiastical province, they would rouse all Catholic France as one man to resist his advance in that direction. In a word, they should have remained bishops, and not have attempted to be courtiers. Had they done so, we should not now have to weep over the prostrate Church in France, for prostrate for the present it is. That free, bold voice, which we heard in France, under the monarchy of July and the republic of 1848, and which electrified the whole Catholic world, is heard no more. It is silent now. Frenchmen are free only to blaspheme the Church which has given their country its glory. Her princes have now a temporal master, who fastens upon their necks the yoke they seemed by their apparent sycophancy to invite. Alas ! how often do we have to deplore that Catholics, while retaining the simplicity of the dove, forget to add to it, as our Lord commanded, the wisdom of the serpent. The whole battle for religious freedom has to be fought anew in France, and under greater disadvantages than ever.

“ If,” says Montalembert, “ the clergy had only urged the ac-

ceptance and support of the imperial government, as it has been accepted and supported by nearly all France, nobody would have blamed them. But a portion of them have done, or permitted to be done in their name, what the government has not attempted, and the country has not accepted; namely, the theoretic rehabilitation of despotism. And this, too, by the very voices and the very pens which for so long a time and so solemnly had professed the theory of liberty, and liberty for all. Whilst the founder of the new empire permitted us to catch a glimpse of liberty in the distant future as the crown of his work, the semi-official organs of the clergy in the press have maintained that this liberty is impossible, illegitimate; that even the word *liberty* has no place in the vocabulary of a Christian country; that it is necessary neither to ponder nor to discuss rights, but to deny them all; that 'to seek guaranties against power is, in politics, what it is in geometry to seek the quadrature of the circle,' and so every day for five years successively. The very men who, always in the name of the clergy and stipulating for them, in 1848 said, 'the Republic gives liberty to the Church, the only liberty, the liberty of every body, and the Church will owe it eternal gratitude,' say to-day, that when Catholics claim liberty in a Protestant country, they demand it only for themselves, and they regret not being able to sweep away the whole work of liberal civilization, corrupt to the very core. And they who speak thus have been authorized by the encouragements and approbations which have been lavished upon them, to declare that they have the best and most decisive reason for believing that they follow the *true* way, and that which the Catholic press *ought* to take. They thus make in the name of the clergy, whose silence they misinterpret, the saddest palinode of which the nineteenth century has given an example.

"Certainly there was, in 1852, neither motive nor pretext for a religious opposition to the new government; but there was just as little for derogating from the dignity and the independence which for twenty years had characterized the political attitude of the clergy, and which was so easy to reconcile with an honorable and loyal adhesion. There was, above all, neither motive nor pretext for making litter of the principles, institutions, and antecedents which they had recently invoked or applauded; to fulminate anathemas against all modern liberties; to constitute themselves the sole approvers of measures the most excessive; to be rabid against adversaries gagged in advance by official warnings; to exhaust the formulas of an adulation fitted only to excite pity, and most likely of him who is its object, and certainly of those who have been witnesses of it. There was neither motive nor pretext to clap the hands with a servile enthusiasm at the ruin of those rights which they had themselves passionately exercised but recently; to couple with the defence of religion that of the most unpopular theses and the most decried personages in history; to insult the overthrown republic, after having

greeted with acclamation its accession ; to forget that it was under its ensigns and by favor of its liberties they were able to re-establish Pius IX. in his government at Rome, to emancipate Catholic instruction, and even to reproach the Republic itself with the prominent place it assigned to bishops in its solemnities. Be tranquil, if the Republic ever returns, it will give you no more of these pretexts for posthumous mockery."—pp. 650, 651.

But, after all, we must not be too severe against the clergy or those who have done so much to place them in a false political position. There are none of us who can boast that we have never committed any mistakes. M. Montalembert himself has had occasion to chant his palinode, and we ourselves have had, on more occasions than one, to chant ours. During the revolutionary epidemic of 1848 and 1849, we all had our fears, and exerted ourselves to save liberty from being destroyed, as it so often has been, by its own excesses. When the *Ere Nouvelle* was seeking a fusion of Catholics and Democrats, and laboring to erect democracy into a dogma of faith ; when even Catholics were found carried away by a revolutionary spirit, and siding with Mazzini against the Holy Father ; when all authority except that of demagogues was threatened in its very foundation, and society seemed likely to be given up a prey to anarchy and barbarism ; we labored with all the forces we had to re-establish and confirm legitimate order, and, no doubt, used expressions and even arguments that might be cited against us to-day with effect, if no attention be paid to the altered circumstances in which the world is now placed. We have always considered it the part of wisdom to oppose the danger that is most imminent. In 1848, the danger most imminent, for the moment, was from the excesses of what was called liberty, in whose name so many crimes are committed. Intent on warding off that danger, we and our friends were obliged to confine ourselves chiefly to one side of the question, to dwell on the dangers of anarchy, and the need and benefits of authority. But when the revolution was checked as it was in 1849, and order was comparatively safe, we felt that the danger was then from the opposite side, that then we had to protect liberty, not against anarchy, but against despotism. It was necessary, after the defeat of the Hungarians, to change front, and to labor for safeguards against the excesses of

power, as we had labored for safeguards against the excesses of liberty.

But, unhappily, the course we were obliged to take in order to confine the revolution within legitimate bounds, gave an impulse in favor of authority, which the mass of those we addressed, seldom aroused to a sense of danger till it is over, thought they had nothing to do but to continue, although by continuing it after the time, they could only pave the way for the establishment of downright absolutism. The very men, in our own ranks, who in 1848 were disposed to identify Catholicity with democracy, in 1857 are ready to identify it with Cæsarism, and are astonished to find us opposing them now as we opposed them then. They suppose that they are now only carrying out the principles we then held, and look upon us as having not only changed front, but also our principles. This should not surprise or anger us, for there are few men who can comprehend more than one side of a question, or preserve themselves balanced on principles equidistant from an extreme on either hand. The mass of men reason well enough from their premises, but, unhappily, their premises are usually only a partial aspect of truth. Hence, they always swing like a pendulum from one extreme to another; now towards the frightful abyss of anarchy, and now towards the no less frightful abyss of an inexorable despotism. In their minds, notwithstanding all the precautions we took in 1848 to prevent misunderstanding, we, in advocating liberty to-day against Cæsarism, are eating our own words and retracting the warnings we then uttered. It is always so, and it is the grand reason why the world has seen, and why it always will see, so little of well-ordered liberty. Even in our own country liberty is abused, and the tendency on the one hand to licentiousness begets a tendency on the other to the exercise of arbitrary power. He who defends liberty here becomes, in the popular mind, the advocate of license, and he who defends authority and upholds the supremacy of law, becomes practically the advocate of despotism. There is nothing singular or strange in the fact, that the men who had opposed authority in France and were frightened at the danger its overthrow threatened to religion and society, should recoil from their own work, and run now to the opposite extreme of anathematizing all liberty, and of

adulating despotism. We foresaw, at the close of 1849, the reaction, and uttered our word of warning against it ; but, of course, in vain ; for we could not convince even our most intimate personal friends that the danger was no longer from the excesses of the revolutionary spirit, and most of them remain still unconvinced. We regret the political attitude which has been assumed by, or for, the clergy in France since the beginning of 1852, because it has in the eyes of the non-Catholic world placed our religion itself in a false position. For three hundred years the Catholic religion has appeared to be associated with the cause of absolute monarchy, or rather, with civil despotism. In the sixteenth century it had for its royal and imperial defenders Charles V. and Philip II., both monarchs hostile to all power but their own ; in the seventeenth century it had for its crowned champion Louis XIV., who destroyed the last vestige of freedom in France, and made himself the State, and was associated in England, Scotland, and Ireland, with the cause of the unfortunate Stuarts, who labored to concentrate all power in the crown, and who detested the parliamentary freedom of the English nation. So long, and apparently so strictly, have Catholicity and absolutism been associated, that a strong conviction has been produced in the minds of non-Catholics and even of many Catholics, that Catholicity has a natural inclination for despotism, and that the Church is incompatible with liberty. It is the grand objection of the age to our religion, and an objection, though totally unfounded, that is apparently supported by the whole history of the last three hundred years. After the French Revolution of July 1830, a powerful effort was made by the clergy, in France, and several of the younger members of the Catholic nobility, to sever our religion from this apparent alliance, and to prove that its proper element is freedom, not despotism. Their success was great, and the universal Catholic heart responded to their spirit-stirring appeals. So great had been their success, that when the revolution of 1848 broke out, seconded as they had been by the bold measures of Pius IX., hardly an insult was offered to the Catholic religion throughout France or Germany, and save in the Pontifical States, where other passions than love of liberty were at work, the Catholic religion was never, since St. Peter entered Rome,

so free, or so able to speak in her own voice and follow out her own divine instincts. It seemed, for a moment, that the standing objection to the Church was triumphantly refuted, and that she was enabled to relieve herself of the false position in which accidental circumstances had placed her.

But the course adopted by a portion of the clergy in France after the *coup d'état*, the fulsome eulogies pronounced upon the new power by several eminent French prelates, and the doctrines daily put forth in their name or under their patronage, or, at least, with their acquiescence, have revived the old objection against the Church, and the European liberals are now, to a greater extent than ever before, not only non-Catholics but anti-Catholics. In vain do we repel the objection and write elaborate essays, or deliver eloquent lectures, to prove that our religion is the grand support of civil freedom. Our opponents have only to cite against us the conduct, during the last five years, of the French clergy and the columns of the *Univers*, as a practical refutation of our essays and lectures. When they add to this the further fact that the sympathy of the whole English-speaking Catholic world is, apparently, with the present imperial *régime*, and that of all the organs of Catholic opinion out of France, at least so far as known to us, our Review is the only one that refuses that sympathy, and ventures to repel the new-fangled *Cæsarism* as incompatible with the freedom, the dignity, and the inherent rights of the Church, what have we to reply? All others, until quite recently at least, have been silent, or else have joined in the general chorus of adulation; we know that the Catholic heart beats in unison with our own, but how are we to prove it to non-Catholics with all these appearances against us? We cannot answer with mere words, we must have deeds, and what avails it to point to the deeds of French Catholics from 1830 to 1852, if those deeds are now disowned and repudiated by the accredited organs of Catholic public opinion?

We think our Catholic friends are pursuing a short-sighted policy in suffering Catholicity to become associated in the public mind with the imperial government in France. The substantial gain, not to speak of principle, is nothing, and the loss is immense. The Catholic religion requires me to

defend all vested rights not repugnant to natural justice, but there is nothing in it that requires or even permits me to defend on principle either despotism or slavery. But we, also, have been too slow to insist on what is a very necessary policy. It is only since we published our criticism on M. Montalembert's Essay, that we have appreciated the necessity of political freedom to the maintenance, in our age, of true religious freedom. We thought little of this doctrine when M. Montalembert put it forth, but in this we were wrong. The subsequent developments in France prove it, and we are now fully convinced that the only security, although that will not always be a perfect security, for the liberty of the Church, is the general liberty of the citizen. The mutual relation of the Church and the state, recognized and sustained in the Middle Ages, no longer subsists, and cannot be restored; Concordats, necessary in their day, and still useful in some parts of Europe, are only a temporary expedient, and, for the most part, remain a dead letter, or serve merely to bind the Church without practically binding the state. There is no reliance to be placed on princes as protectors of the freedom of religion or the rights of the Church. They are and will be governed by their views of state policy, regardless of their obligations to the Holy See. The only attitude that is safe for the Church to assume before the state, or that comports with her interests and dignity, is that of independence. This attitude, however, she can assert and maintain only in free states, where the freedom of religion is the recognized right of the citizen, and not simply an agreement between the Church and the state. The Church in this country is free, not by any grant or concession of the sovereign power, not by a special law declaring her free, but by virtue of the freedom of the citizen, or rather, the equal rights of all citizens before the state. All men are recognized as equal by our laws, and one has no rights that another has not. My Church is my conscience, and to follow my conscience, when not opposed to the equal right of another to follow his conscience, is my right, and recognized as such by the state. The Church then is free, because her freedom is included in my right as a man and an American citizen. Any encroachment by the state on her freedom is not merely a violation of its religious obligations, or of a Concordat it has



accepted, but is an encroachment upon my right as a citizen, and not only upon mine, but upon that of every other citizen, whether Catholic or non-Catholic. It is a denial of my right of conscience to believe and profess the religion I choose, and at the same time the denial, in principle, of the same right to others ; and, therefore, all others are naturally drawn by all their devotion to principle and all their regard for their own rights, whose turn to be attacked may come next, to my defence. This places, we grant, the Church and the several sects, truth and error, on the same footing before the state ; but this is no objection, for it is only on the condition of claiming no more in the political order for the Church than we are prepared to assert for all religions not *contra bonos mores*, that we can gain, in the modern world, any tolerable security for her freedom. To ask more would be to get less. This is the order which prevails in the United States, an order which asserts the incompetency of the state in spirituals, and secures the religious freedom of each, by securing the freedom of all in the civil and political rights of the citizen, which the state is instituted to recognize and defend.

But it is obvious that this order, which is now so desirable, is impracticable in a state where the equality of all men is not recognized, and where the citizen has no rights but the will of the political sovereign. Hence the necessity in our modern world of establishing political freedom as the condition of the freedom of religion. In a despotic country the freedom of religion, which is only another name for the freedom of conscience, is not a political right, a right of the subject against the sovereign ; and when the sovereign chooses to deny it, there is no public law to which appeal can be made against him,—no public right which he acknowledges himself bound by the very tenure of his power to maintain, and the violation of which absolves his subjects from their allegiance, that can be pleaded. It is only in what are called free states, only where liberty is the established order, that there is or can be any general liberty into the category of which religious liberty can enter. There is more truth in the coupling together, in the popular harangues of the day, of religious and civil liberty, than is commonly imagined. Political liberty, as with us, affords a practical basis to religious liberty, and gives means and

scope for its defence ; while religious liberty in turn consolidates and protects political liberty. In a word, they are each the condition of the other.

We do not pretend that political freedom, as with us, is always an adequate protection for the full freedom of the Church, but we do pretend that it is the best practicable. Prejudice or passion may now and then even here attempt to make an exception unfavorable to Catholics; may seek to form a Know-Nothing party for excluding us from the acknowledged political rights of American citizens; may even excite the mob to certain local and transitory acts of violence against us; but in these cases, if the hostility is directed against us purely on the ground of our Catholicity, the pretext is that we ourselves are not entitled to equality before the state, because we are opposed in principle to the equality in the political order of non-Catholics with Catholics, and would, if we had the power, exclude them from the enjoyment of that religious freedom we claim for ourselves. Yet, however much violence may be done to our feelings as Catholics, there is, with the exception of Belgium and the Pontifical States, no country in the world where the Catholic conscience is less oppressed than in our American Confederacy of Republics. Even the legislation attempted by Know-Nothings in several of the States is less unfavorable to the Church than that which is to be found in most countries under nominally Catholic sovereigns, and no instance of interference by our courts in the internal discipline of the Church, like that of the Council of State in the case of the Bishop of Moulins, can be cited in our whole history since we became an independent nation. The movements stirred up against us effect very little to our prejudice. The public law, public right, the constitution, the general spirit of freedom and love of fair play, and the sincere attachment of the great majority of the American people to religious liberty, and liberty for all who will concede it to others, are on our side, may always be appealed to in our defence, and seldom do appeals to them prove ineffectual.

To the state of things which obtains here the public opinion of the world has already come, and to it Catholics, whether they like it or dislike it, will in all countries be ultimately obliged to conform. Any efforts to resist it will only tend to exclude us from its advantages. We cannot

in our day have liberty for good without liberty for evil,—liberty for truth without liberty for error. We cannot secure liberty for our Church as an exclusive liberty. Such is the state of public opinion, such is the temper of the times, such the dispositions of the government and people in nearly all countries, that it is worse than idle to attempt it. The freedom of the Church must henceforth, in most countries, be enjoyed in common with the freedom of the sects, without any special recognition or favor from the state. This we regard as a “fixed fact,” and to this there is, to our knowledge, nothing in the history, in the principles, in the discipline, or in the canons of the Church that prevents her from conforming. All things, says St. Paul, are lawful for me, but all things are not expedient. The Church existed in all her integrity before Constantine, under the Pagan Emperors of Rome, and would, no doubt, at any period during the first three centuries, have deemed it much to have been placed on an equal footing before the state with the old Pagan religion. Constantine was looked upon as the deliverer of the Church, but Constantine never suppressed the old religion in favor of the new, and his edicts go no farther than to place both religions on the same footing before the state. If a different policy was subsequently pursued, or if a different order obtained, it was not because it was essential to the Church, or because her own inherent constitution made it obligatory, but because in the circumstances it was expedient, because, prior to the Barbarian Conquest, it was to some extent imposed by Roman Imperialism, and because, after that Conquest, in the breaking up of the old civilized world, it became necessary, in order to save society and religion from downright barbarism. But nothing imposes upon the Church the necessity of maintaining an exclusive freedom, or of continuing, where liberty is the established order, her old connection with the state.

It seems to us, therefore, the duty of Catholics, in all cases where we are in some measure free, and where liberty is not impracticable, to labor in such way and manner as best suits our several localities to secure political freedom, and to obtain in the general freedom of the citizen before the state a basis for the practical maintenance of the liberty of our religion. The loss of political liberty invariably carries with it the loss of the freedom and full independ-

ence of the Church. The Church is always the first and greatest victim of despotism. In France the nation has lost its freedom, and although the sovereign is a Catholic, infidelity and the sects alone are free. The Church is deprived, in principle, of her freedom, and there is no public right, no law of the empire to which appeal can be made in her behalf. The press, gagged in politics, is free to vent, and daily does vent, the vilest blasphemies against her, but no voice is free through it to speak out in defence of her violated rights. So it is, and so it will always be, wherever religious liberty is not recognized and guaranteed in the general liberty of the subject.

The Church can enjoy freedom and make progress in the Modern World only by throwing herself upon the rights of the individual, and claiming her liberty, not as her own, but as that of the free Catholic citizen,—only by taking her chance with the sects, receiving no favor and subjected to no disadvantage from the State. It seems to us, as we have elsewhere said, that she must throw herself back on her resources as a spiritual kingdom, and, relying on her Heavenly Spouse, make her appeal to the intellect and the heart of the age, and, without any extrinsic support, make progress by her sole power to convince reason and win love. In our judgment this is for her a gain, not a loss. It is what we would wish for her, for we have full confidence in her intrinsic excellence to win the heart and to lead the intelligence of all ages.

We regard it as certain that no reliance can be placed on princes as her protectors ; they are and will be governed by their own views of State policy, regardless of their obligations to the Holy See, and they will grant their protection to the Church only at the price of her freedom and independence. The sooner, then, circumstances permit the Church to cut herself loose from her old bonds to the State, and to free herself from all dependence on politics, the better. We need but look to the ricketty Catholic States on this Continent to be convinced of it. Religion will never revive in Mexico so long as it retains its present connection with that miserable caricature of a republic. No honest man can do otherwise than execrate the policy pursued towards the Church by General Commonfort's Government ; it is marked by sacrilege and robbery ; but no intelligent

man can doubt that the peculiar connection of Church and State inherited from old Spain, operates as a grave hindrance both to the material and religious prosperity of the Mexican people. The Church is, indeed, by the old legislation, acknowledged to be supreme in spirituals, but the State is supreme in whatever touches the temporal. A parish priest violates ecclesiastical discipline, commits a grave canonical offence ; his bishop suspends him, excommunicates him ; but though he ceases to perform any sacerdotal functions, he still retains under favor of the Government his benefice, and the bishop has no power to remove him and appoint a successor. Here, in a similar case, our courts would decide, as they have decided in principle, in several cases, that the benefice being a trust for the benefit of the Catholic religion, is vacated when the priest ceases by the laws of his own Church to be competent to hold it, and they would decide so in case of a Catholic priest, because the principle is just, and because they would decide so in the case of any Protestant minister. Both the Church and the State suffer from the present state of things, and unless it can be so changed as to place matters on the footing they are with us, we see no hope in Mexico for either. The fact that Bishop Rosati, when he was sent to arrange ecclesiastical affairs in Hayti, received instructions from the Holy See to place them, if possible, on the same footing they are in the United States, tells us plainly enough what are the wishes of Rome in this respect, and may satisfy us, that, if there are objections on the part of individual Catholics who suppose the world has stood still for the last two hundred years, or that it is perfectly possible and easy *revocare defunctos*, they are such as we need have no scruples of conscience in disregarding, or even combating, providing we do it with the respect always due to those who adhere to the past, and resolutely resist all changes.

Let us not be misunderstood. We do not, as we could not as a Catholic, censure or complain of the order which obtained under the Christian emperors, under the Barbarians in the Middle Ages, or under modern monarchy. We do not oppose Concordats ; we do not pretend they are either wrong or unwise ; we defend the practice of the Church and the principle of her practice in every age. We

are finding no fault with what has been. The Church, as we often say, deals with the world as she finds it, and when she does not find free men, she cannot deal with free men. Where there are only sovereigns, and no free citizens, she can in her political relations deal only with sovereigns. She has done the best that was to be done with the ages she has traversed. If circumstances have changed, or are changing, so as to render a different policy practicable or expedient, it does not follow that she has ever been wrong or unwise. No reproach is necessarily cast upon the past, nor do we demand a revolution in France or any where else in favor of republicanism. We do not like the Napoleonic *régime*, or dynasty, but we believe a revolution against either would, even if successful, cost more than it would be worth. Our readers need not to be told that we are opposed to all revolutions, because they generally fail in their purpose, and because we are not at liberty to do evil that good may come. In France, even, we should be a loyal subject were we a Frenchman.

But what we do ask, and what we write, as far as in our power, to effect, is, that Catholics should not allow themselves to regard modern liberalism as an unmixed evil, and that in all countries where even a shadow of public liberty remains, and Catholics have a degree of freedom and equality, they should resist with all their power and influence every attempt, under whatever guise it may be made, to establish despotism on the ruins of the liberties of the citizen. We have wished also to draw attention to the connection there is between religious freedom and political freedom. What we ask for our Church is not State patronage, is not special favors or special protection from the Government, but liberty, and that liberty which is liberty for all as well as for us. Give the Church an open field and fair play, she needs nothing else. We confide in her own intrinsic power and divinity to win the victory. We pray, therefore, those inconsiderate Catholics, whether in France or out of France, who make themselves the adulators of Caesarism, to look ahead and see that they are only storing up wrath against the day of wrath, or only preparing the way for the new republican revolution, when it breaks out anew, to be more hostile to religion than ever; that they are confirming in the minds of non-Catholics the grand ob-

jection we have in our age to combat, and that they are so compromising the Catholic cause that Catholics in the new revolution must either join a movement hostile to the Church, or join the cause of the sovereigns, fight on the side of despotism, and go down with kings and Cæsars. That revolution may be put off for a time, but come again it will, if the sovereigns have their way, and all their military forces will prove impotent before the irrepressible instincts of humanity. True prudence foresees the evil and guards against it.

The danger is not now of a republican outbreak, for the pear is not ripe, but there is danger that the reaction against republicanism in Europe, since 1850, will provoke such an outbreak, and one that will not be repressed so easily or so suddenly as was that of 1848. The danger to us Catholics is that in this new outbreak we shall be found associated in the popular mind with the defenders of Cæsarism, and thus be opposed even by the sincere and earnest friends of rational liberty. We warn our brethren of this danger, and we earnestly entreat them not to let our words pass unheeded. Many things indicate to us that the Emperor of the French is losing, rather than gaining popularity. He was thought to have come out of the Eastern war with a manifest advantage over England, and as the arbiter of Europe. But however much British interests may have been disregarded by the Peace of Paris, it is clear that the English Government has since contrived to recover the ground it had lost, and to make its policy for the East triumph over that of France. In diplomacy, Lord Palmerston has carried it over the Emperor. He has defeated the French in regard to a canal across the Isthmus of Suez, gained a footing in the Persian Gulf, defeated the Russian policy in the Persian Court, induced Napoleon to aid his views of conquest in China, and obtained a grant from the Porte of a railroad along the Valley of the Euphrates, with the guaranty from the Turkish Government of a minimum of six per cent., while the Emperor of the French has to content himself with the present of St. Anne's Church at Jerusalem. This in this age of materialism will not render the Emperor popular with the active spirits of his Empire. English supremacy seemed never so near being permanently established as at this moment. The interests of France

seem to us to have been more compromised by the developments of the English policy in the East during the last year than those of England were by the peace. Lord Palmerston seems likely, so far as regards France, to prove in effect a second Chatham. Let this defeat of French interests be exploited as it will be by French republicans, and the effect upon the Imperial *régime* will prove all but fatal. Let not our Catholic friends repose in too much security. The throne on which they lean may fail them, and the only way in our judgment to sustain it, and ward off the revolution, is to anticipate it, and develop the Imperial constitution into a liberal government, satisfactory to the friends of rational and well-ordered liberty.

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ART. VI.—LITERARY NOTICES AND CRITICISMS.

1. *L'Immaculée Conception de la Bienheureuse Vierge Marie, Considérée comme Dogme de Foi.* Par Mgr. J. B. MALOU, Evêque de Bruges. Bruxelles: Goemaere. 1857. 2 Tomes. 8vo.

We have not yet received the second volume of this work, although it was to have been issued on the 1st of last April. When we receive it we shall make it a point to bring the work very fully to the notice of our readers. The Bishop of Bruges is one of the most learned and eminent writers in Europe, and he has, we are told, written this work at the request of the Holy Father. From what we have read of the first volume, we have formed the highest opinion of its merits, and we are led to believe it the very work needed on the subject.

2. *Etudes Philosophiques. Ontologie, ou Etude des Lois de la Pensée.* Par M. l'ABBÉ F. HUGONIN. Tome premier. Paris: Belin. 1856. 8vo.

We are ignorant whether the Abbé Hugonin has or has not published more than this first volume, a copy of which he has done us the honor to send us. We have no space at present to speak of it according to its merits. As far as we have examined it, the work strikes us very favorably, and proves that the French mind, though still affected by Cartesianism, is working its way into the elevated and serene regions of a truly ontological philosophy, which places the order of knowledge in harmony with the order of being. We shall return to this volume soon, and attempt an appreciation of its merits.



3. *Bertha and Lily; or, the Parsonage of Beech Glen.* A Romance. By ELIZABETH OAKES SMITH. New York: J. C. Derby. 1855. 16mo. pp. 336.

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4. *Mary and Hugo; or, the Lost Angel.* A Christmas Legend, by ELIZABETH OAKES SMITH. With Illustrations by Darley. New York: Derby and Jackson. 1857. 16mo. pp. 149.

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5. *The Newsboy.* New York: Derby and Jackson. 1856. 12mo. pp. 527.

These three works by an estimable lady, deserve a more extended notice than we are now able to give them. They are marked by a fine vein of philanthropic sentiment, and by deep and independent thought. They are the genuine utterances of the heart and soul of the author, and indicate a mind of great earnestness, and a heart that craves truth and goodness. The author is not a Catholic, but she has advanced far beyond the vulgar Protestantism of the day, and has aspirations which can be met only in the Catholic Church, though she probably sees it not, and believes it not. She is not satisfied with any form of Protestantism that she has yet encountered, but she is one of those who are looking for a new development of the religious sentiment, and its embodiment in a new Church, or "The Church of the Future." She is not with us, but she is not against us. The literary and artistic merits of her works are very considerable; and *Bertha and Lily* is entitled to a high rank as a romance. The interest of the story is well sustained; the characters are well marked and life-like. The incidents are a little wild, but they are not wholly improbable, and the effect upon any other than a Catholic reader, must be pleasing and inspiring. *Mary and Hugo* is a wild and unearthly story, with a little too much of the mystic for our taste, yet it indicates thought and reflection as well as imagination.

*The Newsboy* is our favorite. We like it for its appreciation of boy's nature, for its hearty sympathy with the poor and neglected, and its detestation of all hollow pretence and hypocrisy. The author loves humanity, but she detests all sham, all mere seeming, and allows herself to be deceived by none of the heartless conventionalities of society. She carries her radicalism somewhat further than ours goes in our maturer years, but we find it refreshing to meet a writer now and then that dares call things by their right names, and to plead the cause of those whom society regards as outcasts. She is no Puritan, no self-complacent Pharisee; she is not afraid to compassionate sinners, and to tell the scribes and Pharisees of the day, that publicans and sinners, even harlots, go into the kingdom of Heaven before them. She believes love and genuine kindness are often due where we mete out only cruelty and wrath. So far we believe her right.

6. *The Life of Saint Elizabeth of Hungary, Duchess of Thuringia.* By the COUNT DE MONTALEMBERT, Peer of France. Translated by MARY HACKETT. The Introduction translated by Mrs. J. SADLIER. Second Edition. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co. 1857. 16mo. pp. 427.

We cannot speak of this work in higher terms than it deserves. It is marked alike by faith and solid learning, by genius and piety, and is a model in its way. If the illustrious author had done nothing else than write this book, he would deserve to be held in grateful remembrance, through all time, by the Catholic world.

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7. *A Life of the Right Rev. Edward Maginn, Coadjutor Bishop of Derry, with Selections from his Correspondence.* By THOMAS D'ARCY M'GEE. New York: P. O'Shea. 1857. 16mo. pp. 306.

We received this work at too late a day to be able to do more than glance at a few of its pages. We have a profound respect for the high character, and religious and patriotic labors of its Right Reverend subject, who died too soon for religion and for his country. Its author is no friend of ours, but as far as we have read, he appears to have acquitted himself of his task in a manner creditable to himself and satisfactory to the numerous friends of the late Bishop of Derry.

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8. *Roman Vespéral; containing the Complete Vespers for the whole Year, with Gregorian Chants in Modern Notation.* Baltimore: John Murphy & Co. 1857. 16mo. pp. 264.
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9. *The Life of our Lord Jesus Christ; or, Jesus Christ revealed to Childhood and Youth.* By the ABBÉ F. LA GRANGE. Translated from the French by Mrs. J. SADLIER. New York: D. & J. Sadlier. 1857. 24mo. pp. 318.
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10. *The Sufferings of Jesus.* By CATHERINE EMMERICK. Translated by a Sister of Mercy. New York: P. O'Shea. 1857. 24mo. pp. 187.
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11. *The Three Kings of Cologne.* By REV. TITUS JOSLIN. New York: E. Dunigan & Brother. 1857.

12. *The Creator and the Creature ; or, the Wonders of Divine Love.*  
By FREDERICK WILLIAM FABER, D.D. With an Introduction by  
an American Clergyman. Baltimore; Murphy & Co. 1857.  
16mo. pp. 414.
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13. *The Complete Works of Gerald Griffin.* Parts I.—XII. New  
York: D. & J. Sadlier. 16mo.

We welcome this new and complete edition of the works of Gerald Griffin, now in the course of publication by the Messrs. Sadlier & Co. We read *The Collegians*, when it was first published, with a pleasure we have never forgotten, and which we have found increased at every repeated perusal. Ireland has produced many geniuses, but rarely one, upon the whole, superior to Gerald Griffin. When we have his life, and the publication of the edition is completed, we shall endeavor to render our tribute of gratitude to the memory of the gifted author.

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14. *Concilium Baltimoreense Provinciale VIII, habitum Anno*  
1855. Baltimore: Murphy & Co. 1857. 8vo. pp. 40.

We find in this pamphlet the following Decree, which, as it applies to the whole United States, we take the liberty of copying.

"*DECRETUM Concilii primi Provincialis Sancti-Ludovici, quod S. Sedes approbavit, et per alias quoque Provincias servari mandavit quoad Ecclesiastica judicia.*

"Sacerdotes, quibus per Ordinarii sententiam sacri ministerii exercitium interdictum fuerit, nullum jus habent ad sustentationem ab eo petendam, cum ipsi se sua culpa missionibus operam navandi incapaces reddiderint. Ut autem omnis occasio querelarum tollatur, censeant Patres omnino expedire ut Ordinarii in causis criminalibus clericorum aut presbyterorum servant certam judicii normam, quæ ad formam a Concilio Tridentino (*Cap. VI, Sess. XXV, de Ref.*) præscriptam, quam proxime accedat: scilicet, ut Episcopus, seu Vicarius ejus Generalis, de ipsius commissione, duos ejusdem Episcopi Consultores (ex eis quos, juxta alterum Baltimoreense Concilium pro gravioribus negotiis pertractandis designatos habet), nec semper eosdem eligat, qui ei presbyterum criminis postulatum judicatu, coram Notario tamen ipsius Episcopi, assistant. Unum autem sit utriusque votum, possitque alter Episcopo accedere. Quod si ambo ab Episcopo, seu ejus Vicario, discordes fuerint, tertium tunc ex prædictis suis Consultoribus ipse eligat, et juxta eam partem cum qua tertius convenit, causa terminetur. Si autem contigerit omnes Consultores ab Ordinario electos, ab ejus sententia dissidere, tunc ad Metropolitanum causa referri debet, qui sententiarum motiva expendit, et judicium feret. Quando autem quæstio erit de subdito Metropolitanum, criminis postulato, et omnes Assessores Metropolitanum, modo prædicto ab ipso designati, ab ejus sententia dissenserint, tunc appellatio fiat ad seniores Episcopum comprovincialem, ejus sententia finalis erit, salvo semper Sedis Apostolicæ privilegiis et auctoritate."

BROWNSON'S  
QUARTERLY REVIEW.

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ART. I.—*The Catholic. Letters addressed by a Jurist to a Young Kinsman proposing to join the Church of Rome.*  
By E. H. DERBY. Boston: Jewett & Co.. 1856.  
12mo. pp. 293.

CATHOLIC controversy changes its form with the circumstances of the age and the country. When Catholics in the United States were few, and generally regarded as idolators, ignorant, degraded, superstitious, and base, controversy very necessarily and properly assumed an apologetic tone, confined itself to the work of self-defence, and aimed simply at proving that Catholics are not so bad as they have been represented, and may prudently be suffered to live and act as freemen in the same community with Protestants. When by natural increase, conversions, and immigration they had become a notable part of the population, and capable of forming a body able in some measure to suffice for itself, it became equally necessary for their own security and progress to make them feel their independence in the face of Protestantism, and induce them to rise to the level of their position as free and equal citizens of a free republic. This has continued long enough; an impulse has been given which may now be safely trusted to itself. Very few Catholics now in the country are likely to feel ashamed of their religion in the presence of non-Catholics, or that it excludes them from their rights as men, or their equality as citizens. It is time now for our controversy to assume a new phase, and leaving the question of self-defence, as well as that of infusing the spirit of inde-

pendence into Catholics, aim at the conversion of Protestants, or producing on their minds an impression favorable to our holy religion.

Mr. Derby has written his book, not to induce Catholics to turn Protestants, but to prevent Protestants from becoming Catholics. Much the same may be said of nearly all the works written against us, that issue from the American press. The aim of the Protestant controversialist is not primarily damage to Catholicity, but the preservation of Protestants in their allegiance to the Reformation. This proves that a spirit of inquiry, a tendency to Catholicity, is at work in the Protestant community, and that without extraordinary exertions on the part of its leaders, considerable defections from the Protestant ranks are to be feared. At the same time that it proves this, it indicates the tone and direction that our own controversy should take. The works written against us, being written for Protestants, should be answered for Protestants, not with a view to preventing Catholics from abandoning their religion, but with a view to bringing Protestants to the faith, or at least rendering them less indisposed to examine its claims. If our aim were merely to prevent Mr. Derby's *Letters* from exerting any unfavorable effect on the Catholic mind, a few words would be amply sufficient, and we could not justify ourselves to our readers in devoting so much space as we have done to them ; but when it is understood that we are replying to them for the sake of the Protestant mind, no reasonable Catholic can blame us.

Mr. Derby's book, though it contains some things the ordinary Catholic may not be able to answer, can make no impression on Catholics unfavorable to their religion. But worthless as they are in the estimation of the Catholic, his *Letters* are not wholly worthless in the estimation of Protestants, and their reasoning passes with them for solid and weighty, for it chimes in with their preconceived notions of Catholicity. The book simply tells what Protestants already believe, or are fully prepared to believe. Books like Mr. Derby's circulate extensively among Protestants, confirm their prejudices against Catholicity, and do much to prevent them from coming to the knowledge of the truth. It is this fact that gives them importance, and renders their circulation a source of grief to the Catholic ; for these

Protestants have souls as well as we, and their salvation is not less dear to our Lord and his Church than ours. It is this fact, also, that makes it our duty to do all we can in truth and conscience to counteract their influence, not on those within, indeed, but on those without the Church.

Mr. Derby is not a great man, nor a great theologian, but he is a man of respectable standing in society, and has in his Letters collected, combined, and presented in a plausible manner nearly all the objections popularly urged against us, or which are fitted to have weight with the ordinary Protestant mind. If we regarded only the influence they may have on the Catholic mind, a witty retort, a newspaper paragraph, a sneer, or a squib, would be all, and more than all that would need to be said in reply to them ; but regarding their influence on the Protestant mind, or the influence of the same objections as urged by other authors, and which may as well be refuted in him as in another, it is hardly just to accuse us of spending too much ammunition in their refutation, or of breaking "a fly upon the wheel." The blame which has been bestowed on us in certain quarters proceeds from mistaking our motive, as well as from a certain forgetfulness of the great mission of Catholic controversy. We English speaking Catholics have so long been accustomed to regard only our defence, that we almost forget that the Protestant mind is not wholly unimpressible, and that Catholics may do even much to remove its prejudices. We have insensibly fallen into the habit of treating anti-Catholic books chiefly from our own point of view, as they affect us, and seem to conclude that when we have warded off the danger they threaten us, we have done all that can be required of us. This is all that could be required of us some time ago, but not all that is required of us now. We beg the attention of the Catholic press to this important fact. In replying to books against us with a view of benefiting the non-Catholic community, it is of far more consequence to consider what is objected than who it is that objects. Truth is objective, and is independent of your personal character or mine. I do not necessarily establish my own character by damaging the character of him who assails it, for he may be a knave without my being an honest man. Controversy should deal with reasons, not

persons, and in no case is any thing gained by indulging in personalities. Whether the writer is a great and distinguished man or not is not the point to be considered. If Mr. Derby uses as good arguments and brings as pertinent and forcible objections as Bramhall or Barrow, as Chillingworth or John Henry Hopkins, he is equally deserving of a refutation. We selected his book for refutation, not because it was the best or the worst that might have been selected ; but because accident threw it in our way, and it could serve our purpose as well as another. Its author is welcome to all the distinction or importance he can derive from our dissection of his book. We fear neither a loss of our own dignity nor the imparting of an undiscovered dignity to him. We shall, however, take our leave of him with our present article.

In our previous articles on Mr. Derby's book we have disposed of his first ten Letters, which in reality cover the whole ground occupied by the author. His eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth chapters are taken up with further attempts to disprove the Papacy from the Scriptures and the Fathers, and to set aside the arguments usually adduced by Catholics in support of the Primacy of Peter. I do not perceive that he has added any thing of importance to what he had advanced in his previous Letters, and which have been already sufficiently answered. A few general remarks will close all we choose to say. Mr. Derby commits the grave mistake of supposing that he can conclude against the Papacy and the Primacy of Peter from the silence of the Scriptures and of particular Fathers. He proceeds on the assumption that the Scriptures are the charter of the Church, and that nothing can be affirmed of her that cannot be deduced by strict construction from the letter of the charter. He even gives his son to understand that in this both Catholics and Protestants agree ; but this is a great mistake. Whether his assumption of the Bible as the charter of the Church be well-founded or not, he has no right in an argument against Catholics to make it, for they deny it, and he must, if he would conclude any thing against them, prove it, before undertaking to found an argument on it.

According to Catholic doctrine, the Bible, though the inspired and authoritative word of God, is not the charter or act of incorporation of the Church ; for the Church existed

prior to the written word. It is historically certain that the Church existed with all her rights and powers before one line of the New Testament was written. It is evident, from the very face of the New Testament, that its books and epistles were written after the institution of the Church, and addressed to the Church as already existing. This much is undeniable. Catholics therefore deny that the Church was founded by the Scriptures, or that she is obliged to consult them as her act of incorporation. They hold that the Church was founded immediately by our Lord in person, that her charter is in the commission or authority which he gave to the Apostles, and which derives from his continued presence with her all days to the consummation of the world. The Church, in their view, is the body of Christ, as St. Augustine says, is Christ, and the body of believers in union with him are the whole Christ, *totus Christus*, as the soul and body united in their living union are the total man. The charter of the Church is in her internal constitution and life, as the living body of our Lord, and her rights and powers are in and from him living in her, and speaking and operating in and through her as his own body, or the visible continuation or representation on earth of the Incarnation. I say his *own* body; for the Church is not a foreign body, having relation with him only through the medium of an external commission, or, if Mr. Derby pleases, a written power of attorney. She is his spouse, flesh of his flesh and one with him, having her personality in his Divine person. She has no more need on her own account of appealing to the Bible to prove that she is God's Church than a man has of appealing to an external authority to prove to himself that he is a man, not an ox or a horse. The evidence is in her own intimate consciousness, for she is the living impersonation on earth of the Incarnate Word, and can no more mistake her rights and powers than he can mistake his.

The question at present is not whether this view of the Church be true or not, for it is no part of our present purpose to prove the truth of Catholicity. We are simply showing that Mr. Derby's reasons, addressed to his son to dissuade him from joining our Church, are not good reasons. It is sufficient for this purpose, that the view we have given is the Catholic view,—is the Catholic doctrine,



and therefore, in an argument against Catholics, a doctrine the Protestant must recognize as their doctrine, and as one which he must disprove before he can assume, even if he can then assume, that the Bible is the charter of the Church, and can have no rights or powers not deducible by strict construction from its letter. The consideration is of high importance, and intimately affects the principle of interpretation. On the Protestant hypothesis the Church is nothing, has no rights or powers not positively affirmed in the Scriptures ; on the Catholic doctrine, she must be conceded to be and to possess all she claims, unless expressly, or by necessary implication, denied or forbidden in the written word.

On this point, Protestants fall, consciously or unconsciously, into a miserable sophism. The Catholic asserts, the Church has always asserted, the divine inspiration and authority of the written word, and with a distinctness and emphasis that no Protestant sect does or can. Therefore, says the Protestant, the Catholic does and must found the Church on the Bible. Not at all. If both the Church and the Bible are from God, there can, of course, be no discrepancy between them, as there can be none between revelation and reason ; but it no more follows from this that the Bible is the foundation of the Church, than it does that reason is the basis of revelation. Revelation is made to reason and presupposes it ; the written word is addressed or communicated to the Church, and presupposes her existence and constitution. If the Church did or could teach any thing contrary to the written word, her claims would, indeed, be refuted ; not because the authority of the written word is greater than hers, but because she would thus be convicted of contradicting herself, since she herself declares the written word to be the word of God, and therefore infallibly true. But on her principle nothing can be concluded against her from the silence of Scripture. So long as there is no positive contradiction in Scripture of her teaching, her claims stand good. By declaring the written word to be the word of God, she necessarily includes its teaching in hers, and if she teaches elsewhere any thing incompatible with what she teaches in it, she of course contradicts herself, and must be rejected ; but no argument can be framed against her, from the fact

that she teaches things not in the written word, so long as these things are in harmony or capable of being harmonized with it ; for it may well be that the whole doctrine of Christ is not contained in the Scriptures, that all was not written, and that even what was written, can be properly understood only through the light of the fuller, more explicit, and more complete revelation made primarily to the Church, without any written medium.

On Catholic principles, it is not necessary to prove from the Scriptures that our Lord conferred the Primacy on Peter and established the Papacy in his successors in the See of Rome. The uniform teaching and tradition of the Church suffices for that, in case the contrary cannot be shown from the written word. This rule applies to tradition universally. In no case are we required to prove the tradition from the Bible, and all we can be required to do is to show that the Bible does not contradict it, or necessarily exclude it. The same principle must be adopted in interpreting the texts of Scripture adduced in favor or against any particular doctrine or claim of the Church. The presumption, in law, Mr. Derby must be jurist enough to be aware, is on the side of the Church. Suppose a text is adduced, which may without violence to the letter be understood either against or in favor of the Church ; in which sense must it be taken ? The Protestant assumes, against the Church, and that he has the right to assume that it is might not be wrong, if the Protestant rule that the Bible is the charter of the Church were once solidly established ; but till then, it must be understood in favor of the Church. She has the right to claim as not against her every text which can without violence be explained in a manner compatible with her claims, and also as decidedly for her every text which can without violence be explained in her favor. Suppose that the Protestant succeeds in showing that one of our proof texts is susceptible of a sense which does not prove our doctrine ; he does nothing to his purpose, if we are able at the same time to show that it is fairly susceptible of a meaning in favor of the Church. The presumption being on our side, and against the Protestant, determines the text in favor of the Catholic.

Mr. Derby goes into an examination of the texts usually cited by Catholics from the New Testament, to

prove that our Lord did confer the Primacy of order and jurisdiction on Peter, and shows, or thinks he shows, that they do not of themselves necessarily prove it. I am far from conceding that he succeeds in this ; but even supposing he does, he has effected nothing, because he has done it only by virtue of his Protestant assumption, that nothing can be affirmed of the Church not positively affirmed in Scripture, and because there is no question that these same texts may easily and naturally be understood in the Catholic sense. He also alleges other passages, which he regards as contradicting the claims of the Church. But all of these may be explained easily and naturally in accordance with those claims, and therefore prove nothing against us, even supposing they could without violence be understood, as he professes to understand them. So in explaining the Fathers. Nothing can be alleged against us from a particular Father, that is susceptible of a sense compatible with Catholic doctrine, and every thing must be taken as for us that is susceptible of being explained in our favor.

I do not deny that this rule gives apparently the advantage to the Catholic, and denies that in the use of Scripture and tradition he and the Protestant stand on an equal footing. The reason is, because the Church is in possession, and the presumption is in her favor. Protestants and Catholics stand on equal footing only when they reason from a common principle ; but they do not reason from a common principle when Mr. Derby assumes that the Church derives her authority from God through the medium of the written word, for the Catholic asserts that she derives it immediately from our Lord in person, who continues with her all days to the end of the world. Mr. Derby, as seeking to disprove the Church, can avail himself of no presumption against her, while she having from time immemorial asserted what she now asserts, and had her assertion admitted, has the right to every presumption, and to throw the *onus probandi* on every one who rises up to contradict her claims, and oust her from her possession. The Protestant can restore equality in interpreting the testimony of Scripture and tradition only either by positively disproving her existence and constitution in the sense she alleges, or by positively establishing his rule that the Church is founded

not on Christ and his Apostles, but on the written word. In not doing either, Mr. Derby labors, no doubt, under grave disadvantages. Till then he does nothing by means of texts or authorities which *may* be understood in a sense against us, or by showing that our texts and authorities *may* be understood in a sense which does not support us. In both cases it is incumbent on him to show that they *must*, not merely *may* be understood in the sense he alleges.

I have dwelt at length on this point, because Protestant controversialists, so far as my experience extends, invariably overlook it. They forget that the Catholic maintains that our Lord founded his religion through the institution of the Church, and would persuade us that he only inspired certain holy men in divers places and times to write a series of books, which collected and bound in a single volume we call the Bible, or the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. Because we assert the divine origin, constitution, and authority of the Church, as the living depositary and teacher of the faith, they run away with the notion that we are at least wanting in proper reverence for the written word of God, when, in fact, we are the only people on earth who really believe the Scriptures to be that written word, who recognize their divine authority, and treat the sacred text with the reverence due to it. Because we deny that the Scriptures are, ever were, or were ever intended to be the charter of the Church, it by no means follows that we do not hold them to be really and truly God's word, and reverence their authority as such. Because we believe our Lord makes his revelation primarily to the Church without any written medium, and that the Holy Ghost is always present in her to bring all his words to her remembrance, and to assist her to preserve, to understand, and to teach it infallibly, it does not follow that we do not recognize the authority of the same revelation in the written word, in so far as the written word contains it. It is very possible to believe truly and firmly that the Scriptures are the word of God, authentic and authoritative, without holding the Protestant notion that the Church derives her authority from God through them. The Scriptures addressed to the Church, may be good evidence of her constitution and authority, without being her charter or act of incorpora-

tion. They may be, too, a record made by the hand of the Almighty of the principal doctrines he has communicated to her, and teaches through her, and as such of priceless value, without thereby diminishing her authority, or casting the slightest suspicion on the fulness and integrity of the revelation made to her.

The great difficulty with the Protestant is, that he does not believe in the Church, the Holy Catholic Church, of the Creed, as a real and truly divine institution ; and he lacks all conception of her as a living organism with its own unity and central life. To whatever sect he belongs, the Protestant is essentially a Nestorian, and fails to recognize in our Lord the two forever distinct natures in one person. He dissolves Christ, and regards the human and the divine simply as associated in a common work, each with its own proper personality, not as united in the one Divine person by a hypostatic union. Hence he fails to regard the Church as a person, and having her personality in the Divine person of our Lord. In his mind the Church is not the living body of Christ, living his life, and one in the unity of his person, but separate from him, a mass of individuals aggregated around a doctrine, a discipline, or a form of worship. He has no conception of the Church as the mystic body of Christ ; mystically, indeed, but really united to him as the body to the head, so that each sympathizes with the other, the body with the head, the head with the body, and each member with the whole, and the whole and each with each. Neither his philosophy nor his theology rises to the conception of that solidarity of Christian life, so distinctly and so energetically asserted by the great Apostle of the Gentiles, "As in one body we have many members, . . . so we being many are one body in Christ, and each one, members of one another." \* "As the body is one, and hath many members, and all the members of the body being one, are nevertheless one body, so also Christ. . . If one member suffer any thing, all the members suffer with it ; or if one member glory, all the members rejoice with it. *Now ye are the body of Christ and member of member.*" † Therefore, as the same Apostle tells elsewhere, the Church is "one body with one spirit." These pregnant passages really mean nothing to the Protestant.

\* Rom. xii. 4, 5.

† 1 Cor. xii. 12, 26, 27.

His views are external, formal, cold, lifeless. To his mind the Church is wholly outward, material, a body without a soul, without interior unity or life. Her authority, if authority she has, in his view, must come from abroad, through an external medium, not from within, from her own interior life, light, and ability, by virtue of the indwelling Christ whose body she is. To his conception Christ is not in her, but apart from her, and her light and ability are only the light and ability of the individuals aggregated, and her authority only that conveyed in the written power of attorney formally executed by our Lord in her behalf.

The fact is, our Protestant friends have lost the sense of the deeper significance of the Church, and with it the scriptural sense of the Christian order. They have become strangers to the profound Christian philosophy, as set forth in the Epistles of St. Paul, and in the writings of the great Christian Fathers and Catholic doctors, and they see no more in the Christian Church, than the carnal Jews saw in Jesus of Nazareth, whom they crucified between two thieves. To these Jews our Lord was only a man, claiming to be the Son of God. They saw only the humanity, and suspected not that in the form of the son of the humble Mary there was, as well as the perfect man, the eternal and ever-living God, the Creator of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible. So in the Church, Protestants see only the human element, only an aggregation of individuals, differing very slightly, if at all, from any other aggregation of individuals. They see not, suspect not, in the human form visible to their senses, the living presence of the Incarnate God, who is himself the truth, the way, and the life. The Catholic believes the Incarnation, and sees, as it were, its visible continuance in the Church, the living presence of Christ himself, as God-man. In his view the Church has an interior life, and lives the revelation of God, and knows and declares the truth, so to speak, from her own life and consciousness. Her doctors teach with a delegated authority; the Pope teaches and governs as the Vicar of Christ, but the Church herself teaches and governs with no authority externally delegated, but with the inward authority of her Lord, who dwells in her, and is her life, her unity, her personality.

Now all the Catholic has any need to have proved to

him, is the fact of the existence of the Church ; and this fact is proved to him by his own union with her and participation in her life. He must lose all sense of what she really is before he can doubt any thing she says. He goes to the Scriptures indeed, to learn what she believes and teaches, but not to find a criterion by which to judge what she believes and teaches. His own mind is at rest, knowing that the same God who inspired the written word, lives and teaches in and through her, and can no more deceive or be deceived in his teaching in and through her than in his teaching in and through the written word itself. This for himself as a Catholic, in the respect that by the gift of faith he is united in the one Divine-human life of the Church. When he appeals to the written word for proofs, either of the truth of what the Church teaches, or of her authority to teach, it is not for himself, but for unbelievers, who, notwithstanding their unbelief, acknowledge the divine authority of the written word. He himself would believe the Church, though he had no Scriptures at all, and he even believes them only because he believes her. The texts he cites from them to serve his purpose, do not need to be in all cases explicit and direct. It is enough, if by an unforced and natural interpretation they are in favor of the claims of the Church, in the sense I have explained, that is, the sense which connects her existence and character intimately and really with the Incarnation, the assumption of flesh by the Word, without which the Church can have no significance, and the whole Catholic Church system would fall to the ground. Let the Protestant once understand the relation of the Church to the Incarnation, that mystery of mysteries, and that in the Catholic sense, a Church without the Incarnation would be a solecism, and his own good sense will show him that all his reasoning against Catholicity proceeds on a gratuitous assumption, and is irrelevant and wholly inconclusive.

If the Protestant could for a moment place himself at the Catholic point of view, and take in the Catholic conception of the Church, or regard her as the visible continuation on earth, through her sacraments, of the incarnate life of Christ, or representation of the Incarnation in the visible order, he would soon perceive the logical necessity of asserting the Papacy. The Church is, I have

said, a person, and her person, in the interior sense, is the person of Christ ; but this person must be represented in the visible order, or else the Church fails to represent in the visible order the Incarnate Word. Being external as well as internal, visible as well as invisible, body as well as soul, without the Pope the Church would and could be no visible person, and would and could have no visible centre or unity. The Church regarded as the visible Christian order, would not be an organism, would be only a collection of members without a body, without any bond of corporal unity, and the truth which the Church lives, and the authority which derives from the indwelling Christ, the Holy Ghost, or the Spirit of Truth, would have no visible organ through which it could teach and govern the Church as one body. The very conception of the Church as the visible continuation or representation of the Incarnation on earth, necessarily implies the Pope as the visible representation of the divine personality of the Church, the visible centre and focus of her authority, from which all radiates through the whole body, imparting light and life to all the members in the visible order, corresponding to the light and life of the invisible. This creates, to say the least, a presumption in favor of the Papacy, and if from the beginning the Papacy has been asserted by the Church, and if we find in the New Testament passages which, by an easy and natural interpretation, assert that our Lord did establish the Primacy of Peter, the presumption is converted into certainty.

Mr. Derby undertakes to disprove both suppositions, which is fair enough ; but he overlooks the legal presumption in the case. As to the New Testament, the most he can pretend to have done, is to show that some of our proof texts may, but not that they *must* be taken in a sense which does not assert the Primacy of Peter, and this is all that he can pretend to have done with regard to the Fathers. Moreover, he does even this much, if at all, only by mistaking the quality of the power Catholics hold was conferred on Peter. He starts with the assumption that Catholics hold that the sovereign dominion is given to the Pope, and that the Pope is authorized by our Lord to rule with that sort of authority claimed by princes of the Gentiles, and not finding any texts of the New Testament



that speak of such authority, nay, finding several texts which clearly forbid the Apostles or any one of them to claim or exercise it, he concludes, not illogically, that no such power was ever conferred, and therefore that the Pope in claiming it is a usurper. If the Pope did claim it, or set himself up as our sovereign lord and master in the sense in which the absolute monarch claims to be our sovereign lord and master, we too would pronounce him a usurper, and refuse to obey him. But such is not the fact. So far from claiming such authority for themselves, the Popes, as well as other doctors of the Church, deny that such power is given even to temporal princes. St. Augustine says : "Imperant enim qui consulant : sicut vir uxori, parentes filiis, domini servis. Obediunt autem quibus consulitur : sicut mulieres maritis, filii parentibus, servi dominis. Sed in domo justī viventis ex fide, et adduce ab illa cælesti civitate peregrinantis, etiam qui imperant serviunt eis, quibus videntur imperare, neque enim dominandi cupiditate imperant, sed officio consulendi ; nec principandi superbia, sed providendi misericordia. Hoc naturalis ordo præscribit : ita Deus hominem condidit. Nam, *Dominetur*, inquit, *piscium maris, et volatiliū cæli, et omnium reptantium quæ repunt super terram*. Rationalem factum ad imaginem suam noluit nisi irrationabilibus dominari : non hominem homini, sed hominem pecori. Inde primi justī, pastores pecorum magis quam reges hominum constituti sunt."\* He had previously given us to understand that the king is more properly said to rule than to reign. Speaking of the Romans, who expelled their kings because they converted their power into a regal domination, he says : "Hinc est quod regalem dominationem non ferentes, annua imperia binosque imperatores sibi fecerunt, qui consules appellati sunt a consulendo, non reges aut domini a regnando atque dominando : cum et reges utique a regendo dicti melius videantur, ut regnum a regibus, reges autem, ut dictum est, a regendo ; sed fastus regius non disciplina putata est regentis, vel benevolentia consulentis, sed superbia dominantis."† According to St. Augustine, the subjection of man to man, the domination of the prince and the servitude of the people, as the relation of master and slave, have their origin in sin,

\* *De Civitat. Dei.* Lib. XIX., cc. 14, 15.

† *Ibid.*, Lib. V., c. 12.

and are permitted by Almighty God only as its chastisement.

St. Gregory the Great, Pope and Doctor, speaks to the same purpose: "Potentibus viris magna virtus humilitatis, considerata æqualitas conditionis. Omnes namque homines natura æquales sumus; sed accessit dispensatorio ordine, ut quibusdam prælati videamur. Si igitur hoc a mente deprimimus quod temporaliter accessit, invenimus citius quod naturaliter sumus. . . . Nam, ut præfati sumus, omnes homines natura æquales genuit, sed variante meritorum ordine, alios aliis dispensatio occulta postponit. Ipsa autem diversitas, quæ accessit ex vitio, recte est divinis judiciis ordinata, ut quia omnis homo iter vitæ æque non graditur, alter ab altero regatur. Sancti autem viri cum præsumunt, non in se potestatem ordinis, sed æqualitatem conditionis attendunt, nec præesse gaudent hominibus, sed prodesse. Sciunt enim quod antiqui patres nostri, non tam reges hominum quam pastores pecorum fuisse memorantur. Et cum Noe Dominus filiisque diceret: *Crescite et multiplicamini et implete terram*, subdit, *Et terror vester ac tremor sit super cuncta animalia terræ*. Non enim ait: Sit super homines, qui futuri sunt, sed, *Sit super cuncta animalia terræ*. . . . Homo quippe animalibus irrationabilibus, non autem cæteris hominibus natura prælatus est.\*

Pope St. Gregory VII. holds the same doctrine, and follows St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great. "Quis nesciat," he asks, "reges et duces ab iis habuisse principium, qui, Deum ignorantes, superbia, rapinis, perfidia, homicidiis, postremo universis pene sceleribus, mundi principe diabolo videlicet agitante, super pares, scilicet homines, dominari cæca cupiditate et intolerabili præsumptione affectaverunt?"† He also cites with approbation, in the

\* *Moralium Libri in Job*, Lib. XXI., c. xi. This passage was referred to in the article on Slavery, in our Review for April last, and attributed by mistake to Pope St. Gregory VII. It is none the less authoritative by coming from Pope St. Gregory I.; but even more authoritative, if there is any difference, for St. Gregory I. is one of the four great Latin doctors of the Church. The reader will perceive that it is express to the purpose we then had in view, namely, to prove that the Catholic doctrine is that all men by nature are equal, and that one man has not, by the natural law, the dominion of another.

† Lib. VIII., Epist. 21, *Ad Herimannum, Episc. Metensem*.



certainly, constitute Peter a sovereign prince, in the sense of a Gentile prince, who claims the right to lord it over his subjects, nor do they make over the flock to him as his property, for our Lord says, "Feed *my* lambs, feed *my* sheep," by which he intimates that he himself retains the proprietorship of the flock ; but they do confer on Peter the supreme pastoral office under Christ, and that is all we need, for it is all we assert. No words could be chosen more appropriate than these, to confer the chief pastoral authority, and at the same time to distinguish the nature and quality of that authority from the dominion claimed by the princes of the Gentiles. If Mr. Derby had adverted to the nature and quality of the authority, he would hardly have found any inconsistency between its possession by Peter and the lessons of humility which our Lord gave to him as well as to all the Apostles.

"When the mother of James and John desired the highest place for her sons, and the other apostles were moved with indignation. 'Jesus called them to him and said, You know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them, and they that are the greater exercise power upon them. It shall not be so among you ; but whosoever will be the greater among you let him be your minister, and he who would be first among you shall be your servant.'\* Again, our Saviour, warning his disciples against the love of rank and power, says, 'Be ye not called Rabbi, for one is your master, and all ye are brethren.†' We read in Luke, also, 'He that is least among you shall be the greatest.' And again, when 'there was a strife among them which of them should be accounted the greatest,' our Lord, after saying, 'let the leader be as him that serveth,' adds,‡ 'I appoint to you as my Father has appointed to me, a kingdom, that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom, and may sit upon thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel.' Now all these lessons of *humility* and *equality*, were given by our Saviour after the gift of the keys to St. Peter, and after the promise that the church should be built on the rock, to which you refer, when pressing his claim to supremacy. And if Peter was constituted prince of the apostles, and invested with 'superior jurisdiction,' and 'a special dignity,' by the figurative words of our Lord, is it consistent therewith that he should afterwards have inculcated such lessons of humility and equality ? Would he not have told them, bow with deference to Peter, for after I leave you, he is to be your sovereign pope and judge."

\* Matt. 20 : 25. † Ibid. 23 : 8. ‡ Luke 9 : 48 ; 22 : 29.

These texts, if against us, are equally against Mr. Derby, for he assumes the position of an Episcopalian, and the Papacy is no more repugnant to their spirit than the Episcopacy. If the power Mr. Derby claims for bishops is compatible with these texts, nothing hinders the Papacy from being equally compatible with them. If no one is to be called master, because one is our Master in heaven, and all we are brethren, by what right is one man invested with the authority of a bishop, a presbyter, or even a deacon? Certainly our Lord in these texts forbids his disciples to claim or exercise the power claimed and exercised by the princes of the Gentiles, whether in church or state, that is, he forbids them to lord it over their brethren. He certainly did not confer on Peter or on any one else the mastership, or the lordship. The words and symbols used convey only a pastoral or parental authority, and the prelates of the Church from the Pope down, never claim to be masters or lords. The title, his Lordship, or his Grace, given to a Bishop or an Archbishop, in Great Britain, Ireland, the British Colonies, and sometimes even in our own country, is no ecclesiastical title, and is nowhere in the English speaking world, a proper title to be given to Catholic prelates. It is a civil title, and originally given to Catholic prelates, not because they were prelates of the Church, but because they were made, by the constitution of the state, *ex-officio* members of the House of Lords. It can be given to Catholic prelates in Great Britain and America now only by courtesy, and a courtesy prohibited, I believe, in this country, by one of the Councils of Baltimore. Be this, however, as it may, the title of Lord or Grace is not and never was an ecclesiastical title. The Church has never conferred it, and in her official correspondence never uses it.

Unquestionably, the texts cited assert that Christians are brethren, are equals, and that their only Master is Christ. But this militates in nothing against either the Episcopacy or the Papacy. Christ is our only master, and the Bishop's or the Pope's master as much as he is mine. The elevation of a Christian believer to the Episcopal throne or to the Papal throne does not break the original equality or make him the master or lord of his brethren, as even our own American republicanism might teach the learned Jurist. Our republicanism asserts that all men by

nature are equal, and no man has or can have, rightfully, the dominion of another ; and yet we do not regard it as any inconsistency to have magistrates, governors and presidents, legislators and judges, because these all are held to exercise their power in the name of the people, and for the good of the people, and therefore are servants, not masters or lords. This is wherefore we are accounted a free people, though our government is as imperative in its voice, when it speaks, as any royal or imperial government on earth. The freedom of the people remains intact, because it is they who govern in the government. We have applied,—and this is our glory,—to the political order the principle laid down in texts Mr. Derby cites, and if that principle is compatible in the political order with the full authority of legislators, magistrates, governors, and presidents, why should it be incompatible with that of priests, bishops, popes ? If the presidency does not break the equality of men as citizens, why should the Papacy break their equality, or fraternity, as Christians ? If the clothing of individuals with power to govern in the name of the people and for the people does not break the sovereignty of the people, why should the investing by our Lord of individuals with authority to govern the faithful in his name and for him, as his vicars, break his sovereignty, or negative his declaration, “One is your Master in heaven, and ye are brethren ?”

The Pope is selected from his brethren to perform, in the name of his and their Master, the chief pastoral functions for the good of the Church and the honor and glory of Christ. He is not the master but the master’s vicar, not the master of the flock but its servant, and hence his usual style is that of servant of servants, the servant of those who serve God. I am unable to see how in this there is any thing inconsistent with the lessons of humility addressed by our Lord to Peter or to the other Apostles. The princes of the Gentiles are proud, and have a ground of pride in their assumption that their power is their own, and that they may use it for themselves as they please, that it elevates them as men above their fellow-men, and confers on them in their own right a superior jurisdiction, or a special dignity ; but what ground there is for pride in being elevated to the Papacy, to the chief pastorship of

the Church, under strict accountability, for the purpose of serving at the bidding of the Master in heaven, the servants of God, I am unable to understand.

But a closer inspection of the texts Mr. Derby cites would, I think, convince even him that he has been too hasty in his conclusion. What is it our Lord condemns? The claiming or exercising of power by his Apostles? Not at all, "Ye know that the princes of the Gentiles lord it over them; and they that are the greater exercise power upon them. *It shall not be so among you,*" that is, ye shall not lord it over your brethren, or regard the power as yours or as a mark of your personal greatness, or superiority. "But whosoever would be greater among you, let him be your minister; and he who would be *first* among you shall be your servant." Here it is clear that superiority of office, nay, the Primacy was contemplated by our Lord, for he speaks of the "greater," and "the first;" but the point to be considered is that the power to be recognized in the Church was to be founded in humility, not in pride and ambition,—to be the power that serves, not the power that dominates, or domineers. The Primate is to be not the lord of the flock, but the first servant, after the example of our Lord, who came to minister, not to be ministered unto. "He that is least among you shall be the greatest." But how, if there be no greatest, no Primate? "Let the *leader* be as him that serveth." How if there is to be no leader? All these texts show simply that the power our Lord establishes, or with which he invests men, is a sacred trust held from him for his service, the good of the body governed, or his glory in its government, and therefore they who hold the trust are to hold and exercise it in humility, not in pride, and to count themselves ministers, servants, not lords or masters. But it is equally clear that, if our Lord contemplated the establishment of no power, no official dignity or distinction, among his followers or in his Church, all these lessons of humility would have been misplaced, and without the slightest appropriateness. Why impress upon his disciples lessons of humility and equality, or give directions as to the exercise of power, if there was to be among them no one with superior jurisdiction, or special official dignity? The texts read precisely as if addressed to persons already selected for high official dignity and au-

thority, and intended to instruct them as to the nature of their authority, the spirit in which, and the end for which they were to exercise it.

It is, no doubt, because Peter and his successors, the Bishops of Rome, observed the humility enjoined by our Lord, and were studiously careful not to obtrude their authority, or to assume airs of superiority over their brethren in Christ, and who were their inferiors only in official dignity, that has given occasion to men like our learned Jurist, whose ideas of power are those of the Gentiles, not those of Christians, to call in question the fact of their primacy. These men find it difficult to understand how so much modesty, so much humility, such a studious avoidance of all arrogance or assertion of power, can be reconciled with the conscious possession of the high authority Catholics claim for the Pope. This is because they do not understand the Christian doctrine of power, or the spirit of the Catholic pontiff. The Popes did not wish to parade their power, nor to boast their high official station. As St. Gregory the Great tells us, they thought more of the original equality of all men by nature, than of their official dignity, and felt more deeply their duties as servants, than their possession of authority to govern. If in later times the supreme pontiffs have seemed to assert more distinctly, and with more emphasis, their authority as vicars of Christ, to feed, guide, protect, defend, and govern the flock of Christ, it has been because that authority has been questioned, or denied, by such men as Mr. Derby, and those he follows, and fidelity to their Master, and the service of the flock committed to their charge, made it their duty. A little attention to the humility of Peter, and his care to exercise his authority as an equal rather than as a superior, will explain the difficulty Mr. Derby feels in reconciling Peter's conduct at the Council of Jerusalem with his possession of the Primacy.

Mr. Derby clearly mistakes the real issue ; and he finds difficulties where none exist, in consequence of not understanding the doctrine he professes to oppose.

“ Again, if the promise of the keys, and of power to bind and to loose, was given *exclusively* to St. Peter, how do you reconcile the fact, recorded in St. John's gospel, 20 : 22, that our Lord after his



ascension came to the room where *all* his disciples were assembled, and addressing himself to all alike, said, 'Peace be unto you; as the Father hath sent me, I also send you; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose you shall retain, they are retained?' Does not this gift include St. Peter and his associates, without distinction or degree? Do they not hold under one and the same commission?

"If St. Peter was usually named first, is not the solution easy? He was the first called, and was probably the oldest and most energetic of the disciples. This would account for his prominence on many occasions, but not for the fact to which you also advert, as a proof of his supremacy, that our Lord thrice asked him after his resurrection, 'Lovest thou me?' and thrice repeated the charge to him to feed his sheep and lambs. Does not this repetition make against him? We read,\* that when our Lord said to him the third time, 'Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me? Peter was grieved.' And why did he grieve? Did not these repeated inquiries imply doubt and distrust? Had he not promised, 'Lord, I will lay down my life for thy sake?' Had he not said, 'Though all men shall be offended because of thee, yet will I not be offended?' Had he not assured our Saviour, 'I am ready to go with thee even to prison and to death,' and confidently declared, 'If I should die with thee I will not deny thee?' Melancholy exemplar of human frailty! Did he not that selfsame night thrice deny his Lord, draw his sword upon an innocent witness, and after deserting and denying his master, begin to curse and to swear, and to confirm his denial by an oath? After all this, might not our Saviour single him out from his fellows, and repeat in a tone of reproof as often as he had denied him, 'Lovest thou me? then feed my lambs and sheep,' without thereby giving him supremacy? And when enthusiasts cite the visit of our Saviour, first made to Peter's ship, and the miraculous draught of fishes, as proofs of superiority, are you not reminded how his heart failed him when he tried to walk upon the waters, and our Lord addressed him, 'O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?'† How is it, again, that you find no proofs of Peter's supremacy in the apostolical canons still extant, which define the positions of bishop, presbyter, and deacon, but do not advert to the supremacy of Peter? On the contrary, the thirty-third canon prescribes a metropolitan for each nation, whom his associates should 'esteem as their head, and that they should do nothing of difficulty or great moment, without his opinion. But neither should this primate do any thing without the opinion of all, for thus shall concord continue.' The Council of Nice and the Council of Ephesus followed these canons, and decreed that every bishop should acknowledge his metropolitan; but in neither canons nor councils is there any allusion to a sovereign prince, or tiara-wearing prelate.

\* John 21 : 16.

† Matthew 14 : 31.

“ If St. Peter was the rock on which alone the church was founded, and he alone held the keys of heaven ; if he alone could loose and unloose, allow me to ask, how could St. Paul perform his mission to the heathen for three years, without once conferring with St. Peter, or receiving from him some portion of his gifts ? And yet the mission of St. Paul was eminently successful. But how did the ancient fathers, still honored by Rome, construe these passages ? Did they give the exposition now claimed by the Roman see ? The golden-mouthed St. Chrysostom, translated for his eloquence and learning from the see of Antioch to that of Constantinople, reads it thus : ‘ Christ founded and fortified his church upon his (i. e. Peter’s) *confession*, so that no danger, nor even death itself, could overcome it.’ And commenting on the very words of our Saviour, ‘ And I say unto thee that thou art Peter, and on this rock I will build my church,’ St. Chrysostom says, ‘ That is, upon the *faith* of his *confession*.’ Is not this express and definite ? ”

Our Lord gave to Peter alone the keys or symbol of power ; and as St. Cyprian says, gave him the Primacy ; but all the Apostles were Apostles, and possessed Apostolic powers. The point of most importance for us, is not how much superior Peter’s power was to that of the other Apostles, but where is continued now in the Church the Apostolic power which our Lord instituted, and which is always to be distinguished from the Episcopal power. Even if the Apostles were all equal, and in a certain sense they certainly were, that would not negative the claims of the Bishop of Rome as the inheritor from Peter of the Apostolic authority. The point Mr. Derby should consider is, whether there be any Apostolic authority in the Church now or not. He must concede that our Lord founded his Church for all coming time, and that he placed in it Apostles, and therefore established for its government an Apostolic authority, an authority which I have heretofore proved is distinct from and superior to the Episcopal authority. Does that Apostolic authority continue, or does it not ? If it does, where but in the Bishop of Rome, the successor of St. Peter, are we to look for it ?

The Fathers usually consider the fact, that St. Peter is in every list of the Apostles named first, as a proof of his Primacy ; Catholics have always done so, and Mr. Derby must concede that they have at least as much authority as scriptural interpreters as he has. His attempt to disprove the Primacy of Peter by proving that Peter denied his Master,

and showed a certain degree of weakness before his conversion, or before he was filled with the Holy Ghost, has been sufficiently met in our second Article on his book.

What Mr. Derby says of the Apostolic Canons and of the Councils of Nice and Ephesus, we let pass for what it is worth, without disputing or conceding its accuracy. The Papacy, in the belief of Catholics, was instituted immediately by our Lord himself, and the Pope derives his authority immediately from him, not mediately through the Church, whether dispersed or congregated in council, and therefore can neither be given nor regulated by canons. Mr. Derby alleges nothing that negatives the Papacy. We should expect no allusion to the Pope as sovereign prince, for sovereign prince, in Mr. Derby's sense, the Pope is not. That there is no allusion to a tiara-wearing prelate, may be a matter of regret, but I do not find in the same councils any allusion to coronet-wearing prelates, as are the Greek Bishops, or to apron-wearing prelates, as are the Anglican Bishops, both pets of the learned Jurist. However, it suffices for us, that these Councils were convoked by the authority of the Pope, presided over by his legates, and none of their acts were of any authority without his approbation. No acts of a Council have any force, save as they are acts of the Pope, or rendered his by his approval, for the Council derives its Apostolical authority from Christ through his Vicar, and there is no Council conceivable without him. The speculations of certain doctors and prelates at the time of the great Western Schism, who supposed it would be necessary to assert the subordination of the Pope to the Council, in order to extinguish the scandal of three rival claimants of the Papacy at the same time, are no part of Catholic doctrine, and are excusable only in men who are distracted by the evils of the times, and forget that the Lord never fails to save his Church without violence to her constitution. The power to enact canons is an Apostolic power, and therefore vested in the Pope, who may enact them with or without a Council, as he judges wisest and best; his power is regulated by the law of Christ alone. It will be time enough to answer Mr. Derby's question, how St. Paul could perform his mission for three years to the heathen, without authority from Peter, when he shall have proved that St. Paul did so.

Mr. Derby speaks of the golden-mouthed St. *Chrysos-*

*tom.* I suspect his Greek is a little rusty, and he is not aware of the tautology. If he spoke of the Golden-mouthed simply, or St. John the Golden-tongued, there would be no doubt as to the saint of whom he speaks. Let it be that St. John Chrysostom interprets the rock, as do several of the Fathers, of the faith of Peter, or the truth Peter professed, it makes nothing against the other interpretation given by Catholics. In arguing against Arians, or persons who deny the divinity of our Lord, I should myself interpret it as does St. John Chrysostom, but in arguing against those who deny the Primacy, I should interpret it of Peter himself. Both interpretations are admissible, and neither excludes the other. But I have in a previous Article sufficiently discussed this question.

The Fathers cited in the following pages of the Eleventh Letter to negative the Primacy of Peter, all assert it, and the passages quoted from them are easily explained in accordance with it. The same may be said of the citations in his two following Letters. In his Letter XIV., Mr. Derby refers to the recently discovered work, entitled *Philosophumena*, and ascribes it without hesitation, on the worthless authority of Chevalier Bunsen, to St. Hippolytus, Bishop of Porto. The book was published a few years ago as the work of Origen. It has since been ascribed to a Roman priest named Caius, to Tertullian, to St. Hippolytus, to another Hippolytus, but the learned have as yet settled nothing as to its authorship, and the only reason for ascribing it to any of the persons named, is, that if some one of them did not write it, it cannot be conjectured who did. All that is certain is, that it was found in a Greek monastery, in a manuscript supposed to be of the fourteenth century ; that it was written by a heretic and schismaticist of the Novatian stamp, who appears to have lived in Rome in the early part of the third century, under the Pontificates of St. Zepherinus and St. Callistus, against whom it contains a most bitter diatribe. The work is not of the slightest authority for Mr. Derby, but is of some importance to us as the testimony of an enemy. It contains clear and unequivocal testimony to the fact, that the Bishop of Rome, within a century after the death of the last of the Apostles, claimed and exercised the Papal authority, or the authority of supreme Pastor of the Universal

Church, for it denounces him in most outrageous terms for doing it. It is a bad witness for Mr. Derby, who seems to think the Papacy sprung up only after St. Gregory I., since he claims St. Gregory I. as one of his authorities against the Papacy, as a sort of Archbishop of Canterbury.

In dismissing this subject, we must ask Mr. Derby again, denying as he does the Primacy of Peter, and the Papacy, how he explains the universal tradition of the Church from the earliest times, that the Primacy was given to Peter, and that the Apostolic power survived in his successor, the Bishop of Rome? That such is the universal tradition it is idle to dispute; you cannot name a writer in any age or country that has occasion to touch the question, whether for or against, that does not bear witness to it as an existing fact. None of the Fathers received as such by the Church deny it, and I am aware of no one that does not either expressly assert, or at least imply it. Now give me, Mr. Derby, I pray you, a reasonable explanation of this fact, on your hypothesis that the Papacy is a usurpation? How do you, maintaining as you do that the Primacy not only was not conferred on Peter, but that it was never even instituted, explain the fact that from the first clear historical view we get of the subject, we find the Bishop of Rome the acknowledged Chief Pastor of the Church, and in the full exercise of all the authority we Catholics claim for him to-day? It is idle to dispute the fact; not one of the Fathers you cite, fairly interpreted, but bears witness to it. The effort you make to the contrary, is nothing but the chicanery of the pettifogger, unworthy of the large and liberal mind of a jurist. The passages you quote serve your purpose, because you have detached them from their context, and have read them in the light, or rather darkness, of your Protestantism; not in the light and spirit of their authors. I have not found you just to the spirit and scope of a single Father you cite, and I cannot believe that you have ever read an entire work of any one of them. The works of the Fathers are penetrated, saturated with the Catholic spirit, and no man of a fair or unprejudiced mind can read them, especially those you cite, without feeling they were as *Romish*, to use a Protestant term, as Bellarmine, as Perrone, Cardinal Wiseman, or Pius the Ninth. There is no Catholic

of to-day who would not find his heart warmed, his soul expanded, his fervor increased, and his faith enlightened and confirmed by an assiduous study of the Fathers as well as of the Scriptures. In addition to this you must concede that all the worldly passions of other bishops, their pride and ambition, as well as the pride and ambition of the temporal lords, kings, and Cæsars, must from the first have been opposed to the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome, or to the bishop of any other see. Be so good, then, as to explain to me, how the Bishop of Rome has been able to grasp the supremacy, to force the whole Church to recognize it, to submit to it, and to retain it down to our own times?

But here we close. Mr. Derby, barring a few stale slanders, a thousand times refuted, in the remainder of his book only repeats what he has equally well said in the portion of his volume we have specially dissected. Whatever he advances in the remaining Letters, depends for its force on what we have examined and refuted. It would be an inexcusable waste of time on our part and that of our readers to occupy ourselves with it. Nobody pretends that all Catholics are perfect, that no scandals have ever occurred, or that every Pope has been personally a saint. But scandals our Lord said would come, and it is not a weak proof of the Divine origin of the Church and that a Divine hand has sustained her, that in spite of all the scandals that have occurred, she still exists, as fresh, vigorous, as blooming in the nineteenth century as in the first. The hard things said against her are arguments in her favor. They called our Lord a glutton and a drunkard, a friend of publicans and sinners; they accused him of sedition, and crucified him between two thieves as a blasphemer and an enemy to Cæsar. Worse they cannot say of the Church, or do to her.

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ART. II.—*The Catholic Church and the American Constitution.*

THE United States of America constitute, at the present moment, the most interesting portion of the civilized world. They present signs pregnant with good or evil consequences, as their future good or evil fortune may determine, which are worthy of the study of every Christian, and every true lover of the human race in the world, but especially within their own borders. Daily expanding, and even gathering internal strength in their expansion, they promise in the future to become a glorious monument of human grandeur. If they continue their career of prosperity in any thing like fair proportion to their past progress, no man would attempt to say what they will have attained to in half a century from the present time. Their growth has been entirely without a parallel; it has challenged the admiration, and excited the jealousy of the whole world. And for ourselves, we can see no conclusive reason why their future may not, nor even why it will not, be as brilliant, as happy, and far more glorious than their past. They have just begun their mission, and their influence is just beginning to extend itself to the workings of other political systems throughout the world. No man is able to say in what that mission and that influence will ultimately terminate. A few years ago our country was regarded with contempt by the statesmen of Europe and our future confidently appealed to as a certain proof that all Democratic Government was an abortion. It was said that the political principles of our country could not bear the test of time, that our dreams of political happiness would prove fallacious. Now these opinions are giving way before the evidences of our substantial progress, and the writers and statesmen of Europe are beginning to doubt the truth of their predictions, and to manifest evident signs of disquietude at our continued prosperity. They regard us with ill-disguised jealousy, and plainly intimate their fears that we shall, ere many years roll by, force upon them new lessons in politics and the art of government.

The great hopes entertained by the ultra-monarchists of the Old World, and the honest fears of some timid individuals among our own citizens, that the question of slavery would soon produce a disruption of the Union, and that Kansas was destined to prove the grave of our national prosperity, are both sure to be disappointed. Both make in their estimate too little account of the strength of those bonds which unite the North, South, East and West of our country ; too little account of the deep and abiding love of the Union which pervades the breasts of our countrymen, and attribute too much importance to the clamors of demagogues, partisans, and political preachers. The dangers of a dissolution of the Union are diminishing every year, as the bonds which hold it are increased and strengthened, and as the interchange of produce and manufacture, and the social intercourse of our citizens, are more and more facilitated and multiplied. Each geographical section of the country is necessary to all the rest, each would be paralyzed and prostrated without the others to aid and sustain it. Notwithstanding the occasional swaggerings of an idle braggadocio, here and there, during a political contest, our statesmen and people know and feel this condition of mutual dependence in which we are placed by the very physical character of our territory. In the beginning, before the corresponding resources of the North and South were so fully explored, and so thoroughly applied, the duration of the Union might have been, with some reason, considered problematical ; but since its advantages and necessity to the development of the natural wealth of all the States, have been so clearly manifested, and since the habits, convictions, and sympathies of the people are so powerfully concentrated in it, there is no need of alarm. So long as our great rivers and mountain chains run in the direction they do, so long as the products of the South shall continue so necessary to the North, and the industry of the North so essential to the prosperity of the South, and above all, so long as the American people shall preserve their national character and their very political life, the Union, we firmly believe, will be growing stronger instead of weaker. The dissolution of the Union is not half so much to be feared as the loss of that liberty which we should so highly prize ; not near



so much to be dreaded as the absorption and destruction of individual right in the overgrown majesty of majorities, or in other words, of the State.

We are not insensible to the faults of our countrymen ; neither do we propose to indulge in idle and vain-glorious boastings. But neither are we ashamed to confess that as an American we are proud of our country, and that we entertain the most sanguine hopes that God, in his merciful providence, has great things in store for her. What is there in her past history to discourage these hopes ? Has not the finger of God been visible, ever disposing and shaping events in her favor ? He has given her victory in every battle, energy in every trial, safety in every danger. Notwithstanding the novelty of her position, and the difficulties of her origin amid the wreck of old feudal manners and ideas, and the opposition of all that was honored in the political systems of the Old World, she now stands, after the lapse of only half a century, a proud, even the proudest, because the most favored political fabric in the world. She only needs the Church to instruct her people in their duty to God, and to themselves, and to her, to insure her duration, and make her in reality, and in every respect, what she is already politically, the happiest nation on the face of the earth.

The objection that the Catholic Church is antagonistic to our republican form of government and the free institutions of our country, has been a thousand times made and as often refuted by the clearest evidence, so that it is now quite stale, and is only repeated by demagogues and fanatical preachers. The great majority of the American people have manifested their confidence in their Catholic fellow-citizens in the most decided manner within the last three years. The statesmen of America are now united in their respect for the Church, and are even beginning to observe the happy influence which her faith and teachings are calculated to have on the minds of the American people, and the tendency which their adoption would have to insure the future preservation of the liberties which we now enjoy.

Though non-Catholic, and though even hostile in sentiment to the Church, the American people are too keensighted, and with all their apparent levity and real worldy-

mindfulness, too profound to remain long the dupes of Protestantism. They love the world, and because it is fashionable and respectable in the world to adhere to some form of religion, many of them (I speak of the better classes) still attend "worship" in some church, and allow themselves to be called, and even call themselves, Methodists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, or members of some other of the many sects of Protestantism. But it may be fairly and truly said that most of them have lost all respect for Protestantism as a system of religion. They adhere to its forms because they were born and educated under their influence, and because it has not yet become entirely fashionable to profess open infidelity. The shallow pretences of Protestantism have not been able to stand their penetrating glance, and the absence of all authority, save that of man, in its teachings has been more or less clearly discovered. Being merely a negative system, and carrying its own condemnation as a teaching church, in its avowal of private judgment, it has not been able to furnish religious aliment to satisfy the cravings of their souls. This is no more than natural. A human system must be supported by human agencies, and Protestantism, originating in very peculiar circumstances of time, place, and political condition, has ever since been sustained by the arm of the civil power and the force of human prejudice; or in other words, by the world and Satan warring against the truth. In England, in Scotland, in Northern Europe, wherever it has a foothold to-day, it owes it to persecuting codes and the interested protection of crowned heads, rich nobles, and venal parliaments. Where it wanted these aids, it has made no progress. It has never been able to recommend itself upon its own intrinsic merits, as a divinely commissioned authority. Though backed by millions of money, plenty of talent, learning, and zeal, it has never converted a single barbarous tribe. It has always been able to make apostates, but converts, never. The area of civilization has not been extended a square inch solely by its influence or teaching. The world owes nothing to it but innumerable wars, revolutions, the multiplication of sects, and in many countries, both in past times and at present, the loss of liberty. It introduced into the world the doctrine before unknown and unheard of, in the sense in which it incul-

shallow  
calculated

cated it, that kings ruled by *Divine Right* ; a doctrine which lays the axe at the root of all liberty, and inaugurates despotism as the normal character of all government. It has been fashionable here in America and elsewhere, to boast of Protestantism as the parent of liberty, and to stigmatize the Catholic Church as the upholder of tyrants and brute force. It was to be expected that Protestantism would set up this pretence both to justify its own rebellion against Divine authority and to insure its existence ; for in the progress of the love of liberty among its dupes, and after its total discomfiture on theological grounds by such intellects as Bossuet and Bellarmine, it could not maintain itself a single hour without seeming to espouse the cause of freedom and the progress of civilization. In Germany and England, at its origin by the hands and voice of a rebellious monk and the secular princes, it pointed to Rome and cried, *Down with the Tyrant* ; and peoples oppressed, not by Rome, but in spite of Rome, partially caught up the word, threw off the authority of Rome, which was in effect their only resource under the oppression of the civil power, and were, in return for their folly, compelled to witness the spoliation of monasteries, the pillage of their sanctuaries, and the robbery of the clergy, merely to fill the tyrant's coffers and furnish him with all the appliances of human power to enforce the Divine right which Heresy gave him to oppress them ! Wherever it obtained the power it inaugurated despotism civil and religious. The great doctrines of civil rights established by our fathers on the shores of America were not of Protestantism, but of Catholicity ; and so far is America from owing any thing of her glorious Constitution to Protestantism, that she was compelled by force of circumstances, directed, we firmly believe, by a special Providence in her behalf, to go back to the Catholic Church for her fundamental political principles. Protestantism had never taught these principles ; it had, as far as in it lay, eliminated them from the codes of Europe. It had given Geneva a theocrat in the person of Calvin, in place of its ancient franchises ; Germany, a line of brutal and arrogant petty princes in place of her ancient constitution, and had established in England a despotism over soul and body which never had a parallel in the worst ages of the past.

The proclamation of freedom by the fathers of Protes-

tantism is therefore clearly shown to have been selfish, hypocritical and insincere by the whole of its after history. They, forsooth, throw off the tyranny of Rome, a tyranny which had never gone farther than to protect the people and the Church from the violence of kingly monsters ! By whom in effect was the power of Rome most dreaded in the Middle Ages, by kings or people ? Search the annals of that turbulent period of seven hundred years which intervened between the reign of Charlemagne and the Reformation, and examine whether it was good monarchs or bad, peoples or their oppressors, that uniformly quarrelled with Rome ! Where was the arm of a Pope ever raised to strike down the power of a ruler that did not oppress his people and interfere with the freedom of religion ? Echo answers *where ?* No, the power of Rome, the influence of the Church, her teachings and example, were always on the side of liberty and against the exercise of despotic power. And had it not been so, the history of the Middle Ages would have been written otherwise than it has, if, indeed, it would have been written at all. For had it not been for the Church, with her heavenly commission to instruct and save mankind, it is more than probable that the world would have lapsed into complete barbarism at the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Protestantism has, in writing modern history, formed a vast conspiracy not only against the truth, but even, in some sense, against liberty itself, by calumniating its heroes and espousing the cause of the despots and tyrants of the past. Herein its real genius and its true sympathies are shown to perfection. Protestant historians have not found terms sufficiently strong to stigmatize the course of St. Gregory VII. towards that monstrous tyrant Henry IV. King of Germany, in hearing the cries of his oppressed Saxon and other subjects, and absolving them from their allegiance, nor that of Innocent III., in his disputes with John Lackland of England ; nor in fine, that of the heroic Boniface VIII. in *his* efforts to teach Philip the Fair that RELIGION MUST BE FREE !

These calumnies have been a thousand times rung both from pulpit and press in the United States, but if we mistake not, they have ceased to be effective. The American people are not distinguished for sympathy with tyrants, and they cannot be induced, as the experience of the last

three years has shown, to fear any attempts upon their liberties from a power which never engaged in a worldly contest, except in behalf of freedom.

How far the Catholic Church is from being a foe to republicanism and free institutions in general, may be seen by reference not only to those Italian Republics which grew up under the shadow of the Papal throne ; but also, and more especially, in those institutions which originated in her very bosom, and the glory of whose formation is all her own. I speak of the Religious Orders ; complete organizations of government with which the secular power never had any thing to do, and in the institution and moulding of which, the Church was free from those trammels often imposed upon her in other cases by old national usages, and the prejudices of remote and semi-barbarous ages. If we should here enter into a full exposition both of the leading principles and minute details of the constitutions of some of these orders, our readers would perhaps be startled at the resemblance which they bear to the constitution and frame of government formed by our ancestors for these United States. They would see that in the very ages to which Protestantism has had recourse for instances of her despotism and tyranny, and in which she sustained the rudest shocks from the evils of the times, the Church was legislating for her children in a spirit of the largest freedom, and framing institutions which, even yet, stand as models of republicanism.

The end of the twelfth, and the beginning of the thirteenth century, was a stormy period, and one to which, above all, we should not naturally recur in search of free institutions. The Plantagenets reigned in England, and the Hohenstaufens in Germany ; France was filled with haughty and turbulent nobles, as troublesome to the king as they were oppressive to the people ; whilst Italy, resounding with the hostile cries of Guelph and Ghibelline, seemed to promise little for freedom. And yet it was at this very time that the Church, in the person of her Pontiffs, put forth the most brilliant efforts in the cause. The glorious struggles of Alexander III., alone, for Italian nationality and independence against Frederic Barbarossa, ought to be enough to ennoble the age and to consecrate his memory in the minds of posterity. And the same may

be said, more or less justly, of his successors throughout an entire century, but especially of Innocent III. and Gregory IX. The Popes of the thirteenth century were a line of heroes. In that age, too, arose the celebrated orders of St. Dominic and St. Francis, which for three hundred years played so conspicuous a part in the world. Numbering amongst their members men of the highest talent, boundless zeal and love for the human race, side by side in the Church, and breathing her spirit, these two orders became in a short time powerful organizations, and exerted on the arts, literature, manners, and ideas of the age an influence which it would be difficult to overrate. They were everywhere, in the cottage of the serf, in the castle of the baron, and the palace of the king. They taught on the wayside, from the pulpit, and from the chairs of the then infant universities of Europe; and in their missionary zeal, they penetrated far to the north, Christianizing and civilizing the rude nations of Poland, Russia, and Hungary, and even found their way to the interior of Asia, and to the very palace of the Grand Khan. Nor did they confine their labors to missionary efforts to convert the heathen and reform the manners of the Christian. All things were of course with them subservient to these ends; but they did more. They labored, and labored successfully for art, literature, and science. In this respect they led on the age, and in many cases were far in advance of it. Witness the renown of Fra Mino de Turrita, the Franciscan, who had already gained celebrity in "Mosaic," as early as the former half of the thirteenth century, and Fra Sisto and Fra Ristoro of the order of St. Dominic, eminent architects of the same period. Who that has paid any attention to the early history of modern art, has not heard of Fra Guglielmo da Pisa, of Fra Giovanni da Campi and of Fra Jacopo Talenti? Who is not also familiar with that brilliant episode in Italian history, which recounts the struggles of the Dominicans to renovate and re-establish the arts, when they had been prostituted and degraded by the false taste and profligacy of the times? The life and tragic death of the eloquent, enthusiastic, and fearless Savonarola, is familiar to every reader of Florentine history, and there are now but few that sympathize with the cause of his enemies. It was the

Order of St. Dominic that produced Fra Benedetto del Mugello, Fra Angelico, and Fra Bartolemeo della Porta, those illustrious painters of the fifteenth century, and it was members of the same institute that educated and prepared for their mission, Rafaello da Urbino and Bramante Lazzari. The same order, in fine, produced in the sixteenth century, Father Domenico Portigiani, the celebrated caster in bronze, who cast fountains, cannons, bells, and even domestic utensils, for the Florentines ; and scores of others, who during the first three centuries of its existence filled Europe with their fame as architects, painters, sculptors, intarsiatori, miniaturists, and painters of glass, and adorned all Italy with monuments, in all these departments of art, for the admiration of our own times. They have left us substantial memorials of their taste and enthusiasm for the fine arts in the cathedrals of Milan, Pisa, Orvieto, and St. Peter's at Rome, and hundreds of other splendid works, shrines, churches, bridges, mausoleums, and palaces erected under the patronage of government, or by individual enterprise. Volumes would be required to do justice to the services rendered by this order alone to the world of art. And, in all this, the order of the humble St. Francis was its rival.

In Philosophy they gave the world an Albertus Magnus and a Roger Bacon ; in Theology, Law, and Politics, a Thomas Aquinas and a Bonaventura, an Ambrose Sanse-  
donius and a Dun Scotus, and hundreds of others, less celebrated, but scarcely less worthy, men whose influence still lives and is felt throughout the civilized world ; but, above all, men who ennobled the age in which they lived, and in Italy saved the hopes and resolves of Liberty and progress, even in the midst of internecine feuds, and under the menaces and blows of the haughty House of Suabia.

It may therefore be fairly said that these two religious establishments were the most prominent features in the ecclesiastical history of that period, so unjustly described by modern writers as the age when the Church ruled supreme over the minds and bodies of men. She never ruled in this manner, and on earth never will ; but she produced these orders in that age as remedies for the many evils of the time, and sent them forth on their mission through the world ; and nobly did they fulfil, and nobly do they still continue to fulfil, that mission. Let

us now see for a moment what were the ideas of the medium of authority and the just powers of government which she imparted to them. It is to be supposed, of course, that were the Church despotic in her ideas, sympathies, and doctrines of civil right, they too would be perfectly despotic in their organization and frame of government. We shall see ; confining our view chiefly to the Order of St. Dominic, as that order has been the more calumniated of the two.

The whole Order is divided into Provinces, (and in the day of its glory these Provinces amounted to forty-six,) which are perfectly independent of each other, under the authority of one Master General,—and each Province always contains several houses, which, with their local superiors, are likewise independent of one another, under the jurisdiction of a Provincial Superior. Of these officers the General holds his office for six, the Provincial for four, and the local Superior for three years. These offices are all elective, and the laws of the Institute are extremely strict in their requirements for the prevention of fraud, coercion, or any thing else that could interfere with the freedom of elections ; insomuch that if it can be shown, after an election, that one illegal vote was cast, or one legal voter was deprived of his right fraudulently, forcibly, or by defect of notification, the election is void ! The Master General is elected by the Provinces in their Provincial capacity, each Provincial having one vote by right of his office, and each Province choosing, in addition, two Electors to make up the College. This gives to every Province three votes. The Provincials are elected much in the same manner by the local Superiors and one Elector chosen by the free suffrages of the members of each house ; and the local Superiors themselves are elected by the votes of those over whom they are to rule, even to the exclusion of those who, although they may be “sons” of the house, do not reside immediately within it. And no authority in the order can remove a member from one house to another, within one month of the time of holding an election in the house to which he belongs, and one month’s residence is required to entitle a member of the same Province to a vote, whilst one year in the house is necessary for one of a different Province. No member can be elected to the same office two consecutive terms ; for the local Superior,



an interstice of three, for a Provincial of eight, and for the Master General, of twelve years, is required before re-election. Even while in office, the authority of these officials is far from being absolute or arbitrary. The Dominican at his profession makes a vow to obey his lawful superiors, but he qualifies and distinguishes, by an express clause in the formula, that is, *only according to the confirmed laws and usages of the Order*. Those laws and usages guaranty him the largest freedom compatible with his state, and almost entire immunity from oppression. The Superior is constantly checked in the exercise of his power, by a Council consisting of not less than three, nor more than twelve members besides himself, with whose appointment he has nothing to do, and in which he has but one vote. This Council assembles at least once every month, and the Superior is bound to convoke it at all other times when any thing of moment is to be done. Without the advice and consent of a majority of this Council, (the Superior has not the casting vote in case of equal division,) no weighty punishment can be inflicted even on those who grievously offend against the laws of morality, or their special rules. No one is ever to be condemned without a hearing, and is always to be tried by his peers. In order to guaranty still farther this immunity of the subject from every species of arbitrary oppression, there exists in every house another officer next in power and dignity to the Superior himself, who is appointed annually, and one of whose duties, the Constitutions expressly declare, is to admonish the Superior of any excess of which he may be guilty in the exercise of his authority, and to mediate between him and his subjects. To this officer it also belongs to preside over that Council which sits once every two years, on the eve of the assembling of the Provincial Council, to receive, hear, and act upon the complaints of members against the Superior. If these complaints prove weighty and just, the Provincial Council is informed of the facts, and the Superior is to be deprived of his office. This Provincial Council is composed of four select members of the Province, elected by the local Superiors and one Elector from every house, chosen by ballot, and deputed for that purpose. Here the Provincial presides, making a fifth member, and has the casting vote.

These remarks apply, more or less, to the General Council, in respect of the Provincials, and the Master General.

In the reception of new members, every thing is conducted upon principles strictly Republican. The candidate is proposed first to the Council of the house into which he is to be received, and in case he receives a majority of the votes, he is proposed to what is called the *Chapter*, in which all the members of the house have a vote. Unless he here also receives a clear majority of the votes he cannot be received. At the end of one year, during which he is carefully instructed in the laws, usages, and obligations of the Institute, he is again proposed to the Council and Chapter, and with the consent of a majority of both, is then permitted to make his solemn vows. The idea of progress is also implied and encouraged by the spirit of their laws ; there is no rigid adherence to mere forms ; no meaningless conservatism of antiquated notions and observances. Does it happen in the progress of time, or owing to peculiar circumstances of place, that some law, usage, or ceremony, ceases to promote the great ends of the Institute, viz. teaching and preaching ? It ceases from that moment to be binding, and superiors are expressly charged not to insist on its observance. For it is a fundamental maxim with them, that " whatever impedes study, preaching, and the gaining of souls to Christian piety," militates against their end, and is to be avoided. Do there spring up new modes of thought, new social forms, new errors, which cannot be effectually met by the old weapons ? If so, the Dominican is instructed also to vary his tactics, and whilst preserving scrupulously the ancient spirit, the ancient zeal, and the ancient devotion of his order to the welfare of men and the spread of Catholic truth, he is to give up obsolete forms, lay aside his ancient armor, and meet society upon its new grounds. The end of the Institute is always to remain the same, says their constitution ; the forms may vary, and ought to vary, according to circumstances. " Quod propter aliquid institutum est non debet contra illud militare et quæ sunt ad aliquem finem ordinata debent esse proportionata et commensurata eidem fini, et regulari secundum congruentiam ad illum finem."—*Prol. Const.* III. L. h.

In this order, as well as in all others, the Catholic Church completely levels all distinctions of birth and for-

tune ; the son of a nobleman takes his position by the side of him whose fortune in the world it was to beg his bread. No distinction but that of merit and virtue is recognized. What must have been the influence of such institutions, in the thirteenth century, in thus softening the asperities of feudal manners and uniting the high-born and low-born, the rich and the poor, the weak and the powerful, by a common tie of interest and affections. And history proves that these orders were always on the side of the people against their oppressors. How could it be otherwise ? Surely men taught in such schools could not have any sympathy with tyrants. These considerations alone are sufficient to show conclusively that the Church is not an enemy to free institutions, and that her spirit is not at variance with the Constitution of the United States. We say not that she is a foe to monarchy, and recognizes only republicanism ; for this would be to repeat the calumnies of her enemies in times past ; but only that our republicanism does not conflict with her principles, but on the contrary, is protected and encouraged by them. All she asks for herself of the civil power is freedom, and in return she insures it stability by teaching the citizen or subject loyalty, and obedience and respect for the laws. All forms of government are the same to her, provided that they recognize the law of nature ; she asks not to form civil codes for the government of nations, but she claims the right to labor for the salvation of the souls of men. Such is her mission, and never does she go beyond it. She is as ready to resist the despotism of the mob as she is that of the crowned tyrant, and she is as willing to encourage and enforce loyalty to a monarchy, as she is to a republican constitution. Her children may have their predilections for the one or the other, but she has none. She only requires them to be loyal citizens, faithful subjects, and devout Christians in the fulness of the liberty of the children of God. She is ever pointing heavenward, and inculcating the solemn lesson that earth is not our home, and that we shall be free indeed only when the Son of God shall make us free.

But the idea has grown old in our country among non-Catholics, that she can flourish only under a monarchy, and that she aspires to a union with the State. The

calumny has been often repeated, and as she advances in strength and prosperity in the land, it is made use of to excite against her even the patriotic feelings of our countrymen. Writers on the other side of the water, too, as is quite natural, wedded to their peculiar prejudices in favor of the old European forms, and assuming to write in the name of the Church, have essayed to make good to some extent the same position. Without openly espousing the theory of union with the State, which has nearly always resulted in the oppression of the Church, they still claim her exclusive sanction in favor of their ideas of government. Frederic Schlegel did this in his day; the able editor of the *Univers* is doing it at the present time, and many others, more or less able, and more or less interested, have done the same. But we look in vain for any feature in the mission of the Church, in her constitution, or in her history, to give weight to this opinion. In the earlier part of the Middle Ages, when called upon to legislate for the Northern tribes, who by conversion became her wards, she was forced to shape her work according to their capacities, and even, in a great measure, according to their semi-barbarous prejudices and old usages; but even here she did much for liberty. Compare, if you please, the despotism of the mediæval codes with that of Rome, even under the Christian emperors, and you will discover that more than one great stride was made towards political freedom. Always asserting her own liberty, she encouraged the growth of liberal ideas of government, cherished municipal franchises, and finally became the avowed protectress of those Republics which proved for so many years the bulwarks of Italian independence. The greatest foe she has encountered since her establishment on earth, has been uniformly the despotism of the civil power. In her infancy, it drove her into the catacombs, and it spilled the precious blood of most of her martyrs from the beginning. Later, it plundered her possessions, despoiled her of her rights, and, worse than all, in various times and places, it thrust into her sanctuaries unworthy ministers whose wicked lives have furnished weapons for the malice of her enemies and scandalized her little ones. She sought not union with the State, so much as the State with her; and this union has too often proved in times past the union of the wolf and the lamb. To save

her inalienable rights, her ordinary resource has been, in the old monarchies of Europe, to enter into Concordats with the civil power ; terms of agreement which she never failed to observe, and which it seldom failed, at some time or other, to disregard and trample under foot. In America, under our Constitution, she is under no such necessity ; it guaranties to her all she asks of the civil power—perfect freedom. She demands nothing more from governments ; she possesses within herself all the truth, vitality, and grace necessary to insure her progress in the fulfilment of her great mission—the salvation of men.

We repeat that she is no exotic, no stranger here. This is not a Protestant country, as it has been sometimes called. It is no more a Protestant than a Catholic country, though most of our countrymen still call themselves Protestants. It is so far from being true that our country is Protestant, that the fundamental principles of her Constitution are far more in accordance with Catholicity than they are with Protestantism, as we have seen. And here, no doubt, is one of the causes why Protestantism has so rapidly declined, and Catholicity so rapidly progressed in America.

In all this we are far from saying that the conversion of our countrymen will be an easy task, far from insinuating that their conversion will follow as a matter of course, either from their political principles, or their present dispositions. We confess there is much, very much in both that is discouraging, much that is even calculated to make us despair. But what we do mean, and what we are not afraid to avow, is that the picture has also its bright side ; that there is much to quicken the zeal of Catholics, and to inspire hopes the most sanguine in their bosoms, that this conversion will, by God's grace, ultimately take place. At least we know that it is possible, and that it is the will of God and a part of our vocation as Catholics, that we spare no exertion and leave no means untried, to accomplish a result so happy and so glorious. It is a duty we owe to God, to ourselves, and to our countrymen. With her present Constitution, supported by the faith, loyalty, and sound conservatism, of a Catholic people, our country would be a spectacle truly worthy of admiration, and could scarcely fail, ultimately, to change the political aspect of

the world, and inaugurate a new and better order of civilization. Secure against the disorganizing influences of fanaticism and error, she would steadily advance in her glorious career of peaceful prosperity, realizing, as far as possible on this earth, the true end and object of all society and government. Let us as Catholics, therefore, set ourselves vigorously to the work which our hands have found to do. We are at home here, and at least as near to heaven as we should be in any other part of the world. Let each Catholic young man especially, in his appropriate sphere, aid his pastor, and even regard himself as an apostle to his countrymen and neighbors, challenging their respect by his firmness, winning their affection by his patriotism, and above all, edifying them by his virtuous example. But more than all, let us besiege Heaven with our prayers; for it is on prayer that our chief reliance must be placed. Holy prayer, the incense of the Church, ascending from the depths of fervent and purified hearts, will not fail to reach the Almighty Throne, prove acceptable in the sight of Heaven, and in the end be found irresistible. This was the great weapon of all the Saints, it was this that converted the nations in the beginning, and it will not prove less powerful nor less effective now.

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ART. III.—*Aspirations of Nature.* By I. T. HECKER, New York: Kirker. 1857. 12mo. pp. 360.

THE numerous readers of that admirable book, *The Questions of the Soul*, will most eagerly welcome a new work by the same popular author. Mr. Hecker's *Aspirations of Nature* is written in the same free and earnest style, so much admired in his former publication, and is marked by the same loving spirit, the same tone of independent thought, and the same glowing enthusiasm, while it takes broader and deeper views of the subjects it discusses, and addresses itself to a larger public.

The aim of this new book is to show that all men naturally aspire to religion, and that the aspirations of their nature can be satisfied in the Catholic Church, and no-

where else. The author endeavors, on the one hand, to vindicate the rights and dignity of human nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, who decry it, and seek to supersede it by what they call grace ; and on the other, to show that fidelity, in a large sense, to one's own reason and nature, will conduct the earnest seeker to the communion of the Catholic Church. He takes his starting point in our own rational and moral nature, and proceeds on the principle that no religion can be deserving of the slightest respect, that contradicts reason or leaves the aspirations of our nature unsatisfied. He meets the Rationalist and the Transcendentalist each on his own ground, accepts their principle and method, and endeavors to prove that if they will only be faithful to them, they will and must find the true religion.

We cannot better show the spirit and principles of this deeply interesting book than by extracting what the author calls "The Confessions of an Earnest Seeker :"

"MAN."

"We are conscious of an intense and painful void within our breast. How are we to be relieved of this ? Relief there must be, for it is insupportable. The insensibility of death were preferable. Forgetfulness a boon.

'Forgetfulness—  
Of what,—of whom,—and why ?  
Of that which is within me ;  
Read it there—  
Ye know it, and I cannot utter it.'—BYRON.

"The world may appear beautiful ; the ties of friendship, kindred, love, seem dear and sweet ; life may appear full of hope and bright prospects. Alas ! what are all these joys to the soul, so long as deeper needs deprive us of their enjoyment ?

'A different object do these eyes require ;  
My lonely anguish melts no heart but mine ;  
And in my heart the imperfect joys expire.'—GRAY.

"All sacrifices would be to us as steps to bliss, and renunciation enjoyment, so that we found what answers to our nobler necessities. A journey to the torrid zone, were we sure to meet it there, would be but a trip of pleasure. Somewhere it must be ; if not, the heavens will reveal it. This confidence is stronger than death.

"Thank God ! we were left unfettered and unswayed in our be-

lief, in our childhood and youth. We are in our full manhood, in possession of our reason and freedom. Happy is the man who is ready to receive the whole of God's everlasting truth, and searches after it with all the energies of his being.

"The possession of Truth, not the simple search of it, is the true end of Reason and the source of all true life. Whenever, therefore, the Truth is presented to the mind with rational and sufficient evidence, it matters not by whom, to withhold one's assent, is to reduce Reason to the ignominious servitude of passion, and to inflict upon the soul the most painful of deaths,—the death of inanition.

"The slave is noble, his chains brilliant ornaments, he is free, in comparison with the man who enslaves his godlike Reason by his passions, shackles it by his prejudices, or lets it rust unused from slavish fears.

"Reason affirms its own authority, and can admit of no other which does not support its claims, and coincide with its dictates. Of all forms of slavery, that of the soul is the most abject, degrading, and cruel. The negro slave possesses his soul, but the man who yields up the authority of his Reason, abdicates his manhood, and renders his soul a chattel.

"Endowed with Reason, man has no right to surrender his judgment. Endowed with Free-Will, man has no right to yield up his liberty. Reason and Free-Will constitute man a responsible being, and he has no right to abdicate his independence. Judgment, Liberty, Independence, these are divine and inalienable gifts; and man cannot renounce them if he would.

"As an intellectual being, man has the right to know the Truth. As a moral being, man has the right to follow the Truth. Any authority that interferes with our exercise of these, violates the natural rights of man, and insults their Divine Author.

"The assent of Reason to Truth is not the subjection of Reason, but its sublimest assertion. The voluntary following of Truth is not a restriction of our Free-Will, but the only and the truest expression of its liberty. The acknowledgment and acceptance of Truth constitute man's true Independence, Dignity and Glory.

"Man cannot be thought of consistently with just and honorable ideas of his Creator, otherwise than as good, in possession of all his faculties, whose primal tendencies are in accordance with the great end of his being.

"There is no earthly Dignity equal to that of Human Nature, for there is stamped upon it, in glowing characters, the perfect resemblance of its Divine Author.

"Let us therefore be loyal to the dictates of Reason, knowing that they will lead us to our Archetype and Divine Original.

"Let the light of Truth be our guide. Let Reason be our Authority. We fear not to follow where they point the way. What contradicts Reason contradicts God.



## "RELIGION."

"We go forth in earnestness and in hope, with the sacred torch of Reason in our hand, to seek, to find, and to accept true Religion, resolved at the same time to cast aside all creeds and systems of belief which exact the surrender of our judgment, independence, or liberty.

"If we find a religion to tell us that the truth we see is not truth, but falsehood; if we find a religion to tell us that the good we love is not good, but evil; if we find a religion to tell us that our good deeds are not virtues, but vices; we in indignation answer: 'To the dogs with such a religion. We ask not its heaven; nor fear its hell. Such a religion comes not down from heaven, but up from the bottomless pits below.'

"A religion which gainsays the plain dictates of Reason, is hostile to our holiest affections, or mutilates our nature, is no religion, but a base imposition. It is treason against God and Human Nature to listen to its horrid and impious creed. No, rather die a heathen or infidel than submit to a religion which outrages God by making the creatures of his own likeness, abject, base, accursed.

"We say, with the voice and the united energies of our soul, and the Author of our being: 'Let the religion perish from the face of the earth which invades the sacred boundaries that constitute man's Reason, or which would diminish the dignity of Human Nature.'

"Reason's certitude is anterior to all other certitude, hence its authority is indisputable, and, in its own sphere, supreme. The denial of this is the undermining of the foundations of all knowledge of truth, and of all religious belief, and opens the way to the triumph of Atheism. The first step of the true Religion is to confirm the rightful authority of Reason, to call forth the full exercise of its powers, to elicit its free and undivided assent, and look to it for its confirmation, support, and defence.

"A religion, therefore, that is not an imposition, a fraud, cannot move a single step independently of the voluntary assent and suffrage of Reason. Its first duty is to afford rational and sufficient evidence of the doctrines which it teaches. Let it look to this, for the sake of its own honor, for a religion which interdicts the right exercise of Reason, or violates its laws, exposes itself, sooner or later, to the just indignation of all intelligent thinkers.

"No truth or doctrine of Religion is really believed and held without an act of the intelligence and will. These united constitute man's rational nature. A religion unsupported by the inward witness and free assent of Reason to its truth, is no religion, but a delusion, an hypocrisy. For man, as a rational being, cannot, if he would, embrace a religious belief which is contrary to his essential nature—Reason.

"As on one hand Religion is bound to attest with satisfactory evidence the divine origin of the truths which it proposes to our belief, so on the other hand, we are bound to accept the truths so presented. To believe is not less a function of Reason than to know, or to perform any other of its normal operations. The refusal, therefore, of our belief to truths duly attested, is a violation of our allegiance to Reason, and if consistently carried out, would end in its entire overthrow.

"Religion adds no new faculty to the soul. A sure mark of its divine origin is, that when fairly presented, it meets and welcomes all the honest demands of the intellectual and moral faculties of our nature, and in such a way as to produce an entire conviction of its truth. True Religion opens to our intellectual vision the great end of our existence, and so directs, strengthens, and excites our will and its energies that we reach it.

"It should not be forgotten that the destiny of the soul and body is one and indivisible. For man is soul and body, inseparably united in one person. The body, therefore, has a religious purpose. 'Nothing is holier than that high form.' A religion which is of divine origin must be adapted, in its doctrines and worship, to the whole of man's nature.

"There is no use of disguising the fact, our religious needs are the deepest. There is no peace until they are satisfied and contented. The attempt to stifle them is vain. If their cry be drowned by the noise of the world, they do not cease to exist. In some unexpected moment they will break forth with redoubled energy. They must be answered. And unless they be satisfactorily answered, they will rise up at the last hour of life, and, with irresistible force, seize upon the mind, and strike terror into the soul.

"It is a necessity, therefore, to find a religion coinciding with the dictates of Reason, and commensurate with the wants of our whole nature, or else to wait for its revelation.

"If we find no such religion, and God deigns not to reveal it, then on our tomb shall be written, 'Here lies one who asked with sincerity for truth, and it was not given. He knocked earnestly at the door of truth, and it was not opened. He sought faithfully after truth, and he found nothing.'

#### "CHURCH."

"Religion is a question between God and the Soul. No human authority, therefore, has any right to enter its sacred sphere. The attempt is sacrilegious.

"Every man was made by his Creator to do his own thinking. What right then has one man, or a body of men, to dictate their belief, or make their private convictions, or sentiments, binding upon others?

"There is no degradation so abject as the submission of the

eternal interests of the soul to the private authority or dictation of any man, or body of men, whatever may be their titles. Every right sentiment in our breast rises up in abhorrence against it.

"A Church which is not of divine origin, and claims assent to its teachings, or obedience to its precepts, on its own authority, is an insult to our understandings, and deserves the ridicule of all men who have the capacity to put two ideas together.

"A Church that claims a divine origin, in order to be consistent must also claim to be unerring; for the idea of teaching error in the name of the Divinity, is blasphemous.

"A Church, if it deserves that title, must yield us assistance, and not we the Church. The Church that needs our assistance, we despise. Only the Church which has help from above for mankind, and is conscious of it, is a divine institution.

"A Church that has its origin in heaven, is an organ of divine inspiration and life to humanity. For Religion is not only a system of divinely given truths, but also the organ of a divine life. Life, and its transmission, is inconceivable, independent of an organism. The office of the Church, therefore, is not only to teach divine truths, but also to enable men to actualize them.

"If entrance into the Church is not a step to a higher and holier life, the source of a larger and more perfect freedom, her claims do not merit a moment's consideration. Away with the Church that reveals not a loftier manhood, and enables men to attain it.

"The object of the Church authority is not to lay restraints on man's activity, but to direct it aright; not to make him a slave, but to establish his independence; the object of Church authority is to develop man's individuality, consecrate and defend his rights, and elevate his existence to the plane of his divine destiny.

"Divine Religion appeals to man's holiest instincts, and inspires the soul with a sublime enthusiasm. A Church without martyrs is not on equality with the institution of the family or state; for they are not wanting in heroes. A Church that ceases to produce martyrs is dead.

"Hearts are aching to be devoted to the down-trodden and suffering of the race. Breasts are elated with heroic impulses to do something in the noble cause of Truth and God; and shall all these aspirations and sentiments which do honor to our nature, be wasted, misspent, or die out for want of sanction and right direction? Who can give this sanction? Who can give this direction? No one but God's Church upon earth. This is her divine mission.

"In concert with the voice of all those who are conscious of their humanity, we demand a visible and divine authority to unite and direct the aspirations and energies of individuals and nations to great enterprises for the common welfare of men upon earth, and for eternity.

"If the Religion we are in search of does not exist, and we

remain in darkness, we shall be found standing upright, looking heavenward, our Reason unshackled, in all the dignity and energy of our native manhood.

“ ‘ Better roam for aye, than rest  
Under the impious shadow of a roof unblest.’ —DE VERE.”

pp. 31-43.

The author accepts the challenge, and proceeds to prove that Protestantism does not and cannot, and that Catholicity can and does, fulfil the conditions demanded by the Earnest Seeker ; and, as far as we can judge, does it with a force of argument, beauty of expression, and felicity of illustration that leaves little to be desired. There can be no doubt that what is called Evangelical Protestantism is utterly unable to meet the demands of reason or the wants of the heart, and no one who knows Catholicity can doubt its capacity to do both. Calvinism proceeds on the principle that our nature has been totally corrupted by the Fall, and that men as they are now born are incapable of thinking a good thought or performing a good deed. Hence it teaches that all the acts of the unregenerate, even their prayers, are sins. Catholicity proceeds on the principle that, though by the Fall man has lost all power, prior to regeneration, to perform acts meritorious of eternal life, he yet retains his essential nature, —reason and free-will,—and can discover and embrace truth, and perform acts really good, in the natural order. Hence the Church condemns the proposition : “ All the works of infidels are sins,” and asserts the reality of natural truth and virtue. Catholicity presupposes reason or natural truth as the preamble in the logical order to revelation, and nature as the recipient of grace, and therefore accepts natural reason and our natural affections, and elevates them to a higher order, purifies and strengthens them, instead of decrying and condemning them.

It will be seen that the author boldly accepts the principle that “ what contradicts reason contradicts God.” There is nothing startling in this principle to Catholics, though they do not usually express it in this way, for it is more reverent and less dangerous to say, what contradicts the word of God contradicts reason, making thus the revelation the criterion of reason, not reason the criterion of the revelation. When we say, what contradicts reason con-

tradicts God, we have the appearance of favoring the rule of private judgment, and of justifying Rationalists in setting up their private opinions as the criteria of revealed truth. There are comparatively few who can practically distinguish between reason and their own mental habits and prejudices, or so to speak, between reason and their own view of reason, that is to say, between reason and their own private judgment. To the mass of men brought up in a Protestant community, nothing appears more contradictory to reason than the various dogmas and practices of the Catholic Church, and they really are contradictory to *their* reason, that is, to reason as modified or perverted by their anti-Catholic habits and prejudices. Certainly, reason taken strictly, in its own essential nature, approves or teaches nothing that does not accord with the teachings and usages of the Church. But men do not generally so take reason in practice. They do not easily divest themselves of their habits and prejudices. They reason as they are. In practice they confound their habits and prejudices with reason itself, and conclude that whatever contradicts them, contradicts reason. Hence the rule, as stated, is not regarded generally as a safe practical rule, and although strictly true, for God is present in reason as well as in revelation, and his veracity is the same in the one as in the other, the author, we presume, would not lay it down if he did not regard it as in no danger of being abused by the class of minds he is addressing, and also as necessary in some sort to give a strong denial to the denunciations of reason by so-called Orthodox Protestantism. He has thought it proper and in the highest degree prudent to show the earnest seeker after truth, who is revolted by the depreciation of reason and nature by Calvinism, that on this point Catholicity is totally different, and not the enemy, but the warm friend of reason. In this he is certainly right, and giving the right direction to Catholic controversy.

We must bear in mind that the author addresses his book not indiscriminately to all classes of non-Catholics ; but to that class who have cast off Protestantism, fallen back on simple nature, have become earnest seekers after religion, and are prepared to accept it the moment that they see that it meets their intellectual and moral wants, and that they can embrace it without denying the plain

dictates of reason or forfeiting the rights and dignity of their human nature. He thinks this class includes a majority of the adult portion of our population. On this point, however, we are not able to agree with him. We may be wrong, but we are not, with what knowledge we have of our countrymen, able to believe that they have as yet, to any great extent, cast off false Christianity, absolutely got rid of all the various forms of Protestantism, and now stand in simple unprejudiced nature, prepared to receive Catholic truth in proportion as it is clearly, distinctly, and affectionately presented. It is true, as the author states, that the majority of the adult population have been said, on respectable authority, to profess no religion ; but I attribute the fact, if it be a fact, not to the keenness of their intelligence which has seen through the hollowness of Protestantism, and rejected it from a conviction that it is essentially unreasonable and false, dishonorable to God and unfit for man ; but to their indifference to religion itself, to their want of seriousness, earnestness in the affairs of the soul, and to their insane devotion to the world and its goods. They are not precisely skeptics, but are to Protestantism what cold, dead, and worldly Catholics are to Catholicity. Awaken them to a sense of their religious obligations, make them feel the necessity of attending to their salvation, and they unite with some one of the various Protestant sects, the one in which their infancy was trained, or to which accident determines them. A General Jackson, old and on the brink of eternity, unites with the Presbyterians, a Henry Clay with the Episcopalians. The American mind properly so called, whatever we may say of it or hope from it, is as yet thoroughly Protestant. Protestantism, chiefly under the Calvinistic or Methodistic phase, has had the forming of the American religious character, and what of religion the American people have is cast in a Protestant mould, and when quickened into life and activity runs in a Protestant channel.

A change is, no doubt, taking place with as great a rapidity as we could reasonably expect, and we look for large accessions to the Church from conversions, but not so much from among those who have cast off all religion, as from among those who really believe the Christian truth

Protestantism retains, and who see that it is incomplete, fragmentary, insufficient for itself, and are led from a view of its defective and broken character to seek its unity and integrity in the Catholic Church. We are all of us liable to be deceived by relying too much on our own peculiar experience, and taking what, after all, was only our own clique, coterie, or party, as representative of the whole country. It is evident to any one who reads the book before us, and has been acquainted with the New England Transcendentalists, that the author has taken them as the representatives of the class he addresses, and as an index to the direction likely to be taken by the American mind. But every thing in this country changes so rapidly that a reasonable induction from a state of facts which existed yesterday becomes absurd to-day, though it should chance to be reasonable again to-morrow. The Transcendentalists, with Ralph Waldo Emerson for their high priest, Margaret Fuller for their high priestess, and *The Dial* for their organ, never a numerous or a very powerful party, have nearly all disappeared, and are as hard to find in New England now as are the Saint-Simonians in France. They were able, in their best estate, to find little response from the national heart, and were, after all, an exotic transplanted to our American garden from Germany, rather than a plant of native origin and growth, and we think but little account should be made of them in estimating the tendencies of the American people.

There has been, if we are not much mistaken, since the palmy days of Transcendentalism, a reaction in the American mind towards Evangelicalism. The naked pantheism of the Transcendentalists, and the tendency of their speculations and utterances to foster a weak sentimentalism, never slow to run into a demoralizing sensualism; the rationalistic tendencies of the Unitarian preaching and literature; and the bold, unblushing infidelity of Theodore Parker and his friends, together with the attacks of the Catholic press, have alarmed, to some extent, the better portion of the American people, and produced a reaction in favor not directly of Catholicity, but of more conservative forms of Protestantism. I may be mistaken, but I think the American people are more Evangelical to-day than they were fifteen or twenty years ago. But I also

believe them nearer the Church, because I believe them less Rationalistic, and more deeply impressed with those elements of Protestantism which have been retained from Catholicity. Protestants have, to some extent, changed their front. Alarmed by the extravagances and ultraisms of a portion of their own number, and pressed from without by Catholicity, which insists on its right to hold them responsible for all these extravagances and ultraisms, they are now falling back, not as they were on simple nature, but on the truth the Reformers retained. We hope much from this reaction, for it will give us some elements of *Christian* truth in the Protestant mind to which we can make our appeals. We therefore think the class of minds the author addresses not so large as he supposes, nor in fact so large as it was fifteen or twenty years ago. The direction of the leading American mind has changed, and our hopes are now from the more serious and religious among non-Catholics, rather than from those who still retain their Rationalistic and Transcendentalist tendencies. In addressing ourselves to Rationalists and Transcendentalists, and in accepting their principle and method, there may be danger of doing more to confirm them in their present tendencies than to win them to the Church; for it may well happen that they will be more deeply impressed with our strong assertions in favor of reason and nature, than with our arguments, clear and conclusive as they may be, designed to prove that Catholicity meets all the demands of intellect and all the wants of the heart. They have not, with individual exceptions, any very deep or painful sense of the need of something above reason and nature, and are far better satisfied with themselves as they are, than we who know from our religion and from our own experience the insufficiency of reason and nature alone commonly imagine. It is only when divine grace is operating on them or striving with them, that they experience those internal longings or those deep aspirations to something above nature, which create so much misery in the bosoms of non-Catholics. However strictly accordant reason and nature may be with Catholicity, or however necessary it may be to enable man to attain to his supernatural beatitude, reason and nature do not of themselves aspire to it, for they do and can of themselves aspire only to a beatitude in their own order, that is to say, a natural beatitude.



The author has shown clearly that Calvinism, indeed Protestantism throughout as set forth by the leading Reformers, is contrary to the dictates of natural reason, and the purer instincts of our nature, that it annihilates reason and nature to make way for grace, and in doing this, though it has been done many times before, he has done good service to the cause of religion. He has demolished forever the claims of modern Protestantism to be the friend of reason, an intellectual religion, and the emancipator of the mind, the asserter of the rights of reason and the dignity of human nature. He has gone farther; he has proved that Catholicity protects reason and the rights of nature. Under this last head it is possible that some who do not fully understand the question may think that he has gone too far, and assigned to reason and nature more than belongs to them. Nobody knows better than the author that we ourselves do not belong to the school of theologians he is disposed to follow, and that we think the disasters of the Fall greater than that school appears to regard them; but we cannot find that in any thing he positively says, he goes beyond the line of sound doctrine, and it is only fair to interpret his strong assertions in favor of reason and nature as intended to deny the false assertions of the Reformers. If he should be found, in the opinion of some, inexact in one or two expressions, he should be excused, if his general thought is Catholic and his intention right. The author writes to the popular mind, in a popular style, and seldom aims at technical precision. He is chiefly intent on the general impression he produces, and perhaps is not always so clear and exact in his particular statements as if he were writing a strictly scientific work. He intentionally writes in a style familiar to the class of persons he addresses, and expresses his thoughts as far as possible in their language, in the way which he judges most likely to convey the truth to their understandings. We must not tie such an author, anxious to reach the understandings and the hearts of non-Catholics, down to stereotyped forms, but must defend for him the largest liberty compatible with loyalty to the faith.

We do not think, however, that even as to the effects of the Fall and the present powers and capacities of reason and nature, the author has said any thing to which any

Catholic can reasonably object, or any thing that he has not a right as a sound theologian to say. If any one has any doubt on the subject, it arises either from his own misunderstanding of Catholic doctrine, or from the fact that the author's purpose has led him to dwell on the goods retained after the Fall rather than on those lost by it. His line of argument required him to present the goods retained in the strongest light possible, and those lost in the weakest light possible. Hence he has presented in its full strength the case of reason and nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, but not in its full strength as against Rationalists and Transcendentalists. To the superficial reader, therefore, he may appear to express more on the one side than he means, and less on the other than he actually holds. The fairest way, however, is, on this point, to let him speak for himself:

"Boldly, as it becomes impartial friends of truth, we put to the Catholic Religion, the problems of our 'Earnest Seeker,' and demand what it teaches with respect to the nature, value, and dignity of Reason?"

"The method of arriving at sincere and satisfactory answers to these great questions, is by determining what the Catholic Church teaches to be the effects of Man's Fall. For we saw in Protestantism, and shall see in Catholicity, that the character of the answers to our inquiries depends on the doctrines held touching the nature and effects of Original Sin.

"The authority of the General Councils of the Catholic Church is, with its members, beyond all dispute. The last of these, and at the same time the one which, more than any other, has spoken on the question under present consideration, is the Council of Trent. This Council, in speaking of the Fall, says:—

"That the first man, Adam, when he had transgressed the commandment of God in paradise, immediately lost the holiness and justice wherein he was constituted."\*

"Two important questions start up here: In what consisted 'the holiness and justice wherein man was constituted?' What were the effects of their 'loss?' The reply to these demands will bring us our desired answers concerning Reason.

"In answering the first, we will premise that God created man in the beginning in his own image. He formed him of the earth, breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, and man became a living soul. The Soul was endowed with Reason and Free-Will.

By the faculty of Reason man was capable of knowing all that was needful for him to know; and by his Will of doing all that was required of him to do. Had man been left thus, his happiness would have consisted in the knowledge and love of God as the Author of nature. He need not have been exempt from hunger and thirst, or ignorance, or from the revolt of the passions, or from sickness and death. And God could have left man in this state, for all these inconveniences spring from the natural union of spirit with matter, and in them there is nothing contrary to God's infinite perfections.

"But God did not leave man in this state of mere nature. He at the same time added the gift of integrity. This adorned the Soul with all the natural knowledge of which man was capable; no dangerous ignorance, or defect of judgment, tarnished its beauty. The Will was in possession of perfect liberty, was upright, and tended to good without any inclination to evil. Adam was master of the sensitive appetites, of all the bodily movements; with an equable temperament, always tranquil, with no tendency to excess, he enjoyed perfect health of body without being subject to infirmities and death.

"All these rich gifts, not indeed due to mere human nature, but tending to complete it in its own order, were held by Adam on condition of his not losing sanctifying grace, which God, at the same moment, superadded.

"Sanctifying grace elevated man's nature to a new principle of life and action. It infused into his mind and heart a science and virtues which transcended altogether the order of nature. Man became participator of the Divine Nature, and fitted, one day, to enjoy the Beatific Vision, which consists in gazing upon God's own essence.

"Such was the nature of the holiness and justice wherein Adam was constituted before he had transgressed the commandment of God in Paradise.

"This explained, we come to the second question: What was the effect of Adam's transgression?

"The effect of Adam's transgression of the commandment of God in the garden of Paradise, was the 'immediate loss of the holiness and justice wherein he was constituted.' The holiness and justice wherein he was constituted consisted in the gifts of integrity and sanctifying grace. Consequently Adam, by the loss of these, was exposed to ignorance, to the revolt of the passions, sickness and death; and lost his title, with the virtues connected with it, to the Beatific Vision. In other words, Adam by his transgression fell from a state to which he was elevated by the gifts and graces of God's pure bounty upon his mere and unadorned nature.

"Original sin, therefore, did not efface the image of God stamped upon the Soul. Reason and Free-Will remained, their

essence unimpaired, uncorrupted, uninjured. It did not despoil man of any of his merely natural faculties, capacities, or powers. All the rights which absolutely belonged to man's nature, he possessed after the Fall. Man, by Original Sin, lost nothing absolutely necessary to his nature,—since he only fell back into the simply natural state in which he had been originally, *or might have been*, created.

“Adam's transgression left in man no positively evil quality, depraving the substance of our common nature. For there is no sin whatever in man's being exposed to toil and hunger, to ignorance and temptations, to sickness and death. Consequently, God might have created man's nature in the beginning consistently with his divine perfections, as it now exists. For man in his natural condition, with the right use of his Reason, and the good use of his Free-Will, *graciously aided as they always are*, can attain to the great end for which he was divinely appointed. It follows also, that those who die in the state in which we now are born, without actual sin, will obtain from the hands of their all-good Creator all the happiness their natural capacities are capable of.

“Briefly, man is not, in consequence of the Fall, born with essential depravity, or with the loss of any of his natural faculties, or with the forfeiture of any of his merely natural rights; what the Fall did was to despoil man of the *graces* and *gifts* which were not necessary to his nature, which he had no right to claim, but which were bestowed upon him, over and above his mere nature, from the pure bounty of his benign Creator.

“This beautifully reconciles the Sacred History of Man's Fall with the first principles of Reason and with right and honorable views of God.

“Grant, says one, that man is in full possession of his Reason, what can it do? Who knows? We may after all be told in the classic language of the great Reformer, that ‘in religious matters Reason is worthless,’ ‘Reason is the enemy of all Religion,’ and ‘in discussing such matters we should leave the jackass at home!’

“Catholicity must give us a definite and explicit answer to this question: What can Reason in its present condition accomplish?

“On two occasions the Catholic Church has required, as a test of orthodoxy, a subscription to the following proposition: ‘Reason can with certitude demonstrate the Existence of God, the Spirituality of the Soul, and the Liberty of Man.’\* ”

“This is a Catholic authoritative decision; and if we grant to Reason the knowledge of these three great truths, we have Reason not as a mere abstract and speculative faculty, but Reason informed and constituted. Grant to Reason the knowledge of these important and primal truths, and Reason has the ability to deduce

\* Bautain, 1840.—Bonnetty, 1855.

from them the fundamental principles of Religion, Society, and the State. This is important and demands development.

"Give to Reason the knowledge of God, and Reason is able to deduce from this knowledge the principal attributes of God ;—God as the Author of the Universe ; God as the Upholder of all things ; God as the Rewarder of the good and the Punisher of the wicked.

"Give to Reason the knowledge of the Spirituality of the Soul, and Reason is able to deduce from this knowledge the Soul's future existence, and its priceless value, excellence, and dignity.

"Give to Reason the knowledge of the Liberty of Man, and it is able to deduce from this knowledge man's responsibility to his Creator for all his actions—religious, moral, social, and political.

"For these deductions flow immediately from the preceding primary truths. And no one who understands himself, will dispute that Reason is competent to draw from primary truths their evident conclusions.

"Reason, therefore, rightly exercised, is able to know with certainty the great principles which underlie Religion, Morals, Social Order, Political Economy, and the Rights of Man. According, then, to sound Catholic teaching, the great ideas and sentiments which constitute the foundations of the noble Institutions of human society, are a part of the domain of Reason."—pp. 193–200.

There is nothing here that is unorthodox, although the terms selected and the forms of expression adopted, betray the purpose of the author to make the most possible of reason and nature in their present condition, and the real loss by the Fall is in part implied rather than fully brought out. It is possible that the author holds that man was created in a state of pure nature, and afterwards adorned with the gifts of integrity and of sanctifying grace, but he does not assert this, for he asserts pure nature only as the state in which man originally was, or *might have been*, created. Some Catholics have held, I believe, that man actually was created in a state of pure nature, and only afterwards endowed with the integrity of his nature and sanctifying grace ; but the more common doctrine is that he was originally created in the integrity of his nature, and instantly endowed with the sanctifying grace by which he was constituted in a state of justice. All that Catholic faith requires us to hold on the point is, that God could, not that he did, create man in the beginning, as he is now born. For our own part, we do not believe man actually exists or ever did exist in what theologians call *status*

*nature pure*, and we believe he is and always has been under a supernatural Providence.

The author's statement of the effects of Original Sin is we believe dogmatic, as far as it goes. Certainly by the Fall man lost none of his natural faculties, and he retains all that is or ever was absolutely essential to his nature as human nature, intrinsically unimpaired ; but he did lose not only original justice, but the integrity of his nature, what theologians call the *indebita*, by which the body was held in subjection to the soul, the flesh to the spirit, the appetites and passions to reason, and reason to the law of God. He did not lose reason and free-will, but reason and free-will lost their dominion over the lower nature, whence internal disorder, anarchy, and discord, immediately followed, as they follow in a state the moment it is deprived of civil government. In the integrity of his nature, man experienced no internal disorder, no lawless concupiscence ; all within was peaceful and harmonious : the flesh moved only at the command of reason, and, through the subjection in which it was held by reason, only in subordination to the will of God. Man's whole nature was orderly ; its face was towards God, and it aspired to him as its supreme good. All this was changed by Original Sin. Reason and free-will retained their original nature indeed, but losing their dominion, no longer held the lower nature in subjection, but became its servants, often its vile slaves, serving where they should rule. The flesh, the appetites and passions, the inferior powers retained their nature also, but no longer held in subjection by reason, they went ahead, so to speak, each on its own hook, to its own special end. The appetite for food, dormant before the Fall, before the law of death began to operate, for food is necessary only to resist the operations of that law, or to supply the continual waste it causes, sought according to its nature its special gratification, pushed the man to excess, and he became a glutton ; the appetite for drink did the same ; pushed the man to excess, and, as soon as he had found the means, he became a drunkard. Noe planted the vine, drank of the juice thereof, and was drunk. The same may be said of all the appetites and passions according to their respective natures. Hence the world became filled with excesses, vices, and crimes.

Now, as the special end of all the inferior powers is a created good, our lower nature, by escaping from the dominion of reason and will, became averted from God, and turned from the Creator to the creature, practically carrying away with it even our higher nature. Original Sin, in fact, rendered man averse to God, and he needs to be converted, to be turned towards God, before the primary and instinctive motions of his nature tend to him. We do not think it true to say that man, as a fact, always aspires to God, or tends naturally to him even as the Author of nature ; nor do we understand the author of the book before us to maintain that he does. Intellect and will have, as before the Fall, truth and good for their respective objects, and of course naturally aspire to the true and the good ; and as God is the only absolutely True and the only absolutely Good, they may be said to aspire implicitly or indirectly to God, inasmuch as that to which they do aspire can be found in its fulness, in its perfection, only in him. But in point of fact, left to fallen nature, intellect and will are developed under the influence of our lower nature, and seek the creature rather than the Creator. Concede that they seek truth and goodness, it is rarely that they directly and formally seek the Supreme Truth and Goodness. The will takes up with a smaller present good, in preference to a greater but more remote good, and there is often intellect enough expended on an intrigue or in compassing a crime, a robbery, or a revenge, if rightly directed, to ascertain the true religion. All this is certain, and included in the consequences of what our nature lost by the Fall. The author does not dwell on this, because he is not writing a treatise on Original Sin, and because he was necessarily more intent on what we retained than on what we lost ; but we cannot find that he anywhere contradicts it, or implies the contrary.

The point the author is intent on maintaining is that we did not by the Fall lose reason and free-will, and therefore that our higher nature did not become *necessarily* subjected to the lower as represented by the Reformers, but retained the power or ability to assert and maintain its freedom, and to aspire to God, in the natural order. It is not to what our nature actually does, but to what it has the innate power to do, that he directs our attention. We

are able by our natural forces to keep the natural law, but we do not do so, and our theologians of all schools derive an argument for revelation and the aids of grace from their practical necessity to enable men to grasp the truths and to practise the virtues even of the natural order. The author himself does as much, for although he maintains that reason can demonstrate the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of man, he argues from its failure to do so, the necessity of seeking the helps of revelation, assistance from above.

If we should find any fault with the author, it would not be in his overstating the radical power of reason and nature, for in his statements on this point he is sustained by the highest and most decisive authorities ; but in perhaps not taking sufficient pains to guard his readers against confounding what reason and nature have the power to do with what they actually accomplish. The Church has decided that " Reasoning,—*ratiocinatio*—can prove—*probare potest*—with certainty, the existence of God, the spirituality of the soul, and the freedom of man ;" but I am not aware that she has ever decided that man does, in fact, arrive at these great primal truths of all science and morality, without the aid of revelation. St. Thomas teaches us that revelation is necessary, practically necessary, to enable men to know even the natural law, especially in the case of the great mass of mankind. Undoubtedly, "the great ideas and sentiments which constitute the foundations of the noble institutions of human society, are a part of the domain of reason ;" but not therefore does it follow that reason and nature alone have erected those noble institutions, or are practically able to sustain them. Reason, inasmuch as purely natural reason, is in the savage as well as in the civilized man, and all in the one that it is in the other, and yet the savage does not erect them. If men by reason and nature alone erect the noble institutions of human society, what becomes of all our talk about the services rendered by Catholicity to modern civilization ? What reason and nature can do, when rightly directed and exerted to their full power, is one thing, and what they actually do or will do when abandoned to themselves, is another, and a very different thing. The Church vindicates the ability of reason and



nature, and asserts what they are able to do, but she also has occasion to condemn them, to conclude them under sin for not doing it.

The author, perhaps, in his strong desire to show the power of reason and the dignity and worth of human nature, has not made enough of the practical aberrations of reason and miseries of our fallen nature, or rather, has not brought out as carefully as he might the other side of the picture. He does it, indeed, in the chapter in which he shows that the problems of the Earnest Seeker do not find their solution in philosophy, ancient or modern, and also in the chapter in which he proves the necessity of light and strength from God to enable us to solve them ; but he does not, perhaps, show as clearly and as satisfactorily to his readers how he reconciles the failures of reason and nature with what he asserts of their native ability and aspirations as might be desired. In speaking of their ability and aspirations, he has the appearance of asserting not only that they are able to do, but that they really do what they are able to do ; in asserting that they have failed and urging the need of light and help from above, he denies that they have done it, maintains that they have been abused, misdirected, or not properly exerted. Certainly we do not mean that there is any inconsistency in asserting the ability of reason in the strong terms used by the author, and asserting also its miserable failures ; and we do not object in the least to the real meaning of the author ; but he will permit us to say, that it seems to us that he has so expressed himself that the unlearned reader may regard him as maintaining, when asserting reason and nature against Calvinists and Jansenists, what he denies when asserting revelation and grace against Rationalists and Transcendentalists. The contradiction is apparent, not real, and the author really avoids it, but is not as clear, as distinct, in his statements as we could desire. There is a little confusion of tone and expression, but after all no inconsistency. If it had comported with his purpose to expose the weakness as well as the strength of reason, its practical inefficiency as well as its innate ability, its voluntary submission to the inferior nature as well as its power to master it and maintain its freedom, he would have avoided even the appearance of inconsistency, and shown

clearly and satisfactorily, how that with all its innate ability, reason in fact accomplishes very little even in the order of natural truth and virtue, without the aid, direct or indirect, of divine revelation and grace.

The author's design, it cannot be denied, is one that it is difficult to execute. He starts with the principle of the Transcendentalist that nature aspires to God, and with the principle of the Rationalist that reason is able to apprehend and conduct us to our appointed end. He therefore boldly accepts the challenge for Catholicity of the Earnest Seeker. But the fact is, though these principles are true in his sense, they are not true in their sense. As held by them they are false, though there is a truth that underlies them. The difficulty is to eliminate that truth, and fix their minds on it alone, while accepting their statements, or at least not objecting to them. A serious, and, as we think, an insurmountable difficulty. The author does all that man can do to get over it, but after all, he does not get over it. When we use the language of Rationalists and Transcendentalists, whatever explanations and qualifications we may introduce, they will understand us in their own sense, and fail to catch the sense we intend. Concede to the non-Catholic world that they already hold our first principles, and they will find in that fact a reason for being satisfied with themselves as they are, rather than for coming to us ; for they feel very little need of logical consistency, or necessity of developing all the consequences of the principles they hold. Strictly speaking, our nature, though it might aspire, and ought to aspire to God, as a general thing, does not explicitly so aspire, nor does it instinctively move in the direction of its true end. It requires an effort of reason and will to raise our affections to God. Virtue is always an effort. The soul desires good, no doubt of that, but to desire good and to aspire to God as the Good in itself, or as our good, are not formally one and the same thing, and it is only by a process of reasoning that we perceive that our true good is in God, that he is the end of our nature, and only by an effort of free-will that, after we apprehend this, we really aspire to him. The Transcendentalist principle then is not true, and consequently we can never deduce the truth from it, or bring the truth to harmonize with it. Even if the principle were true, it would

not help the matter much, and would be no proof that man naturally aspires to the Catholic Church, or that she is that which responds to the aspirations of nature ; for the aspirations of nature cannot rise above nature ; nature can aspire to God only in the order of nature,—to God simply as its natural beatitude, while Catholicity and the beatitude it promises lie in the supernatural order.

We know that many theologians maintain that man has an innate natural desire for the supernatural, or to see God as he is in himself, impossible by the simple forces of nature. But this desire is only a vague, inefficacious, and indirect desire, which resolves itself into our general desire of knowing things as they are in themselves, and in their causes, which we cannot fully know unless we see and know God in his essence, as he is in himself. In any other sense the assertion that we have it, is condemned by Pius VI. in the Bull *Auctorem Fidei*. For ourselves, we doubt the innateness of the desire, and think in so far as it has any explicitness, it is due to reminiscences of the revelation made to our first parents in the garden. We should say, and we suppose that this is really what the author means, not that the soul aspires to Catholicity, but that Catholicity meets its aspirations to good, by securing it the good it craves, or a greater and more abundant good, though not precisely of the kind it craves.

The author justifies himself in accepting this principle of the Rationalists, on the ground that reason can attain, though not of itself to the true end of man, to a certain belief in revelation. But this is not to attain to our end by reason and nature. Reason can do all that reason is required to do. From the motives of credibility addressed to it, it can attain to a certain belief that God has made us a revelation, but this belief is not faith, nor are these motives of credibility the formal reason of faith. Even these motives of credibility are not furnished by reason ; they are furnished by the Revelator himself, and addressed by him to reason, and they render the act of belief in revelation a perfectly reasonable act, for they are sufficient to convince and satisfy it. Revelation is neither through reason nor by reason, but is made to reason, and reason is simply able to receive it, and to yield its assent to it from the motives of credibility in the case. It is not correct to argue, then,

that man by reason can attain to his appointed destiny, or his true end, because by it we can attain to a full belief in the supernatural means by which it can be attained. What the author means is not what the Rationalist holds. He means that Catholicity presupposes reason, respects it, addresses it, and satisfies its innate desire for truth, not only by enabling it to know better, more clearly, more fully the truths of the natural order, but by pouring in upon it a flood of light from above, and raising it to the possession and contemplation of the truths of the supernatural order. This is true, but it is not what the Rationalist means, nor will it, in point of fact, satisfy him; for what he wants is to be rid of revelation, to be rid of the supernatural, and to be able to assert the sufficiency of reason and nature. The unreasonableness of Calvinism serves him as an excuse for his Rationalism, but its real source is in his aversion from God, in the pride of the human heart which refuses to receive assistance even from its Maker. Instead of aspiring to God, the Rationalist wishes to suffice for himself, and till subdued by divine grace, he revolts at the thought of being dependent on another.

What the author is really laboring to prove is that the Church accepts reason and nature, operates on and with them, vindicates their rights and capacities, and meets and more than meets their purest, highest, and noblest aspirations after truth and good, and therefore that a man may become a Catholic without sacrificing his reason, his natural dignity, or his manhood. He is laboring to prove that in Catholicity the man will find all his intellectual and moral wants amply provided for, but not that Catholicity is formally that to which he naturally aspires or tends, or that to which by a right use even of his faculties, operating upon natural *data* alone, he can attain. The slight confusion, or want of clear, distinct, and direct statement, which the reader meets or fancies he meets here and there, does not, we are sure, spring from any confusion or inexactness in the author's mind, but from the necessities of the line of argument he has wished to adopt, and, from his unwillingness to set forth distinctly in the outset his real purpose, lest he should unnecessarily excite the prejudices of the class of persons he proposed to address, and therefore, lose his labor. Thus he studiously avoids using the word

*supernatural*, and presenting and defending Christianity, in name, as the supernatural order. He has wished to conduct the Earnest Seeker on his own principles, step by step, to the acceptance of Catholicity, without informing him in advance whither he intends to conduct him. A very pardonable artifice, but, as it strikes us, wholly useless, for every reader knows beforehand, the author is a Catholic, and intends to conduct him to Catholicity. We would excite gratuitously no man's prejudices, but Catholicity *is* the supernatural order, or it is nothing, and the Earnest Seeker must accept it as such, not as a development of reason and nature, or he does not accept it at all. We cannot, if we would, seduce men into accepting the Church through Rationalism and Transcendentalism. In accepting, or in appearing to accept the first principles of Rationalists or Transcendentalists, we are more likely to be regarded as converting the Church to them, than we are to convert them to the Church. The moment we convince them that their avowed principles and aspirations require them to go farther and join the Catholic Church, they will, unless divine grace prevents, enter into a new analysis of reason and nature, eliminate from their principles and aspirations what is due to tradition and the influences of Christian civilization, and fall back on a reason and nature that aspire to natural good alone.

The fact is, practically considered, reason and nature never operate as pure reason and nature. The Earnest Seeker, as described by the author, is not a man who has or has had only his own unassisted reason and nature. His confessions are such as no man, not in some sense Christianized, could possibly make; they presuppose a belief, vague and indefinite it may be, that there is a supernatural order, a supernatural religion somewhere, of some sort, whence may come the solutions demanded. These demands of intellect, these wants of the heart, these aspirations of the soul, which the author so feelingly and so eloquently sets forth and which all serious and earnest-minded men, brought up outside the Church, are more or less conscious of, are not those of a soul in a state of pure nature, but of a soul born and bred in Christendom, and are due rather to reminiscences of a lost faith, than to the operations of pure nature. Christian civilization is never to be

confounded with Christianity, yet something Christian enters into it, and is, as it were, assimilated by Christian nations. Reason and nature in the bosom of a Christian nation are indeed essentially what they are everywhere, we grant ; but they receive from the first a culture, and are imbued with habits, which render them in their practical development very different from the reason and nature of the savage, the barbarian, or even the civilized pagan or Mahometan. Formed under the influences of Christian civilization, they have habits, wants, and aspirations which are not purely natural, and which in part are due directly or indirectly to the Church. Nowhere out of Christendom could the author's Earnest Seeker be found. He is not a man, save as to merit, remaining in a state of pure nature, but a man who has been born and trained in a Christian atmosphere, under direct or indirect Christian influences, for no man absolutely ignorant of revelation and grace could propose his problems in the form he proposes them. He is, we were about to say, an inchoate Christian, and has principles, views, aspirations, feelings, thoughts, which he owes at least to the Christianity Christian nations have morally assimilated, and which characterizes what is called Christian civilization.

Even the heathen were never abandoned to pure reason and nature alone, for they never lost all tradition of revelation made to our first parents in the garden. Among all tribes, and nations, however high or however low in the scale of civilization, we find, mixed indeed with errors and superstitions, beliefs, notions, and practices, which were never derived from reason alone, but from the primitive revelation preserved in a corrupt state by Gentile, and in its pure and integral state by Jewish and Christian tradition. The state of pure nature is a possible, but is not, and never has been an actual state. As a matter of fact, it has never existed, certainly not since the Fall ; for Almighty God intended from the beginning man for a supernatural end, and placed him under a supernatural providence, with gracious helps always within his reach.

We commend this consideration to a very spirited and agreeable writer, for whom we have a great liking, in the *London Rambler*, who, in his zeal for the justice of God, imagines in the upper regions of hell a sort of natural

heaven into which he proposes to admit not only unbaptized infants dying in infancy without actual sin, but the greater part of the heathen world, as well as of "our dissenting brethren" who die out of the Church. Indeed, he seems to think the only use of hell, properly so called, is to punish bad Catholics. We can conceive it probable, as our theologians generally hold, and are permitted to hold, that unregenerated infants dying in infancy, though they will never see God, may have mercifully concealed from them the knowledge of what they have lost. Not being guilty of any actual sin, they cannot be condemned to suffer the *pœna sensus*, and therefore will not be exposed to positive suffering. But with regard to adults, who have attained to the use of reason, we understand no natural beatitude in or out of hell for them, for they are placed under a supernatural providence, and sufficient grace, if complied with, is given to every one to enable him to gain the supernatural reward of the just ; and for one, come to the use of reason, not to comply with that grace is sin, and deserving of punishment according to the degree of malice in the non-complying individual.

Considering that man has never been left without at least some reminiscences of revelation, and that the grace of God strives with all men, it is never safe to conclude that what we experience in ourselves or observe in others, even though not in reality transcending reason and nature, is in fact derived from them ; and to found an argument upon it as an argument founded on pure reason and nature will never have that weight with Rationalists and Transcendentalists it really ought to have. For our own part we think the best way of dealing with those who are disposed to assert the sufficiency of reason and nature, is not to labor to show them that our religion lies in their plane, or may be attained to by reason and nature, but that we have in our religion something far better than any thing they have, far better than reason and nature in their best estate, and that while we accept the natural order, and assert and maintain it in all its rights and dignity, we are able to offer them a supernatural order, another order of life proceeding from the same Author, corresponding to it indeed, but infinitely superior to it, and inconceivably better and infinitely more desirable. While we concede to them that reason and nature are not essentially impaired by the

Fall, and are still good in their own order, and that God could, had he chosen, have created and left man in a state of pure nature, destined to a purely natural beatitude, it is best to tell them distinctly that he did not do so, and did not do so because he chose to do something inconceivably better for us, and thus labor to present our religion not as a want or necessity of their nature intellectual or moral, which, if it be supernatural, it is not and cannot be, but as a higher and nobler manifestation of his infinite love, which would not be contented with providing us nothing more than natural beatitude. It is not so much the needs or the satisfaction of reason and nature we would insist upon, as the inexhaustible bounty of God which does for us far more than we are naturally able to ask or even to conceive,—more than we have ever desired or been able without Divine assistance even to desire—a bounty that not only meets our desires and aspirations, but infinitely exceeds them. This, it strikes us, is more likely to touch the heart, to win love, and command obedience, than simply showing that Catholicity responds to the wants or aspirations of the soul. It is the fact that Christianity is supernatural, that it introduces us into an order above nature, inconceivably better than nature, good as nature may be, and gives to reason a higher and clearer light, and to nature new and nobler aspirations, that constitutes its great recommendation, and makes it dearer to us than life itself. It is dear in that it redeems us from the curse of the law, and heals the wounds we received by the Fall ; it is dearer in that it ennobles human nature by making it the nature of God, through its union with the human nature assumed by the Divine Word.

In these remarks it would be alike unjust to the author and to us to suppose that we are questioning any doctrine he asserts. We may not place as much confidence in the line of argument he is pursuing as he does, but that is not saying that that line of argument is not allowable, or that it is not important. Brought in with other arguments, we place on it a very high value, and it has always been recognized by our theologians. When taken alone by itself, we do not think it the strongest or the safest. But this is only our opinion, which must go for what it is worth. Every man should be allowed to take his own method of addressing the non-Catholic mind, so long as he keeps within the limits of



faith and allowable opinion. Because we think there may be a better line of argument, it does not follow that we are right or that he is wrong. He does not claim his own line of argument as the only one it is lawful to adopt, and we do not claim ours as exclusive of others. We have made our remarks not to controvert any views he advances, but to guard the reader against the injustice of confounding him with a school which we do not like, and to which he certainly does not belong—a school which seems to us to found itself on what may be called the eccentricities of theologians, rather than on the general current of theology, on opinions which are tolerated rather than approved, *sententiæ in ecclesia* rather than on *sententiæ ecclesiæ*. Several publications, to which our attention has been recently drawn, make us fear such a school is rising, and we do not believe its introduction into our country would do any good. We are also opposed to every thing which looks like accommodating Catholic teaching to the tastes and temper of the age or country. In choosing our mode of presenting Catholic doctrine, we should consult this taste and temper, but that which we present is that over which we have no control, no right, and must be the same one Catholic truth, believed always and everywhere by the Catholic Church ; and in this sentiment the author will assuredly agree with us. There are, as far as we can discover, no other points in Mr. Hecker's book likely to be misapprehended, or to which exception can be taken by any Catholic however fastidious. Here is an extract that may please our readers.

" Catholicity, therefore, has the highest appreciation of Reason, stimulates its activity, and welcomes with joy its discoveries. ' This most tender mother, the Catholic Church, recognizes and justly proclaims,' says the reigning Sovereign Pontiff, ' that among the gifts of Heaven, the most distinguished is that of Reason, by means of which we raise ourselves above the senses, and present in ourselves a certain image of God. Certainly the Church does not condemn the labors of those who wish to know the truth, since God has placed in human nature the desire of laying hold of the true ; nor does she condemn the effort of sound and right Reason, by which the mind is cultivated, nature is searched, and her more hidden secrets brought to light.' \*

" Consequently, the geologist may dig deep down into the bowels

\* Pius IX. Letter to the Bishops of Austria, 1856.

of the earth till he reaches the intensest heat ; the naturalist may decompose matter, examine with the microscope what escapes our unaided observation, and unveil to our astonished gaze the secrets of nature ; the astronomer may multiply his lenses till his ken reaches the empyrean heights of heaven ; the historian may consult the annals of nations, and unriddle the hieroglyphics of the monuments of bygone ages ; the moralist may expose the most delicate folds of the human heart, and probe it to its very core ; the philosopher may, with his critical faculty, observe and define the laws which govern man's sovereign Reason ; and Catholicity is not alarmed ! Catholicity invokes, encourages, solicits your boldest efforts ; for at the end of all your earnest researches, you will find that the fruit of your labors confirms her teachings, and that your genuine discoveries add new gems to the crown of truth which encircles her heaven-inspired brow.

" Our indulgent readers will not be displeased if we relate an example illustrative of this truth.

" Professor H. was distinguished for his researches and discoveries in the field of Natural History. For these his writings merited translation and publication in France. One of his discoveries was that of a family of animalculæ. One day, observing these by the aid of a microscope, and with more than usual attention, he perceived that they had a perfect system of an organized government. There was a chief, with subordinate officers, each having his own duties to perform, and all acting in unison and perfect order.

" This unexpected discovery surprised the Professor, and led him to turn his observation abroad upon the wide field of nature. Everywhere, to his satisfaction, he found the same unity, the same laws, the same harmony, the same form of government, from the meanest floweret or insect to the vast planetary systems of worlds. A thought occurred to him at this moment, whether this universal form of government, found in all nature, was not a stamp and similitude of nature's Author ; and whether, if God had made known his will to his rational creatures, he would not display the same laws, the same government, but only in a higher and more perfect form.

" Now, this was no small stride for our Professor to make ; for the truth is, he was bred a Protestant, and on arriving at the age when men are accustomed to do their own thinking, he found that this religion neither answered his Reason nor satisfied his conscience. He therefore abandoned the religion of the Sixteenth century, began to read the works of French philosophers, gave up all ideas of Christianity, and ended in becoming a Deist.

" What now ? After having discovered this law running through all nature, his curiosity was excited to see whether he could find it in any one of the prevailing systems of religious belief. Of the dissensions and degrading doctrines of Protestantism, he knew sufficient from his own experience. There was no way left but to examine Catholicity. His acquaintance with the Catholic Church was very

slight, and no priest residing in his village, on inquiry he found a Catholic in the place who was prepared to give him the information he desired. The Professor was gratified to find in the Catholic Church the same organization, the same laws, the same form of government which he had found in all nature. His conclusion was that the Catholic religion has for its author the great Author of all nature and of the vast universe.

"What next? Too sincere not to acknowledge the truth when known, too earnest not to be faithful to the light he had received and his convictions, our Professor starts for the metropolis, to have an interview with the Catholic Bishop. He introduces himself to the Bishop as Mr. H. On taking a chair, it occurs to the mind of the Bishop that the gentleman's name was the same as that of a celebrated professor of Natural History, and he put the question, whether he was that Professor. Modest, like all truly learned men, he replied, 'Sometimes persons call me so.' But he continued under feelings of excitement because of the important nature of his visit, and, addressing the Bishop, he asked him if he had any reason why he should not become a Catholic. The Bishop was not a little startled at such a question, and replied in his usual bland and winning way: 'Why, Professor, I have no reasons why you should not become a Catholic, but many and every reason why you should.' Understanding the purpose of the Professor's visit, and curious to know what had turned his attention to the Catholic Church, the Bishop asked him, before going further, what it was that first directed his thoughts to Catholicity? 'Bugs! bugs! bugs!' replied the Professor, quickly.

"'Bugs!' repeated the astonished prelate. 'What have these to do with the truth of the Catholic religion?' Thereupon the Professor related the facts which we have just narrated, and the Bishop found them satisfactory as well as amusing. In due time the Professor became a member of that Church whose doctrines are consonant with the dictates of Reason,

' Whose proofs are everywhere.  
Whate'er we hear or see, whate'er doth lie,  
Round us in nature: all that the structure of  
Science, or in Art, hath found or wrought.' \*—pp. 201-206.

The fact discovered in natural history became the occasion of the Professor's conversion, and his reasoning was good, because the supernatural corresponds to the natural, although that it so corresponds or must so correspond is not a truth known by reason without revelation; for nothing obliges God to establish the same system of government in both the natural order and the supernatural.

\* De Vera.

The reader will find the chapter on *Individuality* very felicitously disposing of the objection that Catholicity destroys individuality of character and tends to mould all individuals after the same pattern. We make a brief extract.

“‘The truth seems to me to amount to this,’ says a Protestant writer, ‘that the Roman Catholic Church has had the good sense to turn to account, and assimilate to itself, and inform with its own peculiar doctrines, a deep-seated principle in our Human Nature,—a law of life, which we Protestants have had the folly to repudiate.’\* ”

“That Catholicity gives full scope and freedom to individual action, is seen on a broader scale in the characteristics of Catholic nations. For though she makes all men Catholic, yet at the same time they lose nothing of their individual or national virtues. Italy, Spain, Germany, France, Ireland, Belgium, are all Catholic nations, yet how widely different in their personal and national character! Can one imagine a wider difference than that which exists between the passionate, lively, and choleric Italian and the slow, grave and philosophic German? What a difference between the sombre, stately, inflexible Spaniard, and the gay, affable, plastic Frenchman! Compare the warm-hearted, cheerful, all-enthusiastic Irishman with the quiet, steady, sedate Belgian. Yet these are nations that have been under Catholic influences from the cradle of their civilization. How strikingly have they not preserved all their national features, national virtues, national existence! Indeed the Catholic Religion is the only religion which preserves the individuality of persons as well as the characters of nations. Alas! there was a time when England had a national character, and that was when she was under the healthful influences of Catholicity;—England then was merry, renowned for her piety and religious institutions. What is England renowned for now? Sadness, impiety, ginshops, workhouses, and factories.

“What a change! A nation that under Catholic influences was called par excellence merry, now, under antagonistic influences, so far from being merry, that hypochondria is treated of by their own medical writers under the title of “the English malady.” A nation which once was looked upon as a beautiful garden, studded as it was with its magnificent churches and glorious abbeys, now, with all its wealth, and all the exertions of late years in the way of church-building, does not possess, and it is an English Protestant writer who declares it, ‘the number or near it of churches which existed at the time of the Reformation.’ Well may we, in tones of pity and sympathy, join the same writer in singing:—

\* Mrs. Jamieson's Sisters of Charity.

'Oh, the good old times of England : ere in her evil day  
 From their holy faith and her ancient rites her people fell away,  
 When her gentlemen had hands to give, and her yeomen hearts to feel,  
 And they raised full many a bead-house, but never a bastille ;  
 And the poor they honored, for they knew that He who for us bled,  
 Had seldom when he came on earth whereon to lay his head.

'But times and things are altered now, and Englishmen begin  
 To class the beggar with the knave, and poverty with sin.  
 We shut them up from tree and flower, and from the blessed sun,  
 We tear in twain the hearts that God in wedlock had made one.  
 No gentle Nun with transport sweet, no Friar standeth nigh  
 With ghostly strength and holy love to close the poor man's eye,  
 But the corpse is thrown into its ground, when the prayers are hurried o'er,  
 To rest in peace a little while, and then make room for more.' \*

"Thus on the one hand, we have Protestantism denying to man all that goes to make him a man, repudiating his nature, mutilating his faculties, and destroying all elevated personal and national character; while, on the other hand, we find Catholicity calling forth all man's slumbering powers, sustaining their action, and giving a full liberty, and her benediction to his individual exertions; offering to every one a place for his activity in accordance with his tastes and genius, and teaching him that he serves God by sanctifying his nature."—pp. 274–276.

There are several other passages which we had marked for insertion, but we must content ourselves with inserting the concluding chapter.

"The aspirations of Reason so eminently distinguish man in his superiority to the animal creation, that loyalty to these constitutes the highest nobility and dignity of his nature.

"Philosophy for long centuries has vainly endeavored to solve the riddle of man's destiny, and answer his aspirations. Man is constrained to look elsewhere for adequate answers. This is a dictate of Reason, no less than a cry from the conscience of the whole human race.

"Christianity is the only Religion that can reasonably claim the attention of all mankind. There is no rational hope, not the faintest prospect of any other satisfactory Religion. Either we must become Christians, or abandon our religious natures to the agonizing alternatives of doubt, despair; a condition which terminates in the death of the soul.

"The Protestant form of Christianity in its exposition of Christian Doctrines contradicts the dictates of Reason, shocks the convictions of conscience, and is subversive of all human dignity. The more intelligent and conscientious of its adherents have awakened to this recognition, and hence the Protestant Religion has ceased to possess a real hold upon their convictions, or to retain their respect.

\* *Hierolog.* by Rev. J. M. Neale.

"Skepticism, infidelity, atheism, can never satisfy our religious nature, for they are the denial of its convictions. Unitarianism, deism, pantheism, under the light and quickening influences of Christianity, are, beyond all measure, inadequate to our deep religious necessities.

"The only road open for us to be Christians, consistent with Reason, with moral rectitude, and with a proper respect for ourselves, is to become Catholic. For the expositions of Christian Doctrines by the Catholic Church are consonant with the dictates of Reason, in harmony with our moral feelings, and favorable to the highest conceptions of the dignity of human nature.

"Nations unaided by the powerful influences of Religion cannot realize their destinies. Our own country is becoming conscious of this truth. The question now pressing itself upon the American people is, to determine their Religion, as our fathers did the character of their political institutions. These, under the guidance of an overruling Providence, were based on Catholic principles, and Catholic views of human nature.

"With the free exertions of Reason, with the natural impulses of our instincts, and with the silent influences of our noble institutions, the American people will rise in the strength of its manhood and proclaim itself Catholic.

"Brothers of America! you who look for a Religion agreeing with your intelligence, commensurate with all the wants of your nature, and which presents a destiny worthy of your highest efforts, investigate the claims of the Catholic Religion, and exercise your freedom by paying a loyal homage to its Divine Truth."—pp. 359, 360.

The author has addressed his book to non-Catholics, and we hope it will be read by them, and do something towards overcoming that silly and mischievous prejudice which excludes nearly every Catholic book from non-Catholic circles. He has written it with a view to what he conceives to be the wants and aspirations of the American mind, which he has studied with lively sympathy, and evidently with the hope that it will turn the attention of the American people to investigating the claims of the Catholic religion, and ultimately, with the grace of God, lead to their conversion. He thinks there is a crisis in their affairs, and that they cannot pass it safely without the aid of Catholicity. It is but simple justice to him to say that he does not urge this as a reason why they should become Catholics, but as an excellent reason why they should not oppose the Church, and why they should investigate her titles.

There has been much said and written of late on the conversion of Americans, and no man amongst us is more devoted to the work of effecting, or more hopeful of its being effected, than our author. He does all by word and by writing in his power for it, and has quickened the zeal of many to do the same, among whom he may count ourselves. But from the much we say and write in reference to this subject, and the frequency with which we speak of the American mind, the American people, American institutions, and the appeals we make to American patriotism, some Catholics not of American birth, or not having any very lively sympathies with the American character as they see it manifested, are led to suspect us of a design to Americanize Catholicity, and of a desire to induce the American people to embrace our religion through appeals to their American prejudices, passions, habits, or patriotism. This suspicion, so far as we are concerned, is wholly unfounded, although we as well as others may have used expressions which would seem at first sight to warrant it. Unhappily this is a country in which no good thing can be proposed, but there stand ready a large number of unemployed individuals to convert it at once into a hobby, to mount it, and to ride it to death. Certainly no such thought or design exists as is suspected, but with unreasoning opposition on the one side and unreasoning enthusiasm on the other, we cannot say what may come in the end, if no pains be taken to guard against extremes, and if there be not on the part of those who are so earnest for the conversion of the country a proper respect for the Prelates whom the Holy Ghost has placed over us, and full recognition of their authority and obedience to it. We know there is a feeling in certain quarters that, under the pretext of converting the country, or presenting Catholicity to the American people in a form adapted to their understanding, there is a secret intention to undermine, or at least to restrict the authority of the Bishops and Clergy, and to give the laity an influence in ecclesiastical matters to which they are not entitled, and cannot have without subverting the order of government which our Lord has established for his Church. Although we know that on our part and that of our personal friends among the laity, there is nothing to justify this feeling, yet the fact of its

existence may well make us fear that there has been imprudence somewhere, and that expressions may have been used or a tendency manifested, which are not in strict accordance with Catholic order.

The government of the Church is not vested in the hands of the laity, and it does not pertain to them, even though Editors of Journals and Reviews, to assume the direction of Catholic affairs, or to labor through outside pressure, or the force of public opinion which they may create, to compel the ecclesiastical authorities to favor a movement of any sort which has not received from them the initiative. It is no great stretch of humility on our part to concede that the Bishops and Clergy understand as well as we Catholic interests, have them as deeply at heart, and however unassuming they may be, are quite as well fitted to direct us as we are to direct them. If they fail in their duty, as individual bishops and priests may, it is not our business to call them to an account, for we have not been appointed either their judges or their overseers. We must leave that to God and his Vicar. *Appels comme d'Abus* to the editorial tribunal are, in principle, of the same nature as appeals from the Ecclesiastical Courts to the Council of State. Before we can hope to effect any thing for the conversion of the country, we who are Catholics must be thoroughly respectful and obedient to legitimate authority, so that our Bishops and priests may have freedom of movement, and liberty to mature and carry out their own plans for the advancement of religion.

In a country like ours there is always danger of disrespect and disobedience to authority, save with those who have a simple childlike faith, together with great humility of character, or those who add to the same faith great and manly intelligence. The tone of the country is averse to authority; its very atmosphere is that of liberty,—we might almost say, that of license, of insubordination. Young America rails at the "Governor," and has a great dislike to obedience. The very essence of Protestantism lies in its transfer of the ruling authority in the Church from the clergy to the laity. Under Protestantism power operates from low to high, the sheep choose, commission, and govern the shepherd; and when he refuses to let them



stray whither they please, they dismiss him, and choose a new shepherd, who will prove himself more accommodating. Catholics who mingle much with Protestants, and in general American society, catch something of the Protestant tone, and there is always more danger with us of the laity tyrannizing over the clergy, than there is of the clergy tyrannizing over the laity. The laity, no doubt, have rights, but the more resolute and firm we are in asserting them, the more scrupulous we should be in recognizing and respecting the rights of authority. It were better that our rights than those of authority should suffer. What we call our Americanism does very well in the political order,—at least so our countrymen hold,—but it can not be transferred to the Church without heresy and schism.

We have shown as strong a disposition, both by word and example, to assert and maintain the rights of the laity as any man that can be named; we have gone the full length we can go, without exceeding the limits marked by Catholic discipline; perhaps we may have gone farther in appearance; but we have never forgotten that our first duty is obedience to God in his ministers, and that no plan or project of ours, touching religion, can be urged with propriety or advantage against their wishes, or without at least their tacit approbation. We know the Holy Father has admonished the Bishops to encourage laymen of science, learning, and piety, to write in defence of religion; but we know, also, that he addressed this admonition to them, and it is authority to them to encourage such men, but it is not an authority to us to do what is recommended without them. We know that every man has the right to do all the good in his power, and no one has the right to hinder him; but whether what he takes to be good, or whether he is really doing good or not in the way he attempts to do it, is not for him, but for authority to judge. Order is Heaven's first law, and we can never expect the blessing of God upon any enterprise, however good in itself, that carries with it the slightest taint of irregularity. Every movement intended to advance religious or Catholic interests, initiated by laymen, and supported by them against the wishes, or without the approval of authority, is to be distrusted, and abandoned by every one whose attachment to his Church is stronger than his attachment to his own

private opinion. No one should ever knowingly take part in any such movement. No movement of any sort, not approved by the Prelates of the country, should ever have our countenance, unless it has the express sanction of the Pope, the Bishop's superior, as well as our own,—a sanction never to be counted on against the united voice of the Prelates of any country.

Having made these remarks in reply to feelings and suspicions which we know exist in certain quarters, and which are unfounded, so far as we are personally concerned, and which we trust are not likely to be justified by any movement or tendencies, worthy of the slightest consideration we are acquainted with, we turn to the subject of the conversion of the country. Here it seems to us necessary to be on our guard against crotchets and hobbies, and to take care not to say so much about it as to disgust both those within and those without. The Bishops and Clergy know at least as well what it is necessary to do, in order to convert non-Catholics, as the laity do, and we are not disposed to run in advance of them. There is a great work to be done here before any direct efforts on a large scale can be attempted for the conversion of those who are without. If the souls of non-Catholics are dear to our Lord, the souls of bad Catholics are no less dear. With all that our Bishops can do, they can only partially provide for the spiritual wants of the Catholics already in the country. We have a large Catholic population unprovided for, who neglect, if they do not forget, their religion, and are the greatest drawbacks there can be on the conversion of non-Catholics. The pastor's first care is to those who are of the household of faith, and, we may add, to the children of the faithful. The conversion of bad Catholics, the proper training of Catholic children, the correction of the vice of intemperance, and other immoralities, prevalent in a portion of our Catholic population of this city, and the introduction of morality, good order, sobriety, and economy, into what are now haunts of drunkenness, dens of vice, and petty crimes, would do more for the conversion of non-Catholics than all the books and reviews we can write, all the journals we can edit, or efforts we can make expressly for their conversion, for it would prove to them, what they now doubt, the practical moral efficiency of our religion. We

must provide first for our own spiritual wants, get our own population all right, and then we may turn our attention with confidence and success to those who are without.

The conversion of the country is a thing every Catholic desires, prays for, and to some extent, no doubt, works for, although perhaps not with as much earnestness, zeal, and hopefulness as the impatience of us converts demands. But the conversion of a whole Protestant people, like the American, is a work of magnitude, and not to be effected in a day. We agree with our author that there never was opened a more glorious field to the Church than is opened here. We believe the Church is destined to reap here a glory that she has never reaped in the conversion of any other country, not because the conversion of this country is more easy than that of others, but because it is more difficult. It was easier to convert the Roman empire, than it is to convert the American republic, and it took the Church six centuries to complete that ; it is easier to convert Great Britain than the United States, for her people have more of the habit of obedience, subordination, submission, and retain a stronger attachment to religion. There is scarcely a trait in the American character as practically developed that is not more or less hostile to Catholicity. Our people are imbued with a spirit of independence, an aversion to authority, a pride, an overweening conceit, as well as with a prejudice, that makes them revolt at the bare mention of the Church. In dealing with them the Church has and can have no extrinsic aid. She has to address them as individuals, and can hope nothing any farther than she can convince the individual reason and win the individual heart. Her success here she must owe to herself alone, to her own intrinsic power and excellence. This is no reason why the Catholic should despair of the conversion of the country, or make no exertions to effect it. The post of difficulty and danger is precisely the post the true Catholic chooses. Notwithstanding all the difficulty of the task, we believe the Church is able to accomplish it, and will accomplish it, and in doing so acquire a glory greater than she acquired in converting the Roman Empire.

But we do not believe it is to be accomplished by any new or unusual means. The American people, like every

other people, have, no doubt, their peculiarities, their idiosyncrasies, but their conversion will never be effected by seeking in these our *point d'appui*. They must be converted very much in the way and by the same means that other nations have been,—by addressing that in them which is common to all men, their reason, their heart, and their conscience, not what is peculiar to them, or what is their local or temporary interest or passion. We shall not do it by appeals to their patriotism, or by favoring their radicalism or their conservatism, their slavery or their anti-slavery proclivities. The Church leaves to every people their nationality and to every state its autonomy, and in return claims to be free and independent of the temporal order. To induce the American people to become Catholic from patriotic motives would be to make them like the multitude who followed our Lord for the sake of “the loaves and fishes.” It would be to subordinate the Church to American nationality, as the English did at the time of the Reformation, as the Republicans did, or attempted to do in France in the last century, and to destroy her Catholic freedom and independence. The Church must obey God and follow truth and justice irrespective of nationalities. She cannot be trammelled by nationalities. She is Catholic, not national, and can no more be American, than European, Asiatic, African, or Australian. She is a kingdom in this world, but not of this world. To mix her up with a radical party or a conservative party would be to compromise her Catholicity. Were we to court the North by leaguering Catholic interests with the anti-slavery movement, abolitionists might pat us on the back, call us clever fellows, and profess great respect for our Church. Were we to labor to identify them with the slave interest, Southern politicians would also pat us on the back, call us clever fellows, and profess great respect for our Church. But besides losing as much in the one section as we should gain in the other, we should be trammelled by the section we courted. If the Abolitionists or the pro-slavery men should be disposed to go farther than we could with our Catholic conscience go with them, the party deserted would come down upon us in a storm of wrath, and all the politicians among our own friends would stand aghast, and fear that Catholic interests were ruined, or put back a century. So

it must be, if in the hope of winning the American people to the Church, we as Catholics form a coalition with one or another political party, or with one or another outside interest. As Americans we have a nationality, political preferences and duties, but as Catholics, we know no nationality, no political party, unless a party is formed for the purpose of depriving us of our Catholic freedom. The Church cannot be involved in the conflicts of nationalities or the squabbles of demagogues.

Moreover, in our country the Catholic population is made up of a variety of nationalities, and one nationality in the eyes of the Church is as respectable as another. These in time will be moulded into one American nationality. We cannot hasten that time by any attempts to force them to Americanize. It is well to bear in mind that they will Americanize, so that measures may be taken in season to guard against Americanizing becoming apostatizing. The most efficient portion of our Catholic population are of foreign birth and training, and it will be so for some time to come. We cannot serve the interests of religion by throwing our American nationality in their faces, any more than they can by throwing theirs in our faces. Americans have the right to be Americans, and we will defend that right against whosoever assails it, as we would defend our country against the enemy who should invade our shores; but in laboring to promote Catholic interests in the country, the best way undoubtedly is, to lay aside nationalities, to remember only that we are Catholics, and make our appeal to our countrymen as men, as simple human beings, endowed with reason and free-will, having souls that will never die, and capable by a right use of their faculties, assisted by divine grace, to attain to the endless beatitude of heaven.

We must also bear in mind that the instruments Almighty God will use in the conversion of the country are the population with their clergy already Catholic. However we may work for non-Catholics, we must work with Catholics, and carry with us the sympathies and affections of the Catholic body, or effect nothing. No doubt that body has, outside of its religion, its crotchets, its peculiarities, its idiosyncrasies, and, above all, its sensitiveness. We must never run athwart these when it can be helped ;

we must remember we belong to the same body, with our own crotchets, peculiarities, idiosyncrasies, sensitiveness, and therefore must not be too rude upon others. We cannot move much in advance of the public sentiment of our own body. While, however, we say this in reference to those who are thought to be too impatient to Americanize, we hope it will be permitted us to say to others of different tendencies or sympathies, that they must not be too suspicious, too ready to take offence at a word or an expression, or to put a bad construction when a good one is possible. On this point we need not say that some injustice has been done to our Review, and its position and influence very unnecessarily injured. No one seems to have considered the delicate position in which we and every American-born Catholic were placed on the rise of the Know-Nothing party. There was no question that we must oppose that party with all the force and energy we could command ; but the difficulty, hard for any one but an American by birth and breeding to appreciate, was to oppose the party without offending the sentiment of American nationality, enlisting it on the side of the party, and thus rendering it still stronger and more dangerous. To oppose it in an anti-American spirit, or on Catholic grounds alone, would have been about as wise as for a man to attempt to bite off his own nose. There was only one ground on which we could offer any effectual opposition, that was the American ground,—to accept distinctly and sincerely the American nationality, and to prove that the spirit and principles, the ends and aims of the party were opposed to the genuine principles and spirit of American institutions. It was necessary to take from the party all chance of appeal to the sentiment of nationality, the sentiment common to every man with regard to the land of his birth, and defend Catholics and foreign-born citizens, not as Catholics and foreigners, but as American citizens, as we well could do. Our misfortune was that, while we were doing all in our power to prevent a false issue from being made up before the public, which would have been fatal to us as Catholics, and deeply prejudicial to the foreign-born portion of our population, whether Catholic or not, we were understood to be working on the side of the Know-Nothings, and sharing their sentiments against foreigners. A great-

er mistake it was not possible to commit, and greater injustice could not be done us. The Know-Nothing party is now comparatively dead, passion has had time to subside, and Catholic charity may induce those who so grossly misconstrued our motives, to inquire if they were not too hasty, and if our course, which seemed to them so unjust and ungenerous, was not dictated by a wise and prudent regard for all the interests attacked by the Know-Nothings. A little reflection, it seems to us, might have convinced the persons who took offence, that, supposing us to have the least grain of common sense, we could not have meant any such thing as they supposed ; and common justice, not to say Catholic charity, if passion and suspicion had slept, would have prevented us even from being accused. We had and have no interests and no affections but such as are bound up with the Catholic body of which we are an insignificant member, and as the portion of that body from which we have the most to hope for Catholicity are Irish or of Irish descent, it is ridiculous to suppose that we were anti-Irish in our feelings, or were disposed to join the Know-Nothings in a war against Irish Catholics, which could be only a war equally against ourselves.

Certainly, we do not allude to these bygone events for the purpose of complaining ; we suffered, yet not more than we expected to suffer ; but we allude to them for the purpose of reminding those who suppose that there is an American party forming amongst the Catholics of this country, and that it is necessary to crush it out by crushing every man supposed likely to favor it, that they should guard against ungenerous suspicions, lest they in the end bring about the very thing they oppose, and to which we are as strongly opposed as they are. It is difficult for flesh and blood to bear with equanimity what we have had to bear during the last three years, from men whom we have done our best to serve, and if the grace of God had not restrained us, and our deep devotion to the Catholic cause had not influenced us, we might, when provoked almost beyond endurance, have even ourselves been tempted to do what we should forever have regretted. Confidence begets confidence, and suspicion breeds suspicion, and sometimes makes the thing it dreads. We think there has been too great readiness to suspect American-born

Catholics and converts of designs, intentions, aims, and wishes which we would be the last to entertain. We have ourselves been sneered at in the Catholic press as a convert ; sometimes we have been scolded because we did not show a proper regard for converts, at other times we have been admonished that being a convert we should shut up our mouth ; and one journal has gone so far as to sing its palinode for the encouragement it had given us, and to admonish Catholics that they are too ready to confide in converts and to push them forward. All this is sad, sad, and not the best way to encourage conversions. It is hard enough to feel that one is a convert, that he has not had the advantages of being trained from his childhood in the true faith, and of having grown up with Catholic habits and tastes, without having it flung in his face by Catholics, if he ventures to speak boldly on Catholic matters. But these are trifles, and are mentioned only to show that if there are complaints on one side there might be complaints also on the other, and that the only way is for all to study mutual forbearance, mutual confidence, and mutual charity, so that there shall be, as there ought to be, no *one* side or the *other* side, but one body, with no rent or schism in it. In reality there is no American side, and no foreign side, but there are American feelings and foreign feelings, which it would not be impossible for evil-minded persons to push to the formation of a native party and a foreign party. Happily, through the good providence of God, no such parties are formed among us, and we trust there never will be, certainly shall not be by our means. We publish our Review because originally invited to do so by the Prelates of the Church, and because we wish to serve Catholic interests; but if we believed that it was likely to produce any such division, or could, under any possible combination of circumstances, become the organ of any particular section of the Catholic body, we would discontinue it with the present number, for the evil it would do would far overbalance any good it could possibly effect ; and we assure the authorities of the Church that the moment they signify to us that they lack confidence in its usefulness, that moment we will discontinue it at whatever loss to ourselves personally. We want no party for us or against us ; we want to form no schism or school ; we want simply to



serve the Catholic cause. When it is made clear to us that in the opinion of those who are the proper judges we are not serving it, we shall retire, not because of clamors, or opposition, but because our only motive for publishing a Catholic Review will then cease to exist.

Although we have made these remarks *apropos* of Father Hecker's book, happily neither he nor it is implicated in them, and one of its great merits is, though addressing Americans, it is not American in any offensive sense, and avoids all references that could offend the most fastidious foreign-born Catholic, yet its author has a livelier sympathy with his own countrymen than we have, and is less disturbed by the dangerous tendencies by which they are affected than we are. With him hope is constant, ever-living, and active; with us it is spasmodic, and is kept up only by an effort. We fear the tendencies now at work in our people will carry them so far, licentiousness and corruption of all sorts, in public and private life, will become so universal before the salutary influences of the Church can be brought to bear on them with the requisite power, that they will need to be visited by Almighty God in judgment rather than in mercy. We fear also that they are more likely to carry away with them a large proportion of our Catholic population, than this population is to restrain them; we fear that even the salt that should save them will lose its savor, and we tremble hardly less for our Catholic than for our non-Catholic population. But it is always better to take counsel of our hopes than of our fears, and we will not dwell on our gloomy forebodings, which, after all, may spring from the ill-health, under the depression of which we are forced to write.

In conclusion, we wish to thank the author sincerely and earnestly for his deeply interesting and highly valuable book. It is free from routine, from all cant, from all pretensions; a fresh, sincere, earnest, genuine book, warm from the mind and heart of the writer, and cannot fail to reach the minds and hearts of his readers. It is written in a style of great force and beauty, free, spirited, and seductive. The parts which please us the most are those in which the author answers the popular objections of the day to Catholicity. His answers to them are almost universally happy, brief, animated, witty, good-natured, and conclu-

sive, refuting the objector without ever wounding his self-love or mortifying his vanity. It is in its way a model of controversial writing, and it cannot fail to have a good influence on our polemical literature, to which it is certainly one of the most important contributions ever made by a native-born Catholic. We are much mistaken, if it do not prove one of the most popular works ever issued by our American press, and it will certainly establish the author in the first rank among our most esteemed Catholic writers. The author may not realize all his expectations as to the influence on the precise classes he addresses, but there are many minds, where they are not looked for, that it will reach and help, and it will be read with interest and profit very generally by members of his own communion. It belongs to the class of books of which we cannot have too many, and which can nowhere else be produced but in our own country.

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- ART. IV.—1. *Dramas*. By CHARLES JAMES CANNON. New York: Dunigan & Brother, 1857. 12mo. pp. 351.
2. *Poems Dramatic and Miscellaneous*. The same. New York: The same, 1851. 12mo. pp. 208.
3. *Ravellings from the Web of Life*. By GRANDFATHER GREENWAY. New York: D. & J. Sadlier & Co., 1855. 12mo. pp. 364.

THESE are not all the publications with which Mr. Cannon has favored the public, but they are the principal of those which we have seen, with the exception of *Mora Carmody* and *Father Felix*, heretofore noticed in this Review. Mr. Cannon is not a literary man by profession, and devotes to the cultivation of letters only his leisure moments. We judge from the preface to the *Poems* that he looks upon himself as not having received the encouragement to which he is entitled, and though he is above complaining, he feels that the critics have unduly neglected him. We may ourselves have in this respect fallen under his suspicion, but if we have failed to extend to him all the consideration that is his due, it has been unintentionally, or

because we did not suppose our good or bad opinion could be of the least importance to him. A popular writer, who addresses the public at large, and treats topics that lie within the range of the common mind, can neither be made nor unmade by the critics, and is pretty sure in the long-run to obtain the rank he merits. The public judgment of such a writer will in general be the true one. The exception is more likely to be in his favor than against him. In our country, learning, ability, genius, if a man really has them, will sooner or later make themselves felt and acknowledged, although by espousing an unpopular cause, an unpopular party, or by running athwart prevailing tastes, prejudices, or convictions, he may not be a popular author.

Mr. Cannon has labored long and industriously to promote in our Catholic population a taste for polite literature, and to contribute what he could to create for us such a literature. For this he deserves credit, and even supposing him not to possess genius of the highest order, he should be honored and encouraged. He has had a laudable ambition to be a poet, and to gain an honorable place among the poets of this his native country. Whether he is entitled to that place or not, we cannot presume to say ; for we have a great distrust of our judgment in poetry. There was a time when we read and loved poetry, when we even thought we really could tell poetry if we found it ; but we find so much praised nowadays as poetry, so much passing for poetry of the first order, which in our younger days would hardly have been regarded as respectable prose, that we no longer dare undertake to decide even for ourselves what is or is not poetry. We do not think Mr. Cannon is a poet to rank with Shakspeare, Milton, or Byron, but as far as we can judge he is the equal of many whom we have seen very highly praised by critics of far more pretension than we. Frankly, we like for ourselves his prose better than his poetry, and find him more agreeable in the character of Grandfather Greenway than in any other character in which we have seen him. His *Ravellings from the Web of Life* have in them touches of true genius, and we have read them with much interest and pleasure. They indicate nice observation, deep feeling, happy descriptive powers, and now and then some-

thing of the witchery of romance. They are prose poems, in which we find to our taste more poetry than in his verse. The writer has true poetic sensibility, but it flows not so readily in his verse as in his prose.

The *Dramas* are the production on which the author no doubt sets his heart. His great ambition is to be a successful dramatic author. We have read his *Dramas* through, read them attentively, and with no disposition to find fault with them. We are too ignorant of the stage to know whether they are good acting plays or not. Read as *Dramatic Poems* without any view to the stage, they possess considerable merit. For acting plays we should think they lacked real dramatic character and position; have not enough of dramatic action and passion, abound too much in long speeches and yet remain undeveloped. *The Sculptor's Daughter*, perhaps the best of them, contains several fine passages, and the characters of the Father and Daughter are happily conceived, but they are characters not at all original or new on the stage. Maldonado the brigand has been familiar enough since Schiller's *Robbers*. The only novelty is *Gian-Angelo*, the brother of Maldonado, and the only novelty here is that of converting a sister into a brother. The author has mistaken the sex of Gian-Angelo, and has given us as a boy a true-hearted woman, with genuine sisterly affection, whose heart and soul is wrapped up in the love of her brother. Gian-Angelo is no boy, never was, and never can be a boy, any more than his mother.

The Sculptor Perelli, a Roman, loving his art, pursuing it with a sort of idolatry, but poor, and little known, has an only daughter Enrica, beautiful, accomplished, affectionate, and most dutiful, as all only daughters are, who is betrothed to Orazio, a worthy citizen, and their marriage is to take place on the morrow of the opening of the play. Ottavio, a sprig of the Orsini family,—the time is in the Sixteenth century during the pontificate of Sixtus Quintus,—sees Enrica and seeks to make her his mistress. Failing with her he has the impudence to make his infamous proposals to her father, and seeks with gold to win his consent to the dishonor of his daughter. The father, justly indignant, spurns the offer, seizes Ottavio's dagger, and with it strikes him to the earth, and, as he supposes, kills him. Frightened at the deed, and fearing the vengeance of the powerful Orsini, he

carries away the body and prepares instantly to fly from Rome. While he was doing all this, Enrica and Orazio have had a lover's quarrel, made it up, and Orazio has gone home dreaming of the happiness that awaits him the morrow morning. Camilla, Enrica's aunt, has been fretting that the lovers have kept her so long from her bed, and her patience is well-nigh exhausted when Enrica at her call enters.

" CAMILLA.

And is Orazio gone at last?

ENRICA.

At last.

CAMILLA.

He had his supper, doubtless, ere he came,  
Or he had not so long remained with thee,  
Though to discuss your wedding. 'Twas the least  
He could have done, to leave thee to thyself  
For this one night. I should have had by this  
My first sleep o'er, if it had pleased him go  
At seasonable time. But what cares he  
How others suffer, so no injury  
Fall to his share.

ENRICA.

Nay, blame not him, dear aunt,  
The fault was none of poor Orazio's.  
'Tis my last night of freedom. The last time  
That I can play the tyrant. And I could not,  
For life of me, forego the chance of showing  
The power that still is mine. The silly youth  
Had got some jealous fancy in his head,  
About that stranger, whom I told thee of,  
That, like an evil spirit, has of late  
Hung on my steps, and tempted me with offers  
Of wealth and pleasures for myself, and—what  
He knew would weigh far more with me than these—  
Provision for the age of my dear father,  
If for his love I would but give him mine.

CAMILLA.

And thou didst treat his offers with the scorn  
They merited.

## ENRICA.

But which Orazio knew not.  
And so I threw out hints about this stranger,  
That set his fiery temper in a blaze ;  
And then took pains to feed it, 'till his rage  
Had grown a conflagration. Then I had  
My own work to undo—no easy task—  
Ere I could let him go ; for 'twould be strange  
To part in anger on our wedding eve.

## CAMILIA.

Perhaps, perhaps ; yet, after marriage, parting  
With downright hate is now a thing so common,  
That people seldom think to call it strange.  
With all thy wisdom, child, thou yet hast got  
A deal to learn. But what can keep thy father ?

## ENRICA.

The friends whose company is aye preferred  
To all the world ; the gods and goddesses  
Of the old time, who have their worshippers  
Even in our day 'mong those within whose souls  
True love is cherished of the beautiful ;  
Though to my eyes, and to my heart as well,  
The holy meekness of the Virgin Mother,  
The love that radiates the infant face  
Of Him she folds so fondly to her bosom,  
More deeply are imbued with beauty than  
Aught classic art hath sculptured. But my father  
Thinks not with me. His soul is in the past,  
And all his efforts but to reproduce it.  
And though his hand, with ready skill obeying  
The promptings of his genius, has bestowed  
Whate'er of grace or grandeur they possess,  
The forms that crowd his studio are to him  
As full of life as thou or I ; and sometimes  
I think he hath a stronger love for them  
Than me—his only child.

## CAMILIA.

I have no patience  
With what he calls devotion to his art,  
And love for things that have nor life nor reason !  
Had he but listened to a fool's advice—  
Yet one, perhaps, who knows as much as some  
Who make more boast—he might, with half the labor

He throws away upon his senseless idols,  
By any handicraft, have made more money  
Than would the sale of twenty Venuses,  
Junoes, or Dians, each a master-piece,  
Put in his purse.

ENRICA.

Art thou my father's sister?  
But thou art weary. Kiss me, and good night. (*Kisses*  
*her.*)

Now hie thee to thy bed. I've here some work,  
Will till my father comes beguile the time.

[*Exit CAMILLA.*

ENRICA, *taking her work, sits down at a table. After a short time lets it fall from her hands, and continues.*]

And so to-morrow morn I am to wed!  
To-morrow morn rise up in maiden freedom;—  
And then;—What then? Why, with a word, resign  
My sovereignty into another's hands,  
And be thenceforth whate'er that other wills—  
In every thing, perhaps, but name, a slave!  
Well, after all, 'twere not so very hard  
To be even that, when love has forged the chain  
Which to the master binds the slave. (*Starting up.*)  
My father!

*Enter PERELLI, (cautiously bolting the door behind him.)*

PERELLI, (*in a whisper.*)

Are we alone?

ENRICA.

We are.

PERELLI.

Where is thy aunt?

ENRICA.

In bed, and doubtless sleeping.

PERELLI.

That is well.

Enrica, my poor girl! I bring thee news  
Will test thy courage. What, already pale  
And trembling? How wilt thou abide the tempest  
When the first breathings of the gale affright thee?

ENRICA.

In Heaven's sweet name, dear father, speak thy news.

PERELLI.

Thou lovest this old palace? which, forsaken  
By its proud lords, has now for many years  
A kindly shelter been to such as we.

ENRICA.

I do indeed. It is the only home  
I e'er have known. The rudest hut on earth  
Is dear to him whose childhood it hath sheltered,  
For 'tis so natural to love the thing  
That one has earliest known.

PERELLI.

It is, it is.

And lov'st thou Rome?

ENRICA.

The mistress of the world!  
My heart leaps up when I but think upon  
Her wondrous past, and still more wondrous present,  
A miracle of God's protecting love  
For him who fills the place of holy Peter.  
O who that is so blessed as t' have been born  
A child of hers, would love not glorious Rome?  
Ay, glorious 'mid decay!

PERELLI.

And well as these

Thou lov'st Orazio?

ENRICA.

I'm to be his wife;  
And in a wife's affection for her husband  
Is love of home, of country—all things lost.

PERELLI.

Then, with so much to love, thou wilt less miss  
Thy father when he's gone. Listen, Enrica.  
I have done that to-night which puts my life  
In peril.

ENRICA.

Father!

PERELLI.

Cling not to me, child,  
But nerve thy heart to hear the worst at once.  
My crime is—murder! and I must—*(she faints)* O  
Heaven!



The word has murdered her. Poor, timid dove,  
How little art thou fitted for the trials  
The very love thy father bears thee has  
Exposed thee to.

ENRICA, (*reviving.*)

Come, father, let us go.

PERELLI.

Go whither, darling ?

ENRICA.

To what place thou wilt,  
So that we leave the danger at a distance  
Which threatens thee in Rome.

PERELLI.

Orazio ?

ENRICA.

Will, if he love me, come to us, when we  
Have found a certain refuge. Should he not,  
There will be none to share with thee the duty  
Of thy Enrica.

PERELLI.

True Bianca's daughter !

But no, this must not be.

ENRICA.

My dearest father,  
I pray thee do not bid me stay behind.  
I ne'er have disobeyed thee, and I would not  
At such a time oppose my wish to thine.  
But I shall die if thou dost leave me here  
Uncertain of thy fate. And shouldst thou fall  
Beneath the weight of suffering thou must bear  
Where'er thou goest, who into thy heart,  
So deeply wounded, will the healing balm  
Of comfort pour like her who hath so often  
Thy soother been in sickness and in grief ?

PERELLI.

Well, be it so ; yet much against my will  
I yield to thy entreaties.

ENRICA.

Bless, O bless thee !

PERELLI.

Then get thee ready, for in one hour's time  
Must we begin our flight.

ENRICA.

The half of that  
I do not ask for needful preparation.  
[PERELLI *withdraws into an inner room.*

ENRICA.

Orazio! poor, dear Orazio!  
Thou wilt be wroth to find thyself deserted,  
Even at the hour should see us at the altar,  
To ratify the vows, were made long since  
By two fond hearts, of love and faith to each.  
And thou wilt chide, revile, and, in thine anger,  
May'st even curse—No, no! thou wilt not curse,  
For seeming fickleness—and only seeming—  
Her who, although she saw thee wed another,  
Would couple blessings with thy name in dying.  
O no, thou wilt not curse! and some days hence,  
Or weeks, or months—they will seem years to me!  
The trusty messenger will come and say,  
'Hie thee, young lover, to the arms of her  
Who eager waits to bless thy constancy!'

*ONE passing without sings:*

Never despair! never despair!  
The darkest of nights has had ever a morrow,  
And time has a balm for the deadliest sorrow,  
Then hope from the past for the future still borrow,  
And never, O never despair!

ENRICA.

O blessings on thee, minstrel! may thy song,  
By zephyrs wafted to Orazio's ear,  
Bear to his heart its sweet philosophy,  
And teach him manly patience.

Here I stand

In idleness, when on the coming moment  
Depend the life and safety of my father.  
O shame, Enrica! love should be more prompt."

This is a favorable specimen of the author's poetry, and of his style of thought and expression. But we will cite the next scene. It will explain itself.

“ACT II.

SCENE I.

*The Coliseum, partially lighted by the moon. MALDONADO, coming out of the shadow of the ruins, leans against a broken column.*

**MALDONADO.**

They little know of solitude who bid us  
 In mountains seek it, or the pathless forest,  
 Or far off isle amid the waste of waters,  
 Where print has ne'er been left by foot of man.  
 No, the true solitude is loneliness.  
 And how can one know that where there is aught  
 To mind him of the many links which bind  
 Man to the brotherhood of man? And where,  
 Beneath the sway of nature's sovereignty,  
 Is there a spot that something does not this?  
 The ever pleasant sound of running brook;  
 The dash of the cascade, or moan of ocean;  
 The wind at play among green boughs, or shrieking  
 A hoarse defiance to the powers of earth;  
 The aimless floating of a summer cloud  
 In the deep blue of heaven; the wide-stretched wings  
 Of mighty tempest that shut out the sky;  
 The carol of a bird; an humble flower,  
 Which by the wind is planted in strange soil,  
 Will in his mind call up the recollection  
 Of scenes or objects loved in days gone by.  
 And while th' affections have vitality,  
 Or rather, while to living thing they cling,  
 The curse of loneliness he cannot know.  
 But when the green love of his heart is withered,  
 Or, living, nothing clasps in its embrace  
 That death has touched not, wander where he will,  
 He cannot fly from solitude. It is  
 Within his breast—a present desolation!  
 And whether 'mid the ruins of the past,  
 Grey with the moss of ages, or the dry  
 Hot thoroughfare, where crowds with crowds commingle,  
 The feeling that he ever is *alone*  
 Weighs down the spirit fortune could not humble,  
 When, like a bird whose heart the fowler's shaft  
 Has sudden pierced, Hope drops to earth, and dies!  
 Here (*laying his hand upon his heart*) is my solitude.  
 With mine own hand  
 Did I unchain the passions there shut up,  
 And, where a Paradise once blossomed, they  
 Have made a howling waste!

How, Maldonado!

Can sight of these hoar ruina, which so oft  
Thy boyish gambols witnessed, change thy nature,  
And set thee rhapsodizing like a poet  
Who owns the influence of the moon! Come, rouse thee  
To thought of that which brought thee hither, for  
Thou must not hence till thou hast left some token  
Of the dear love thou bear'st thy native city,  
Who, like a cruel stepdame, drove thee forth  
To crime and outlawry. But every wrong  
From her hast thou repaid a thousand-fold,  
'Till she, who trampled on and would have crushed thee,  
Now pales with fear to hear the name but whispered  
Of "MALDONADO, KING OF THE CAMPAGNA!"

OTTAVIO, (*coming feebly forward.*)

I pray thee, gentle stranger, lend thine aid  
To one whose life is nearly drained, and faints  
From loss of blood. Conduct me to the palace  
Of Count Orsini; and, if thanks or gold  
Can recompense thee for thy pains, thou'lt not  
Go unrewarded.

MALDONADO, (*aside.*)

An Orsini suing

To me for aid! Infernal Powers! I thank you!  
(*Aloud.*) Let me support thee. I've some friends at hand  
Will help me bear thee hence. (*Gives a low whistle, when*

*Enter GIACOMO and another Robber. Aside to them.*)

Timely encountered.

(*Aloud.*) This gentleman is ill;—with your assistance  
I would convey him home. (*Aside to the Robbers.*) Bestir  
yourselves.

Beyond the city get without delay;  
And with all speed then bear him to the camp.  
His ransom would repay a greater service.

[*Exit GIACOMO and Robber supporting OTTAVIO.*

*Enter GIAN-ANGELO from the opposite side.*

MALDONADO.

Thou here, Gian-Angelo!

GIAN-ANGELO.

Should I be absent  
And danger threaten thee?

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MALDONADO.

What danger, boy ?

GIAN-ANGELO.

Art not in Rome, where to be found is death.

MALDONADO.

Ay, to be *found*. But I shall not be found.  
Who in this bronzed visage could discern  
The features of the youth who, ten years since,  
For such a deed as in the rich and noble  
Were deemed a venial fault, was driven forth  
To herd with felons ? But thou understand'st not.  
Howe'er, there is no danger.

GIAN-ANGELO.

Understand not ?

They tell me that my mind is weak. It is.  
I know my reason is no match for thine.  
But, Ugo, thou art all I have to love;  
And love in such as I supplies the place  
By reason held in others. Well I know  
Thou hast been wronged. I never asked the cause;  
And will not ask;—but I, who know thy heart,  
So loving and so trusting in its nature,  
Do know they wronged thee, who did drive thee hence.  
Then let us go. If they, who wronged thee then,  
Should find thee here, they will to their first wrong  
Add yet another, and more grievous wrong—  
A wrong to thee and me, for in thy life  
Is mine bound up, and both will they destroy.

MALDONADO.

No fear of that ;—yet will I humor thee."

Ottavio is not killed after all, the villain, and the flight from Rome was unnecessary. But we will follow the fugitives.

" *An open country, with Rome in the distance. Enter PERELLI, with ENRICA in male attire.*

PERELLI.

Majestic Rome ! that on thy throne of hills,  
Discrowned though thy art, still sit'st a queen,  
To whom the proudest of the earth do homage !  
I, who have gloried in thy glories, and

Have wept for thine afflictions; who have loved  
 The meanest fragment of thy former greatness  
 More than all splendors of the world beside,  
 Leave thee self-banished! Yet, alas! not so.  
 But driven from thee by the fear that still  
 Pursues the guilty.

ENRICA.

Father, talk not thus,  
 There is no guilt without premeditation.  
 And though I grieve for that which thou hast done,  
 As thou a noble impulse didst obey,  
 In striking down the foolish youth who did,  
 By his base offer, rouse thy just resentment,  
 Thou shalt not wrong thyself to call that crime  
 Which is but thy misfortune.

Lo! the dawn,  
 With kindling eye, and cheek like youthful hero's  
 Flushed with assured hope of early triumph,  
 Comes on apace. Then let us to our speed,  
 For we have many weary miles before us  
 Ere we repose in safety. Hark! the tramp  
 Of horses' feet the morning stillness breaks.  
 We are pursued. Quick! quick! or we are taken!  
 O Blessed Mother! save us from that peril!

[*Exeunt hurriedly.*]

The wedding guests assemble at the chapel of the convent near by, but the bride is missing. Great trouble ensues. Orazio fears that she has gone off with Ottavio, —is ready to curse her, and storms and raves in good set terms. The old aunt Camilla is half distracted, the sculptor's servant, Giatto, is more distracted still that his master is nowhere to be found. A rumor spreads that Maldonado has carried off an Orsini, and has sent to the head of the family to demand five thousand scudi as his ransom, and is answered by a proclamation offering the same sum for the head of the robber chief. It is at once concluded that Maldonado has murdered Perelli and carried off his daughter. Forthwith it is resolved that the citizens shall arm and, under Orazio as their captain, go and seek the robbers in their fastness in the Abruzzi, and compel them to deliver the bride. In the mean time, Perelli and his daughter have fallen into the hands of Maldonado and his band. They are now in the robbers' cave, sad enough, as may well be supposed. Maldonado enters, and is addressed by Enrica in her male attire :

" MALDONADO, (*stopping.*)

What wouldst thou, boy ?

ENRICA.

The freedom of my father,  
A weak old man, whom thou wouldst find a burthen,  
And freedom for the child whose duty 'tis  
To tend upon his age.

MALDONADO.

What can ye give  
For ransom ?

ENRICA.

Nothing. We have but our thanks  
To offer ; and our prayers, that Heaven may not  
Be deaf to thee when thou shalt cry for mercy.

MALDONADO.

Thanks fill not coffers, boy, and ours are empty.  
And not the prayers of all the saints in Heaven  
Would move the Sovereign Ruler to forgive  
Such rebel to his grace as I have been.

[*Passing on.*]

ENRICA, (*detaining him.*)

O, if thy sinless childhood ever knew  
The blessedness of home ;—securely slept  
Beneath the sacred roof tree of a father,  
While at thy couch a mother's love kept watch ;—  
Think what is due to his gray hairs, and bid  
This reverend old man go forth in freedom,  
And let me, to repay some of the debt  
Due his past care, go with him.

MALDONADO.

I have not  
The power thou dost suppose me to possess.  
Though leader, I am not sole master here,  
And without ransom cannot set you free.  
Yet this much will I do. If thou remain,  
To serve—or rather be companion to—  
A youth of thine own age who dwells with us,  
Thy father shall depart.

PERELLI.

And leave my child ?  
That will I never !

ENRICA.

No ; together we  
Will go or stay. Whatever be our lot  
It shall not be divided.

MALDONADO.

As ye will.

*[Going ; stops, and after a pause.]*

One offer can I more. Within yon tent  
A wounded prisoner now lies, by whom  
Must our exhausted treasury be supplied.  
To Rome shall one of you with our demand  
For ransom, and if he speed well, ye both  
Shall go at large.

ENRICA, (*eagerly.*)

I'll be thy messenger ;  
For I have youth, and health, and strength of limb,  
All which my father lacks, promptly to do  
Thy bidding, and a tongue with eloquence  
To plead the cause of yon poor prisoner,  
Because in that I plead my father's too,  
And turn even selfishness to charity.  
Instruct me what to do, and let me hence.

MALDONADO.

This readiness to serve me hath a show  
Of filial love for this old man, that doth  
Persuade me strongly of thine honesty.  
But shouldst thou in thine errand fail, what then ?

ENRICA.

I will return to share my father's fate.

MALDONADO.

What, though that fate were slavery for life ?

ENRICA.

Ay, even that dreadful fate ! for then would he  
More need my aid than were he free, because  
The chains too heavy for his aged limbs  
Would my young strength sustain.

MALDONADO.

A noble lad !  
But when in Rome, surrounded by thy friends,  
With freedom there, and chance of happiness,



And slavery here, with certain misery,  
 For years, perhaps for life—and thou art young,  
 With the warm blood of youth, and youth's high hopes—  
 Couldst thou renounce home, kindred, hope, and come  
 Back to a living grave for one man's sake?

ENRICA.

That man's my father, sir.

MALDONADO.

I like thy answer,  
 And think thou may'st be trusted.

PERELLI, (*earnestly.*)

That she may.

MALDONADO.

*She may? she may? What masking have we here?*

[*Seizes ENRICA, who submits calmly to his scrutiny.*

Or youth or maid, thou hast no woman's spirit.  
 Yet this is no boy's face. Girl, hast thou dared  
 To trifle with me?

ENRICA, (*freeing herself.*)

It is not my fault,  
 If my poor face less manly is than thine,  
 For it hath known few years and fewer sorrows.  
 But though my face be woman's, in my heart  
 Is nothing of the weakness which the world—  
 With justice or without—ascribes to her.  
 O then, brave sir, I pray thee doubt me not;  
 But let me have thy message, and be gone.

[*Without appearing to hear her, MALDONADO walks apart,  
 communing with himself.*]

PERELLI.

O my accursed tongue! All, all is lost!

ENRICA.

Seem not to fear;—we may avert suspicion.

[*She affects a show of cheerfulness, and leading PERELLI  
 aside, appears to converse with him unconcernedly.*]

MALDONADO, (*coming forward.*)

It must be so. Her sex speaks in her face  
 Not less than in her voice. And what a face!

Such might have been the face of Brutus' Portia,  
 Or mother of the Gracchi when a maid.  
 No daughter she of our degenerate day,  
 But one of ancient Rome's, the type of all  
 Most lovely and most lovable in woman ;—  
 In whom were faultlessness of form and feature,  
 Commanding dignity and sweet reserve,  
 Undoubting trust with noble self-reliance,  
 Together blent to form one perfect whole.  
 Of such a mother might a race be born  
 To win us back the glories of the past,  
 And from the land, which now they hold in thrall,  
 Sweep the besotted tyrants, who have wrung  
 From human hearts the wine that makes them drunk !  
 Gods of the olden time ! how my heart swells  
 With fierce anticipation of the hour  
 When son of mine shall set his foot upon  
 The necks of these oppressors ;—raise from earth  
 A long down-trodden people, and erase  
 By patriot deeds the blot a father's crimes  
 Shall leave upon the name of MALDONADO.  
 Come hither both. (*They advance.*)

I've thought it not quite safe  
 To send this youth alone to yonder city,  
 Where innocence is every hour exposed  
 To snares the wary cannot always shun.  
 Nor can I send for his protection any  
 Of my rude followers,—the citizens,  
 I fear me much, so well they love my people,  
 Would scarce consent they should return to us.

ENRICA.

Thou mock'st us, sir.

MALDONADO.

In faith, I mock you not,  
 For thou art one that I, at any risk,  
 Would save from peril. But to this old man,  
 For whom there is less danger, I'll intrust  
 The message which at first I meant for thee.

ENRICA.

O not to him ! A terrible mishap  
 Has forced him fly the city, where even now  
 Unpitying Revenge, whose tongue is hot  
 With rage, is seeking him, that he may slake  
 His thirst in blood.

MALDONADO.

What was his crime ?

ENRICA.

No crime.

He did—perhaps too readily—resent  
 An insult to his honor, and struck down  
 A foolish youth of an illustrious house.  
 And, well thou know'st, no mercy would be shown  
 To one judged guilty of a noble's death.

MALDONADO.

Do I not know it ? Wherefore am I here,  
 Consorting with the outcasts of my kind ?  
 An Ishmael 'gainst whom are all men's hands,  
 As now this hand is against every man ?  
 Feared, hated, banned !—a miserable robber ?  
 Why, that in reckless youth, in heat of blood,  
 Set boiling by a gibe at my condition—  
 An honest *poor* man's son—by a proud noble,  
 A silken, soft patrician, who had come  
 Between me and the maid whose troth I held,  
 And bade me stand aside while he should pour  
 The poison of his words into her ear,  
 Did I become a homicide ;—the blow  
 I struck at random reached the villain's heart ;  
 And knowing well what justice would be dealt  
 To one of my estate, I fled the city,  
 To be the scourge of yonder bloated tyrants.

ENRICA.

Then must thou see my father cannot go  
 To Rome in safety. O do not refuse  
 To let me be the bearer of thy message,  
 For sake of this poor prisoner. Why pause ?  
 I know thou think'st me not what I appear,  
 And thou art right.

PERELLI, (*aside to her.*)

Art mad ?

ENRICA.

Not mad, dear father.

I do but throw away a useless mask  
 To show an honest face. (*To MALDONADO.*) But not  
 my sex  
 Shall e'er by me be pleaded to excuse

A fault in duty or a broken pledge,  
And, on the honor of a Roman maiden,  
Howe'er I speed, I will return to share  
The fortunes of my father.

PERELLI.

Yet her word  
Has ne'er been falsified, and will not now.  
Then prithee let her go.

MALDONADO.

It cannot be.  
If thou wilt bear my message, well ; if not,  
Stay here in safety ;—some one else will go  
Upon mine errand. But I cannot part,  
And will not, with this maiden. Giacomo !  
The throne of the Campagna, where alone,  
For ten long years, have I—a mateless eagle,  
Upon the topmost bough of blasted tree—  
Set in unsocial power, may well afford  
Room for another, and no one more fit  
To fill the place an empress need not scorn  
Than this fair Roman. Giacomo !

GIACOMO, (*entering.*)

My chief !

MALDONADO.

Go send thy wife into my grot, and bid her,  
From out the costliest robes she there will find,  
Choose those best fitted for a queen.

[*Exit GIACOMO.*]

(*To ENRICA.*) Thy hand.

ENRICA.

What dost thou mean ?

MALDONADO.

To lead thee to the throne  
Where thou art hence to share my sovereignty.

ENRICA.

Do not presume upon the power that Heaven  
Permits thee o'er my liberty to hold.  
Nor o'er my liberty alone, but life,  
For both are in thy hands. But as with one,  
So can I with the other freely part

At honor's bidding. Sir, I am not free  
To choose the man whom I would own for lord,  
For I've already chosen; and this hand  
No more is mine to give, or to withhold,  
Than if the church had blessed my union with  
My heart's sole master. Thine I cannot be.  
Then let me go upon this errand, and  
So earn my father's freedom and my own.

MALDONADO.

I have decided. Thou remainest here,  
To be my queen—the sharer of my power,  
Or else my—slave.

ENRICA.

Thy slave then, if I must,  
For not in servitude, or forced or free,  
Can there be degradation. But to share  
The power which thou by violence hast won,  
I cannot and I will not. Do not glare  
Thus fiercely on me. I would not offend;  
But neither will I bow my head in silence,  
And yield me to a wrong I can avert.

PERELLI.

I'll do the bidding of this man, my child.  
I will to Rome; and should I ne'er return  
To claim thy freedom, thou hast still one friend  
Who will not rest and thee in bondage. Sir,  
Prepare thy missive with what speed thou may'st,  
And let me hence.

[MALDONADO withdraws.]

ENRICA.

O jeopard not thy life  
For me, my father. I've no fear of aught  
That man can do if Heaven be on my side.  
And though my guardian angel for a time,  
To prove my strength, his radiant face may hide,  
He will not in this strait abandon me.

PERELLI.

The purpose of this man speaks in his eyes;  
And more—far more—than life is now in danger.  
Thy purity, which not the breath of slander yet  
Has ever touched, will he tread in the mire,  
Till thou become as vile a thing as he.

O I would risk all blessings this side Heaven  
To save thee from the dark, the dreadful fate  
That threats thee here. Yes, I'll to Rome, and there,  
To guard against mishap, first seek Orazio,  
And let him know thy peril. Should I fail—

ENRICA.

Dear father !

PERELLI.

Nay, my child, fear not that I  
Will seek out danger. But should danger come, .  
There will be one on whom thou may'st rely  
For present help, and future guardianship;  
And who, when I am gone—

ENRICA.

O talk not thus !  
Such words will make a coward of me when  
I should be bravest.

MALDONADO, (*returning.*)

To the Count Orsini  
This letter bear. His son Ottavio  
Is prisoner here ; and for his ransom this  
Demands five thousand scudi. Why dost stare ?

PERELLI.

The Count Orsini !

MALDONADO.

Thou hast doubtless heard  
That name ere now ?

PERELLI.

Alas for me ! I have.  
And he of all men living is the last  
Whom I would choose to meet. One of his house  
Was the unhappy youth my madness slew.

MALDONADO.

O, then, to thee it is I am indebted  
For the good chance that makes mine enemy  
An instrument the coffers to replenish  
Of our poor band ! for he thou deemest slain  
The prisoner is who lies in yonder tent.

PERELLI.

Can this be true ?

ENRICA.

O Heaven ! most heartily  
 I thank thee, that the stain of blood rests not  
 Upon my father's hands ! All evils now,  
 Since thy dear life is sacred from the laws,  
 I cheerfully can meet. Go then to Rome ;  
 And in thine absence do not fear that harm  
 Shall fall on me. And tell Orazio,  
 Though we should never meet again on earth,  
 When meet we do, I shall not be less his  
 Than when we parted. Now good angels speed thee.

PERELLI, (*embracing her.*)

And guard from every ill mine only treasure !

[*Exit.*

[ENRICA remains looking after PERELLI, while MALDONADO  
 stands gazing earnestly upon her.]

Perelli departs, and falls in with the band of armed citizens, with Orazio at their head. Enrica remains in the power of Maldonado, and bravely resists his suit, and in the nick of time gains a respite through the intervention of Gian-Angelo ; and, before the robber can renew it, Orazio, and the citizens, guided by a traitor in the robber band, fall upon the robbers in their concealment. Orazio and Maldonado fight ; Maldonado's sword is broken, and being overcome, Orazio is about to despatch him, when Gian-Angelo rushes between them, and receives Orazio's sword in his breast, and saves his brother from instant death. Gian-Angelo dies ; Maldonado is made prisoner, repents, and is led off ; Orazio recovers his bride, and the curtain drops. The copious extracts we have made, and the analysis of the plot we have given, will enable our readers to judge for themselves of the merits of the *Sculptor's Daughter*, either as an acting play or as a dramatic poem. It is in our judgment too hurried in the last act, and the characters are not sufficiently well marked. We should also object to the sympathy the author enlists with the robber chief,—a man covered with crimes, which are represented as nearly overbalanced by a few generous feelings, and not ignoble sentiments retained.

*Dolores*, the second drama in the volume, is a work of more power than the *Sculptor's Daughter*, but less finished, and besides is objectionable in its slurs on the Inquisition. The author was not required to obtrude his religion, but he was required not to contradict it, and to avoid favoring the Protestant cant against it. If he really intended to represent the Devil, under the character of The Stranger, in his play, he should have, either first or last, more distinctly marked his meaning. There is too great an accumulation of murders, crimes, and horrors for one play, indeed enough for a dozen.

"Better Late than Never," an attempt at a comedy, is not very successful. It wants the genuine comic spirit, and its political satire is too broad. It is a cross between comedy and broad farce, and satisfies neither one's love of fun nor one's love of virtue. There are, however, a few good touches in *Mrs. Allsides*. *Allsides* is a merchant, somewhat involved, a vain, foolish, unprincipled, and consummate rascal, except that he has not ability enough to carry out his roguery. He has just pledged himself to three different and opposing parties, and fancies that he is sure of his election to Congress.

"ALLSIDES, (*alone*.)

O this is rapturous! my fondest dream  
Shall now be realized! By means of these  
Shall I at once ascend the glittering height—  
Which thousands have in vain essayed to reach—  
Where sits enthroned the goddess of my worship—  
Immortal Fame! Who'd not be prodigal  
Of promises, which are but breath—no more—  
When they can purchase all that heart requires  
To make it blest.

*Enter Mrs. ALLSIDES.*

Ah, now for the old story.  
A dress is wanted, or a shawl, or bonnet,  
Of the last style, and I, of course, must pay for't.  
You here, my dear?

MRS. ALLSIDES.

I hope you see I am.

ALLSIDES.

And if I did not, I should doubtless hear it.



MRS. ALLSIDES.

Did you mean that for wit? Of course you did.  
It is the name that men are wont to give  
To all ill-natured sayings. But, my dear,  
Things of that kind are thrown away on me.  
I am wit-proof. But to my errand. I,  
To please the girls, have sent out half a thousand,  
Or so, of invitations, for a party  
I give to-night; and on your way to 'Change,  
I wish you would a moment stop at Downing's,  
And say, besides the things already ordered,  
He must send up what I have here set down.

[Gives a paper.]

'Tis the first *Soirée* of the season, and,  
If cost can make it such, shall be the finest.

ALLSIDES.

Cost, madam? cost? Who is to meet this cost?

MRS. ALLSIDES.

You, to be sure.

ALLSIDES.

But how? I ask you, how?

MRS. ALLSIDES.

By money, certainly.

ALLSIDES.

O yes, by money.  
But have you thought where that is to be got?

MRS. ALLSIDES.

In Wall street, is it not? At least I've heard so.

ALLSIDES.

I'm not disposed to say unpleasant things,  
But hang me, madam, if I ever knew  
One of your sense speak quite so like a fool.

MRS. ALLSIDES.

Now don't be rude, my dear good man. 'Tis vulgar;  
And quite unsuited to your style of features;  
And, more than that, with me it counts for nothing.  
But do as I desire, and you to-night  
Shall hear your taste commended in the choice  
You made of wife."

The last Drama in the volume is *The Oath of Office*, founded on a real incident, we believe, in the history of Galway. Walter, son of James Lynch Fitzstephen, mayor of the city, in a fit of jealousy, murders Gomez, a noble Spaniard, a guest in the house of his father, and his own dearest friend, whom he loves as a brother. His father is the judge and sentences him to death, and in spite of all entreaties insists upon the sentence being executed, and, finding no one who will execute it, he himself executes it with his own hand, rather than his oath of office to execute the laws should be broken. The struggle between parental affection and the stern sense of official duty is wrought up with a truly tragic interest. The Drama exhibits at times a most terrific power. But it is, we should think, too horrible for representation on the stage. It lacks relief, and revolts rather than pleases even the reader. We should like to copy the last scene, but we have not the space.

The author enlists indeed our sympathy with the unhappy father, but he does not secure our respect for him, and the reader condemns him for his slavery to what is made to appear as a punctilio, rather than venerate him for his stern integrity and high sense of justice. He has, we suspect, wished to enter his protest against capital punishment, a protest in which we do not share. In these dramas and in all the works we have read of the author we miss the stern moralist. The author often exhibits deep religious sensibility, but in his moral lessons he is very often not only defective but wrong. He writes as a man who has earnest Catholic faith combined with the moral notions of philanthropists, sentimentalists, and Transcendentalists. His tone is too Catholic for non-Catholics, and not Catholic enough for Catholics, and in this fact, we suspect, lies the secret of his not having met with that brilliant success to which he aspires. He has studied not enough the moral principles and sentiments that belong to his religion, yet we think no one can read the extracts we have liberally made, without feeling that the author has many of the elements of the true poet in his composition.

ART. V.—*Souvenirs of Travel*. By MADAME OCTAVIA WALTON LE VERT. New York: Goetzel & Co. 1857. 2 vols. 12mo.

IN these volumes Madame Le Vert gives us her recollections of two voyages to Europe and of her travels in Cuba, England, France, Spain, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Switzerland. She does not deviate much from the beaten track of fashionable tourists, and seldom describes any but familiar and often described objects; yet she has contrived to give us two very charming volumes, which interest the reader deeply in the amiable and accomplished author, if not in the incidents related and scenes and objects described. Madame Le Vert is the granddaughter of one of the signers of the Declaration of Independence from Georgia, and perhaps is more widely known in society than any other American lady. She was born in Georgia, appears to have been brought up in Pensacola, and is the wife of Dr. Le Vert, of Mobile, where she resides. She is a lady of varied accomplishments, and highly esteemed and loved wherever known. She seems to have set out on her travels with the determination to enjoy herself, to look upon the bright side of every thing, and to be pleased with every land and with everybody. She evidently opened her heart to all friendly and gentle influences, and seems to have found warm and devoted friends wherever she went. Both tours, bating a little sea-sickness, against which she bore up resolutely, appear to have been marked by uninterrupted pleasure and enjoyment. She seems to have experienced scarcely an annoyance, scarcely a vexation, and scarcely any fatigue. The only drawback upon her enjoyment was her absence from her "darling mamma." Her enjoyment exceeded all our powers of imagination, and we are puzzled to understand how one small body could survive the amount of pleasurable emotions she describes in her volumes. We are sure our own "stalwart" frame would have broken down under them, and we should have gone off in a euthanasy. So much love, so much friendship, so much tenderness, so much pleasure, so much ecstasy of all sorts and kinds, was never, we are sure, crowded before into two volumes, or endured by one frail, delicate female body. We are amazed that she could live through it, or that the monotony of pleasure did not become painful.

Seriously Madame Le Vert has been a little too demonstrative in her volumes, and we should have been better pleased if she had sobered down a little their tone, which was all very well in writing to her near and dear friends, and restrained a little the expression of her feelings of the moment, when it came to the matter of publication. There are feelings which are too sacred to be paraded before the public, and he or she who loves or praises every one without discrimination renders his or her love or praise a little too cheap to be highly prized. It is pleasant, we grant, to meet a pure, warm, gushing heart, that speaks out from its fulness and lovingness every thought and emotion as it rises, but not to the cold and profane public. Much of the pure rich feeling displayed in these volumes should have been kept sacred for the author's husband, children, and most intimate friends, for the world is so ill-natured as to believe that one who expresses so much to strangers reserves little to be expressed in the narrower but dearer circle of home. Her volumes are principally made up of Letters which the lady wrote at the time to her friends at home, and regarded as Letters so addressed, or as a private journal in which she recorded her impressions at the moment they occurred, they are admirable, but there was a sort of profanation in publishing them to strangers, and though they have given us a great amount of pleasure, we can hardly forgive the friends who persuaded her to print them.

The volumes are, no doubt, what they profess to be, *Souvenirs of Travel*, and consist of hasty and often felicitous sketches of what the accomplished, intellectual, and imaginative author saw and felt. They are the *souvenirs* of a graceful, highly cultivated, sprightly, loving woman, determined to see all she could of men and things, and to impart and receive all the pleasure possible. She makes us her friends, wins our heart, fascinates us, and in spite of sympathies we do not share, of opinions we dislike, and errors of all kinds, historical, chronological, ethnological, topographical, and typographical, she carries us with her through her journeys, her interminable sight-seeings, everlasting visits to picture galleries, till we close her volumes with the sad feeling that there is one pleasure the less for us in this world. We do not understand nor investigate the secret

of her fascination, we only know we feel it and cannot escape from it. We lay aside thought, care, judgment, reflection, and give ourselves up to a real holiday enjoyment. We are obliged to enjoy volumes so fresh, so genuine, so artless, so running over with kindness and affection, although they tell us little we did not know, or give us of country, person, or event, scarcely a more lively impression than we had before.

A great portion of these volumes are taken up with mere catalogues of artists and works of art, which might have been copied from a Hand Book of Travels. If the amiable writer saw all the works of art she names, she could only have glanced at them. It would require a long lifetime to have studied a tithe of those she names sufficiently to be able to pass a judgment on their merits. No genuine work of art tells you at once all its merits, and any one must be studied long and sympathetically before it can be truly appreciated. The lady has, no doubt, a real fondness for art, but her remarks can have little real value to those who have never seen the works on which she comments. Indeed, we do not quite share her enthusiasm for art, or, as to that matter, her enthusiasm for natural scenery either. We love art, and we love nature, and can feel their beauty, their grandeur, their sublimity, but we cannot very well become ecstatic over them. There has been latterly a great deal said of art and artists which we regard as a sort of cant. Art is not religion or worship, and artists are not much diviner than other men. If artists have done much to refine and ennoble, they have also done much to corrupt and debase human nature. The glory of Italy is not in her art, but that her art has been inspired by religion, and consecrated to its commemoration and service. As far as human genius goes we find the frescoes and bas-reliefs of disinterred Pompeii admirable, but they indicate a people sunk in sensuality, and are such as could serve only to sink them deeper in corruption. Art is worthy of praise, is desirable indeed, not simply as art, but only as it is devoted to high religious and moral purposes. We have had amongst us, perhaps we have yet, a school that confounds art with religion, and the inspiration of the artist with that of the seer or the prophet. It idolizes the productions of human genius, and tends to an idolatry of a lower grade than that of ancient Greece or Rome. Artists

even artists of a very high rank, are not always holy men, and personally, even when employed on religious subjects, work for fame rather than for God. Certainly we would not speak slightly of art, certainly we would not disparage its civilizing services, but we do not wish it to be confounded with religion, or made an idolatry. We would remember that, after all, it is human, and should be consecrated to God, as we consecrate to him or to his service what we have that is best and most precious.

But it was not of art we intended to speak ; we only wish Madame LeVert had been more deeply impressed with the fact she observed in all Catholic countries in which she travelled, that what is most precious in art, and most rare and costly in gems and precious stones, is devoted to the churches and the service of religion, proving that with the people in these countries religion has been, if not now, the great purpose of life, and that they have held that what is consecrated to God is safe, and applied to its best possible use. No expense lavished upon churches, or the pomp and splendor of worship, can be too great. Capital so invested is far safer, and will yield a richer return than capital invested in railroad stocks, Atlantic telegraphs or Western lands. When we read Madame Le Vert's glowing descriptions of the churches and their jewels, and precious relics, which even the barbarism of modern times has spared, we cannot help feeling how much wiser, how much more reasonable and just in their ends and aims were our old Catholic ancestors than we, the worshippers of a cold, material utilitarianism. They had noble conceptions, lofty spiritual aims, and lived for an end worthy of man, for they lived for their Maker.

*My copy  
of Vert's Souvenirs*

We do not know what Madame Le Vert's religion is, or whether she has any or not ; but this we must say in her honor, that she never speaks disrespectfully of any one's religion, and speaks of Catholics and Catholic things always with respect, and not unfrequently with sympathy. She cannot be a Catholic, otherwise she would not speak of the *Romish* Church, and commend, as she does, in one instance, suicide, when she speaks of a young lady who killed herself, and "put an end at once to her existence and her misery." She goes to Mass, it is true, is deeply impressed with the deep tones of the organ, and the sub-

limity of Catholic worship ; but she goes also to the Anglican meeting, and is delighted with the sermon. She seems in fact disposed to accept all religions, and even retains a lingering fondness for the old religion of pagan Greece and Rome. As far as we can judge from her book, it is the poetry, the æsthetic beauty of religion that captivates her ; and any religion poetic and beautiful charms her. We should judge her to have more credulity than faith, and more romance than piety. Yet we are grateful to her for not following the example of most Protestant travellers in Catholic countries, and bearing honorable testimony to the moral and religious worth of the Catholic population, in treating their religion with respect, in speaking reverently and affectionately of their clergy, and in neither seeking nor inventing scandals against them. This in these days is much, and we are happy to record it.

Madame LeVert evidently has a romantic turn of mind, and makes the most of every romantic incident that falls in her way. She has a ready sympathy with all lovers, whether they love wisely and well or not. Where she finds true lovers she espouses their cause, whether their love was virtuous or criminal. This is the worst feature of her book, and almost the only thing in it to censure under a moral point of view. The chaste matron, travelling with her husband and daughter, and writing to her "darling mamma," should have distinguished between lawful and unlawful love, and not shown too ready a sympathy with the latter, whenever it chanced to have a spice of romance in it. Love, in its true sense, is a rational affection, and amenable to the laws of morals ; love, as a passion, is no more respectable than anger, revenge, or any other passion of human nature, and is perhaps the source of more crime, more evil, more misery to the individual and to society than any other that can be named ; and no one who honors her sex should ever chant its praises or consent to its apotheosis. On the part of Madame Le Vert, it is idle romance, or sheer thoughtlessness. We know,—no man knows better than we,—the attractiveness of this kind of romance, but age and experience have taught us its dangers, and we set our face sternly against it.

Madame Le Vert's own sunshiny nature,—the warmth of her affections, and the glowing enthusiasm of her imagi-

nation, have almost won our love for England and the English. She is unbounded in her admiration of Queen Victoria, who is, we dare say, a very good wife and mother; she is enraptured with the noble families she visited, and from whom she received a cordial welcome. We have no doubt, the English nobility are very agreeable people, well bred, and therefore simple and natural in their manners; but we know not why an American lady should be ecstatic in her admiration of them. They are the first class of their own country, but persons of the first class of one country are of equal rank with the first class of another, and entitled to associate with them on equal terms. The titles of the English nobility are for their own country, not for ours; they place them on a par with the American gentleman or the American lady, but give them with us no superiority. To suppose otherwise, is to retain the spirit of provincials, and to forget that we are an independent nation, standing on an equal footing in social point of view with Great Britain, and socially our first class are the peers of her first class, although hers bear titles and ours do not. The American *Mister* is the equal of the English *My Lord*, providing it covers equal breeding and accomplishments, which it often does. We like the specimens we have seen of the English nobility; indeed, we like, wherever we meet him, the well-bred Englishman, as we do the well-bred gentleman of any country. We have a natural sympathy with the English, for the basis of our own American character is English; but we regard the title, only as it marks the Englishman's rank in his own country. We neither envy it nor condemn it; we do not care for it; we see the man under it, if there be a man under it, neither enlarged nor lessened by bearing it. We sympathize neither with the English radical, who would abolish all titles of nobility, nor with the American snob or flunky, who bows to them, worships them, and is dying to have them recognized by his own country, and bestowed on him and his. We see no disparity of rank between Mrs. Le Vert and the Duchess of Sutherland, or why there should be any more condescension on the part of the English lady in extending hospitality to the American, than on the part of the American lady in extending hospitality to the English lady; or why a mutual exchange of civilities and kind attentions between them should be regarded as a



matter to be recorded and printed and published to the world. Is it any thing remarkable, that an American lady, moving in the first circles in her own country, should move and find herself at home in the first circles of other countries, which she chooses to visit ?

Madame Le Vert is in London, in her hotel, looking out of the windows to the street, where she sees what she had never seen in her own country.

"In front of me, at the crossing of the street, stands an old woman, with snow white hair; in her hands she has an ancient-looking broom, with which she 'sweeps the crossing,' and puts forth her hand for charity. No one gives her any—yes! one person has dropped a copper in her hand. There seems a spell about some objects; for, though my eyes are enchanted by the gay and gorgeous scene, they irresistibly wander back to the old woman. It is another revelation of London life. Wealth and luxury dash proudly by, while poverty holds out its hands for the charity which does not come. A sad, sad feeling stole over me, and involuntarily I exclaimed, 'Thank God, I have never seen this in my own country!'"

Surely the excellent lady could never have lived in New York, where the thing which struck her fancy so powerfully, may be seen almost any day in the year, or hour of the day. It is not necessary to cross the Atlantic to find the contrasts of wealth and poverty, or to see "wealth and luxury roll by, and poverty hold out its hands for the charity which does not come." It is impossible that the contrasts should anywhere be greater than in our large commercial and trading cities. We have known not a few instances of death from actual starvation. Madame Le Vert may have known nothing of the sort; for she probably has never visited much among the poor people of her own country, and she belongs to the South, where the system of slave labor obtains, and the poor whites are not recognized. America has noble institutions, noble traits, and in many things may claim superiority over the nations of the Old World; but it is a blind patriotism that asserts that, save in politics, the inequalities of the European nations do not obtain here, or that we have with us no beggars, no poverty, no squalid wretchedness. There is frightful poverty with us, and no little of that most frightful of all poverty, the poverty that seeks to conceal itself, and put on the appearance of competence. No country in the world, considering our advantages, has more of it, and we

believe there is no country in the world, unless it be Great Britain, where it is so great a misfortune to be poor as in these United States. Poverty is looked upon here as a disgrace, and treated as a crime. Every year, too, matters are growing worse with us, and the silly boasts over other nations, that we are too ready to make, should be very materially moderated. Considering the new world we have at our disposal, the rich virgin soil inviting our cultivation, the high and advanced civilization our first colonists brought with them, and the free scope we have for our intelligence, our virtue, and our energy, it is doubtful whether we have the right to hold up our head in presence of a single European nation. We have done and are doing, not the best, but the worst in our power. It is nonsense to boast of the success of our experiment of freedom; and, if it has not proved an absolute failure, we owe it to the conservative institution of slavery, an institution that contradicts every principle of freedom the American people glory in asserting. We believe the experiment will succeed; we have hope in the future of our country; but as yet the experiment has not succeeded, and as a people we are below what we were in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in substantial freedom, in loyalty of principle, in stern integrity, in manly energy. We have undergone a fearful moral deterioration; we are even deteriorating physically, and there are practices rife amongst us, which if not soon checked, will tell fearfully on the *physique* as well as the *morale* of the future generations. That is not true patriotism that shuts the eyes to these facts, and goes on boasting of our prosperity. True patriotism looks the evil full in the face, owns it, and exerts itself to find a remedy, and a remedy that will reach the children of the immigrants as well as of the older inhabitants of the country.

The portions of Madame Le Vert's volumes which have interested us the most, are those devoted to Cuba and Spain. She is a Liberal and sympathizes with Kossuth, and the Liberal party throughout Europe. She cannot hate, but she comes as near hating Austria and the King of the Two Sicilies as is in her nature. She is a strong American and a strong republican. Moreover, she lives in Mobile, where the desire to annex Cuba to the Union is stronger than in any other city we have visited, yet this is the way she speaks of the Cubans:

"After leaving the Plaza de Toros, we drove around the paseos which were exceedingly thronged. In every volante the prettiest and youngest woman sits slightly in front of the other two, and is always called *la nina bonita*, (the beautiful child.) The Captain-General and his Guard were out amid the crowd. He rides in regal style. Oh! lovely was the view of hundreds of volantes filled with gracefully-dressed girls, smiling and waving their fans as they passed along. They certainly seem a most happy and contented people, and really appear to feel compassion for those whose lot is cast far from Cuba. What a pity it would be to make them Americans! Soon then would they learn to strive—to drive—to struggle—to labor to be rich. To them the delicious climate would have no charms, unless 'they had wealth at command.' It was pleasant to look upon the contentment visible in every face. Agreeable thoughts filled the mind, as when one gazes upon a charming picture; and it was absolutely refreshing to the spirit, to see no more the stir, the rush, the effort of Anglo-Saxon life. An enjoyable quietude pervades the earth and air, and all objects present a novel aspect.

"Beautiful Cuba! Beautiful Cuba! It is not strange to me now that the followers of Columbus knelt upon the ground where first they landed, and thanked the good God for the gift of such a glorious country."

No pen could write a severer satire on our countrymen, on American energy, American life, yet nothing more true. American energy, American enterprise, if rightly directed, would be a glorious thing, but as it is, it is sad and saddening. For what is all our hurry and bustle? For what do we toil early and late, giving ourselves rarely a single holiday? For what do we traverse sea and land, forego all the sweets of society, all the pleasures of life, reckless of man's law and of God's law, the rights of nations or the rights of individuals? To amass wealth, which we never enjoy, which slips from our grasp in our old age, or which at best we can only leave for our children to squander. Never was Thrift so unthrifty as the American, never did so little good come of such immense labors as we perform. Yet we would annex all nations to us; yet we hold ourselves up as the model for all nations to copy. Let Cuba be annexed, and Cuban life is gone, and the American life of toil, drudgery, gloom, and speculation takes its place.

Here is a paragraph or two on old Spain, which we commend to the traducers of the noble Spanish people:

"During our sojourn in Madrid, we made the acquaintance of many of the members of Las Cortes. We found them charming in

conversation, intellectual, and exceedingly well informed. They gave us much information concerning Spain, and freely discussed her present position. Many of the people are eager for a republic, and all are anxious for some improvement in the government. The Cortes is now occupied with a new Constitution, which they are striving to make acceptable to all parties.

"The eloquent eulogist of our country we soon discovered was the Marquis de Alviarda, leader of the 'Progresistas,' the party who are strong advocates for progress. He is a man of noble talent and chivalric impulses—enthusiastic in debate and feared by his enemies. Only a few years ago all his possessions were confiscated, but have since been restored to him. He seemed just the man to be the idol of the people, warm, frank, and sympathetic. It was really a delight to listen to his impassioned words, when he spoke of his country, of its past grandeur, and its present agitated and reckless existence.

"It is nearly thirty years since the civil war began, soon after the death of Ferdinand the Seventh, and during that long period fearful and frightful has been the desolation of homes and hearts. Kindred blood shed by kindred hands has deluged the land. Parties and fierce factions have risen up, each contending for power while the wretched country was tossed from one to the other as though it were a football. Yet with all this demoralizing strife, and its attendant evils of poverty, rapine, and murder, the loyalty and chivalry of the Spanish character have never been extinguished. It still possesses the noble bearing, the love of independence, and generous ardor of those ancient days, when Spain was first among the nations of Europe; and though dimmed by its surroundings of discord and internal warfare, its elements of greatness and true dignity still live in many and many a heart. Spain is really a wonderful country; for none other could have so long sustained itself under such trials and difficulties. Often is my admiration called forth by the firm faith with which its people look forward to the future, always picturing it as bright and prosperous, and saying, 'After the storm comes the sunshine;' and though constantly disappointed, they are ever hopeful. Never has any country been more calumniated by the false impressions which have gone abroad of its inhabitants. Before we came to Spain, persons were frequently warning us of the rough and terrible roads; of the dangers of the mountain-passes, where wild and fearless banditti held supreme control; of the miserable inns and lawless peasants. All of these stories have proved utterly false, and absolutely a myth. The roads are good, the inns excellent, the mountain-passes well protected by the Guardia Civil, and the people most instinctively polite and cordial to strangers. Spain is the land of romance and of beautiful legends. Then it is truly rich in the memories of the past. In all our wanderings we have never heard an uncivil word or seen a

rude action. Amid all classes of persons, from the nobility to the poor peasant, we have received the kindest and most genial attentions."

This is simple justice, and we are glad to find Madame Le Vert has the courage to write and publish it in the face of our Anglo-Saxon world. England finds it for her interest to calumniate Spain, which she has done her best to ruin, and which shows a vitality and love of independence that annoy her. The mass of our American writers are but the feeble echoes of their English masters, and rarely dare have on any subject an opinion of their own. Our sycophancy in literature and opinion to England is disgusting, and proves that we have not yet thrown off from our souls the badge of colonial dependence. English and American scribblers have grossly misrepresented and calumniated Spain, the Spanish Queen and Court, the Spanish grandees and nobles, and the Spanish people. The Spaniards are the most noble, chivalric, hospitable, and courteous people in Europe, where, except, perhaps, in Ireland, the stranger is sure of the most hearty welcome, and to be made to feel himself the most at home. In spite of English materialism, in spite of French philosophy and infidelity, the Spanish people are substantially a Catholic people, with the pure and gentle manners, the courteous bearing, and the warm hearts the Catholic religion is so well adapted to foster. Thirty years of revolution and civil war have not yet destroyed the Spanish nature or Spanish manners, and the nation has in itself a recuperative energy to be found in no other people. Not all the O'Donnells and Esparteros, backed by all the power of England and English creditors, will prove able to prevent her from recovering from her present fallen state, and holding her proper rank among the nations of Europe.

Madame Le Vert spent much time in Rome and Italy. While in Rome she was permitted to visit the Pope, Pius the Ninth, now gloriously reigning. We copy the account of her visit in her own words in a letter addressed to her mother :

"ROME, ITALY, *April 19th, 1855.*

"I cannot sleep to-night, precious Mamma, until I have written and told you the delight we experienced in being presented to the Pope of Rome, and of the affectionate and captivating kindness with which he received us. A cordial letter from our excellent Bishop

Portier introduced us to Monsignore Barnabo, to whom we are indebted for the favor of this private audience.

"Yesterday morning a charming note came from Count Borromeo, informing me that his Holiness would gladly receive a visit from us at four o'clock this afternoon. Hence at that hour we drove to the Vatican (the winter residence of the Pope), attired, according to the etiquette of the court, in deep black, with long black veils thrown over our heads. Passing a group of Swiss Guards at the foot of the marble stairway, we were conducted by an officer along corridors, and through great apartments, to the ante-chamber. The walls of this room were glowing with the radiant pictures of Raphael, of Murillo, Titian, and Guido. As we stood admiring these masterpieces of painting, Monsignore Talbot (an English Bishop) joined us, and we then proceeded to the reception room, which was a long saloon with exquisitely frescoed ceiling, but no adornment of furniture.

"Near a table, at one end of the room, his Holiness was seated. He arose when we entered. Monsignore Talbot presented us and immediately retired. As we approached him, he held out his hands, and in a sweet voice said, 'Welcome to Rome, my friends.' I knelt before him and kissed his hand, with the earnest reverence I would feel for an honored parent. At once we glided into conversation, and were soon completely charmed by his genial manner so honest and truthful. He is an exceedingly handsome man, about sixty years old, we were told, although he appears much younger. His features are fine and his eyes beautiful. The expression of his mouth is indescribably sweet, and his smile possesses a magnetic charm which draws to him all hearts. Every word and look revealed the generous and sympathetic nature which, were it within his power, would gladly shield every human creature from sin, suffering, or sorrow.

"He spoke of our country, and its onward progress, with deep and warm interest, calling it the 'noble land of Washington.' The New World, he remarked, had always been very dear to him, for the early days of his life as a priest had been passed in Buenos Ayres, South America. Its vast pampas he had traversed, and crossed over the Andes to the Pacific shore of the continent. During his residence in Chili Pope Gregory had recalled him to Italy, and soon after named him Bishop of Imola. Oh! Mamma, it was a perfect enjoyment to listen to his description of those far-away lands, and of the sublime scenery of the lofty mountains whose summits are nearest heaven.

"We conversed at first in French and Spanish (English, the Pope said, he could never learn;) but fearing it might be some effort to his Holiness to speak them, I begged he would address me in Italian, which, although not so familiar to me as the other languages, I could understand exceedingly well. How glad I was afterwards this thought came to me, for his utterance of the Italian was

as soft and melodious as the strains of music, so rich, full, and sonorous. The orations of Cicero, and the verses of Virgil, were worthy of a language harmonious like this; for though the Italian is somewhat changed, it is still the daughter of the Latin, and has all the exquisite grace of expression and flowing elegance of the parent tongue.

"Then, the dear Pope dwelt with touching eloquence upon the goodness of God, which had so miraculously saved him from a terrible death, during the accident at the Convent of St. Agnese. He related to us the incidents of that frightful scene. Some catacombs had been recently discovered near the church, and his Holiness went to visit them, accompanied by a large suite of cardinals, bishops, and foreign Ambassadors. After they had explored the subterranean home of the dead, they proceeded to the convent near by. In a great, old room of the building, long unused, the monks had prepared a collation. The Pope was seated in an immense oaken chair, with a high back and enormous arms. Before he commenced partaking of the refreshments a number of boys from a neighboring school were brought in to receive his blessing. He had just given it to them, and had commanded the servants to bring him some of the delicacies to distribute among the children, when a fearful crash was heard and the floor sank into a vault below thirty feet deep. Shrieks of terror, and appalling cries of the wounded resounded through the convent. The crowd without, rushed along the corridors leading to the banquet room. The walls alone were standing. Far below there was a mass of rafters, and stones of the paved floor, and crushed and bleeding bodies. 'Save our Father! save his Holiness!' was the first thought animating the hearts of the throng around. Through the vaults below, they found their way to the scene of disaster, and removing tables, chairs, and mangled forms of men and children, at last they reached the great oaken chair, which had fallen over the Pope, and thereby preserved him from serious injury, perhaps from instant death. They raised it, and to their joy the good Pope was unhurt. His hands were clasped in prayer for the suffering creatures around him. He seemed to have no thought of himself.

"Oh! how frightful must have been your emotions, when you felt the floor sinking beneath you,' I exclaimed as I listened. He looked at me almost reproachfully, as he said, 'No, my daughter, I was calm; for in that fearful moment, I felt I was in the hands of a gracious God who would save me, if it were his divine will; but my heart was pierced with agony, as I heard the screams of the innocent children, and I thought of the poor mothers rendered desolate by this horrible accident; for I then believed many were killed, and that others would die of their wounds. However the result has proved less severe than I imagined, and, with the blessing of the Almighty, I trust all may recover.'

"The Pope asked O. her name, and she replied, 'Octavia;'

while I added, 'She bears my name, your Holiness, and I was called after the Roman Octavia, whose character my mother greatly admired.' Whereupon his Holiness uttered a most charming panegyric upon the character of my illustrious namesake, saying, 'You should be proud of that name, for the Roman Octavia possessed every virtue and grace which should adorn a woman. Even now, in Rome, you will find an undying remembrance of her noble and generous qualities, and many monuments to her memory.'

"Thank you a thousand times, Mamma, for giving me the name of *Octavia*.

"I wish I could repeat to you all the words the Pope said, they were so genial, sparkling with intellect, and warm with kindness. After one hour's interview, we bade him farewell. But ere we left him, he gave me his benediction. As I knelt before him, he placed his hand upon my head, saying, 'May the blessing of God descend upon you, and his Holy Spirit guide you into all truth; may God's providence protect you and yours, and bring you in peace to the world of the redeemed.' The tones of his voice were so solemn, so full of affectionate feeling, tears of gratitude burst from my eyes, as I eagerly, and with the utmost veneration, kissed the hands he extended to raise me up. Then I asked him to bless my child; and she, kneeling before him, likewise received his benediction and we withdrew. M. D., as well as your two Octavias, was deeply impressed with the honesty, the truth, and nobleness of the Supreme Pontiff, and with a sincere admiration of his kind manner and cordial reception of us.

"In the ante-chamber we met again Monsignore Talbot, an extremely intelligent man, who had spent some years travelling in the United States. He accompanied us to our carriage, and after a little pleasant conversation we drove away. It was a bewitching afternoon, and the grand colonnade of St. Peter's was bathed in a golden flood of the sun's parting rays. The fountains were joyously casting up their bright waters, and 'earth and air seemed in a holiday mood.'

"It is impossible for me to tell you, Mamma, how happy I was, thinking of the sweet visit to his Holiness, and looking upon the grandeur which encircled me. The blessing and the prayer of that saintly man will be forever precious to my soul, and dear to me as the memory of the loved and the lost.

"I will write soon to Bishop Portier, and tell him of the message from his Holiness which he charged me to deliver. It is very kind, and manifests how deep an interest the Pope feels in the spiritual welfare of his distant children.

"Octavia has been long asleep, and I am quite weary, for it is past the midnight; but I care not for the lateness of the hour. I have faithfully given my darling Mamma a picture of the scene, and a true history of the incidents of our interview; and I will now knock



at the 'golden gate of dreams,' first asking the good God to bless Mamma, and dear little Netta, for the sake of their loving

"OCTAVIA."

There are various other passages we would like to extract, but our space is exhausted. The volumes are a little gossipy, and we have given but a gossipy notice of them, yet the reader will find in them little to offend, and much to please him. They are the genuine outpourings of a fresh, unsophisticated heart of a true Southern lady, with whom one cannot help being charmed, if he would. They are light, sketchy, imaginative, yet contain a very large fund of information of one sort and another, and indicate a highly cultivated mind, that is not a stranger to serious thought, perhaps to sad feelings, and to solid studies. At any rate, they are two charming volumes, and we assure the author that since Hillard's *Six Months in Italy*, we have read no work of travels which has pleased us so much, or which we can so warmly recommend to lovers of light reading or polite literature. The few criticisms we have allowed ourselves, detract little from their merits, which are real.

ART. VI.—*The Eastern Question not yet settled. British India, &c.*

THE succession of events is so rapid, and the changes in the aspect of things are so frequent, that a Review published only once in three months cannot keep pace with them. When our July Review went to press, Lord Palmerston appeared everywhere in the ascendant, and France everywhere as overreached and compelled to second the policy of Great Britain, British preponderance everywhere established, and not likely soon to be disturbed. But hardly were our speculations on the subject published before news from British India rendered our speculations, for the moment at least, doubtful, if not false.

An English periodical has pleasantly remarked of us, that our strongest passion after love for our religion is hatred of England. But this proves that even English periodicals are not infallible. We do not hate England, indeed

hatred is not with us a very strong passion, and we are not aware of hating any nation or any individual. We like England as the land of our ancestors. We like the English people, and perhaps have more points of sympathy with them than with any other European people. But both as a Catholic and as a patriot, we do dislike English preponderance, and we would rather, for the best interests of mankind, see any other European nation supreme than Great Britain. This is because we are, rightly or wrongly, opposed, heart and soul, to the British industrial and mercantile system. We have been opposed to that system ever since we had a thought on the subject, and our opposition becomes stronger and more intense in proportion as we see more of its workings, especially in our own country. Wherever the influence of Great Britain is felt, the virtue and simplicity, the peace and happiness of the people depart, and a fierce, bitter, all-absorbing struggle for the goods of this world alone ensues. English influence has ruined Portugal, has prostrated Spain, embroiled Sardinia, demoralized, to a fearful extent, the greater part of Italy, and weakened France. It corrupts morals, weakens the hold of religion on the heart, and diffuses a degrading heathenism. Her literature, her philosophy, her religion, as well as her industry and commerce, tend to materialize the nations, and to produce the conviction that man lives for this world alone. She is of the earth earthy, and the grand Apostle of Carnal Judaism. We cannot, then, but dread her preponderance, and though we may admire her intense energy, we cannot but deplore its direction.

We regretted that the opposition to the British system had, in the late Eastern war, no better representative than Russia, but we believed that the interests of religion and humanity required the defeat of what we regarded then and regard now as an unprincipled combination against her. We regretted the Anglo-French alliance, and in the war we own we wished the defeat of the Allies, not because we had any hostile feeling to France, but because we believed their success would tend to confirm British supremacy, which in our view is worse for the world than would be that of Russia, as bad as that no doubt would be. We believed that Great Britain was the enemy from whom France had the most to dread, and that Russia or Austria was the ally the Emperor should have courted. The true interest of France is to

labor to isolate Great Britain from the continent, above all to prevent her from finding, as in times past, an ally in Austria and Central Europe. France now, no doubt, has a good understanding with Russia, which we are glad to see, but it has been purchased at the expense of an equally good understanding between those old allies, Austria and England. What is desirable is that France and Russia should so accommodate their respective interests to the legitimate interests of Austria as to detach her from her English alliance, and enable her to act in harmony with them ; for we regard English policy as alike hostile to every Continental State.

England depends for her rank as a first-class power on her Indian Empire, threatened by the Transcaucasian expansion of Russia and the African expansion of France. Her policy is, very properly, to guard against these two expansions ; Russia dominant in the Turkish and Persian courts, and France dominant in Egypt and Syria, with a ship canal across the Isthmus of Suez, the Indian Empire is not worth a life's purchase and British preponderance has ceased to exist. Finding the new emperor of the French ready to engage in a war to consolidate his throne and to force his recognition as legitimate sovereign of France by the monarchs of Europe, England enlisted him in a war against Russia, hoping through his aid to cripple the power of Russia, and check her farther advance towards India, nothing doubting that she would be able to keep him faithful to her policy, through her hold on the Revolutionists, and her power, if he became restive, to stir up a formidable Red Republican movement against him. The war was declared, and grew to more gigantic dimensions than were counted on ; Russia proved a more formidable enemy than had been anticipated, and though in fair fight, man to man, the Allies beat the Russians, they were able to do it only at a terrible loss to themselves. The Emperor of France having gained his objects in going into the war, and having secured the point of honor in the fall of Southern Sebastopol, succeeded in making peace, and in coming to a good understanding with Russia, before England had secured any of her own objects in the war. Russia had suffered, but she had neither been humbled nor effectually crippled, and as between France and England, the Peace of Paris, March

1856, was a French triumph. But the triumph was but for a moment. The settlement of the Danubian principalities was left to be effected by commissioners. France leaned to the Russian mode of settlement, which was opposed to the Austrian mode. This gave to England a chance to side with Austria, and in concert with her to check France and Russia at the court of Constantinople, and to reestablish the preponderance of British diplomacy in the councils of the Sublime Porte. She used her preponderance to defeat the projected canalization of the Isthmus of Suez, and to obtain from the Porte, with the guaranty of a six *per cent.* minimum on the cost, the concession of a railway along the valley of the Euphrates from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf, both measures directly in the teeth of the policy of France as well as of Russia. Her Indian government declared war against Persia, sent an army to invade the Persian dominions, and took possession of Bushire, on the gulf, which she yet holds, and will hold as long as she can. With the command of Aden, of the Persian Gulf, and through a friendly power of Herat, she seemed, when our last Review went to press, to have command of all the gates of India, and with a Red Republican revolution held *in terrorem* over the Emperor of the French, and through a good understanding with Austria, the predominance at Constantinople, to have checkmated both France and Russia, while through the interests of trade and the power of credit, she held the United States as her vassal. She seemed to have completely triumphed, and to hold the world at her feet.

But at this moment, when the only trouble she had on her hands was a trifling brush with four hundred millions of Chinese, in which she counted on the coöperation of France and the United States, the revolt in India came like a sudden clap of thunder to startle her from her dream of universal supremacy,—to threaten her with the loss of that very empire she had directed all her policy to defend, and to which she owed her rank as a first-class European power. It is impossible to judge, at this distance and with our imperfect information, of the magnitude or probable consequences of what is called the “Indian mutiny.” Its first effect has been a partial relaxation of her Constantinopolitan policy, and the partial ascendancy of French

and Russian diplomacy over the English and Austrian, which will be a complete ascendancy, if the troubles in India continue for any great length of time.

The British authority in India before the revolt, extended, directly or indirectly, over one hundred and fifty millions of souls. The British Indian army, of regular and irregular troops, distributed through the several presidencies and provinces, from the best information we can get, was not far from three hundred thousand, of which less than thirty thousand were Europeans. Of the native troops about one-third have mutinied, or been disbanded, and the greater part of the remainder, though reported loyal, we suppose cannot be relied on with entire confidence. The revolt, we take it, must be suppressed mainly by European troops. Of these, counting the forces intended to operate against China, but countermanded to India, about fifty thousand, all the available forces England has to spare, have been despatched, and may reach their destination in the early part of November. Our own impression is, that these, with the European troops already in India, will be sufficient to defeat the revolt wherever it makes a stand, but not to render the future possession of India secure and peaceful. We think that the Indian Empire, though retained, will hereafter be a source of weakness rather than of strength to England, and that she will find it henceforth difficult to maintain that supremacy at which she has aimed. Obligated at the moment to abandon Austria, and no longer able to play off Russia against France or France against Russia, she will find herself in the presence of these great powers relatively weakened, and unable to prevent them from carrying out both a European and an Oriental policy hostile to hers.

The press of this city, conducted to a great extent by British subjects, or by men who were born and bred British subjects, and have British rather than American sympathies, is very generally desirous that England should maintain her Indian Empire, and the *Herald*, owned and edited by a "canny Scot," has gone so far as to recommend recruiting the British army in this country, and to propose that in case of need our government should assist England in reconquering India. This only proves that, if we are ever to emerge from our colonial dependence, and to be in spirit

and feeling an independent nation, Great Britain must lose her present rank, and cease to be at the head of the industrial and mercantile system of the world. We are, perhaps, less independent of England than we were in our colonial days. Our mercantile interest is strictly united to hers, and depends on her prosperity ; our planting interests, and latterly even our agricultural interests in general have become dependent on her maintaining her preponderance. The United States are little else than an English farm, and our trade a branch of the English house. Any thing that gives us the possession of our own farm, and the control of our own trade, we should regard as a real blessing to the country. We prefer national independence, with poverty and hard labor, to national slavery to a foreign power or to foreign interests, even with wealth, luxury, and idleness to gild it. Our patriotism revolts at the idea of being the tenant of England, or any other foreign nation. It revolts equally at the idea of having our country governed by men who would sacrifice national dignity, national welfare, and the real interests of the human race to a bale of cotton, a hogshhead of tobacco, a bag of rice, or a box of merchandise. A nation so governed must always be mean and contemptible, and can never be a nation of men, of high-souled, chivalric freemen. Our government now and then, to save appearances, makes a bluster and uses big words, but is really afraid to say its soul is its own before the British government, and seldom fails to conform to its wishes. Yet these Anglo-American newspapers and our Anglo-American administration, professing an anti-English, but always pursuing an English policy, do not represent the real American feeling ; they represent only certain classes and interests. The real American sentiment would not be pained to see England lose her Indian Empire, and reduced to a second rate power. Unhappily this sentiment is smothered, and hardly finds an organ for its expression.

India is one of England's best markets ; deprived of India she can buy less of us ; we then can sell less to her, and buy less of her. No doubt of all that, and for a time our trade would suffer, as well as that of Great Britain, by her loss of her Indian Empire, though not to an equal extent. But there are things of greater value to a nation than trade. No nation is really enriched by trade.

Trade accumulates luxuries, but luxuries impoverish, not enrich a people. All real wealth is in ~~land and labor~~, and that nation is richest in which labor can the easiest obtain from the land the means of subsistence and comfort. The land is with us vastly more burdened than it was fifty years ago, and hence it is far harder for the laborer to maintain his independence. Land and labor have to sustain with us a lavish expenditure, a luxury and extravagance that tax their energies far beyond their present capacity, since our indebtedness, our drafts on the future, must be counted by hundreds, if not by thousands of millions. All credit is a draft on the future, and the amount of a nation's indebtedness is the excess of its expenditures over its income. The actual addition to our productive capital in any one year does not equal the indebtedness we contract during that year, and hence with all our trade and industry we rather grow poorer than richer, and the difficulty of living becomes greater. The fact of this difficulty every poor man feels, and feels notwithstanding the new lands opened to cultivation, and the immense additions made every year to our wealth by the immigration of hardy, healthy, able-bodied, adult laborers, men and women. The reason of this is the fact, that by the modern system of trade and commerce, we increase the burdens of land and labor. Let China engage in trade with the energy and enterprise displayed by Great Britain, and she would soon find herself unable to support her four hundred millions of inhabitants, and the want and wretchedness of her population would be increased a hundred-fold ; for the additional burden it would impose on land and labor would be expended in luxuries, and worse than a dead loss to the nation. During the last thirty years the population of this State has more than doubled, and yet during that time the rural population has been steadily decreasing. Suppose the same to be the case throughout the Union, which I presume it is not as yet, it would be easy to see the increased burden imposed on land and labor, in having more than double the number to support out of their earnings. The evil that weighs us down is in the immense numbers of non-producers land and labor have to support, and to a great extent in luxury and extravagance.

We know that we do not follow Adam Smith nor any

of the political economists, though it is possible that we have studied him and them as much as most men have. They are right enough from their point of view and in their narrow sphere, but the system they defend, when carried into practice, and made the rule of national policy, is about as absurd and mischievous a system as the devil ever assisted the human mind to invent. If all the modern political economies had been strangled in their birth, it would have been a blessed thing for the human race. We know there are few at present to agree with us, and the leading minds of the age and country, if they notice us at all, will set down what we are saying to our ignorance, our eccentricity, or our love of paradox. Be it so. That will not make what we say less true, or prove the wisdom of those who regard commerce as the pioneer of Christianity, and the merchant who does his best to master or circumvent un-Christianized nations for the purposes of gain, as the most successful Christian missionary. But, believing, as we do, the modern industrial and mercantile system the greatest curse of the times, we of course cannot regret as untoward any of those events which tend to break it up. We cannot very bitterly lament the disturbances in British India, and should not grieve immoderately were Great Britain to lose all her foreign possessions, and be confined to her own sea-girt islands, because with her fall must fall, or be greatly modified, that system which now enslaves or cripples all nations, and ruins innumerable souls. We should regret, therefore, to see England recruiting her Indian army on our soil, or aided by American sympathy to preserve her East Indian possessions. If with her own unaided strength she can suppress the revolt, let her do it; let no one try to hinder her, but let no one offer her assistance.

We cannot discover that the English have contributed any thing to the well-being of India. India was wealthier, the land was better cultivated, and the people were less oppressed under Mahometan than they have been under British rule. Unless all the accounts we have been able to get of India, even through British sources, are totally false, India has greatly suffered by coming under British dominion. The English have broken down the Indian manufactures for the benefit of Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham. They have suffered agriculture to decline, large



districts of territory to become depopulated and waste ; and have oppressed to the last degree the unhappy ryots or cultivators of the soil. Under their rule, it appears that out of the twenty dollars a year, the most the miserable ryot can obtain from his holding, eighteen go to the Company and its agents, European or native. Whole districts suffer frequently from famine, and deaths by want, by starvation, may be counted by millions. I cannot find that for this horrible oppression and suffering, England has given any compensating advantages. She has done nothing to bring them within the pale of European civilization,—nothing to Christianize them, or to elevate them in the scale of moral beings. As far as the accounts we have seen can be relied on, English rule has been an unmixed evil to the great mass of the Hindoo population. Let who will govern India, she cannot be worse governed than she has been by the British East India Company. For the sake of India herself, we can see no reason why it is desirable that she should continue under Great Britain,—a nation that has had, since the Reformation, no mission either to Christianize or to civilize any barbaric nation. She has bravery, energy, enterprise, mechanical skill, but she has no heart, no power to work on the nobler elements of the human soul. Her touch, as a government, is pollution, her embrace is death.

In common with others, we are of course shocked at the atrocities of the Hindoo mutineers, their cruelty, their horrible barbarities towards the unfortunate Europeans, men, women, and children, who fall into their hands. But they are only wreaking a terrible vengeance on their oppressors, and the English are only reaping the fruits of their century of bad faith, misrule, oppression, and torture. Let any man read the authentic and proved accounts of the various tortures to which the unhappy ryots have been subjected by the agents of the Company, to wring out from famished poverty the rupee it has not—tortures of the most painful and revolting kind, inflicted on Hindoo women as well as men, and he will see in the atrocities over which he shudders only an infliction on the English of a small portion of that barbarism which they have themselves practised or suffered to be practised upon the helpless natives. Great Britain professes to be a Christian nation, and must

be judged by a Christian standard. So judged, her own conduct in India has been more atrocious than that of the natives. Whoever reads the calls for vengeance on the natives, and threats of vengeance held out in the *London Times*, and other English journals, can hardly fail to regard the *Christian-Englishman* as a greater barbarian than the pagan Hindoo. We can conceive nothing worse than for a hundred and fifty millions of human souls to be subjected to the absolute domination of a trading company, or to be governed by the trading interests of a foreign nation, and while we lament the horrible fate of the innocent victims of Indian hate and vengeance, we cannot but think that if the Hindoos were Englishmen, the atrocities over which we shudder would be still greater. England in India is not England in Europe.

If the question of right had not in our trafficking age grown obsolete, we might demand by what right the English hold India, or wherefore they dispute the authority of the Emperor of Delhi, the heir of the Mogul, in whose name the British East India Company have always, unless a change has very recently taken place, professed to govern India. The company gained its foothold in India, as a trading company under the sanction of the Emperor of India, whose authority it acknowledged; and it was in his name that it interfered in political affairs, and exercised political power. It has no rights in India, but those acquired from the emperor, except such as it may have acquired by fraud and violence. Having abused its rights, the descendant of the Mogul Emperor has, as against the British, the right, if able, to expel them from the country, and to resume the exercise of his authority, usurped and abused by a trading company. A trading company can have no rights of sovereignty, and Great Britain, though she has exercised, has never formally claimed the sovereignty of India. That sovereignty has remained, technically, where it was, in the puppet maintained at Delhi. If that puppet chooses to be a puppet no longer, but henceforth to act the part of a real sovereign, what right has the company, or even Great Britain, to object, or to call his assertion of his rights and the summoning of his subjects to his support, a mutiny, or a revolt?

The rights, whatever they may be, that a Christian na-

tion or a civilized nation may have over a barbarous nation, Great Britain cannot plead, for she has proved herself in relation to Hindostan neither the one nor the other. She has been simply a trading company, in relation to Hindostan, simply an invader, and the Hindoos have a perfect right, by all laws, human and divine, to expel her from their territory, if they can. The right and the law is clearly on their side, and Great Britain has not even the shadow of a right against them.

But it is not to be expected that considerations of this kind will have any weight. Modern nations regard right only in so far as it is coincident with their ambition, or their view of their own interest. Great Britain will not withdraw from India ; she will maintain herself there as long as she can, and she will put forth all her energy to suppress what she is pleased to call "the mutiny of the Sepoys." If all her neighbors remain quiet, if no one among them seizes the opportunity to settle some old score, she will, we doubt not, succeed, and wreak a vengeance on the unhappy Hindoos that will establish her character for cruelty and barbarity down to the end of the world. Yet if the so-called mutineers can prolong the struggle for a twelvemonth from this date, the position of England will have greatly changed in Europe and America. She will find herself embarrassed on all sides, and obliged to use a less haughty tone than has for some time been her wont. Yet when we consider the wonderful vitality of England, and the power through the industrial and mercantile system she exerts over all nations and nearly all individuals, we shall not be surprised to see her emerge from her present difficulties stronger and more imperious than ever. The world with its present passions and interests, knows not how to dispense with the modern industrial and mercantile system, ruinous to the real virtue and happiness of the people as it may be. It is the reigning order, and even they who dislike it cannot live without it, and are obliged to conform to it. The world, which does not and cannot appreciate the superiority of the spiritual to the temporal, nor take any very broad and comprehensive views even of the temporal, cannot spare Great Britain, or suffer her to be eclipsed. Her downfall would carry with it the downfall of the whole credit and funding system, that ingenious device for taxing

posterity for the benefit of the present generation. Stock gambling would fall, the whole system of fictitious wealth would disappear, and the greater part of modern shams and illusions. The downfall of Great Britain would produce a universal convulsion, and produce effects of hardly less magnitude than the downfall of ancient Rome. The emancipated nations would not know how to use their newly recovered liberties. The keystone would be struck from the arch of the modern world. The crash some day must come, but no nation is ready for it, and the nations most hostile to Great Britain, will rather labor to sustain her in order to prevent the catastrophe, than to hasten her downfall. Trade as yet is sovereign, and as commerce is likely for some time to come to be substituted for religion, and the trader for the Christian missionary. It would be exceedingly imprudent to hazard a prediction that the power of England has culminated. The devil will not readily let go the grip he has through the system we condemn on the modern world. Great Britain represents the City of the World, as Rome represents the City of God, and as the complete triumph of the City of God will not take place before the Last Day, we can hardly believe that Great Britain will experience any serious reverses, and we shall not be surprised to find even her enemies uniting to guaranty her a new lease of power. Whoever studies England thoroughly will discover in her few seeds of decay; she has a young vigor, and is at present the most living nation, to all appearances, on the globe, with the exceptions, if exceptions they are, of Russia and our own country. We confess to having misjudged her, and we think very differently of her vitality and power from what we did before the Russian war. She will fall one day, but she will bring down the whole City of the World with her when she does.

In the mean time we hope our government will avail itself of the present opportunity to settle in a just and honorable way the Central American questions, and to assert and secure our national independence. We do not believe in taking advantage of a nation's embarrassments to wring from it hard or unjust terms, and however low Great Britain might fall, we should regret to see any thing more than strict justice insisted upon by our government; but as justice cannot be obtained from her in her prosperity, we

